Speaking at the first National Rifle Association (NRA) Annual Meeting following his 2016 presidential election victory, Donald Trump told the raucous crowd, “You came through for me, and I am going to come through for you.” The NRA itself not only contributed over $30 million in support of Trump’s campaign, but exit polling reflected that voters in households with guns voted for Trump at rates that exceeded virtually all demographic divides other than party identification. The only state in which Trump failed to win a majority of gun-owning households was Vermont. This support was seen by many experts, myself included, as crucial to Trump’s surprise victory that year. And while enthusiasm for Trump among gun owners and the NRA was notably high and impactful in 2016, the general trend wasn’t new, as the organization has shaped gun ownership aligned with and to the benefit of the Republican Party.
But have times changed? In many ways, yes. First, as some observers of the news may already know, the NRA has more recently been weakened financially and distracted legally. The organization faced a serious legal challenge from the State of New York that led to the departure of its long-time leader, Wayne LaPierre. It has engaged in costly infighting with former leaders and its longtime PR firm. It has also seen declining membership and revenue. The NRA was already weakened organizationally in 2020, when Trump lost the presidential election, and remains so today. While other gun rights groups, like the Firearms Policy Coalition, have grown at the NRA’s expense, the organizational support behind the gun rights movement isn’t as strong as in the past and is certainly more fragmented, which may impact the election to the benefit of Democrats.
The gun violence prevention movement, on the other hand, is in a stronger position than in the past. Gone are the days when guns were perceived by national Democratic candidates as a losing issue. In the past, Democratic candidates often shied away from it; during his two successful presidential campaigns, for example, Barack Obama—although supportive of gun regulation—chose not to emphasize the issue, apparently due to a belief that making it more salient would benefit his opponents.
As a result of this imbalance in commitment, issue salience, and participation, politicians who favored gun rights were eager to advance their cause while those who supported gun regulation saw the issue as a potential political loser—something that would lose them more votes than it would gain them.
Why was this case? For a long time, a majority of Americans supported various forms of gun regulation but were much less mobilized on the issue than the minority of Americans who opposed it. In other words, while most Americans were in favor of stricter rules on guns, those who opposed them—mobilized by the gun rights movement—were much more likely to vote based on this issue and to engage in nonvoting forms of political participation, like writing their representatives in Congress. As a result of this imbalance in commitment, issue salience, and participation, politicians who favored gun rights were eager to advance their cause while those who supported gun regulation saw the issue as a potential political loser—something that would lose them more votes than it would gain them.
Now, however, candidates appear more willing and eager to highlight their support of gun regulation. The issue was featured, for example, at this year’s Democratic National Convention and has become much more of a focal point in campaigns. Whereas Democratic candidates used to hope to appease the NRA—or at least avoid its wrath—many now wear “F” ratings from the organization as badges of honor.
There are a few reasons for this change. One is the aforementioned decline of the NRA, which is no longer the mobilizing force it used to be. Moreover, the gun rights movement has become gradually more intertwined with the GOP and more extreme in its stances and rhetoric. While its status within the GOP coalition has produced some clear wins for the organization—seen in the liberalization of state-level gun policies and the emergence of progun jurisprudence—it has also produced openings for gun regulation advocates. For one thing, voter perception of the rhetoric of progun activists as more radical has made it harder for them to appeal to voters who don’t share such views. This includes gun owners with moderate views, who Vice President Harris has seemingly tried to appeal to during recent public appearances in which she has touted her own status as a gun owner—saying she’d be willing to shoot a home intruder—while nonetheless re-emphasizing her support for stricter regulations.
Moreover, whereas the NRA used to support a non-negligible number of gun-friendly Democrats, its fate is now linked more solely to the success of the GOP, and it has shifted away from providing support to virtually any Democratic candidates. Democrats may thus be left with little reason to try to appease the organization.
The difference now is that the gun debate is much more organizationally balanced, with a more robust gun violence prevention and an accordant set of gun regulation activists and voters who are more willing to engage in related political action based on their views.
Another major factor is the rise of a much stronger, robustly resourced, and more organized movement on behalf of gun regulation. The horrific shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School helped spur the development of a new set of well-funded and strategically sound interest groups, such as Everytown for Gun Safety and Giffords, that are active on behalf of gun regulation. In conjunction with additional mass shootings and a backlash against progun policies that some see as having gone too far, the gun violence prevention movement has become increasingly effective at mobilizing its supporters. In contrast to the past, gun regulation supporters now (by at least some measures) actually out-participate those on the other side of the issue. This shift contributed to the passage of the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act of 2022, which was the first new federal-level gun law in decades. There also may well be consequences for the electoral dynamics surrounding guns.
Having said all this, there remains a strong and active progun constituency who will likely rally for Donald Trump this fall. The difference now is that the gun debate is much more organizationally balanced, with a more robust gun violence prevention and an accordant set of gun regulation activists and voters who are more willing to engage in related political action based on their views.
One open question pertains to how new gun owners will vote. Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the racial justice protests of 2020, and the political turmoil surrounding the last presidential election, gun purchases spiked, with many first-time gun buyers coming from demographic groups—including women, Hispanic, and Black Americans—not typically associated with the gun rights movement. Will these new gun owners adopt the views of gun rights supporters and approach the election through the lens of gun ownership? Or will they introduce more political variation within the gun-owning community? Democrats, for their part, seem to be trying to appeal to such voters, with Harris commenting earlier this year that “It is a false choice to suggest you are either in favor of the Second Amendment or you want to take everyone’s guns away.”
In any case, the electoral dynamics of gun issues and related stakeholders have shifted since 2016, when the gun rights movement helped carry Donald Trump into office. The effects of this shift on November’s election may be consequential not only for who takes office in January but also on what happens to gun policy moving forward.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Matthew Lacombe is the Alexander Lamis associate professor of American politics at Case Western Reserve University and an affiliate scholar with the Regional Gun Violence Research Consortium