

"I'll see you on National T.V!"

Creating hit lists

"All I want to do is kill and injure as many of you pricks as I can"

"I'm going to be the next school shooter."

Suicidal ideation

SISMS

Sharing Information to
Stop Mass Shootings

"I see you in hell."

"I am Death."

Social isolation

Sadness/depression

Final Report

Aggressive and violent behavior

June 2026

Paranoia/delusional thinking

Researching other mass shooters

Trouble in school/work

"If I don't survive the attack, goodbye, god bless and I hope to see some of you in Valhalla!"

Gathering weapons

"Tomorrow. Watch the news."

"Forgive me for what I'm going to do..."

Rockefeller Institute of Government

Regional Gun Violence Research Consortium

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Executive Summary

This report examines 171 mass public shootings in the United States between 1999 and 2024 involving 175 perpetrators with identifiable pre-attack warning behaviors and communications. Using the Path to Intended Violence framework, the findings highlight consistent patterns in perpetrators' experiences, behaviors, and communications prior to the attacks. The findings are intended to support efforts to identify, interpret, and respond to warning signs prior to acts of targeted violence.

Key Findings


- **Mass public shootings occur across a wide range of locations and contexts.**
Incidents were most common in workplaces (25.1%) and schools (24.6%), though they occurred across 39 states and the District of Columbia and at all times of day and week.
These patterns reinforce the need for prevention efforts that extend across multiple settings and communities.
- **Perpetrators often experience multiple, overlapping stressors.**
Mental health concerns (64.6%), job-related difficulties (51.4%), and family-related problems (50.3%) were among the most common. On average, perpetrators experienced about five different stressors, indicating that challenges rarely occurred in isolation.
This underscores the importance of recognizing cumulative stressors rather than focusing on any single issue.
- **Many perpetrators have prior contact with law enforcement.**
Nearly two-thirds (64.0%) had prior interactions with law enforcement, including for both violent and nonviolent behaviors.
These prior contacts may represent opportunities for earlier intervention.
- **Firearms are most commonly obtained through legal channels.**
Among cases where acquisition could be determined, the most common source was purchase from a federal firearms licensee (59.6%), followed by access within the home.
This highlights the importance of considering multiple points of access in prevention strategies.
- **Planning behaviors vary widely in duration and scope.**
When identifiable, planning ranged from same-day attacks to preparation over several years. On average, perpetrators spent approximately 10 months planning their attacks.
This variability suggests that opportunities for intervention may exist across different timelines.

- **Leakage is common and often communicated to others.**
 A majority of perpetrators (85.7%) engaged in leakage, or the communication of violent thoughts or intentions, prior to the attack, most often through direct, in-person interactions.
This finding highlights the critical role of bystanders in recognizing and responding to warning signs.
- **Leakage is frequently observed by individuals within perpetrators' social networks.**
 Friends, family members, and coworkers were among the most common observers, and in many cases, leakage was known across more than one type of observer.
These patterns suggest that relevant information may be distributed across multiple individuals.
- **Leakage content frequently centers on violence and harm.**
 More than half of perpetrators referenced violence or death (55.4%), with many also discussing killing others (48.6%), suicide or self-harm (41.1%), or mass shooting-specific violence (40.0%).
These themes may serve as important indicators of escalating risk.
- **Threats are commonly embedded within leakage.**
 Nearly two-thirds of perpetrators (64.6%) made at least one type of threat, most often direct threats.
Understanding different forms of threats can support more effective identification and response.
- **Perpetrators often exhibit multiple concerning behaviors.**
 Indicators such as emotional distress, impulsivity, risky behavior, and social withdrawal frequently co-occurred, with individuals demonstrating an average of more than six concerning behaviors.
These findings emphasize the importance of recognizing patterns of behavior rather than isolated actions.

Across these findings, a consistent pattern emerges: warning signs often are present, observable, and distributed across multiple individuals and systems prior to an attack. These results highlight the importance of recognizing patterns of behavior and communication over time, as well as the critical role of information sharing in preventing acts of mass violence. They also underscore the value of training efforts that support bystanders and community members in identifying and responding to concerning behaviors and communications.

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Sharing Information to Stop Mass Shootings (SISMS)

Introduction

Mass public shootings continue to occur in the United States, often generating significant public attention and concern. These incidents frequently are perceived as sudden and unpredictable, reinforcing the belief that they occur without warning. However, a growing body of research suggests that, in many cases, perpetrators exhibit warning signs prior to the attack.^{1, 2, 3}

Defining Mass Shootings

There is no single, universally accepted definition of a “mass shooting,” and researchers and organizations often operationalize these events differently based on factors such as the number of victims, location, and motivation. These variations can result in differences in which incidents are included in analyses and how findings are interpreted across studies. To ensure clarity and consistency, this report adopts the following definition of a mass public shooting:

[A]n incident of targeted violence carried out by one or more shooters at one or more public or populated locations. Multiple victims (both injuries and fatalities) are associated with the attack, and both the victims and location(s) are chosen either at random or for their symbolic value. The event occurs within a single 24-hour period, though most attacks typically last only a few minutes. The motivation of the shooting must not correlate with gang violence or targeted militant or terroristic activity.⁴

These warning signs can take many forms, including changes in behavior,⁵ expressions of distress,⁶ and communications that signal intent.⁷ In some instances, these indicators are observed by others, such as friends, family members, coworkers, or members of the broader community.^{8, 9} Despite this, opportunities for intervention may be missed when these behaviors and communications are not recognized, interpreted as concerning, or shared with others who may be able to respond.

In many cases, no single warning sign is sufficient on its own to indicate an imminent threat. Instead, risk may become more apparent when multiple behaviors and communications are considered together.¹⁰ This underscores the importance of not only recognizing individual indicators but also understanding how they may combine and escalate over time. It also highlights the need for effective communication and information sharing across individuals and systems.


The Sharing Information to Stop Mass Shootings (SISMS) project was developed to better understand how information about pre-attack warning signs is generated, observed, and shared prior to acts of mass violence. By examining patterns in perpetrators' behaviors and communications, the project seeks to identify opportunities to improve recognition, reporting, and response to potential threats.

This report presents findings from an analysis of 171 mass public shootings in the United States between 1999 and 2024 involving 175 perpetrators with identifiable pre-attack warning behaviors and communications. The findings focus on perpetrators' experiences, behaviors, and communications leading up to the attack, with particular attention to how these indicators emerge and co-occur over time. Additional details on the data sources, coding procedures, and analytic approach are provided in [Appendix A](#). Additional analyses comparing SISMS cases to the broader population of mass public shootings during the same period are presented in [Appendix B](#).

Analytic Framework: The Path to Intended Violence

The Path to Intended Violence model was developed by Calhoun and Weston to conceptualize the progression toward targeted violence.¹¹ Grounded in findings from the US Secret Service's Exceptional Case Study Project¹² and subsequent research on school shootings, the model emphasizes that acts of violence are rarely spontaneous. Instead, they emerge through a series of identifiable behaviors and experiences that unfold over time. By focusing on what individuals do, rather than attempting to profile who they are, the framework provides a structured way to understand how risk develops and where opportunities for intervention may exist.

The Path to Intended Violence Model



SOURCE: Adapted from Calhoun and Weston, *Contemporary Threat Management*. See also Stephen White and J. Reid Meloy, "Threat Assessments 101: Understanding the Red Flags of Workplace Violence," webinar, uploaded September 20, 2017, Vimeo video, <https://vimeo.com/234743780>.

The model describes a set of stages that individuals may move through on the pathway toward violence. Although often presented sequentially, progression along the pathway is neither linear nor uniform. Individuals may spend varying amounts of time in different stages, move back and forth between them, experience multiple stages simultaneously, or skip stages altogether. Importantly, the pathway is dynamic, and intervention at any point may disrupt or de-escalate movement toward violence.

The **grievance** stage reflects the individual's perception that they have been wronged or treated unjustly. These grievances may be real or perceived and can stem from a variety of sources, including interpersonal conflict, workplace or school-related issues, or broader ideological concerns. While grievances are common in everyday life, individuals on the pathway to violence often fixate on these experiences and are unable to move past them.

The **ideation** stage involves the development of thoughts about using violence to address or resolve the grievance. During this stage, individuals may fantasize about harming others, identify with past perpetrators, or become increasingly preoccupied with violent ideas.

The **research and planning** stage is characterized by efforts to determine how an attack will be carried out. Individuals may gather information about targets, explore different methods, or consider logistical details such as timing and location. Many of these behaviors are observable and may raise concern among those who encounter them.

The **preparation** stage involves actions taken to ready for the attack. This may include acquiring weapons, stockpiling ammunition, or engaging in other preparatory behaviors such as practicing with weapons, creating legacy materials, or making final arrangements. As with earlier stages, these behaviors may be visible to others.

The **breach** or **probing** stage reflects attempts to test or gain access to the intended target or location. Individuals may conduct dry runs, assess security measures, or otherwise attempt to determine how the attack will be executed. At this stage, the attack is often imminent, though not inevitable.

The final stage is the **attack**, during which the individual implements their plan. Although not all individuals who progress along the pathway will ultimately carry out an attack, the presence of behaviors associated with later stages indicates an increased level of risk.

Leakage, defined as the communication of an individual's thoughts, intentions, or plans to a third party, can occur at any point along the pathway. These communications may take many forms, including verbal statements, written materials, or online posts. Since leakage is not confined to a single stage, it represents a critical cross-cutting behavior that may provide opportunities for recognition and intervention across the pathway.

The Path to Intended Violence model has been widely applied in case studies of individual perpetrators and high-profile incidents.^{13, 14, 15, 16} In contrast, the present study applies the framework across a large sample of mass public shootings to examine patterns in behaviors and communications at each stage. This approach allows for a broader understanding of how warning signs manifest across cases, rather than focusing on a single trajectory, and provides insight into commonalities that may inform prevention efforts.

Overview of the Shootings


The research team identified 370 mass public shootings that occurred between 1999 and 2024. Of these, 171 were identified as having pre-attack warning behaviors and communications present;¹⁷ these incidents were the focus of the present study. Nearly every incident (n = 167, 97.7%) was carried out by a single offender. The remaining four events were carried out by offender dyads (pairs of perpetrators).

This report presents the findings of the analyses of the 171 shootings that were included in the present study. [Appendix B](#) presents a comparison of the findings relative to the events and perpetrator demographics between the SISMS cases and the full set of mass public shootings from 1999 to 2024.¹⁸


Timing

Across the period of analysis, mass public shootings occurred every year. The greatest number of incidents (n = 13) occurred in 2018, while 2000 and 2004 had the lowest number of incidents, with one each. Related to timing, incidents occurred every day of the week, occurring most frequently on Wednesdays (n = 32, 18.7%) and least commonly on Sundays (n = 16, 9.4%). Similarly, incidents were distributed throughout the day, with the greatest number of incidents beginning during the 10:00 a.m. to 10:59 a.m. interval (n = 23, 13.5%) based on local time. They were least likely to occur in the earliest morning hours.


Mass Public Shootings by Year



Mass Public Shootings by Day of Week



Mass Public Shootings by Hour



Locations


The 171 incidents that occurred between 1999 and 2024 impacted 38 states and the District of Columbia. California had the greatest number of incidents (n = 21, 12.3%), followed by Florida (n = 11, 6.4%). These counts generally align with the relative population sizes of these states. Seven states (4.1%) experienced just one mass public shooting incident during the 25-year study period.

The two most common location types where the incidents occurred were workplaces (n = 43, 25.1%) and schools (n = 42, 24.6%). This aligns with previous research that finds that perpetrators of mass shootings often choose locations where they are comfortable and have or currently spend a majority of their time, as they will be familiar with the patterns of traffic, layouts, security, and other factors related to the space.¹⁹ The “Other Location” category included places such as medical facilities (n = 6, 3.5%), health and wellness (n = 5, 2.9%), transportation and infrastructure (n = 4, 2.3%), law offices (non-workplace; n = 3, 1.8%), and a hotel (n = 1, 0.6%).

Distribution of Mass Public Shooting Incidents by State

State	N	State	N
California	21	Minnesota	3
Florida	11	Missouri	3
Ohio	9	Mississippi	3
Pennsylvania	9	Nebraska	3
Texas	9	Nevada	3
Colorado	8	Alabama	2
Wisconsin	8	Idaho	2
Washington	7	Kansas	2
New York	6	New Jersey	2
Arizona	5	New Mexico	2
Georgia	5	North Carolina	2
Illinois	5	Oklahoma	2
Oregon	5	South Carolina	2
Virginia	5	Arkansas	1
Michigan	4	Connecticut	1
Tennessee	4	District of Columbia	1
Indiana	3	Hawaii	1
Kentucky	3	Iowa	1
Louisiana	3	Maine	1
Maryland	3	Utah	1

Distribution of Mass Public Shootings by Location Type




Incident Resolutions

In a majority of the incidents ($n = 95$, 54.2%), the shooting ended due to the actions of the perpetrator, either by suicide ($n = 62$, 35.4%), surrendering to law enforcement ($n = 10$, 5.7%), or fleeing the scene and being apprehended or dying by suicide later ($n = 23$, 13.1%). When law enforcement intervened to bring the incident to an end, use of lethal force ($n = 35$, 20.0%) was only slightly more common than using nonlethal means ($n = 25$, 14.3%). Conversely, civilians were four times as likely to use nonlethal tactics ($n = 16$, 9.1%) as lethal means ($n = 4$, 2.3%). Across all resolution methods, 96 perpetrators (54.9%) died in the incident while the remaining 79 survived (45.1%).

Incident Resolution by Method

Resolution Method	N	%
Died by Suicide—Before Police Arrived	31	17.7
Died by Suicide—After Police Arrived	31	17.7
Police Interdiction—Lethal	35	20.0
Police Interdiction—Nonlethal	25	14.3
Civilian Interdiction—Lethal	4	2.3
Civilian Interdiction—Nonlethal	16	9.1
Surrender at Scene	10	5.7
Fled Scene	23	13.1

Perpetrator Outcomes



Casualties

Across the 171 incidents, there were a total of 1,991 casualties, defined here as both fatalities and nonfatal injuries. Of these, 734 (36.9%) were fatalities, with the majority of victims dying at the scene rather than later at or en route to the hospital. The remaining 1,257 (63.1%) casualties were due to nonfatal injuries, with victims with gunshots accounting for 74.4% of these.

Casualty Information

Casualty Type	N
All Fatalities	734
On Scene	639
Died Later	95
All Injuries	1,257
Gunshot Injuries	935

Overview of the Perpetrators


In the 171 incidents included in the present study, there were 175 perpetrators. Most incidents involved solo perpetrators ($n = 167, 97.7\%$), though four (2.3%) involved offender pairs.

Demographics


The majority of perpetrators in the sample ($n = 166, 94.9\%$) were male. Seven perpetrators (4.0%) were identified as members of the LGBTQIA+ community. The perpetrators in the sample ranged from 12 to 88 years of age. The average age was 32.9 years, while the median age was 29 years.

More than half of the perpetrators in the sample were white ($n = 109, 62.3\%$), with nearly one in five identifying as Black ($n = 32, 18.3\%$). Lower frequencies were observed across other racial and ethnic groups, including Hispanic, Asian, and Native American individuals, as well as those identified as Middle Eastern or as biracial or multiracial. Relative to the general US population, Black perpetrators appeared overrepresented in the sample, while white and Hispanic perpetrators appeared underrepresented; however, these descriptive comparisons should be interpreted cautiously and do not account for broader structural or contextual factors.

Distribution of Perpetrator Ages



Distribution of Perpetrator Races/Ethnicities



NOTE: Race and ethnicity classifications were based on available official records and media reporting and were coded into mutually exclusive categories. Individuals explicitly identified as Latino/a were coded within the Hispanic category rather than another racial or ethnic classification.

Employment

Occupation status was able to be identified for nearly all ($n = 167$, 95.4%) of the perpetrators. Nearly one-third of perpetrators ($n = 57$, 32.6%) were unemployed at the time of the incident, with three others (1.7%) being retired. One in five perpetrators ($n = 36$, 20.6%) were students in either K-12 or higher education at the time of their attacks.

The remaining 71 (40.6%) perpetrators were employed in a range of positions and fields, including, but not limited to, automotive, education, retail, healthcare, military, food services, and maintenance and repair.

Criminal Histories

Whether perpetrators had a criminal history (i.e., a conviction or alternative, such as a diversion program) could be determined for 100 (57.1%) of the perpetrators. Of these individuals, 52 (29.7%) had a verifiable criminal history. The remaining 48 (27.4%) had confirmatory evidence of no criminal history.

Prior Law Enforcement Contact

In addition to criminal history, prior contact with law enforcement also was captured. Of the 175 perpetrators, 112 (64.0%) had prior contact with local, state, and/or federal

authorities. Contact with law enforcement related to both violent and nonviolent activities was identified.

Violent offenses for which police contact was made included, but were not limited to:

- Assault (including domestic violence)
- Suspicion of murder
- Rape
- Terroristic threats

Other offenses resulting in contact with law enforcement included:

- Crimes against persons (e.g., harassment, kidnapping)
- Drug- and/or alcohol-related offenses (e.g., underage drinking, possession of drugs and/or paraphernalia, distribution to minors)
- Property crimes (e.g., theft, burglary, property destruction, hit-and-run)
- Weapons offenses (e.g., unlawful possession)
- Conduct crimes (e.g., disorderly conduct, menacing, trespassing, noise complaints)
- Traffic crimes (e.g., speeding, driving while intoxicated)

In addition to investigations related to violent and nonviolent crimes, law enforcement also had contact with perpetrators prior to their attacks for reasons such as responding to reports of concerning behaviors (see [Concerning Behaviors](#) section), interviewing perpetrators as witnesses to other incidents, and providing aid (e.g., getting medical assistance, conducting welfare checks, transport to mental health evaluations). Further, many of the perpetrators had multiple prior contacts with law enforcement; one individual even had been in contact with police 115 times related to various offenses prior to their attack.

There was confirmatory evidence for nine perpetrators (5.1%) of no prior contact with law enforcement. Prior contact was unable to be determined for the remaining 54 (30.9%) of the perpetrators.

Domestic Violence Histories

Among the perpetrators, 42 (24.0%) had one or more verifiable incidents of domestic violence prior to the shooting. At least 16 (38.1%) of these incidents resulted in contact with law enforcement.

Pre-Attack Behaviors and Communications

The following section examines perpetrators' behaviors and communications leading up to the attack. These findings are organized using the Path to Intended Violence framework (see [Introduction](#)), with additional detail provided in the subsections that follow.

Grievances, Motivations, and Stressors


A range of stressors was identified across cases, with some appearing more frequently than others. Mental health concerns were the most common (64.6%), followed by job-related difficulties (51.4%), family-related problems (50.3%), and relationship issues (41.1%). School-related difficulties (34.3%), experiences of bullying (30.3%), and financial strain (26.9%) were also reported in a notable share of cases. Other factors, including ideological motivations (18.3%), fame-seeking (16.6%), religious grievances (12.0%), and homophobia (8.6%), were observed less often.

Prevalence of Stressors, Grievances, and Motivations Among Perpetrators

Grievance	N	%	Grievance	N	%
Mental Health Concerns	113	64.6%	Inadequacy	37	21.1%
Job Loss	90	51.4%	Social Rejection	37	21.1%
Family Troubles	88	50.3%	Ideological/Political	32	18.3%
Relationship Loss	72	41.1%	Racism	34	19.4%
School Troubles	60	34.3%	Fame-Seeking	29	16.6%
Bullying	53	30.3%	Religious	21	12.0%
Financial Troubles	47	26.9%	Homophobia	15	8.6%
Friend/Peer Troubles	44	25.1%	Misogyny	13	7.4%
Trauma/Abuse	39	22.3%	Other	8	4.6%

Many perpetrators experienced multiple, overlapping stressors rather than a single issue. Relationship and family difficulties often appeared together and were frequently accompanied by financial strain. These interpersonal challenges were also closely tied to mental health concerns. There is also some evidence that job-related and financial stressors may intersect with ideological motivations in a subset of cases, though these findings should be interpreted with caution. Stressors tend to cluster across multiple areas, which may reflect escalating distress over time.

How Stressors Overlap Among Mass Public Shooting Perpetrators



NOTE: Thicker lines indicate stronger overlap between stressors.

Perpetrators often experienced multiple, overlapping stressors rather than a single issue. On average, individuals faced about five different stressors, with the majority experiencing between two and seven. The number of identified stressors varied widely across cases, but the pattern was clear: perpetrators typically experienced multiple, co-occurring grievances rather than isolated problems.


4.8
Average
Number of
Stressors

Weapons Acquisitions

A total of 305 firearms were brought to the incidents by the perpetrators, averaging 1.8 guns per shooting. More than half (n = 101, 57.7%) of the perpetrators only utilized a single firearm, while the rest brought multiple guns to the scene (ranging from two to eight). Of the 305 total firearms, 233 (76.4%) were confirmed to have been fired at least once during the incidents.

The type of firearm could be identified for all but one weapon. The majority (n = 193, 63.3%) of firearms brought to the incidents were handguns, followed by rifles (n = 70, 23.0%) and shotguns (n = 41, 13.4%). Most firearms utilized a semiautomatic firing mechanism (n = 220, 72.1%).

Distribution of Firearm Types Brought to the Scene by Perpetrators




Distribution of Firing Mechanisms

Type	N	%
Semiautomatic	220	72.1%
Fully Automatic	2	0.7%
Other (e.g., bolt-action, revolver)	66	21.6%
Undetermined	17	5.6%

Acquisition of Firearms

The source of acquisition could be determined for 198 of the 305 firearms (64.9%). Firearms were mostly commonly purchased from federal firearms licensees (FFL; n = 118, 59.6%), followed by access in the home (n = 29, 14.6%) and theft (n = 18, 9.1%).

Source of Firearm Acquisition




The timing of acquisition could be determined for 125 of the 305 firearms (41.0%). The length of time between acquisition and the shooting ranged from one to 12,207 days, averaging 430 days per firearm.

For all 118 transactions through FFLs, perpetrators underwent background checks; four firearms (1.3%) acquired by other means were determined not to have gone through the same review process, and the status for the remaining guns could not be determined. Just seven (2.3%) of the firearm transactions were subjected to a mandatory waiting period prior to the perpetrators taking possession. Fourteen (5.0%) were determined to have had no waiting period, and the remaining cases were undetermined.

Of the 175 perpetrators, 59 (33.7%) had at least one disqualifying factor that would have prohibited them from purchasing or possessing a firearm under federal law.²⁰ Juvenile status (being under 18 at the time of the shooting) was the most common (n = 24, 13.7%), followed by state felony convictions (n = 12, 6.9%). Four perpetrators (2.3%) met the criteria for two categories of prohibition. Notably, of the 77 perpetrators (44.0%) who submitted to a background check at the time of acquisition, 10 (13.0%) were prohibited purchasers who should have been denied due to at least one disqualifying factor.



Distribution of Disqualifying Factors



Information on firearm magazines could be determined for 130 (74.3%) of the perpetrators. Between zero and 60 magazines were brought to the scene by these individuals, averaging seven magazines per shooting. The number of magazines subsequently used in the shootings, which could be determined for 120 (68.6%) perpetrators, ranged from zero to 17, averaging over two magazines used. Drum magazines, which are large capacity magazines typically capable of holding between 50 and 100 rounds, were used in just three (1.7%) shootings.

Acquisition of Ammunition


The sources of ammunition were able to be determined for 64 (36.6%) of the perpetrators. Most of these individuals (n = 59, 92.2%) acquired their ammunition from a single source; five perpetrators (7.8%) acquired it from two sources. The most common source for ammunition was purchased through retail/in-person (n = 39, 22.3%). Thirteen perpetrators (7.4%) were able to access it in their home.

The quantities of ammunition in the perpetrators' possession, brought to the shooting, and used in the shooting were captured, though it should be noted that these are conservative estimates, as only verifiable quantities were recorded.²¹

The total number of rounds brought to the scene (including those in vehicles) could be determined for 127 of the perpetrators.²² This figure ranged from a low of five rounds to a high of 3,096 rounds in one case. The average number of rounds brought to the scene was 188 per perpetrator.

The total number of rounds fired during the shooting could be determined for 138 of the perpetrators. The lowest number of rounds fired by a perpetrator was one, while the highest number of rounds fired was 450. On average, more than 39 rounds were fired by each perpetrator.

Distribution of Sources of Ammunition Acquisition



188

Average Number
of Rounds
Brought to Scene

39

Average Number
of Rounds Fired
During Shootings

660


Average Number
of Total Rounds
in Possession

Finally, the total number of rounds in the perpetrators' possession—including rounds from the individuals' homes or other locations affiliated with them—could be determined for 84 of the perpetrators. The minimum number of rounds in possession was five, while the maximum was 22,000. On average, perpetrators had 660 total rounds in their possession.

Other Weapons

Sixty-eight perpetrators (38.9%) brought at least one other weapon to the shooting. Knives and other cutting instruments were the most common ($n = 51$, 29.1%), followed by explosives ($n = 17$, 9.7%).²³ Notably, none of the knives or cutting instruments were used in the attack, whereas five perpetrators (29.4%) who brought explosives to the scene also used them. Other weapons brought to the scene included gasoline and lighters (used to start fires), brass knuckles, hammers, and stun guns.

Distribution of Other Weapons



Research and Planning

The length of time perpetrators spent on research and planning, measured as the time between the first identifiable instance of planning and the attack, could be determined for 63 cases (36.0%). Planning timelines varied widely, ranging from same-day attacks to more than nine years. On average, perpetrators spent just over 303 days—nearly 10 months—planning their attacks, though the distribution reflects both short-term and more extended preparation.

Thirteen different research and planning behaviors were captured in the records analyzed. Researching location choice, including reviewing schedules and/or building diagrams, was the most common behavior in this category ($n = 45$, 25.7%). Studying other mass shooters was the second most common ($n = 44$, 25.1%), with research being conducted on the perpetrators of the shootings at Columbine (1999), Virginia Tech (2007), Tucson (2011), Isla Vista (2014), and Christchurch, New Zealand (2019), among others. Research on other violent offenders, including the Nazis, the Boston and Oklahoma City bombers, and various serial killers, was the third most common behavior.

Prevalence of Research and Planning Behaviors Among Perpetrators

Type	N	%
Researched Location Choice	45	25.7%
Studied Other Mass Shooters	44	25.1%
Studied Other Violent Offenders	34	19.4%
Surveilled Location in Person	31	17.7%
Researched Weapons	30	17.1%
Mapped Out Plan (Self)	25	14.3%
Researched Logistical Concerns	19	10.9%
Mapped Out Plan (Location)	18	10.3%
Created Hit Lists	17	9.7%
Created To-Do Lists	16	9.1%
Studied Police Response	14	8.0%
Other Research / Planning	6	3.4%
Tried to Recruit Others	5	2.9%

To a lesser extent, perpetrators conducted in-person surveillance at their intended locations (n = 31, 17.7%), researched weapons (n = 30, 17.1%), and logistics (n = 19, 10.9%), and created hit lists (n = 17, 9.7%) and to-do lists (n = 16, 9.1%).


Identified research and planning behaviors were present for 99 (56.6%) of the perpetrators. Of these, 34 perpetrators (34.3%) engaged in a single research and planning behavior. The remaining 65 perpetrators (65.7%) engaged in between two and 10 behaviors. On average, perpetrators engaged in nearly three (2.98) research behaviors.

Costuming

Sixty-eight (38.9%) of the perpetrators engaged in elements of costuming, such as wearing body armor, face coverings, or other items intended to conceal identity or provide protection during the attack. Among these individuals, 38 (55.9%) utilized one costuming element in their attack and 20 (29.4%) utilized two costuming elements. The number of elements ranged from one to eight, with an average of nearly two (1.74) elements per perpetrator.

Ballistics and tactical vests were the most commonly used costuming elements by perpetrators (n = 28, 16.0%), whereas eye or ear protection was the most commonly purchased element (n = 20, 11.4%).

Distribution of Costuming Elements



NOTE: Acquisition and use were coded independently, and values for items used during the attack do not represent subsets of acquisition counts.


Weapons Practice

In addition to acquiring the weapons perpetrators use in their respective incidents, it is not uncommon for these individuals to practice with these weapons to ensure familiarity and comfort with the weapon. Sixty-eight (38.9%) perpetrators in the study were determined to have engaged in some form of weapons practice prior to the shooting. Of these 68 perpetrators, nine (13.2%) practiced using two different modalities. Weapons practice most commonly occurred at formal gun ranges (n = 53; 30.3%), followed by informal gun ranges (e.g., outdoor areas; n = 20, 11.4%) and simulations (n = 4, 2.3%).

Legacy Tokens

In some cases, individuals produced written or recorded materials prior to the attack, often referred to as legacy tokens. These materials include manifestos (written, photographic, video, or other formats), suicide notes, letters to loved ones, and wills, among other forms. Seventy-nine (45.1%) perpetrators were determined to have created at least one form of legacy token prior to their attack; there was confirmatory evidence that five (2.9%) did not leave any such materials, and the status for the remaining 91 perpetrators (52.0%) could not be determined.

Distribution of Legacy Tokens




The majority of perpetrators who left a legacy token behind left one item ($n = 48$, 60.8%), though 22 (27.8%) prepared two legacy tokens. Suicide notes were the most common ($n = 41$, 33.6%), followed by written manifestos ($n = 26$, 21.3%) and journals ($n = 19$, 15.6%).

Leakage

A considerable majority of perpetrators ($n = 150$, 85.7%) communicated their intentions or plans prior to the attack through leakage. Most perpetrators ($n = 92$, 52.6%) engaged in leakage via a single channel, though as many as six different modalities were used to transmit their warnings.


The primary channel of leakage was verbal communication to another person, which also included text messages ($n = 121$, 69.1%). Online communications, either general ($n = 55$, 31.4%) or directed to a specific person ($n = 29$, 16.6%), also were observed, though less frequently, while other forms such as written materials (e.g., class assignments, letters; $n = 23$, 13.1%) and artwork ($n = 18$, 10.3%) were comparatively rare.

Distribution of Leakage Channels



When leakage occurred via social media, a range of platforms were used by perpetrators. Facebook was the most commonly used platform among those who engaged in online leakage (n = 18, 21.4%). Instagram (n = 12, 14.3%) and YouTube (n = 10, 11.9%) also were used more frequently than other platforms, such as Discord (n = 4, 4.8%) and Reddit (n = 2, 2.4%). The “Other” category included platforms such as gaming forums, personal websites, dating applications, and lesser-used social media platforms.

Leakage Across Social Media Platforms



Leakage Observers²⁴

Information on individuals who observed leakage could be determined for 134 perpetrators (76.6%). Leakage most often was observed by individuals within the perpetrators' immediate social networks, particularly friends, family members, and coworkers. In-person friends (n = 37, 21.1%) and parents or guardians (n = 35, 20.0%) were the most frequently identified observers, followed by coworkers (n = 33, 18.9%). Other commonly identified observers included current or former intimate partners, classmates, and school staff. Observers also extended beyond close relationships to include community members, acquaintances, and, in some cases, strangers or professionals such as mental health providers.

Among cases where observer information was available, leakage was typically known across multiple types of observers rather than a single category. On average, just over two categories of observers were identified per case (2.36), though this ranged from one to as many as 13 categories. Most commonly, leakage was observed within one (40.3%) or two (29.1%) categories, with fewer cases involving a broader range of observer types.

Who Observed Leakage Prior to the Shooting

Category	N	%	Category	N	%
In-Person Friend	37	21.1%	Current Spouse/Partner	13	7.4%
Parent/Guardian	35	20.0%	Online Friend	13	7.4%
Coworker	33	18.9%	Sibling or Equivalent	12	6.9%
Former Spouse/Partner	21	12.0%	Manager/Supervisor	12	6.9%
Classmate at School	21	12.0%	Extended Family	9	5.1%
School Staff	18	10.3%	Other Observer	7	4.0%
Community Member	18	10.3%	Roommate/Cohabitant	6	3.4%
Stranger	18	10.3%	Child or Dependent	4	2.3%
Mental Health Support	18	10.3%	Neighbor	4	2.3%
General Acquaintance	15	8.6%	Other Family	2	1.1%

NOTE: Categories reflect the presence of at least one observer within each social group. The total number of individual observers could not be determined.

Leakage Contents

Leakage content also was examined to understand better the themes and topics communicated prior to the attacks. Content shared through leakage frequently was centered on violence and harm. More than half of perpetrators (n = 97, 55.4%) referenced violence or death in some form. General discussions of killing others were common (n = 85, 48.6%), as were references to suicide or self-harm (n = 72, 41.1%) and mass shooting-specific violence (n = 70, 40.0%). Other recurring themes included fascination with firearms (n = 53, 30.3%) and references to previous mass shootings or perpetrators (n = 32, 18.3%). Less frequently, leakage involved harm toward animals (n = 18, 10.3%), while very few cases fell into other categories.

Leakage often contained multiple types of content rather than a single theme. Among cases with available information, perpetrators shared an average of approximately

three different content types (3.04), with the number ranging from one to seven. Most commonly, leakage included one (20.6%), two (23.4%), or three (19.1%) types of content, with fewer cases involving a broader range of themes.

Prevalence of Leakage Contents Shared by Perpetrators

Category	N	%
Violence/Death	97	55.4%
Killing People (General)	85	48.6%
Suicide or Self-Harm	72	41.1%
Killing People (Mass Shooting)	70	40.0%
Guns Fascination	53	30.3%
Previous Mass Shootings and/or Perpetrators	32	18.3%
Killing Animals/Animal Abuse	18	10.3%
Other	2	1.1%

Threat Types

A majority of perpetrators (n = 113, 64.6%) made some type of threat as part of the leakage that occurred prior to the attack. Among these individuals, 61 (54.0%) made a single type of threat, while an additional 40 (35.4%) made two different types of threats. Direct threats were the most common (n = 76, 43.4%), while conditional threats were the least common (n = 24, 13.7%).

Threats by Type

Type	N	%
Direct Threat	76	43.4%
Indirect Threat	28	16.0%
Veiled Threat	50	28.6%
Conditional Threat	24	13.7%

Examples of Threats²⁵

Direct threats clearly describe a specific act of violence against a specific target. These statements are explicit and leave little room for interpretation.

Example: "I am going to carry out a shooting at this school tomorrow."

Indirect threats are more ambiguous and lack specific details. They may suggest the possibility of violence, but do not clearly state that it will occur.

Example: "If I wanted to, I could hurt a lot of people at my workplace."

Veiled threats imply violence without stating it outright. These statements hint at harm but require interpretation.

Example: "People like you won't be around much longer."

Conditional threats link violence to a demand or outcome. These statements indicate that harm will occur if certain conditions are not met.

Example: "If you don't fix this situation, something bad is going to happen at this school."

Reporting of Leakage

Leakage shared by 66 (37.7%) of perpetrators was ultimately reported to another party by at least one observer. Reporting to law enforcement was the most common (n = 45, 25.7%), followed by a supervisor or administrator (n = 25, 14.3%). Reporting to other parties, including perpetrators' parents (n = 5, 2.9%), was less common. In most instances, leakage was reported to a single party (n = 48, 27.4%), though some perpetrators were reported to two (n = 15, 8.6%) or three (n = 3, 1.7%) parties.

Parties to Whom Leakage Was Reported

Source	N	%
Law Enforcement	45	25.7%
Supervisor/Administrator	25	14.3%
Peer (School or Work)	6	3.4%
Perpetrator's Parents	5	2.9%
Mental Health Resource	4	2.3%
Anonymous Tip Line	1	0.6%
Friends	1	0.6%

Concerning Behaviors

Although concerning behaviors are not necessarily part of the Path to Intended Violence, they often occur alongside pathway behaviors. A wide range of concerning behaviors was identified among perpetrators, with several appearing frequently across cases. The most common included expressions of anger or aggression (n = 130, 74.3%) and a desire to kill (n = 106, 60.6%), followed by suicidal ideation (n = 97, 55.4%), social isolation (n = 91, 52.0%), and sadness or depression (n = 90, 51.4%). Other behaviors observed in a substantial share of cases included fixation (n = 69, 39.4%), paranoia or delusional thinking (n = 63, 36.0%), and involvement in fights (n = 56, 32.0%). Additional indicators such as substance use, harassment, and performance-related difficulties were present in a smaller but still notable proportion of cases, while other behaviors were observed less frequently.

In addition to examining individual concerning behaviors, it also is important to consider how these indicators co-occurred. Many behaviors appeared together rather than in isolation, with several clear patterns emerging across cases.

Substance use behaviors were especially interconnected, with different forms of drug use and alcohol misuse frequently occurring together.

Behavioral and performance-related issues also tended to cluster. Poor school performance often was associated with involvement in fights, and both were linked to displays of anger or aggression.

Indicators of emotional distress similarly appeared in combination, including sadness, suicidal ideation, and self-harm.

Prevalence of Concerning Behaviors Among Perpetrators

Behavior	N	%	Behavior	N	%
Anger/Aggression	130	74.3%	Hallucinations	29	16.6%
Desire to Kill	106	60.6%	Conspiracy Theories	26	14.9%
Suicidal Ideation	97	55.4%	Sleep Changes	24	13.7%
Social Isolation	91	52.0%	Physical Changes	23	13.1%
Sadness/Depression	90	51.4%	Illicit Drug Abuse	18	10.3%
Fixation	69	39.4%	Risky/Risk-Taking	18	10.3%
Paranoia/Delusion	63	36.0%	Self-Harm	17	9.7%
Engaged in Fights	56	32.0%	Stalking	16	9.1%
Poor School Performance	44	25.1%	Impulsivity	14	8.0%
Other Drug Abuse	42	24.0%	Prescription Drug Abuse	11	6.3%
Alcohol Abuse	42	24.0%	Other	7	4.0%
Harassment	41	23.4%	Sexual Behavior	2	1.1%
Poor Work Performance	37	21.1%			

Additional patterns were observed across social and behavioral domains. Social withdrawal often was linked with fixation on specific individuals or grievances, and in some cases, co-occurred with stalking. Externalizing behaviors, such as bullying and involvement in fights, also frequently appeared together.

Certain psychiatric symptoms, including hallucinations and paranoid or delusional thinking, were closely associated when present, though these patterns were observed less consistently across cases.

Perpetrators often exhibited multiple concerning behaviors rather than a single indicator. On average, individuals demonstrated 6.6 different concerning behaviors, with the number ranging from one to 18 across cases. Most cases reflected a combination of indicators rather than an isolated concern, highlighting the presence of multiple warning signs leading up to the attack.



Conclusion

Acts of mass public violence often are perceived as sudden and unpredictable. The findings in this report, however, demonstrate that these incidents typically are preceded by a range of observable behaviors, experiences, and communications. These indicators do not occur in isolation but instead emerge over time and across multiple domains. Understanding how these elements come together is critical for identifying opportunities for prevention.

Across cases, perpetrators rarely exhibited a single, isolated indicator. Instead, they experienced multiple, overlapping stressors, engaged in a range of concerning behaviors, and demonstrated varying degrees of planning prior to the attack. These elements often co-occurred, reflecting a broader pattern of escalation rather than a single triggering event. Similarly, leakage was common and frequently communicated through multiple channels, often to more than one type of observer.

Taken together, these findings point to a critical conclusion: mass public shootings are not the result of one behavior, one stressor, or one communication, but rather a convergence of multiple indicators that emerge over time. These warning signs often are observable and, in many cases, known to others prior to the attack. The information associated with these indicators, however, often is distributed across different individuals and systems rather than centralized in a single place.

This fragmentation of information presents a key challenge for prevention. No single individual may have a complete picture of the risk, even when multiple warning signs are present. As a result, recognizing and responding to these patterns requires not only awareness of concerning behaviors and communications but also mechanisms for sharing information across individuals, organizations, and systems.

The findings of this report underscore the importance of moving beyond a focus on isolated warning signs and toward an approach that emphasizes patterns, context, and accumulation. They also highlight the critical role that bystanders and community members can play in identifying and responding to concerning behaviors and communications. Training efforts that support individuals in recognizing these indicators, understanding their potential significance, and reporting them appropriately may serve as an important component of broader prevention strategies.

Ultimately, these findings reinforce a central premise: warning signs often are present prior to acts of mass violence. The challenge lies not in their absence but in recognizing their significance, connecting the information across sources, and taking appropriate action before an attack occurs.


Appendix A. Data Sources and Methodology

This report draws on a comprehensive, open-source database of mass public shootings developed as part of the SISMS project. The database was designed to address common limitations in existing data sources, particularly the heavy reliance on media reports, by prioritizing official records and incorporating a structured approach to data collection, coding, and verification.

Three-Tier Data Collection Strategy

To strengthen the validity and reliability of the data, open-source materials were organized into a three-tier framework based on the origin and quality of the source.

Three-Tier Framework for Open-Source Data



NOTE: Sources are prioritized based on proximity to original information and level of verification.

The highest level, **Tier 1**, consists of official records generated through formal investigative or judicial processes. These include law enforcement reports, court documents, and perpetrator-generated materials such as journals, manifestos, or social media content when recovered as part of an official investigation. These sources are considered the most reliable because they reflect original documentation rather than secondary interpretation.

Tier 2 includes official summaries and interpretive materials, such as press releases, after-action reports, and other governmental or institutional reviews. These sources often provide verified information and a broader context, though they may be less comprehensive than primary records.

Tier 3 consists of media reports, which were used to supplement information from higher-tier sources rather than serve as the primary basis for data collection. To improve reliability, media-based information was triangulated across multiple independent and reputable outlets rather than relying on a single source.

This tiered approach allows for the integration of multiple forms of open-source data while prioritizing those that offer the greatest level of detail and accuracy. Information regarding prior law enforcement contact was identified through this multisource data collection process, including official records, secondary reports, and media accounts, and therefore was not solely dependent on access to criminal history records.

Data collection involved extensive efforts to obtain both official records and open-source materials. More than 280 public records requests were submitted to law enforcement agencies and courts to obtain investigative and judicial documents. Additional materials were identified through systematic open-source searches across a wide range of platforms, including news media, institutional reports, and publicly available archives. In total, these efforts resulted in the collection of more than 154,000 pages of records.

Source Type	Pages Collected
Tier 1	144,628
Tier 2	7,113
Tier 3	2,854
Total	154,595

NOTE: Audio and video files, photographs, and news articles were counted as one source page each.

Coding Procedures

All cases were coded using a standardized codebook developed based on empirical and theoretical literature, including the Path to Intended Violence model and prior research on mass shootings. A structured coding instrument was used to extract information from source materials, with each variable defined in advance to promote consistency across cases.

For each coded variable, source documentation was recorded, including the type of source (Tier 1, 2, or 3), the specific document, and the relevant page number when applicable. This process ensured that all coded values could be traced directly back to their original source.

Verification and Quality Assurance

Given the variability in open-source materials, a multistage verification process was implemented to ensure the accuracy and consistency of the data.

Initial coding was conducted by trained research assistants using standardized procedures. Each case then underwent an independent review by a project investigator, who compared coded values against the original source materials and identified any

discrepancies or missing information. A coding verification memo was prepared for each case, documenting recommended revisions and additional data collection as needed.

A second investigator reviewed the verification memo and corresponding materials. In cases where discrepancies remained, a third reviewer adjudicated the final coding decision. This process created a documented audit trail for each case and ensured that all data were systematically reviewed and reconciled prior to inclusion in the final dataset.

Final Dataset Construction

Following verification, all cases were incorporated into the final dataset. Additional quality checks were conducted to identify and resolve any inconsistencies or data entry errors across variables. These steps ensured that the dataset accurately reflected the verified case-level coding and was suitable for analysis.


**Data and documentation for the SISMS project
are available at:**

<https://rockinst.org/sisms>


Appendix B. Comparative Analysis of SISMS Cases

The following analyses present select comparisons between the SISMS project cases and the full set of 370 mass public shootings that occurred during the same period (1999–2024).


Mass Public Shootings by Year




Mass Public Shootings by Day of Week



Mass Public Shootings by Hour



Distribution of Mass Public Shootings by Location Type




The following analyses present select comparisons between the perpetrators included in the SISMS project cases and the 378 mass public shooting perpetrators for the 370 incidents that occurred during the same period (1999–2024).

Distribution of Perpetrator Sex


	SISMS		All Cases	
	N	%	N	%
Solo Male	160	93.6%	348	94.1%
Solo Female	7	4.1%	15	4.1%
Male-Female Dyad	2	1.2%	3	0.8%
Male Only Dyad	2	1.2%	4	1.1%

Distribution of Perpetrator Ages



NOTE: For the 1999 to 2024 cases, the perpetrators ranged in age from 11 to 88 years of age. The average age was 35.7 years.

Distribution of Perpetrator Races/Ethnicities



NOTE: For the 1999 to 2024 cases, racial or ethnic identity could not be determined for five perpetrators.

Endnotes

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- 3 *Mass Attacks in Public Spaces: 2016–2020* (Washington, DC: National Threat Assessment Center, US Secret Service, 2023), <https://media.nbcbayarea.com/2023/01/Secret-Service-mass-attacks.pdf>.
- 4 Jaclyn Schildkraut and H. Jaymi Elsass, *Mass Shootings: Media, Myths, and Realities* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2016): 28.
- 5 James N. Meindl, et al., "Towards a Functional Account of Mass-Shooting: Prediction and Influence of Violent Behavior," *Perspectives on Behavior Science* 48 (2025): 849–72, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40614-025-00483-z>.
- 6 Jason R. Silva and Emily A. Greene-Colozzi, "Assessing Leakage-Based Mass Shooting Prevention: A Comparison of Foiled and Completed Attacks," *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management* 11, no. 4 (2024): 203–17, <https://doi.org/10.1037/tam0000205>.
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- 10 Naomi Killian, "Missed Signals, Missed Opportunities, and Profiles of Prevention: A Case Study Analysis of Pre-Incident Indicators in Mass Shootings and Strategies for Prevention" (PhD diss., Saint Leo University, 2024), <https://www.proquest.com/openview/0b793813d3337e0f7bbf6aec3d08cc5a/1>.
- 11 Timothy Calhoun and Stephen Weston, *Contemporary Threat Management* (San Diego, CA: Specialized Training Services, 2003).
- 12 Robert A. Fein and Bryan Vossekuil, *Preventing Assassination: Secret Service Exceptional Case Study Project* (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1997), <https://www.ojp.gov/library/publications/preventing-assassination-secret-service-exceptional-case-study-project>.
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- 18 Data for all mass shootings were drawn from the following database: Jaclyn Schildkraut, et al., *Mass Shooting Factsheet* (Albany, NY: Regional Gun Violence Research Consortium, Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2026), <https://rockinst.org/gun-violence/mass-shooting-factsheet/>.
- 19 Jaclyn Schildkraut, et al., "Understanding More Than 50 Years of Mass Public Shootings as a Function of Routine Activities," *Homicide Studies* 28, no. 2 (2024): 127–50, <https://doi.org/10.1177/10887679221083607>.
- 20 *The Gun Control Act of 1968* outlines categories of prohibited purchasers for firearms. See *The Gun Control Act of 1968*, 18 U.S.C. § 44.
- 21 In a number of the police reports, the number of boxes of ammunition found was listed without specific quantities of bullets in each. Similarly, more generalized descriptors, such as "duffle bags full" or "cans full" of ammunition, were used without providing exact quantities. In the Excel spreadsheet of the data, these instances are listed with the verifiable quantity followed by '+' to denote that the number is estimated to be higher, but an exact quantity is unknown.
- 22 For incidents with two perpetrators, rounds that could be specifically verified to one of the perpetrators were assigned to that individual's count. For any remaining rounds that could not be verified as belonging to either, the quantity was divided by two, with half assigned to each perpetrator.
- 23 The explosive category included both Molotov cocktails and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
- 24 Categories of observers were coded based on available case information; however, the number of individual observers within each category was not systematically captured. As a result, these data reflect the presence of observer types rather than the total number of individuals who may have been aware of the leakage. Determining the full scope of observers would require detailed case-level social network analysis, which was beyond the scope of the present study. See, for example, Emily A. Greene-Colozzi et al., "Social Network Analysis as a Tool for Understanding Mass Shooting Prevention: A Case Study of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Shooting," *Journal of Criminal Justice* 101 (2025): 102540, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2025.102540>.
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ABOUT THE REGIONAL GUN VIOLENCE RESEARCH CONSORTIUM

The Regional Gun Violence Research Consortium is a coalition of more than 170 gun violence research and practitioners from across the United States that seeks to inform policymakers and the public by providing evidence-based, data-driven policy recommendations to disrupt the cycle of firearm-involved homicides, suicides, and injuries. The Consortium approaches the study of gun violence with the belief that:

- + Gun violence is a public policy problem.
- + State and local governments are key in the fight to reduce firearm-involved deaths and injuries.
- + We need to better understand the nuances of state law- and policy-making to effectively combat gun violence.

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