



Educator Toolkit

Learn to use best practices in analyzing public policy and how to teach others to do the same. These are essential resources for educators, researchers, and policymakers as well as anyone interested in the workings of public policy.

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Bringing Open Data into the Classroom

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Handbook for Policymakers

In American governments, unlike in other countries, there are thick layers of officials in appointive offices. Thousands of people serve in these roles. This small book — really a long essay — is intended to inform people who should be interested in these exciting, challenging leadership jobs inside America's governments.

How to Be a Good Social Scientist

Senior Fellow Richard Nathan's book *Social Science in Government* presents a first-hand account of how to be a good researcher through a lively retrospective account of a career in American government and academe.

Understanding New York Government

Robert Ward's *New York State Government* is a must-read for anyone who wants to understand how New York state government operates. For educators, we also include an instructional companion for using this important work in the classroom.

Bringing Open Data in the Classroom to Foster Student Engagement

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Although new curricula are sprouting around the use of Big Data,¹ students do not have to become data scientists in order to understand the fundamental principles of using quantitative data to understand and solve problems. The ease of browsing, visualizing, and downloading data from new Open Data portals make it possible to bring data into the university classroom at all levels, from freshman undergraduates to doctoral students. Instructors can take advantage of Open Data to develop in-class activities, assignments, and term projects that challenge students to ask critical questions about the world in which they live and develop data skills to address important social problems. We provide some basic background on student engagement, explain how student engagement can occur around Open Data, and list tangible ideas for incorporating Open Data into the university classroom. Our goal is not to provide an exhaustive overview of specific open data classroom activities or theories on student engagement. Rather, we aim to provide preliminary ideas for a continuing dialogue about how to take advantage of these resources in higher education to make students more critical consumers and producers of data.

Student Engagement: Why It Matters and Guiding Principles²

Effective student engagement is the process that coaxes — and even requires — students to act in ways that make their thinking visible, thereby turning them into critical thinkers. When students act on their thinking and generate consequences, they are no longer passive observers of the discipline but instead become independent agents of disciplinary thinking. Effective student engagement can allow students to increase their traction in the discipline, and learn to be active users and evaluators of disciplinary knowledge. By comparison, traditionally formatted courses are designed primarily around providing *opportunities* for students to learn (via lectures, office hours, a bibliography, etc.) without the framework that impels or compels students to invest effort and take more responsibility for their learning. The traditional, opportunity-based approach will work for some students, but not for all. Those with less rich academic preparation or academic acculturation may need more than open opportunities to be successful. They will need a structure, strategy, and process that implicate them more directly in the disciplinary content.

¹ As examples, see <http://www.analytics.northwestern.edu/curriculum/index.html> (Northwestern University), <https://www.coursera.org/#course/datasci> (University of Washington), <http://datascience.nyu.edu/academics/> (New York University), and <http://newscenter.berkeley.edu/2013/11/13/new-data-science-institute-to-help-scholars-harness-big-data/> (UC Berkeley).

² The material in this section is adapted with permission from presentations and unpublished writings by Bill Roberson and Billie Franchini of the University at Albany Institute for Teaching, Learning, and Academic Leadership.

There are a few guiding principles behind fostering student engagement.

First, students do not need to know *everything* before they can do *anything*. Although “research” is often reserved for advanced electives or graduate courses, students of any skill level are capable of using basic research principles to learn about their discipline and challenge assumptions.

Second, students’ naïveté about a discipline is not an obstacle for instructors. Rather, it is an opportunity to encourage them to adopt an inquisitive attitude about their discipline and environment. Structuring learning tasks that force them to question their assumptions and determine how to assemble evidence to understand a problem can promote critical thinking and excitement about the discipline. For example, a traditional learning approach might encourage students to make judgments and decisions after receiving extensive background information; assignments are designed to be applications, and speculation is discouraged. A critical thinking classroom approach could force students to make decisions, judgments, and hypotheses prematurely, creating frustration and a perceived need for information. This allows students to start to inquire about their discipline at a higher level.

Third, there are several ways to fuel student curiosity. These include:

- The *expectation to discover something* (Are there geographical patterns in childhood obesity rates? Who suffers most from type 2 diabetes? How do patterns of recreational drug use differ across regions?);
- The *desire to resolve a weighing or intriguing doubt* (To what extent can racial disparities in childhood obesity rates be explained by features of the built environment? If type 2 diabetes is so closely related to socioeconomic status, what does that say about the role of personal choice in health behaviors? Are suburban communities really safer than big cities?); and
- The *anticipation of solving a problem* (Would building additional safe play spaces reduce childhood obesity rates? How can health departments promote healthier lifestyle choices? In what ways do we need a more nuanced approach to address the causes and consequences of substance use disorders?).

Instructors can use quantitative Open Data to structure exercises that encourage students to ask these broader questions.

Open Data: A Springboard for Student Engagement

The availability of free, easily accessible, and downloadable data makes it increasingly easier to design activities that force students to use quantitative data to develop preliminary hypotheses, test them empirically, critically reflect on their findings, consider how further evidence could be used to support or refute their hypothesis, and identify potential solutions to address social

problems. These data can allow instructors to set the stage for students to implement the scientific method in order to gain knowledge about the discipline, become more invested in their own learning, and move towards becoming critical thinkers.

Open Data are in a variety of formats and exist in many areas besides public health, making it relevant for almost any discipline. As we are in the early phases of Open Data, these portals will continue to expand their catalogues of available data, providing opportunities to refresh examples, create new examples, or use students to explore and find new examples. The open access policy eliminates the need to go through paperwork-intensive processes to request the datasets from agencies and adhere to strict data use agreements.

Open Data-based assignments can teach critical thinking skills about data use. Basic data management and statistical skills are similar to those needed to analyze traditional datasets. However, Open Data requires additional critical thinking skills about how to use data appropriately. Because Open Data are a work in progress, the data are rarely in a desirable format for direct statistical analysis. Many of these datasets are raw, and not cleaned to create tidy variables or data layouts, and they may have a very coarse-grained granularity (e.g., aggregated to the school district or county level) to protect confidentiality. To work with these data, students need to be aware of data quality concerns, including understanding what data quality means and being able to discriminate between good and poor quality data. This will force students to identify ways to resolve these issues technically (e.g., using data management skills to reformat the data, check for errors, and resolve discrepancies) and analytically (e.g., including other variables in the analysis to address potential omitted variable bias and running additional specification checks). Students may also encounter different visualizations created by the Open Data platforms and infographics used in newspapers and magazines. To become sophisticated data users and consumers, students will need to think critically about how different visualizations may inappropriately bias readers, and how to display data appropriately.

Finally, Open Data is becoming a part of many disciplines. Workforce expectations are changing, and students will increasingly be expected to know about these resources and how to use them. Journalists, policymakers, and advocacy groups are already using these data. As part of their discipline, students should be able to think critically about how and when these data can be used, and to question assumptions about the results of an Open Data-based analysis.

Practical Tips: Ideas for Fostering Student Engagement Using New York State Open Data

In 2013, Governor Andrew Cuomo signed Executive Order 95,³ which asks all New York State executive branch agencies to make government data open. In addition, local governments across the state are encouraged to submit data. New York has multiple Open Data sources, including the main portal from the governor's office (Open NY, <https://data.ny.gov/>), a dedicated health data portal at the Department of Health (Health Data NY, <https://health.data.ny.gov/>), and local government data for New York City (NYC Open Data, <https://nycopendata.socrata.com/>). Below are some specific ideas for ways to incorporate these data into courses in order to encourage students to become more engaged in the production of knowledge:

³ <http://www.governor.ny.gov/executiveorder/95>

- *Web-based communications:* Ask students to use the Visualize tool to create a map displaying geographical differences in the variable. Students will write a news story that uses the data to explain what is happening in both the state and local community, and use the Embed tool to add a live link to the map. Have a class discussion on possible sources of bias in the data, and how to describe data to the public.
- *Data management:* Create an assignment where students use the Export tool to download multiple datasets as .csv files, and import into their statistical software package (e.g., SAS, Stata, SPSS). Students then merge files using a common identifier, clean the data, and make new variables. Ask the class to discuss data quality concerns and how to resolve them, and how analytic decisions on operationalizing variables may lead to bias.
- *Introductory statistics:* Task students with using the Export tool to download the data as an .xls file. Students subsequently use Excel's basic summary statistics functions to describe univariate characteristics of variables, such as means, medians, percentages, and ranges. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using various summary statistics to describe a population, and possible sources of bias in the data.
- *Intermediate statistics:* Create an assignment where students import one or more datasets into a statistical software package, run multivariate analyses to evaluate relationships among variables and confounding factors, and compare the regression-based results to the maps showing geographical differences in the variable. Discuss whether the statistical analysis can fully explain these geographical differences.
- *Geography and urban planning:* Ask students to use the Export tool to download multiple datasets as .csv files, and import them into ArcGIS, apply their data management skills to clean the data and create new variables, and overlap multiple variables to display visual relationships. Discuss whether the location of hospitals, clinics, or other services matches the distribution of the target population, and how to convey this information to policymakers.
- *Software development:* Use the data for a term project in computer science. Task students with either selecting their own application to see how creative they can get with the data, or else specify an industry-relevant priority task with a final contest of what works best for the industry's specific purposes. The project could be organized as a Code-a-thon, with a prize to the team that develops the best application. Invite practitioners to be guest judges. Here the data serve as a test bed for the application of new concepts.
- *Data systems design:* Design a project-based lab class in which students design systems that utilize the data. Turning this into a contest with external judges could boost the stakes and improve students' engagement. Class discussions could push students to identify different types of data (e.g., administrative, survey, electronic health records) and how to adapt data systems to meet the data's unique features and possibly diverging needs of end users.

- *Political research:* Assign students to use the Open Legislation of the NY Open Senate application (<http://www.nysenate.gov/legislation>) to analyze voting patterns or bill content. Ask students to compare their analysis to the rankings of legislatures developed by public interest groups and to hypothesize reasons for discrepancies. Some of this information would have previously been available through subscription-only databases such as Westlaw.
- *Budgeting:* Have students use Open Budget to locate appropriations, budgeted and actual spending, and historical information. Task students with using those data to answer various questions: What is the total size of the budget? How large are the budget deficits and surpluses? How do the budget size and deficits change over time? What are the major sources of revenues and expenditures, as a proportion of the whole budget? Use the results to start a broader discussion about the factors driving these changes, and potential consequences for population health and other social outcomes.
- *Public administration:* Ask students to compare data from Open Budget (budget portal from the Governor’s office) and Open Book New York (budget portal from the Comptroller’s office, see <http://www.openbooknewyork.com/>). Describe similarities and differences in the ways two agencies report information, and reporting incentives. Discuss agencies’ motivations for reporting data, ways in which data collection is influenced by political factors such as formula-based funding, and how to overcome potential data biases in research.
- *Criminal justice:* Design an activity where students explore relationships among ZIP code-level crime rates, race/ethnicity, and income. Use these empirical findings to start a discussion about the causes of disparities and how to reduce them. Discuss the limitations of existing data and how to improve the measurement of these factors.

Citing Open Data

Although Open Data are available free of charge to the public, it is helpful for government agencies to know where, when, and how the data are used. Citing data is also good practice for replication, and gives credit to data repositories. Instructors and students should cite all data sources appropriately in teaching and research materials.

Other Teaching Inspirations

The School of Data (<http://schoolofdata.org/>) provides free courses on how to use and be inspired by data. This nonprofit organization aims “to teach people how to gain powerful insights and create compelling stories using data.” The website has some interesting uses of data and ideas for bringing data into the classroom.

The Open Knowledge Foundation provides a list of Open Data catalogues from government agencies around the world (<http://opengovernmentdata.org/data/catalogues>).

Browse past and current Code-a-thons (<http://www.health2con.com/devchallenge/about/>) for real-world challenge programs for developers to create innovative technologies using data. A class project could be organized around a similar model. Depending on the timing of the next challenge, the class could work together on a collaborative entry.

Other Ideas?

If you have other ideas on using Open Data in the classroom, including success stories, please share them with us at emartin@albany.edu and nhelbig@ctg.albany.edu.

Handbook for Appointed Officials in America's Governments

Richard P. Nathan



**THE NELSON A.
ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT**

Independent Research on America's State and Local Governments

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Handbook for Appointed Officials in America's Governments

An earlier version of the Handbook for Appointed Officials in America's Governments was published by the Rockefeller Institute in 2000. The Institute is reissuing this pamphlet electronically in a revised abbreviated form. It is intended as a tool for students of government and public affairs — encouraging them to consider careers that include periods of public service in appointive positions in the top layers of America's governments.

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1

Introduction

This *Handbook* is for a special group in American government: appointed public officials — “inners and outers” — who serve in between top elected officials and the leaders and staff of the nation’s vast public bureaucracies. These officials play a major role in implementing policy — translating public purposes into governmental actions. There are thick layers of appointed officials in all of America’s governments (national, state, and local), a much bigger group than in other Western democracies. Appointed officials typically serve for two to four years in any one position.

This is not a new feature of American government. The first transition of presidential party control in 1800, the “Republican ascendancy,” which occurred with the election of Thomas Jefferson, saw a reepling of the top layers of political power. President Jefferson viewed Federalist officials working in the federal government as enemies within. After cleaning house, he boasted in 1803 that of the 316 “offices of the United States subject to the President’s appointment and removal, only 130 were now held by Federalists.”¹ Jefferson maintained that he had effected this influx of Republicans “by means so moderate and just as cannot fail to be approved in future.”² He was right.

¹ Jefferson to William Duane, Monticello, July 24, 1803, as described in Adrienne Koch, *Jefferson and Madison: The Great Collaboration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 224.

² Adrienne Koch, *Jefferson and Madison: The Great Collaboration*, p. 224.

Why This Handbook?

Students I taught at the Woodrow Wilson School of Princeton University in the 1980s influenced me to write about how one can gain and use influence as an appointed official inside America's governments. I felt that we (the faculty — myself included) did not tell our students enough about what they needed to know to become leaders in appointive public service. I kept my thoughts in a mental file, supplemented by experiences I had as an appointed federal official (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the 1967 Commission on Civil Disorder), as a congressional aide, as a member of federal and state commissions and advisory groups, and as an observer of politics and U.S. domestic public affairs.

A subsidiary theme of this book is that in the United States the national government is not the key to domestic public affairs; the country has 89,000 local governments.³ Although the media give the impression that ideas for government action originate and flow from Washington, most domestic policies take their real shape in the field. People with energy and purposes interested in public service can often accomplish more at the state and local levels than in Washington.

So many stakeholders put their fingerprints on new laws and domestic policies throughout American governments that the resulting policies are complex, unclear, even vague. This means that people who want to achieve things can do a lot as managers

³ Based on the Census of Governments conducted every five years by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. For an explanation and discussion of these data on American federalism, see the appendix on American federalism, pp. 68.

inside government in appointive posts engaged in refining and implementing policies. This is not to say that people interested in public service should eschew opportunities to influence public purposes outside of government. There are periods and situations where being an outsider pressing for change is likely to be one's most effective venue. Change agents are freer on the outside, less constrained by other actors in the governmental process. However, insiders generally have more horses (people) and resources (money) to get things done on a larger scale and in greater depth.

Aim of the Handbook

In the final analysis, the most important thing a person manages in public life is his or her career. The aim of this *Handbook* is to present what I hope is useful advice about how one gets to be an appointed official in America's governments and how one can effectively wield power once in office. Sections 2 and 3 describe routes to appointed officialdom and the role of appointed officials. Sections 4 through 7 discuss skills of appointive leadership — team building, making and implementing policy, providing feedback and evaluation, and dealing with the media. The final section calls for broadening the talent pool of people who serve as appointed leaders in America's governments.

When I revised this *Handbook* in 2002, there were new stirrings about problems with public service, particularly at the national level. The Brookings Institution formed a commission, chaired by former Federal Reserve chairman Paul A. Volcker, to “focus on

the need for a comprehensive reform for the federal public service.”⁴ Underlying this concern is what an earlier Volcker commission called a “quiet crisis” of decline in the attractiveness and capacity of the federal career service. The headline for the press release announcing the new Brookings group was “The Quiet Crisis Roars.”

As this new Volcker Commission was forming and focusing on the role of *careerists* in the federal service, other experts were highlighting the role of shorter-term appointed officials. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, urged the creation of a commission “to develop a new type of public service that will allow bright young people from the private and nonprofit sectors to move in and out of middle levels of government for specified periods.” The aim of this *Handbook* is to advance the thesis that appointed public officials are a vital and influential source of talent, leadership, and expertise in America’s governments.

⁴ The Brookings Institution, “The Quiet Crisis Roars: Brookings Institution Convenes Second National Commission on the Public Service,” *press release* (Washington, DC: February 13, 2002).

2

Why People Become Appointed Officials

The energy of elected officials is so dominated by media relations, campaigning, and political fundraising that there is little left to devote to the substantive work of making public policies and carrying them out. Therefore, the officials they appoint play a key role and have abundant opportunities to make and administer public policy.

Three groups of people work for America's governments — elected, appointed, and career employees. Close to half a million people serve as elected officials, the highest level of whom are famous and visible, often virtual media celebrities. British political scientist and long-time observer of American politics Anthony King called U.S. electoral campaigns “never-ending.” “In other countries election campaigns have both beginning and ends and there are even periods, often prolonged periods, when no campaigns take place at all.”⁵ King also observed that in few countries “do elections and campaigns cost as much as they do in the United States,” which surely is an understatement. Some elected chief executives and legislators in the U.S. care about the serious business of governing. But for most high-level elected officials, the tasks of developing policies and managing government agencies are difficult to pursue while they continuously have to

⁵ Anthony King, “Running Scared,” *Atlantic Monthly*, January 1997, p. 41.

raise funds and campaign for reelection.

The great bulk of government jobs are held by career government workers — civil servants who have tenure in their position. They are employed in national, state, and local civil service systems grounded on the merit principle. They can be members of public-sector unions, which actually is the fastest-growing area of unionization in recent decades. A major aim of both merit systems and public-sector unions is to shield career government employees from the constant political jockeying of elective politics. Workers in career positions like these constitute the great mass of America’s public employees, most in local government.

This was not always the way it was. In the early 19th century, nearly all positions in government were patronage appointments. This was the “spoils system” (to the victors go the spoils). Getting rid of the spoils system by creating civil service jobs outside of politics was a hot-button political reform issue in the late 19th and early 20th century just as campaign contributions are a high-salience issue today. Over the long haul, the civil service reformers prevailed — but not completely.

The remaining group of workers in government, appointed officials, are *selected, not elected*. Although data are not available on the precise number of people in this category, I estimate that upwards of 400,000 people serve in appointive positions in national, state, and local governments. These officials are called *inners and outers*. Many of them do the heavy lifting of policymaking and management inside America’s

governments and play a significant role as change agents in the nation's political system. Yet books about American government tend to ignore them and focus instead on elected office holders — the president, key legislators, governors, and big-city mayors. Although such figures dominate the political stage, if one really wants to understand leadership in American government examining what elected officials do is not enough.

As America's governments over the years have become increasingly involved in funding and regulating more and more areas of national life, so has the role of appointed officials increased — not just in Washington but throughout the country.

Government expenditures account for 17.5 percent of the nation's gross domestic product; governments (federal, state, and local) directly employ nearly 15 percent of the nation's total labor force.

Arrangements of government employees in other industrial democracies are strikingly different from ours in the United States. Career tracks for top-level leaders are much more highly professionalized. A talented person who enters the British civil service can look forward to becoming a permanent secretary, which is the position in British cabinet departments just below that of minister. These positions are typically filled by graduates from elite preparatory schools and the most prestigious universities. In France, exceptional students admitted to L'École National d'Administration similarly can look forward to careers of high responsibility in government. Although public policy graduate schools at American universities have tried (to their credit) to play a similar role in

preparing exceptional students for leadership careers in government, nothing like the British or French arrangements exists here.

The U.S. System

States and local governments do the heavy lifting of domestic government. We could not live without them. They police communities; build, pave, and maintain roads and bridges; administer traffic safety, airports, and parks; collect trash; and assure the provision of drinking water. State and local employees are engaged in teaching, training, and counseling in public schools, community colleges, and universities. They staff prisons and administer the courts. They are responsible for environmental protection. They care for and supervise the care of the elderly and administer programs to lift needy families out of poverty. They provide poor families and also elderly people with subsidized housing. They operate public hospitals, oversee private and not-for-profit hospitals, and provide health care for the indigent. And this is just a partial list.

As for appointed officials who head these large public and publicly aided activities, we know the most about officials in the federal executive branch — a large and influential group. Every four years, after a presidential election, Congress publishes a “Plum Book” (in some years it actually has a plum-colored cover) listing upwards of 8,000 appointive positions in the federal executive branch. This quadrennial listing is the bible for people seeking to enter a new administration. Roughly the same number of appointed employees work for Congress. Even larger numbers of appointed officials,

both executive and legislative, work at the state and local levels. All these officials in America's governments serve at the pleasure (the phrase is important) of whoever appointed them.

Being part of this governing class of insiders and outsiders in America's governments is not a career path. People in these positions enter, exit, and often reenter public service over the course of their professional life. When not in government, they may be lawyers, business executives, professors, journalists, hospital directors, university officials, or officials of nonprofit organizations that often provide publicly funded services. These outer periods often are a time for former officials to regroup, to recharge their batteries, and perhaps to earn a higher salary than in the public sector, thus enabling them to return later on to the public service. In fact, sometimes people who seek to advance public purposes can do so more effectively outside government rather than inside. Periods in between periods of public service can be when individuals advance their purposes by writing and researching or working with major outside organizations. There is less constraint in such venues, more chance to do one's own thing and say one's piece.

Why Serve?

The most important insider jobs, those of agency heads and top policymakers, entail exciting challenges and can have a major effect on society and the economy. Public service like this can produce a gratifying sense of accomplishment along with recognition and prestige. But there is even more to it than this. Successful leadership in the public

service and the professional contacts it involves can enhance the likelihood of landing a well-paid job after one exits government. Although this does not sound noble, it has its good side. It enables the American governmental system to attract people to public service who might otherwise never participate in government.

But appointive leadership in America's governments is not for the faint of heart. The politics of getting appointed and then being in the public service are intense. One appeal of appointive office is that, unlike elective offices, most people in these jobs are not constantly caught up in political fundraising and campaigning. Still, one cannot succeed in government without being political. A thick skin, the courage to take a stand, and the quickness of wit to defend it are essential qualities for appointive public service. It is exhilarating at the top, but it can also be nerve-racking too. Successful appointed leaders need a keen intuitive feel for the constant bargaining that the American political process requires.

The Academic View

Most academic experts on government do not like this politicization of leadership in the public service. They downplay its scale and significance and frequently advocate reducing the number and curbing the role and power of appointed officials. The National Academy of Public Administration periodically takes this position. In 1985, the academy warned that "in a country as heavily dependent as ours on in-and-outers as executive leaders, deficiencies in the appointments system pose a serious risk to public

management.” The academy maintained that

The number of positions filled by political appointment has grown too large and must be reduced. The House Government Operations and Senate Governmental Affairs Committees should conduct a government-wide assessment to identify and reconvert many of those positions where career executives have been replaced by political appointees.⁶

In an influential book, *A Government of Strangers*, political scientist Hugh Heclo called appointed federal executives “birds of passage,” noting that their most obvious characteristic is “transience.” He called for “selectively centralizing, cutting, and pooling partisan appointments.”⁷ Likewise, the 1989 Volcker Commission on the Public Service held that

... the growth in recent years of the number of presidential appointees, whether those subject to Senate confirmation, noncareer senior executives, or personal and confidential assistants, should be curtailed. Although a reduction in the total number of presidential appointees must be based on position-by-position assessment, the Commission is confident that a substantial cut is possible, and believes a cut from the current 3,000 to no

⁶ National Academy of Public Administration, *Leadership in Jeopardy: The Fraying of the Presidential Appointments System* (Washington, DC, November 1985), p. 28.

⁷ Hugh Heclo, *A Government of Strangers* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1977), p. 198.

more than 2,000 is a reasonable target.⁸

More recently, a report issued in 2003 by the successor commission to the earlier Volcker panel on the public service took the same position, urging Congress and the president to “work together to significantly reduce the number of executive branch political positions.”

The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Presidential Appointment Process reached a similar conclusion:

Reducing the number of presidential appointments will improve the appointment process while simultaneously increasing opportunity, raising morale and enhancing the appeal of careers in public service. This reduction would be good for the president, good for appointees, good for the public service, and good for the country.⁹

There is no question that having large numbers of officials serve on a time-limited basis in America’s governments entails costs. One cost is that people may leave government at precisely the point at which they have learned enough to be effective. This cost can be measured in terms of the time new leaders take to learn the ropes. It is the reason they sometimes act too slowly, too quickly, or unwisely. Another cost occurs

⁸ Volcker Commission Report, *Leadership for America: Rebuilding the Public Service* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), p. 7.

⁹ Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Presidential Appointment Process, *Obstacle Course* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996), p. 9.

when elected officials select political hacks for leadership posts in government, unfortunately not an isolated occurrence.

Despite drawbacks, many of the nation's highest-level appointed officials are more qualified for their roles and dedicated to them than most academic experts are willing to admit. When David T. Stanley and colleagues at The Brookings Institution studied 1,000 top appointed leaders from Franklin Roosevelt's presidency through Lyndon Johnson's, they found the executives a "well-qualified group."¹⁰ Noting that these officials served for relatively short periods of time, the authors urged longer tenure, but also pointed out that many of their subjects were "well prepared" because they had held previous governmental positions. A study of federal political appointees conducted by the National Academy of Public Administration said that despite calls to the contrary, the number of top-level jobs is steadily growing.¹¹ Political scientist Linda L. Fisher commented that "our expectations about their qualifications have increased as well," pointing out that "we now expect political executives to be effective managers of large government bureaucracies."¹² In her study of 50 years of appointees, Fisher reported a marked increase in the proportion of people who "came into their positions directly from some other position involving public service,"¹³ although they often had those positions for only short periods (an average of about two years for federal cabinet and subcabinet officials).

¹⁰ David T. Stanley, Dean E. Mann, and Jameson W. Doig, *Men Who Govern: A Biographical Profile of Federal Political Executives* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1967).

¹¹ National Academy of Public Administration, *Presidential Appointee Project* (Washington, DC: The National Academy of Public Administration, 1985).

¹² Linda Fisher, "Fifty Years of Presidential Appointments," in G. Calvin MacKenzie, ed. *The In- and Outers: Presidential Appointees and Transient Government in Washington* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 1.

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 15.

A Debatable Assumption

The easy assumption of opponents of the politization of high-level leadership jobs in the public service that these jobs should be walled off from politics is very debatable. The contrary argument is that all leaders in American life — both public and private — tend to understand each other better in the United States than in other countries precisely because so many of them move back and forth between the governmental and nongovernmental worlds. The fact that appointed officials gain first-hand familiarity with government activities defuses the “we-versus-they” mentality between public servants and the private citizens that can be dangerous to the social order. Another advantage of the existence of this distinctly American appointed governing class is that when top officials want to change a policy, they often can do so relatively easily (or at least more easily than officials in other political systems) simply by changing horses, appointing a new person to a particular job.

Although elected officials are tempted to appoint political hacks, and aspiring candidates to appointive office often seek such positions as a way to advance their professional, business, or policy purposes, there are checks. The highest-level appointees have to be confirmed by the legislature. Moreover, the ubiquitous media are always watching. Conflict-of-interest laws, in addition, help to prevent appointed officials from securing inordinate personal monetary gain from public office. And most of all in the American governmental milieu, the policy process, divided as it is among branches and levels of government, guarantees constant scrutiny of anyone who is influential in public

life.

In sum, appointed officials are a fixture of America's governments. Efforts to downplay appointive leadership can have the effect of discouraging good people who might otherwise be interested in public service. Greater knowledge, which this book seeks to promote, is needed to stimulate more people — talented, dedicated, politically skilled people, both young and older — to consider appointive public service in their career, learn how to succeed in such jobs, and view public service as an integral part of their life experience.

Turnover at the Top

When a new administration takes office, its leaders are confronted by a situation in which many public agencies (national, state, or local) are staffed with noncareer employees (either in appointed jobs or special-status jobs exempt from the civil service) who can be replaced when the new administration takes office. The new administration faces a gray area, deciding which officials to replace and which to keep. If retained, many carryover officials can help a new administration accomplish its purposes; however, pressures for a clean sweep are great. Political operatives who gave their all to elect the new administration will want to obtain as many jobs as they can for themselves and their troops.

Some state governments and large local governments have a tradition of re-staffing new administrations wholesale. Other states and localities are selective about the types of jobs that should turn over when there is a change at the top. Smaller states, and even some relatively large states with a “good government” tradition, retain senior officials when the political party in power changes despite the fact that they may be serving in ostensibly political positions. Even in sensitive policy areas, I have met state officials who have served under many governors, sometimes governors with very different political ideologies. However, in the very biggest states, the practice tends to be the same as at the federal level. Every appointed official automatically resigns with a changeover in the party in power. Sensitivity is necessary even in these situations in deciding which incumbent officeholders are likely to be so helpful to a new administration that they should be retained. Good advice for newly elected officials is to go easy on revenge and build on existing strengths, or at least to wait awhile to decide which politically vulnerable officials should be asked to stay and which asked to leave. A good test of the political smarts of a new regime is whether it blithely sweeps everybody out or selectively retains valuable holdovers.

Types of Inners and Outers

Despite the pressures, snares, and instability of American political processes, good people take, and indeed seek, high-level appointive posts. Their reasons are varied. Most people in these jobs could not tell you everything you would like to know about their motives for entering public service. They may not even be able to sort them out for

themselves — the desire to serve versus the value of a high-level government job as a stepping stone to future opportunity. The most admirable appointed leaders are men and women who are dedicated to the serious work of government. These members of the appointive governing class strike a delicate balance between their private goals and their public purposes. Even when outside government, they maintain contacts (formal and informal) with leaders in the public agencies that involve their interests and expertise. In fact, because of the insecurity of America's appointive governing class, it is necessary that appointed officials have an outside professional, business, or organizational base. Law is one of the main outsider careers of appointed leaders; law is a good career choice generally for young people who aspire to challenging high-level leadership jobs but are not sure what their career track should be. Lawyers who specialize in substantive areas like transportation, the environment, energy, housing, trade, or labor relations are the logical people to fill policy jobs in government, especially if (as is true of many lawyers) they have ties to a political party or an elected leader.

Business executives, too, often enter government as political appointees because like lawyers they develop special familiarity with functional areas of government and also may have ties to a political party. Another source of candidates for appointive posts is academics. Although sometimes depicted as motivated by noncareer goals, academics have much to gain by being inners and outers. Promotions, tenure, salary increases, publications and royalties (not to mention recognition, *oh fame!*) can ensue from public life. In fact, the hardest part for an academic as an inner and outer typically is not getting in, but behaving appropriately after getting out. The temptation (and it is great) is to continue to play politics

in academe. Newly learned behaviors — to seek headlines and advocate are hard to shake. Academics need strong capacity for self-control to play the role of an inner and outer without becoming just another voice in the policy process. The line between partisanship and scholarship, the latter of which should entail teaching people *how* to think, not *what* to think, is not an easy line to draw. This is not a reason academics should eschew public service, but it is a reason they should be especially vigilant in separating politics and scholarship in their teaching after they have served.

Ethics and Influence

Most appointed officials spend their careers within a functional subsystem called an “iron triangle,” which includes executive branch leaders, the chair and/or senior members of the counterpart legislative committees, and leaders of the relevant outside interests. As people move around in these political subsystems they develop extensive, if uncoded, knowledge of how to operate in these special environments. One result of the existence of these functionalized organizational arrangements is that cozy relationships present a challenge for the integrity of public life. Appointed officials face pressures to form ties to an industry or profession in which they used to work and/or may want to work in the future. People who are inside must of necessity keep in mind that sooner or later their bread will be buttered by people who are outside.

Along with governmental checks and balances and constant media scrutiny, legal requirements come into play in deterring officials from abusing this American system of

inners and outers. Federal conflict-of-interest laws prohibit a former official for a period of time, usually two years, from dealing with “a particular matter” that the former official “knows or reasonably should know was actually pending under his or her official responsibility.”¹⁴ Laws like this are not easy to enforce. What is a “particular matter”? However, while temptations exist, it is the *modus operandi* of U.S. governments to clamp down on abuses; democracy is supposed to give lots of interests a chance to exert influence, but always with a bright light shining on whether this occurs according to law and accepted rules and practices.

Foxes in the Chicken Coop

The strongest argument against the reliance on appointed officials as leaders of America’s governments is that the system can put the foxes in the chicken coop. Despite multiple checks and balances, ethics laws, confirmation requirements, and constant media scrutiny, elected officials are tempted to reward friendly interests. Interest group leaders (for the aged, banking, insurance, agriculture, or environmental protection) often like this facet of the system and work hard to arrange appointments for their own people. Troublesome issues arise when advocacy organizations that are major campaign contributors pressure elected leaders to name one of their own to a key post. Campaign contributions to buy access and influence are a special challenge for government in America.

¹⁴ 18 U.S.C.A. § 207

The bottom line is that governments need to enforce ethics laws, but even more importantly governments need to be ever vigilant in rooting out excesses and discouraging bad practices where special interests obtain undue power. Across the landscape in public affairs, the pluralism of American government is the ultimate protective device against abuses — including shoddy practices in the selection and deployment of appointed officials.

3

Getting to Be — and Being — an Appointed Leader

Section 2 dealt with the desirability of having citizens understand America's appointed officialdom so they can enter public service in a leadership role if the stars are aligned. This section looks at how one gets to be an appointed leader and includes suggestions about how to succeed in such positions.

The key phrase above is “if the stars are aligned.” To win appointment, you have to be at the right point in your career, knowledgeable about the pertinent subjects, and politically positioned so that your ideas and values fit the proclivities of appointing officials. This is not something you can plan ahead with any great precision for the obvious reason that no one can predict the often ephemeral shifts in politics and in political values. You can be ready. You can make useful contacts and build networks that will aid you as a candidate for high office. As a young person you can serve in staff jobs and campaign assistantships that hone your skills and provide networking contacts. You can support candidates and work on campaigns. But in the final analysis, no amount of planning for appointive office can assure you that you will be the right person, at the right time, in the right place, for the right job. People should not overbuild their hopes. I say this even though my message is that more citizens — younger and older — should understand the nature of appointive office and keep an eye out for opportunities for high-

level public service.

When that moment occurs, there are some things you can do as a candidate, and some things you can't. There are no hard and fast rules, but there are ways to think about how you can get to be chosen. Assume you are an aspirant with the experience, skills, and contacts to obtain a high-level appointment as an administrator or top policymaker. A new administration is forming or for some other reason a major post in your field opens up. What should you do? You can campaign, but this has to be done artfully. Leadership in public service is seen by observers, especially reporters, as a privilege one must earn without seeming to have gone all out to be selected. So how do you campaign subtly for a job you want?

You mobilize your friends, urging them to write and make phone calls on your behalf. You let them know who they should try to contact and how they should describe your experience and explain why your ideas would enable you to tackle a particular new post. Your supporters should talk to each other and share their feedback with you. You should identify someone you know with media experience to advise you about how to get mentioned in the press. I have heard of aspirants to appointive office hiring public-relations consultants to engineer a campaign for them, but as a rule I think this is unwise. One must at least appear to be called to serve.

Career bureaucratic officials on occasion bite the political bullet and move up to appointive jobs, which entails risk. The risk occurs when their job is done, that is when a

new leader or administration enters office. Sometimes these people can fall back into a civil service rating. Generally, however, moving up and then out is the best bet for career officials inside government who climb the leadership ladder into an appointive post.

The time right after an election is hectic. The first thing many winning candidates do is take a vacation, which is often both needed and deserved. Good as their intentions may be, candidates for elected office and their advisors and handlers are likely to have been so absorbed by campaigning for office that they devote relatively little time and attention before an election to what they will do once elected.

When the people who make the selections for top appointive posts get around to it, time is short, pressures to make decisions are great, and they often have a frenetic, almost chaotic, selection system, if a system at all. Getting your oar in as a candidate requires fast action.

Even if you succeed in getting named to a high-level job, this is not the end of it. At the national level especially, the next steps can be frustrating, owing to the need to clear appointments politically and with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. For the highest-level jobs, Senate confirmation can add further delays and frustration, even embarrassment at the airing of personal matters. Candidates, family members, and friends need to be prepared for shrill opposition tactics to embarrass a candidate. Spreading information about private finances and business relationships that are perfectly legal (otherwise stay clear of public office) is common. This scrutiny is especially tough when

legislators of the political party that is out of power in the executive branch control the confirmation process. The same points apply to large states and cities.

Which Political Party?

Routes to public service often involve networks of acquaintances and colleagues that are partisan. Both Republicans and Democrats have a sense of obligation to their own. Once adopted, partisan identification is like glue. It sticks to you. It is not smart to change parties. It makes a statement about your reliability, and in politics reliability has a high premium. Nobody likes a turncoat. Hence, a major decision for people who aspire to public service is which political party to join. Ideology is an important factor, although it is not the whole story. Family ties are also a factor that draws people to a political party; young people interested in politics often have life-shaping experiences working in campaigns.

While party identification is important, your reputation in a substantive policy area is often more important. Expertise on finance, economics, the environment, agriculture, housing, banking, health, or transportation is likely to be a key in the selection process. Moreover, one's subject area reputation usually encompasses a particular view of the world. These send a signal that politicians know how to receive.

Being Political

Your public identity, both political and substantive, can help you get in the door, but what do you do once you're inside? While you need to be known as substantively knowledgeable, once you have power there is no substitute for political skill in wielding it. Although many appointed leaders want to serve because of their commitment to their community or their field of interest, those who succeed do so because they also have political skills or because they learn on the job how to be effective politically.

There is no one way of conducting yourself inside government. You can't be too standoffish and you need to be thick skinned. People in leadership positions in America's government operate in a cauldron of constant jockeying. It is important to be bold when the occasion demands it. In many situations the give-and-take of high policymaking outweighs fine calibrations of strategy. Knowing when to hold and when to fold is a needed political sixth sense. Experienced players know when it is smart to take a radical position so the action will come to them; they also know when the better course is to bargain incrementally. Sometimes you have to make deals on unrelated matters, supporting a program in one area to get someone's help in another, or agreeing to a project or to appoint someone to an office to win a legislative vote on a wholly different matter. It is naïve to enter public office if you are unwilling to horse trade. But of this be certain, *get fair measure*. Do not make bargains you can't deliver on. And be careful not to make your reputation as a dealmaker, as opposed to being a person of substance standing for policy goals and ideas you care about.

Experienced hands in leadership positions in government learn, or know intuitively, how to relate to players in the governmental process in ways that can advance their purposes. One generalization that is almost always helpful: Give credit rather than take credit. Planting an idea with legislators about something they can take credit for is often the best way to accomplish one's purpose. Telling a legislator about a new project, or telling the member that a reporter is going to call to talk about it, can be the key to building your coalition. A former director of a state agency told me that this kind of base building — on a bipartisan basis — took one-third of his time. The point is that cultivating trust and sharing credit creates political currency of great value.

When an outsider enters government, insiders will proffer assistance. Long-time careerists can be really helpful. But one has to be careful not to let agency insiders so dominate your time and attention that it cuts into efforts to build relationships with other people and groups inside and outside of government. A second caution is not to overcommit to management systems that are excessively time consuming and involve relationships with more people than you can reasonably interact with. A decade ago a very popular management reform was total quality management (TQM). In its most extreme form, TQM can dominate the time of top managers in interactions with multitudes of people deep in agency structures. There is every advantage to getting around and developing a feel for agency operations, but extensive interaction with too many people can be self-defeating. Be careful also not to be taken in by management systems that involve a multitude of agency goals. I have in mind over-relying on

elaborate management systems (see section 5), which attempt to deal with reams of data about program performance, data that often are not accurate or really useful in the real world of pulling and hauling by the many interests attempting to influence agency operations.

Timing

One piece of advice that may provide comfort is that when a person takes on a new position, there is initially the luxury of a honeymoon. This presents an opportunity to ask dumb questions. As a new officeholder, you should talk to a lot of people, people in your own agency and in other agencies and jurisdictions, as well as “customers” (the organizations and individuals affected by your agency’s activities). Good listeners are a rare breed in politics, but a smart one. During this honeymoon period you can gauge the lay of the land and shape your approach to new tasks. There is no substitute for the feel you get from looking around and getting out and about when you enter a new office. Even if you held a previous position in the same agency, as the leader of a new office you have to develop a fresh perspective.

The length of the honeymoon period varies. In a crisis, it will be short. But whatever its length, once the honeymoon is over, it is really over. Then your dumb questions become just that — dumb questions. At that point, the time for action is hard upon the new leader. Generally speaking, you should strike while the iron is hot. Do the tough things early. As time goes by, you will acquire baggage and develop strained

relationships. Taking advantage of the excitement of a new start is generally a good strategy, but remember that you do not have to decide every question when it is raised. Knowing how to wait for the right moment is intuitive for many people. But you can also learn on the job, by thinking about the timing of major decisions carefully and patiently. Major decisions require astute judgment about the right time to act. In fact, the use of time — both early on and over the course of one's tenure in an appointed post — is an important subject. Leaders in government, both elected and appointed, often portray the near term (an hour, a day) as hectic and frenetic — never offering a moment to think and reflect. This may be a good impression to give to outsiders so you can move on to the next subject or person, but it is not an indication of good practice if it is always the way you think and act.

The worst thing you can do is to remain in such perpetual motion that you sacrifice making wise decisions on big issues at the right moment in order to deal with small matters that are better left unattended or delegated to others. President Jimmy Carter's practice of deciding who should use the White House tennis court and when they should play is often cited. Carter, formerly the commander of a nuclear submarine, was said to be a detail person. Some observers of his presidency believe this trait contributed to his lack of achievements in office. Although I think this is overdone, this point about the importance of not being consumed by details is critical. You should stay focused on the big issues.

Interpersonal Relations

Skill in handling interpersonal relationships is critical to leadership inside government. The academic literature on public administration tends to stress that political leaders should be nice. As a general rule, it is best to let people down easily, an iron fist in a velvet glove. But, despite the fact that gentleness and consideration to others often can win the day, leaders who do not recognize when the time is right to discipline subordinates are bound to learn the hard way that you should not sacrifice the courage to act to the desire to be nice. Shy flowers wilt in American politics. Being firm includes taking strong action, including expressing even angry concern about a particular problem or the way a particular matter has been handled. But a good rule of thumb is never to act when you are upset. It is okay to let people think you are angry, but always wise to rely on controlled anger.

Niccolò Machiavelli put his finger on the relationship between leaders and their associates: “When you see the servant thinking more of his own interest than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in everything, such a man will never make a good servant.” He added, “To keep his servant honest the prince ought to study him, honoring him, enriching him, doing him kindness, sharing with him the honors and cares.”¹⁵ Personal gestures and kindnesses are an important part of leadership. Even casual gestures to people who depend on you can be deliberate and purposeful. Still, different people require different strokes. Some people need lots of stroking and thrive on it, others

¹⁵ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Ware, Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1993), p. 182.

need more mystery in their lives. One of the important intuitive skills of being a leader is knowing what makes people tick and how you can motivate them to work productively with you. What makes a particular team member perform effectively is not the same at all times and in all situations. Moods matter, and you also need to be sensitive to your own mood. If you are upset or tense, you need to be careful not to overreact when a person you need over the long haul makes a misstep. This is not to say that it is always right to forgive. You should discipline people if things go badly, and if that doesn't work, you should remove them. Firings should be rare; doing it too often can be a sign of failed leadership.

Besides exercising strength when needed, appointive leaders can sometimes obtain an advantage by being unpredictable. You need to be sure the action comes to you and that your staff and subordinates think in these terms. Overall, the people around you need to know that you care about their performance fulfilling *your* purposes, and that you can take strong action if people stray too far from these purposes.

Officials in government frequently talk extravagantly about other officials in government whom they respect, suggesting that they will always do the bidding of these respected leaders. Such statements, however, often do not reflect what an appointed official really thinks, because loyalties shift. Stroking, even flattering, people can be useful, but be careful if it is you that is being flattered. Calculations about loyalty must be private. You can be loyal to your chief on some issues but not others, at some times but not others, in some settings but not others. This may not be pleasant, but is unavoidable;

you have to be careful about over-relying on personal relationships and sharing confidences with others.

4

Team Building

This section draws a distinction between two types of leadership teams in government, the A-Team and the B-Team. The A-Team consists of people parallel to an appointed leader, such as cabinet or subcabinet colleagues. The B-Team is the appointed leader's support team. The focus first is on the B-Team because forming it is a crucial early step for political appointees and because appointed leaders usually have the most discretion in selecting and deploying their top aides and advisors.

First the B-Team

The word “team” suggests a group of people who share a knowledge of plays. Your support team should consist of a manageable number of people who work closely and well with you on a regular basis. Experts on management write about “span of control” — the point being that a leader can work regularly with a limited number of associates. There is no magic number. Maybe it is seven, maybe ten, but more than a dozen becomes problematic.

You should use three criteria in selecting members of your support team — balance, point of view, and chemistry. Other criteria include intelligence, experience, and

interpersonal skills, but those attributes are givens for associates on any leadership support team.

The most important attribute appointive leaders need to consider in forming their close-in support team is *balance*. Far and away the worst mistake you can make is to choose all one kind of associate. The wise leader knows that input from different types of people is essential — for example, from a political expert, a brainy type, a public-relations type, a hardball type, and a compassionate type. Also factored into this mix should be people from different generations with different professional backgrounds and prior experience. One person can bring several qualities and perspectives to bear — a young person with a Ph.D. in economics who previously worked at a different level of government, for example.

At critical moments, if everyone around you is too hard-boiled or soft-boiled, too analytical, too legalistic, or too political, mistakes are likely to occur. If your support team consists entirely of public-relations types, the group can be too shallow. If team members are all policy wonks, they are likely to lack political skills.

A well-known example of how an unbalanced support team can misfire is President Nixon's circling of the wagons to protect himself in the Watergate crisis. His close-in team was composed almost entirely of political operatives. No one with a sense of history or deep experience in other institutions was part of this inner circle. Bad traits reinforced each other, and the team made wrong decisions until there was no way out.

The other two critical attributes for selecting B-Team members are point of view and chemistry. As to the former, if someone has a decidedly different point of view and values and goals than you, he or she is not likely to be a good B-Team member no matter how talented. Knowing the views of the other side is important, but a close-in associate who is too wedded to these views can disrupt decision making.

The term “chemistry” refers to the elusive quality of people who relate comfortably to you as the leader and to each other. Good chemistry sometimes involves people with similar personalities, but it can also involve people with different qualities who fit together well. Some leaders are intense, impatient, humorless; they may work well with support-team members who are relaxed, patient, funny.

If a leader has a high enough position, many B-Team members are likely to be people the leader chooses. The appointee can tap people inside of government, former associates from outside government, or other outsiders recruited because of their experience or special knowledge relevant to the leader’s goals.

Complications arise if someone other than the leader selects B-Team members or has to approve their appointment, but even a very high-level appointee rarely has full authority in forming a support team. This is because at least some members are likely to hold permanent civil service jobs. They were there before you, and they will be there after you leave. They can wait you out. However, this is not an insurmountable obstacle.

The new appointee should not be categorically suspicious — as too many political types are — of all civil servants, assuming they will be uncooperative and that their perspectives, values, and goals are different from yours. If you inherit careerists around you, it is a good idea to let a little time elapse before deciding whether someone should be moved or removed, assuming you have the authority to do this.

The civil service is usually not so rigid that you cannot motivate people. Civil servants are evaluated regularly for reassignments as well as raises and rewards. Most high-level career officials in the federal government are members of a special corps called the Senior Executive Service.¹⁶ These officials must be canny politicians in their own right because appointed leaders can move them around, even remove them, much more easily now than in the past. This arrangement empowers appointed officials, and is another way in which the governing class of appointed officials can have a strong role.

In the final analysis, insiders and outsiders have to work wisely and well with many members of the permanent government. Despite reservations appointed officials may have about careerists, they need support from them. Civil servants know the rules and the ropes. Their knowledge of the laws and regulations that define how governments conduct their business is often a crucial ingredient to success. A good example is contracting. Much of what modern governments do today occurs through contracts with private companies and nonprofit organizations. Contracting laws and procedures may seem

¹⁶ The Senior Executive Service was established by the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act under President Jimmy Carter as a “good government” reform. However, some management experts think the legislation backfired because it ultimately gave more power and prominence to appointed officials. Reagan’s administration, which succeeded Carter’s, used this authority in ways that enhanced the power of cabinet and subcabinet officials.

arcane, slow, and needlessly complex. Still, appointed leaders must be sure they are well advised on what is possible and permissible in selecting contractors and overseeing their work. Friends and contributors often seek business from government, and indeed their bids may be the best ones you receive, but you need to be absolutely sure. In some cases, you need to recuse yourself from the selection process. There is no substitute for developing trusting working relationships with civil servants who can protect you and help ensure that you are following proper procedures.

There is of course another side to this coin. No matter what their status (whether or not they are members of the Senior Executive Service), career officials have many reasons for wanting to work effectively with political appointees. One reason may be that they agree with appointees' point of view. Another reason may be that civil servants care about the reputation and smooth functioning of their agency. Still another may be that appointed chiefs have leverage — some of it subtle, some less so — such as the ability to assign career employees to remote branch offices.

The A-Team

The A-Team consists of people with parallel jobs, such as the members of a president's or governor's cabinet. In describing the A-Team, we need to be careful about the "team" metaphor, although it is basically useful. Depending on the style of a particular elected chief executive, the cabinet may not be a team in the sense that its members meet frequently and work together closely. But they are nonetheless usefully

viewed as a group. Inept cabinet making can undo a political chief executive in ways that he or she may never be able to correct.

Although the same three criteria apply to the selection of members of the A-Team as to the B-Team (balance, point of view, and chemistry), the ranking of these criteria differs. While balance is the most essential criterion for the B-Team, a chief executive's foremost consideration in choosing cabinet-level and other top officials should be compatibility of point of view. In American government, alliances are evanescent; today's collaborator may be tomorrow's adversary. It is important to seek as much point-of-view compatibility at the top as possible, despite the tendency in American political practice to do just the opposite.

Because stakeholders pull agency heads in so many different directions, there is bound to be trouble if the goals the agency heads care about are decidedly different from those of their chief. Under such conditions cabinet members are likely to build their strongest alliances with other power centers, such as legislative committees, interest groups, corporations, and unions. There are huge temptations to do this. The executive branch of an American government (federal, state, or local), never a cohesive entity, is likely under these conditions to become a collection of unhappy people whose relationships with their chief and with each other are decidedly strained, even antagonistic.

Some readers may find the caution that top elected officials and their principal aides should avoid ideologically fragmented cabinet making exaggerated, but habits die hard in American government. Elected chief executives too often choose ideologically diverse cabinets. Most presidents, governors, and mayors are elected by centrist coalitions of organizations and voters representing a mix of ideas. Elections tend to be won in the middle of the ideological spectrum, and the center is by nature squishy. An eclectic approach to cabinet making stressing ideological diversity may seem logical, but be careful of that. It is unwise to choose cabinet members who are more beholden to other drummers than to the chief. It is difficult enough to maintain even a reasonable level of policy cohesion amid the pluralism of American government. A strategy that gives up the game before the kickoff is not a good one.

The Subcabinet

Presidents, governors, and chief executives of large cities and counties need to have a strong hand in choosing the members of their top cabinet officials and their own personal close-in staff. Although they can delegate some portion of these tasks to a chief of staff, it is not a good idea to delegate too much, as the person who chooses the members of cabinet or of the White House staff or a governor's top aides is likely to win and hold those appointees' loyalty. However, the elected chief should not and probably can't select everyone appointed to the subcabinet (undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, agency heads, etc.) Which subcabinet appointments should be made centrally, and which delegated to cabinet appointees?

There are pulls in both directions. On the one hand, making these appointments centrally enables the elected chief to more easily achieve point-of-view compatibility. If the director of, say, the highway department, which is part of the department of transportation, is chosen by the governor, one would expect decisions about major highway routes to be in line with the governor's policy preferences and political needs. But on the other hand, if the cabinet secretary who heads the transportation department does not have at least some hand in this selection process, it is hard for the governor to hold that cabinet secretary accountable.

No single approach to choosing subcabinet appointees is right for all seasons. Elected chiefs can establish tight clearance procedures for all agency appointments or delegate all of them to cabinet members. An elected chief is unlikely to take an all-or-nothing position. Even for delegated subcabinet appointments, it is wise for the elected chief to maintain vetting or consultative processes. Likewise, when subcabinet appointments are centralized, it is wise for a chief executive to consult cabinet agency heads about the choices.

5

Making Policy

How does a leader inside America's governments decide which policy goals to pursue and how to pursue them? Policymaking includes influencing the legislative process, responding to legal challenges regarding public services, issuing regulations and policy guidelines, and appointing other officials — all of which require constant decisionmaking on strategies and goals. This section juxtaposes two social science disciplines, economics and political science, to discuss the intellectual underpinnings of policymaking.

Macroeconomics is the study of how economies operate in the aggregate. It exerted its greatest influence on the U.S. federal government in the 1960s. The Kennedy administration drew on the writing of John Maynard Keynes to achieve noninflationary economic growth by cutting taxes to avoid “fiscal drag” and thereby enable the economy to operate at full capacity. Later, in the Johnson years, microeconomics, the more detailed study of economic behavior, came to exert a similarly strong influence inside government. This section of the *Handbook* focuses on microeconomics and theories of public administration to government policymaking.

The Budget Process

The budget process is the spinal column of public policymaking. Appointed officials often enter government with only general ideas about budgeting. But, like it or not, they are soon caught up in the budgetary process, which inevitably includes processes and regulations that heavily influence the content of public policy and its implementation.

An influential school of thought regarding government budgeting is derived from political science, and is best reflected in the writings of Charles E. Lindblom, an economist by training. Lindblom published a seminal article in the *Public Administrative Review* in 1959 called “The Science of ‘Muddling Through.’” He began by noting that there are two ways to solve complex policy problems — by root and by branch. The root approach looks at the whole. It is grounded in theory, examines all possible solutions to a problem, and weighs the costs and benefits of each to allow the decisionmaker to choose the best one. This rational-planning approach, said Lindblom, is “of course impossible.... It assumes intellectual capacities and sources of information that men simply do not possess, and it is even more absurd as an approach to policy when the time and money that can be allocated to a policy problem is limited, as is always the case.”¹⁷

By contrast, the branch method, which Lindblom sought “to clarify and formalize,” is the method of making successive limited comparisons in order to adjust

¹⁷ Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through,’” *Public Administration Review* 19 (Spring 1959): 80.

policy at the margins. According to Lindblom, this method is best suited to policymaking in democracies. It is unfortunate, he added, that “the literatures of decision-making, policy formulation, planning, and public administration formalize the first approach rather than the second, leaving public administrators who handle complex decisions in the position of practicing what few preach.”¹⁸ Although Lindblom called this process of muddling through a science, it was with tongue in cheek. The point is that the policy process is dynamic. It is an art form. Judgment, skill, and timing by jockeying stakeholders in budget processes determine the outcome of most policy issues. Moreover, once a decision is made, it rarely stays made. Public policies constantly need to be tended and amended.

My reason for discussing Lindblom’s views is to compare the “branch method” with theories in microeconomics that reflect the root method. An explicit and revealing illustration of the difference between these two methods played out in President Lyndon Johnson’s effort in the mid-1960s to remake the budgetary process in the style of microeconomics by establishing the “planning-programming-budgeting system” (PPB).

A Case Study: The PPB System

The PPB approach to budgeting, based on systems analysis in the private sector, was applied by Robert S. McNamara, former president of Ford Motor Co., who was originally appointed by President Kennedy as secretary of defense. McNamara and his staff of “whiz kids” used systems analysis to compare alternative weapon systems. Their

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 80

goal was to increase the leverage of the secretary in relation to the individual armed services. Before the Vietnam War escalated, McNamara was riding high. In 1965, President Johnson decided that because of his success, McNamara's approach should be applied not just in the defense sector but across the board in government.

In an executive order issued in August 1965, Johnson, in characteristically ebullient fashion, directed all federal agencies to apply the PPB approach to the entire budgetary process. Federal agencies were to prepare planning documents and then issue analytical papers backing up their budget recommendations to the Bureau of the Budget. (This was before the bureau was reorganized and renamed the Office of Management and Budget in 1970.) Agencies were supposed to identify program objectives and subject different methods of fulfilling them to systematic comparison. Formally, this process was to consist of three kinds of reports prepared by each agency: *program memoranda*, describing the agency's strategy and comparing the cost and effectiveness of major alternative programs; *special analytic studies*, examining current and longer-run issues; and *program and financial plans*, summarizing program choices in terms of their outputs and costs, usually over a five-year period.

The experience with PPB was, to say the least, disappointing. The paper did not flow, or it overflowed. Federal agencies used familiar bureaucratic strategies to continue to operate the budget process the way they were used to doing it. In some cases, they simply did not submit the required planning memoranda and analysis. Agency officials and often also the staff of the Budget Bureau operated as if nothing had changed. In other

cases, agencies used the tactic of swamping the Budget Bureau with thick planning documents and elaborate issue papers that few, if any, high officials of the submitting agency had ever read. Agencies sometimes sent documents to the bureau in cardboard boxes containing material that top officials could not possibly have thoughtfully considered.

Three years after President Johnson established the government-wide PPB system, President Nixon quietly issued a memorandum abolishing it that began: “Agencies are no longer required to . . .” and then summarized the steps of the PPB system. Budget expert Allen Schick, in an article on this little-noticed “death in the bureaucracy,” pointed out, “No mention was made in the memo of the three initials which dazzled the world of budgeting when the PPB system was announced.”¹⁹

Economist Charles Schultze, an accomplished inner and outer in the federal government, was a central figure in this story. As director of the Budget Bureau when PPB was put in place, he was at the forefront of this effort to apply microeconomics in government. After leaving the Johnson administration, Schultze discussed his experience in trying to implement PPB in a series of lectures at the University of California.²⁰ The lectures are a fascinating retrospective on the application of the root method to governmental policymaking.

¹⁹ Allen Schick, “A Death in the Bureaucracy,” in C. Albert Hyde and Jay M. Shafritz, eds., *Government Budgeting: Theory, Process, Politics* (Oak Park, IL: Moore, 1978), p. 191.

²⁰ Charles L. Schultze, *The Politics and Economics of Public Spending* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1968).

Schultze specifically indicated sympathy with Lindblom's argument about the difficulty of specifying the objectives of every possible policy alternative and comparing those alternatives. Then, citing Lindblom's idea of muddling through, Schultze maintained that the PPB approach needed to adapt to the political process. In fact, he said, this is what actually happened under President Johnson. According to Schultze, "program planning and evaluation staffs in the agency head's immediate office, created by the PPB system, strengthen the role of the agency head in relations with the operating units."²¹ The legacy of PPB was that it made policy analysts (new agency staff members) players in policymaking. They became a permanent force, adding an analytical dimension to budgeting. They were empowered. Although not customarily discussed in these terms, this is what all budget reforms are all about — *power*. Although federal government budgeting became more analytical, it didn't change all that much. It was still, and still is, an inherently political process.

Other "Reforms"

The PPB system is not the only effort by reformers to make government decisionmaking more rational. Under President Carter in the late 1970s, the aim of applying the root method to governmental budgeting was advanced under the banner of "zero-based budgeting" (ZBB). This approach, as its name implies, required that every budget decision be made as if it were an entirely new decision, with planners systematically evaluating all the options for pursuing the contemplated purposes. President Nixon had earlier advanced a similar reform called "management by

²¹ Ibid, p. 94.

objectives” (MBO). Both Nixon’s MBO system and Carter’s ZBB system, like PPB before them, called for new processes, players, and documents, and both bit the dust unceremoniously. Still, they added to PPB’s legacy of empowering policy analysts in decisionmaking.

Aaron Wildavsky, a political scientist who played a major role in both interpreting and influencing public budgeting, published a widely read book in 1964 calling all of these budget “reforms” not rational, but *non-rational*. He argued that despite assertions to the contrary, most budget decisions are *incremental*.²² Each year, he said, decisionmakers look at what is being spent and decide how much to add to or subtract from each account, sometimes changing the way programs work but rarely deeply analyzing whether a given program is justified.

Fifteen years after the first edition of Wildavsky’s book on the budgetary process, he published a new version that announced a further evolution in his thinking. Although he had written the first edition to show that the “accepted paradigm does not describe either how budgetary decisions are made or how they might be made,” now he wanted to go further: “This third edition claims (how well the reader will have to judge) that putting objectives first, alternatives second, and choices third is inefficient as a method of calculation, ineffective in relating thought to action, and inappropriate as a design for learning.”²³ Specifically referring to PPB and Carter’s zero-based budgeting system, Wildavsky asserted: “Rational choice (it is always right to be rational) limits calculations

²² Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962), p. 13, emphasis added.

²³ Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process*, third edition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p.v.

so choices can be made, uses history to correct mistakes, harnesses power through organizational incentives, and never, never ranks objectives or resources alone but always together.”²⁴ PPB and ZBB, said Wildavsky, take the exact opposite tack.²⁵

Since the earlier version of this *Handbook*, similar reforms have appeared under the rubric of the “performance management movement,” discussed in the next section.

Ironically, management fads in government are not in sync with thinking on business management. Experts on business management warn against micromanagement, sometimes called “paralysis by analysis.” A book that circulated widely in the 1980s called instead for the ‘*tight/loose*’ approach — tight concerning goals and loose about giving subsidiaries the flexibility to achieve them.²⁶

Where Do New Ideas Come From?

Although much of what happens in government policymaking is incremental, new ideas do happen. In the 1980s, political scientist John W. Kingdon conducted an influential study on new ideas in government.²⁷ Kingdon’s study consisted of interviews with elected and appointed federal officials, career officials, and people outside government representing interest groups, the media, and academe. He interviewed 247 people who were involved in health and transportation policymaking from 1976 to 1979.

²⁴ Ibid, p. v.

²⁵ Ibid, p. vi.

²⁶ Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr., *In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America’s Best-Run Companies* (New York: Harper & Row, 1982).

²⁷ John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984).

Kingdon's focus was on "policy entrepreneurs," whom he defined as people who operate in three streams that flow into the policy process — problem streams, policy streams, and political streams. When the three streams converge, Kingdon said the result can be policy change. Kingdon added that "focusing events" cause these convergences to occur, often in ways that are unpredictable at moments when "policy windows" open, allowing policy entrepreneurs to build coalitions.

Kingdon's sensible book makes one point that fits especially well with this *Handbook* on the role that appointed officials play in this process. "If any one set of participants in the policy process is important in the shaping of the agenda, it is elected officials and their appointees, rather than career bureaucrats or nongovernmental actors."²⁸ Compared with elected and appointed officials, Kingdon said, interest groups are important, but more in blocking than originating in policy changes. He found academics, policy researchers, and consultants important actors in shaping policy alternatives.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 20.

6

Implementing Policy

Participants in policymaking positions in government are engaged in multiple arenas that involve incessant bargaining and jockeying. Most elected officials have little time to devote to what happens to policies after they are made. Moreover, public policies, once made, almost never are so precise and transparent that they can be self-executing. This provides opportunities for appointed officials, but they need to carefully weigh how best to proceed and how best to obtain feedback and evaluate policy implementation.

At their roots, most public policies represent efforts to change the behavior of large institutions and organizations. They are important only if they do so. No matter how well-crafted a public policy, how pure its intent, all is for naught unless the policy is implemented. This process of converting “good” intentions into “good” results is a good basis for the public to judge the performance of leaders in government. In “The Hollow Men,” T. S. Eliot wrote,

Between the idea

And the reality

Between the motion

And the act

Falls the Shadow

It is in this shadowland of policy implementation that appointed officials often do their most important work.

Implementation as Exploration

The first piece of advice for appointed leaders who care about policy implementation is to move around, get out and about, especially early in your tenure. There are few things as harmful to effective management in government as spending all or most of one's time in Washington, Albany, or Sacramento. Distant observation deadens sensitivity to the work state and local governments and myriad for-profit and nonprofit organizations do at ground level. This is not to say that appointed leaders can grapple personally with all the details of implementing all public policies and micromanage them. However, unless a leader has a feel for what occurs at ground level, it is hard to provide direction for implementation. Not only do appointed leaders need to develop a feel for ground-level administration, it is good to be seen doing so. You signal in this way that you are watching.

An important book on policy implementation published in 1984 included three words from a chapter by Angela Browne and Aaron Wildavsky that encapsulate my point. "*Implementation is exploration.*"²⁹ To succeed, appointed leaders must be alert to constant changes in public policy that occur in its implementation.

Textbooks on American government often define away this role in policy implementation for top political leaders in government by drawing a distinction between making policies and carrying them out. They depict making policy as political, whereas

²⁹ Angela Browne and Aaron Wildavsky, "Implementation Is Exploration," in Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, eds., *Implementation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 254, Italics added.

implementation is seen as an administrative task for career officials who take charge of policies once they are agreed upon and do the things necessary (write regulations and exercise oversight) to put them into effect.

Nice as it might be to adopt such a neat distinction, it doesn't work. Most public policies are vague, and their character and purposes change frequently. Different leaders inside governments, both elected and appointed leaders, define policy goals in different ways, at different times — often in an effort to assemble or hold the political coalition necessary to adopt or sustain a given policy. Also, a different participant in the policy process is likely to put a different spin on policy goals at different times depending on the audience being addressed. Leaders of outside groups know the game. It is not unusual for them when trying to influence policy implementation to change the essence of governmental action. Oversight of implementation by appointed officials can make a big difference. However, the higher up you go in government, the harder it is to exercise oversight. Although good feedback is essential both for policymakers and the public, obtaining it is a challenge because of the vast number and diversity of agents that carry out domestic public policies.

How to Keep Track?

Increasingly, private and nonprofit organizations have become the agents of domestic public purposes. Privatization and “*nonprofitization*” are intrinsic to public management.

Officials have to be clear about the type and level of feedback about policy implementation they can realistically obtain and use from both other levels of government as well as from private and nonprofit contractors. Trying to micromanage activities too far down in the governmental food chain can be a source of great frustration.

One useful way to think about the governmental process is that all governmental activities have three dimensions — setting policies, paying for their execution, and carrying them out. A health program, for example, can have national goals, be partially paid for by the federal government, and be administered by a state government or by a local consortium of hospitals and clinics. The key to exercising oversight is knowing what level of government or types of institution has *preponderate* responsibility. If the national government sets goals and pays part (but not most) of the costs of a given service, but does not administer that service, it is not realistic for federal officials to know everything about every aspect of program implementation. In a nutshell, managerial oversight has to reflect who's in charge.

Reporters are notorious for demanding information in a way that misunderstands this reality of American federalism. Yet when a conscientious public official tries to set them straight, the press often regards that as trying to fend off responsibility. Unfortunately, the failure to face up to this challenge and deal with accountability questions directly and candidly feeds resentment of governmental bureaucracies.

In the nineties, innovations for policy oversight have been expanded to subject public governmental policy implementation to the appealing test — *what works?* The ultimate criterion, it is said, should not be whether a given policy was carried out exactly as intended (that’s an input), but whether it made a difference to the people or groups it was supposed to affect. The goal of the performance-management movement is to “manage for results,” to measure the outcomes of governmental actions.

In 1993 the U.S. Congress enacted a law requiring the federal government to manage for results. Called the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA or the “Results Act” for short), the legislation set up procedures for scoring the performance of all federal agencies.³⁰ Then House Majority Leader Dick Arme y stated the purpose of the law as follows in a letter to the director of the Office of Management and Budget. The Results Act is “designed to systematically provide Government decision-makers and the public with reliable information on what actual results federal programs and activities are achieving — i.e., what is working, what is wasted, what needs to be improved, and what needs to be rethought.”³¹ Under the terms of the act, each agency is required to submit a plan to the Office of Management and Budget setting out its goals and indicating specifically how they will be achieved.

³⁰ The Rockefeller Institute assembled expert views on this law, especially as it affects domestic programs and state and local governments. See Dall W. Forsythe, ed., *Quicker, Better, Cheaper: Managing Performance in American Government* (Albany: Rockefeller Institute Press, 2001).

³¹ Dick Arme y, letter to Franklin D. Raines, “*RE: Results Act Implementation*,” August 7, 1997.

Regrettably for its authors, the 1993 law got off to a bad start according to a task force of House staff members assigned to monitor the GPRA process, which assigned numeric scores to agency plans submitted under the act. The task force scored plans for 10 factors, with up to 10 points for each so that with a possible 5-point bonus the best-performing agency could receive a score of 105. However, the highest score in the task force review was less than half of that — 62, given to the Social Security Administration. The lowest score was 6.5 for the Labor Department. Other agency scores ranged from 60 to 11. The mean score was 26.5.

It is notable that among federal agencies the Social Security Administration, which received the highest score, also stands out for having *preponderate* responsibility for administering the programs under its jurisdiction. By contrast, the Labor Department carries out almost all its programs through grants and contracts for states, localities, and contractors for training and employment programs.

Representative Armeý's early assessment was hopeful but concerned. "Much remains to be done," he said, adding that these scores "illustrate rather starkly how far agencies are from the ideal."³² Subsequent reports from the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) were less upbeat. GAO in 1997 said that "examples of substantial performance improvements were relatively few, and that many agencies did not appear to be well positioned to provide in 1997 a results-oriented answer to the fundamental

³² Ibid.

Results Act question: What are we accomplishing?”³³ The GAO has repeatedly pointed out that one of the main barriers to implementing the GPRA is the difficulty of measuring results for “programs that deliver services to taxpayers through third parties, such as state and local governments.”³⁴ In point of fact, the bulk of domestic social services are performed this way — under grants and contracts with literally thousands of administrative agents. The bottom line is that when higher levels of government (national or state) do not themselves pay the piper, they cannot call the tune. It is unwise to obligate them to collect data in a way that assumes that they can do so.

Take a federal grant-in-aid to states for intensive reading remediation for high school students that is disbursed initially by the state to local school districts. A school in a suburb may spend the same amount of grant money per student under this program as a school in a distressed urban neighborhood, and yet reading scores in the suburb may be much higher than those in the city. Does this mean that the students in the suburb performed better because of the grant? One obviously has to take into account the environmental conditions that make it hard to teach kids in the distressed urban schools.

There are several ways one can ask for feedback about the results school districts and schools achieve. One can ask what activities they funded with the federal money. This is *process evaluation on inputs*. One can also try to measure *outputs*: How many students passed a particular reading test? The next level of results is the hardest of all: *outcomes* — measuring whether a given program made a difference.

³³ U.S. General Accounting Office, “*Managing for Results: Prospects for Effective Implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act*” (Washington, DC: June 3, 1997), GAO/T- GGD-97-113, p. 5.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

A research expert is likely to say that what is really needed to assess outcomes is a social experiment with a control group that gets at what is called the *counterfactual*. What would have happened in the absence of the federally aided reading remediation program? Far and away, the preferred method for conducting social experiments is to randomly assign some students in each school district to a treatment group (that gets the special reading curriculum) and a control group (randomly assigned similar students who don't get the special reading curriculum) and then observe the differences in the performance of the two groups. That can be the basis for answering the hardest questions: Did the money spent on the remediation curriculum make a difference? By how much? Where? For whom?

Unfortunately, social experiments are very expensive, time consuming, and extremely difficult to conduct in the real world. They cannot be carried out for every goal or social program. For this reason, the ideal of measuring the outcomes of government programs runs the risk of deterring even the most conscientious government officials from trying to hold all agencies and agents accountable. Officials have to conduct social experiments *selectively*, and then use random-assignment methodologies to produce *benchmarks* for assessing other programs, not to try to, or expect to be able to, measure the results of every program. In the example just given, policymakers would like to be able to argue that if students in a particular reading program with certain kinds of characteristics score above a certain benchmark reading level, that program is viewed as

having produced its results.³⁵ Admittedly, such restraint is hard to apply in the typical political environment in which overpromising is endemic to winning support for something you want to do. Realism and subtlety are called for in establishing goals and evaluating public programs.

A pragmatic approach using multiple techniques for ratcheting up goals requires the leader to meet and work closely with managers using the best, most appropriate, and understandable data available about processes, outputs, and outcomes. A leader who keeps an eye on the clearest management data available in this way can bring incentives to bear — promotions, bonuses, and opportunities for advanced training and networking that enhance the careers of high-performing program managers. Regular report cards on outputs can be used to showcase successes. Leaders can achieve a great deal this way by using practical day-to-day accountability tools in give-and-take relationships with program officials. Experts and policy analysts can aid the leader in selecting the best benchmarks, but the key point is that skillful leaders have to blend rigorous evaluation tools with informed, active oversight grounded in the best available data and expertise.

³⁵ For a longer discussion of the author's views, see *Social Science in Government: The Role of Policy Researchers* (Albany: Rockefeller Institute Press, 2000).

7

Dealing with the Media

An appointed official in government must cultivate the media and always appear to be talking candidly to them. This is hard because there is so much hype in public relations and because there is so little time to get one's point across, especially on television. Telegenic elected leaders who are good at sound bites and have celebrity status often make government unpopular because they oversimplify and play on people's emotions about the foibles of bureaucracies. What is most irritating is that these leaders set the tone. Their simplistic treatment demeans hardworking people inside government carrying out its day-to-day business.

One of your biggest problems as an appointed official in government will be that you will get publicity when you don't want it and can't get it when you do. Reporters seek controversy — better yet, a good fight. You get noticed if you mess up or if you take somebody on or vice versa. Most of the time, it is not worth the trouble to try to find journalists who write about success stories and the serious work of governing. Look at it from their side. Media competition for audiences is intense. It is hard for journalists to get noticed with ever-growing information sources — television, newspapers, magazines, radio stations, and web sites. Given this reality, here are ideas for dealing with the press:

- *Maintaining your image and making it as good as you can is one of the hardest and subtlest challenges you will face as an appointed official in government.* Some reporters are not going to like what you are doing, seeing it as too conservative, too liberal, or just not what they think you should be doing. While they may profess and believe that they adhere to high standards of journalistic objectivity, after a while bad relationships develop if the chemistry is just wrong. The higher up you go in government and the more visible you become, the more likely it is that such animosities will emerge. Where there are weaknesses in your record and vulnerabilities in your performance (and there are bound to be some), a reporter who has it in for you will find them. Therefore, you need to be scrupulous in protecting your integrity. The bolder you are in trying to change policies or win the adoption of new policies, the more likely your success as a government official will hinge on this advice.
- *Calls from reporters should get your quick personal attention.* The higher you go in government, the more likely it is that you will have a press assistant. Still, there is no substitute for taking press calls yourself when a subject you are working on is timely and hot. News is perishable and reporters care about hearing you talk in your own voice and asking you questions.
- *There is a corollary: You don't need to be accessible all the time.* If you don't want to answer certain questions, don't take calls from reporters who are likely to ask them. "No comment" is a bad answer.

- *Be sparing about going “off the record.”* In effect, you are saying I will give you a tip, or a story, or help you on a story, but you can’t use my name. You aren’t identified because someone would not like what you are saying. The main reason you do this (and you should do it selectively) is that it creates chits. The next time you are in a hot spot, the reporter owes you one.
- *Some adversaries you acquire along the way in government should be treated deferentially in the press, some not so deferentially.* These are basically two different groups. Some adversaries will never be anything else. Having them on the other side can even be helpful to you. Other adversaries will be adversaries one day and friends the next. You should reserve the attack mode for the first group.
- *Care about your style.* If you are shrill and always hurling lightning bolts, you may get ink, but you won’t get respect. The saying “I don’t care what they say about me as long as they spell my name right” is not good guidance.

Reporters are powerful. They don’t always make the world a better place, but on the whole our political system is well served by their constant scrutiny. It helps to create what political scientist Wallace Sayre called the “self-cleaning” character of American politics.

8

Wielding Power and Expanding the Talent Pool in America's Governments

Appointed officials have substantial responsibilities for setting public policies and carrying them out. This is a challenging role that often brings satisfaction from public service. It can also bring a heady feeling of power and responsibility and pave the way to future successes. As a country, we need to find ways to convince the wisest and most talented citizens to seek appointive office and bring them to the attention of elected officials.

Ten Rules

The following suggestions are presented by way of a summary as to how you can be a success as an appointed official.

1. *Leaders are role models.* Your ideas, your administrative skills, and your politics are not all that matter. The leader sets a tone concerning responsibility, country, and respect for others.
2. *Care about partisanship.* Ultimately, the road to high office will label you politically and require that you choose a partisan label. Make a choice you can live with. This is not to say that being a Democrat means that you will never serve

under a Republican administration or vice versa. There are times when elected officials see advantages in appointing people of the opposition party to key posts. But this is the exception not the rule.

3. Failing to take account of the pluralism of American government, the barrier reef of federalism, can wreck your voyages. You need to be ever mindful of the states and huge number of local governments and key stakeholder groups that have a role to play in domestic affairs.
4. *Cultivate the press.* The hard challenge in doing so requires that you be a straight shooter and win and hold respect while at the same time being lively and interesting. This is a hard balance to strike. You have to think about which reporters to talk to and which not to call back, when to go on camera, when not. You will need a good press assistant to develop media contacts and write announcements and releases. But in the final analysis your image and public persona have to be of your own making.
5. *Be consistent.* Don't try on a lot of different personas and thus appear to be unpredictable. Think about what you stand for and stay on course.
6. *Be careful about confidences.* It is important to have trusted colleagues and associates, but trust has its limits. The political world changes all the time. There are bound to be situations in which you cannot rely on people you like to do what

- you want, or to work with you in ways you want. But in periods of intense political maneuvering, you should keep your private opinions to yourself.
7. *Pace yourself.* Conserve your energy so you are fresh for major tasks. A good sense of timing is necessary. You need to think about when to act and when to wait. Patience does not come easily to people who are action oriented. This is especially the case in big bureaucracies where delay is endemic. Nevertheless, patience is called for in situations where letting the action come to you will give you more options, more scope for action — more power.
 8. *Be careful about jokes.* Witty remarks about how somebody erred or has a flawed personality have a way of backfiring. The critical distinction is between gracious humor (a nice touch) and sarcasm. Sarcasm is dangerous in public life.
 9. *Think about your future.* Families have to eat. Kids have to go to college. The opportunities you have to maneuver when you are moving from an inner to an outer are limited. Still, you can cultivate relationships so that at the right moment you can make the right decisions.
 10. *Start early.* When you are young, you can try different roles in and around government and politics. If public service appeals to you, you need to be thinking even then about developing a professional base and type of expertise. Appointive posts are inherently time limited.

Expanding the Talent Pool for Appointive Public Service

Because there is so little generalized understanding of appointive leadership in America's governments, people who might be interested in high-level jobs tend not to know about the numbers, character, and roles of inners and outers in the public service. Often people learn about these roles when it is too late to set their sights on serving in them. As a nation we need to think about how to increase the talent pool for appointive posts. When a newly elected leader or different political party takes office, the process of assembling people tends to be short and hectic, sandwiched between the election and the inauguration. Most of the key actors are exhausted and need rest.

The American political system would be well served by steps to aide transitions and appointment processes. What I think is needed are measures to institutionalize processes that can provide trustworthy, well-vetted information on candidates for appointive office. Such institution building to broaden the talent pool for appointive office is made more complex by the need to pass a political litmus test. Another challenge is that many candidates for such positions tend not to be known because they operate in specialized areas. Also, the best candidates often are deferential (at least publicly), insisting they do not seek office. Salaries in the public sector, even for cabinet positions, tend to be lower than the best candidates receive in the private sector or in leadership positions at universities, foundations, or other organizations. In a 1998 survey of 1,000 recipients of master's degrees from 13 graduate schools of public policy, public

administration, and public affairs, Paul Light identified what he called “the end of government-centered public service.”³⁶ Many of the respondents chose positions in nonprofit organizations or the private sector. However, Light also confirmed that many people move among the public, private, and nonprofit sectors.

Government service at the right time in a career can appeal to people if they receive the right information. Indeed, public service can be the experience of a lifetime. What is needed are better ways to link appointing officials with qualified candidates. In the private sector, head-hunting firms fill this role and are well paid for doing so, but in the public sector there is resistance to paying as much as one-half of a new appointee’s first-year salary to a head-hunting firm. Inventive attention to preparing and using dossiers about potential candidates for appointive office is needed. This should include vetting candidates outside the immediate geographical and personal circle of the appointing official, men and women who nevertheless have similar values and the right qualities for rapport. Devoting institutional capability to increasing the supply of candidates for appointive office would send a signal about the importance of finding talented candidates for leadership positions in the public service.

People who have succeeded in their chosen field often feel they have not repaid the nation. We need mechanisms for networking to get to such people — to open the door to them to appointive public service. Identifying candidates, obtaining their consent to put their name forward, and presenting a case as to why a certain elected official should consider them for a post requires time, money, and ingenuity, but the stakes are high

³⁶ Paul C. Light, *The New Public Service* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1999).

enough to make it worthwhile. Foundations could provide a support for expanding talent pools for appointive public service. As a first step, they should convene a group of former elected and appointed officials to support mechanisms to perform this role.

Public management is about getting things done. More than anything else, it involves selecting and working with a mix of people you trust — people you understand and deploy wisely. It is about showing them what you want to achieve by signaling your priorities and staying with them. It is about leading — creating an image that embodies your values and goals. Appointive positions involve learning and leading. Appointed officials must always remember that power in a democracy is on loan. The terms of the loan require good behavior and adherence to values that can win and hold support. The power of appointed officials is hard to retain; it is perishable if you abuse the public trust. There are plenty of people watching you — the politicians who appointed you, their adversaries who have different purposes from yours, the ubiquitous media, other branches and levels of government, interest groups, and the citizenry you serve. All have access to instruments for curbing — or eliminating — your power. Inners and outers can turn governmental purposes into results by setting and adjusting goals wisely and paying close attention to how they are carried out. America's governments are fragmented, diverse, and fast changing. American political pluralism, with its multiple actors and constant policy bargaining, tends to be rough and tumble. The bargaining of public life reflects an almost frontier-like spirit that resents people who have political power yet needs and respects its savvy exercise. You have to be strong.

Appendix

American Federalism

Appointed officials who work in domestic public affairs have to have a clear understanding of American federalism. The U.S. Bureau of the Census surveys America's governments every five years in years ending in "2" and "7" — dates that are as far away as possible from the decennial census years. The Census of Governments describes the characteristics, finances, and personnel of all "governmental units." Their total number is huge.

To be classified as a government, an entity must possess three attributes: existence as an organized unit, governmental character, and substantial autonomy. In 2002 the United States officially had 87,586 governmental units. With the exception of the federal government and the 50 state governments, about half are general-purpose local governments. The rest have special purposes. In 2002, general-purpose local governments included 3,034 counties, 19,429 cities, and 16,504 towns and townships. The remaining local units include 13,506 school districts and special-purpose districts for functions such as firefighting (5,725), housing and community development (3,399), water supply (3,405), sewerage (2,004), hospitals (711), and airports (510).

Illinois had the most local governments (6,904) in 2002 and Hawaii the least (20). Most local governments in the United States are small. Half of all municipalities (called villages or boroughs in some states) include fewer than 1,000 people. One-quarter of all counties have populations under 10,000.

The following are cardinal characteristics of the structure of American federalism:

- Fragmentation. Since the United States has so many local governments, it is clear that Americans must like localism. They want to be part of a community, living with people like themselves.
- Diversity. A second striking characteristic of American federalism is the diversity of local governmental arrangements, both among and within states. States determine both the roles and structure of local governments. Their practices are not uniform. In some states, counties are the most powerful local governments and have appreciable powers. This is the case, for example, in Maryland, New York, and California. In other states, counties perform few functions, as in Massachusetts and Connecticut where they are little more than the boundaries for judicial districts. In some states, towns are more important than cities. New York State had 8,246 towns in 1997, of which 1,133 had more than 300,000 people; no other state has towns of that size.
- Layering. Not only does America have many and diverse local governments, but they tend to be piled on top of each other. This adds to the challenge of all public officials in overseeing policy implementation. Most people live in multiple local jurisdictions and pay taxes to several local governments, often with relatively little idea of which local governments are receiving their tax money and for what purposes. An urban resident can live in a city, within a town, within a county,

within an independent school district, and also be a resident of special districts for a particular service — all of which collect taxes in ways that can confuse even the most conscientious citizen.

Reformers don't like this crazy quilt of American political localism. They press for measures to curb proliferation and simplify and clarify lines of accountability. A contrary view holds that the fragmentation and diversity of American federalism has benefits. This “public-choice” position says in effect that multiple governments provide more opportunities for more people to get involved in civic life. People who favor this position argue that different-sized regions reflect the varied scope needed to efficiently administer different public services.

SOCIAL SCIENCE IN GOVERNMENT

THE ROLE OF POLICY RESEARCHERS

New Edition

Richard P. Nathan



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
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For Mary



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Foreword

More than ten years have passed since Basic Books published the first edition of Richard P. Nathan's *Social Science in Government*. In the intervening decade, the author has been involved in many new public policy research projects that offer rich material — new case studies — to highlight both the pitfalls and possibilities of demonstration and evaluation research. These new cases do not merely pile up examples in support of an old argument. By highlighting the pluses and minuses of this kind of public policy research, they have stimulated a fresh look at Nathan's basic argument from beginning to end.

Once the new version of this book was finished, Dick Nathan was faced with a question about next steps and asked me what he should do. I said he ought to publish this book with the Rockefeller Institute Press. Many of the case studies described are based on research done at the Institute. More to the point, the book's central argument makes the case for the Institute's core mission. Dick agreed, but was unsure about what the process should be. The Institute Press's success depends on its reputation. Manuscripts go through a normal process of anonymous peer reviews, and these reviews can lead to rejection as well as extensive rewriting. There was no way the Press could conduct these peer reviews properly if Nathan were to be the person to solicit reviewers, as he does for other books.

So, for this volume, I acted as publisher during the book's early stages. I solicited reviews, passed them on anonymously, and wrote one myself. These were serious comments that led — as good reviews will

— to considerable revisions. The book is better for the work of the reviewers, and I believe the Rockefeller Institute Press is stronger for having adopted this process. The final product speaks for itself.

Michael J. Malbin

Rockefeller Institute and University at Albany,
State University of New York

Preface to the New Edition

This is a new edition of a book I published a decade ago with Basic Books. Since the earlier version of this book is out of print, I decided to revise and reissue it. The ideas presented are important to me, and I have continued to develop and refine them. The new edition reflects this further contemplation. It also contains several additional chapters that update the earlier edition with new case material to bring to life important questions about how social science can be useful and used in American government.

Besides the five new chapters, a number of the original chapters have been updated. This edition also contains a new final chapter on the limits and possibilities of applied social science. The case material used in this book focuses on major public policy issues, highlighting applied social science research in one policy area — welfare reform and related employment programs and social services. I hope the book can serve three purposes: as a primer for people interested in how social scientists can help social policymakers learn about what works; as a history of welfare policy research; and as a personal retrospective on a career in applied social science in which learning what works and what doesn't has been a central endeavor.

Many people have influenced the ideas advanced in this book, particularly those who worked on the studies used as case material. One of the main sources of case material is ten field network evaluation studies I conducted with colleagues at three policy research centers — the

Brookings Institution, the Urban and Regional Research Center of the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, and the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government in Albany, the public policy research arm of the State University of New York.

The second major source of case material is research by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC), founded in 1974. MDRC has conducted a large number of social experiments to test new programs designed to deal with the hardest problems of society's most disadvantaged people. I was a member of the board of directors of the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation from 1974 to 1997. I admire the work done by its extraordinary staff, dedicated to applied public policy research that makes a difference. At the same time, I should make it clear that I did not participate as a researcher in the conduct of MDRC studies. My discussion of lessons drawn from these studies represents my own personal interpretations.

I also have drawn on the work of other public policy researchers, many of whom are friends of long standing, who willingly (and in some cases without realizing it) helped to shape my ideas. Scores of people, a number of them mentioned along the way in this book, have produced books and papers on which parts of this book are based. I also want to thank colleagues who read the manuscript for the earlier edition of this book and provided valuable reactions and suggestions: Orley C. Ashenfelter, Rebecca Blank, Robert F. Cook, Martha A. Derthick, Paul R. Dommel, Eli Ginzberg, David A. Long, Gilbert Y. Steiner, Donald E. Stokes, Aaron Wildavsky, and Michael Wiseman.

Michael Malbin served as publisher of this new edition and provided valuable advice and assistance. Thomas L. Gais and Irene Lurie are co-authors of two of the new chapters in this book on welfare and employment studies. Robert L. Cohen provided editorial assistance. Howard Rolston of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Rebecca Blank, and Burt Barnow read this new manuscript and made valuable suggestions.

The Ford Foundation and the Florence and John Schumann Foundation provided the financial support for the original version of this

book, written during a sabbatical year from Princeton University in 1986-1987. Special appreciation for this support is due to Susan Berresford and Shepard Forman of the Ford Foundation and William Mullins of the Schumann Foundation. Martin Kessler, my original editor at Basic Books, was a wise critic and a reservoir of helpful advice; Suzanne L. Wagner at Basic Books served as project editor for the original book. Nan Nash, my secretary at Princeton University, helped me put many versions of the original manuscript into our word processors; Carol Kuhl patiently followed suit at the Rockefeller Institute for this edition. Jonathan Jacobson and John Lago proofread the original manuscript, and John Lago provided research assistance as well. Michael Cooper, director of publications at the Rockefeller Institute, took charge of producing this second edition assisted by Marilyn McCabe. Irene Pavone ably provided proofreading and research assistance for this new edition.

New chapters in this book discuss two laws passed after the earlier version of the book was written. Fortuitously for me, evaluation studies of these two national welfare reform laws were helpful in updating this edition in a way that carries forward the earlier discussion of this central social policy issue. Appreciation needs to be expressed to two federal agencies — the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, and Labor. They funded the evaluations conducted by the Rockefeller Institute of Government discussed in the new chapters on welfare reform. I also greatly appreciate the support provided by the W. K. Kellogg Foundation for the field network research by the Rockefeller Institute on the implementation of the Personal Responsibility Act signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 1996.

Richard P. Nathan
Albany, New York



PART I

INTRODUCTION

Applying Social Science to Government

Social scientists who conduct applied research have a role, and it is an important one — to provide intellectual input in order to inform and assist the governmental process. My view is that the proper role for this action research is to educate, not advocate. But this is not an easy role to play. There is an understandable tendency among social scientists to want to use expert knowledge to advance their own ideas and values. The way the media behaves encourages this. Journalists frequently cite experts on both sides of controversial issues, thereby reinforcing the temptation for applied social scientists to act like politicians since their work is so often used as fodder for argument. The result is that too much of the time too many social scientists act too much like politicians.

This is an especially serious problem in fields of social policy. It is institutionalized in research conducted in graduate schools of social welfare, public health, education, and public affairs. In a parallel way, position-taking behavior has become standard and expected behavior in the professional organizations aligned with these institutions. Young people are trained as social scientists with the idea that activism involving the definition of public problems and the presentation of recommendations for their solution is good professional behavior in the social sciences. The net result is that applied research in the field of public affairs has become infused with an op-ed mentality that in an automatic and unconscious way mitigates against research that has a traditional and rigorous knowledge-building purpose.

It is not a simple standard to say that public policy research should be evenhanded and dispassionate and that policy researchers should not take sides. In fact, there has been an almost constant debate in academic circles over whether it is possible to be evenhanded as a social scientist. In one sense, social science, believing as it does in the scientific method and in rational analysis, is a point of view. My reference here to evenhandedness is meant in the ideological sense of not being liberal or conservative, centrist or decentralist, coddlers or admonishers, in public affairs.

Politicians have a very different role from public policy researchers, involving two incompatible jobs — to serve as transmitters of values, and to advance their own values and ideas. The way politicians carry out this delicate balancing act is a good basis on which to judge whether they are good politicians. Politicians make decisions on several grounds — on the ground of what their constituents want, on the ground of what they themselves believe, and on the basis of expertise — that is, the intellectual input to the policy process. This third input to the policy process is the focus of this book.

Politicians also and increasingly vote their pocketbook, reflecting the views of large contributors who finance ever more costly electoral campaigns. I hope this problem of the undue influence of large campaign contributions will be alleviated despite the fact that it stubbornly resists reform efforts.

A newspaper column by Michael M. Weinstein of *The New York Times* on how economists view the issue of school classroom size showed how hard it is to sort out social science knowledge and opinion in the political process. Weinstein juxtaposed the work of two economists whom he referred to as an “odd couple.”¹ The occasion for his article was the long-standing debate on President Clinton’s proposal for new federal spending to put 100,000 more teachers in elementary and secondary school classrooms. Democrats supported him. Republicans, while not opposing the \$1 billion plus in new funding to be provided for education, argued that it should be appropriated flexibly to the states, since more teachers may not be every state’s top priority.

One member of Weinstein's odd couple was Alan Krueger, an economist at Princeton University. Krueger, according to Weinstein, produced "some of the research results that the Administration uses to bolster its case for smaller class size." The other member of the odd couple is also an economist, Eric Hurnushek, a professor at the University of Rochester, who was described by Weinstein as publishing "one study after another arguing that additional spending on schools wastes taxpayer money."

Neither Krueger nor Hurnushek are offenders in the sense just discussed of abandoning impartiality and joining the political fray in their research activities. In fact, it is hard to see why they are an odd couple at all, as they are very much alike. Both are respected policy researchers and empiricists. Weinstein's column, published under the rubric "The Economic Scene," depicted the two scholars as agreeing on only one thing. They agreed, said Weinstein, "that Congress should resolve the many unanswered questions by running careful demonstration projects to figure out whether a national program to cut class size can work."²

For me, the moral of this tale is twofold. One moral is that it is very hard for even the best applied social scientists to avoid being drawn into the political thicket. The second moral is more subtle and pertains to the quality and nature of proof in social science. I am not sanguine that what Weinstein calls the "careful demonstration projects" advocated by Krueger and Hurnushek can ever fully resolve questions like "whether a national program to cut classroom size can work." Applied social science by public policy researchers can aid the political process by amplifying issues and elucidating options, but it can rarely unequivocally and conclusively settle the most emotional, big-stakes political issues.

The Point of View of This Book

A common abbreviation used in filmmaking to show how the camera is positioned is "POV," standing for point of view. Movie scripts are not easy to read. The camera is always moving. It is much easier to get the picture on film than by reading a script on paper: What is the camera looking at? Who is doing the looking? As a teacher, I have found this

convention a useful one in the classroom. I tell students studying American government, especially students interested in public service careers, that they should always be mindful of their own POV. And more importantly, they also and always should be mindful of the POV of the people they are dealing with.

It is a good idea in writing to state one's point of view clearly and up front. The purpose of this book on the role of policy researchers in government is to present lessons I have learned in a career in applied social science. The focus is on the work public policy researchers do outside of government. The book also discusses the role of applied social science inside government. Many of my colleagues among policy researchers, as has been my own case, move in and out of government as "inners and outers."* My experience in the federal government helped me develop ideas that influenced my choices of research subjects and the conduct of studies I have worked on; however, the largest part of my career has been as a political scientist engaged in policy research outside of government.

Most of the research projects I have worked on are field network evaluation studies. My role in this kind of policy research began with a national study of the effects of the general revenue sharing program enacted in 1972. (The idea of revenue sharing was to provide flexible grants-in-aid to states and localities on a basis that enabled them to set and carry out their own priorities.) Previous to 1972, I had directed domestic policy studies for Nelson A. Rockefeller's presidential campaigns, which included the fields of federalism and intergovernmental relations. Later on, during the first term of the Nixon administration, I served as an assistant director of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, and in this capacity participated in drafting federal revenue sharing legislation. Shortly after Nixon was elected for his second term in 1972, I left government and moved back to the Brookings Institution, where I had previously been a research staff member from 1966 to 1969. At the request of the Ford Foundation, I organized a

* I believe this experience is beneficial on both sides, and have urged academic colleagues to get a taste of government as a way both to enrich their scholarship and enhance its usefulness.

nineteen-state evaluation at Brookings of the effects of the new revenue sharing law.

The questions that had to be dealt with in designing this first field network evaluation study help to make my point about how hard it is to study the effects of government policies. Arthur Okun, who had chaired the Council of Economic Advisors under President Johnson, was then a senior fellow at Brookings. He had doubts about the field-research approach. What would you say, he asked, if your mother gave you a check for your birthday and wanted to know what you did with it? His point was that the *fungibility* of federal grants-in-aid (the essential notion being that all money is green) makes it difficult — well nigh impossible, I think he said — to know what happens to such a gift.

My career was at a critical juncture. I responded to Okun that I was confident that studying state and local behavior in policy-making and implementation with regard to the uses of revenue sharing funds would tell us a great deal about what different governments (rich and poor, big and little) do with their shared revenue. Afterwards, Gilbert Y. Steiner, director of governmental studies at Brookings, said he was disposed to march ahead. After all, we had the research money.

The conclusion I reached years later, when we were deeply involved in the field evaluation of the revenue sharing program, was that my instinct in responding to Okun was correct. We did learn a great deal systematically about the uses of shared revenue. Many recipient jurisdictions, as it turned out, were wary of adding these funds to their program base — i.e., using this found-money for ongoing operating purposes. One-time capital purposes were a major use. This was especially the case for small, relatively well off, and fiscally conservative local governments. They feared locking revenue sharing money into their fiscal base and later having to raise taxes or lay off civil service workers when the federal government changed the rules or turned off the spigot, which it eventually did.

Not satisfied with focusing only on this fiscal question, the revenue sharing evaluation also examined the effects of the program in the functional areas where these funds were used for new-spending purposes. We

also studied their distribution: Was the allocation of shared revenue redistributive? And we studied their political effects: Who decided on the use of the funds? How was the political role and structure of different types of governments affected?

Later on, the Brookings Institution was approached by the research office of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to conduct a similar field network evaluation of another form of federal financial aid to states and localities — block grants — specifically in this case, the Community Development Block Grant program. In the same way, we were asked soon afterwards to conduct a study of the public service employment program established under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). Seven other field evaluation studies have been conducted over the years by networks of indigenous researchers in multiple governmental jurisdictions, including:

- ❖ A study of the effects of all federal grants on large cities.
- ❖ A study of the effects of President Reagan’s “New Federalism” cuts and changes in federal grant-in-aid programs.
- ❖ A study in New Jersey of the effects of Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG).
- ❖ A study of the implementation of the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) program for welfare reform under the Family Support Act of 1988.
- ❖ A study of the start-up and early implementation of President Clinton’s Urban Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community program.
- ❖ A study of the Neighborhood Preservation Initiative sponsored by the Pew Charitable Trusts to aid working-class neighborhoods.
- ❖ A study, still ongoing, of the effects of the national welfare reform law, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act, signed by President Clinton in 1996.

The main units of analysis in all ten studies are *institutions*. The studies have been conducted by networks of field researchers coordinated by a central staff. The focus has been on the *implementation* of new policies, broadly assessing their fiscal, programmatic, distributional, and political effects on state and local governments, nonprofit organizations, and private contractors. Were the policies we studied implemented the way they were supposed to be?

My “POV,” which is central to my reason for writing this book, is that these applied social science studies were useful and used in governmental processes, and at the same time that they contributed to scholarship on American federalism. Almost all of the field researchers were professors at universities. In these studies, they answered the same sets of questions in preparing their analytical reports that were then combined by a central staff. While the basic approach is inductive, in the sense of learning as we went along, there tended to be an implicit, and sometimes explicit, set of expectations (which could be called “hypotheses”) about likely program effects built into the framework for each round of the data collection for these studies. Most of these studies were longitudinal; in some cases they involved three or four rounds of field data collection.³ This book, which considers the way these policy research projects assisted governmental processes, also looks at the work of other policy researchers with different research purposes and methods.

This is a good time to reissue the book for two reasons. One is that I have clearer ideas now about the themes developed in the original edition. A second reason is that welfare policy, which is the main subject of the studies used in this book as case material, has changed greatly in the decade since the first edition was written. Two major national welfare reform laws have been enacted, both of which I have studied with colleagues using the field network evaluation methodology. A virtual cornucopia of other studies also have been undertaken on the effects of these two welfare reform laws, so the subject is a big and interesting one.

The first new welfare law passed since the earlier version of this book was written is the 1988 Family Support Act, enacted in the final

year of Ronald Reagan's presidency. The bottom line with respect to this law is that it did not make much of an impact. The second national welfare law examined is the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. In contrast to the earlier act, the 1996 act has already had a pervasive impact in American federalism on a wide range of public agencies and nonprofit organizations at every level of government.

The Role of Applied Social Science

As stated earlier, politicians act on the basis of their beliefs and those of their constituents. They also act on the basis of expert knowledge. This, however, is only one — and often not the main — input to public policy-making. One reason for this is that we simply don't have definitive knowledge that would enable politicians to base all, or even most, public policy decisions on uncontrovertible scientific evidence. Over the years, social scientists have developed three bad habits that are important for the discussion in this book of the need for a realistic view of the role of applied social science.

The first bad habit of social scientists is the tendency to want to emulate the natural sciences. Beatrice Webb, who worked with Charles Booth in England on the early development of survey research methods, considered this problem in a book about her life as what she called a "social investigator." Webb's family had a close friendship with Herbert Spencer, whose philosophizing about unfettered capitalism could not have been more antithetical to the career and political path later followed by Webb. In her book, Webb used her relationship with Spencer to illustrate her ideas about the meaning and role of social science. Referring to Spencer's writing, she said, "There was a riddle in the application of the scientific method to human nature which continuously worried me, and which still leaves me doubtful. Can the objective method, pure and undefiled, be applied to human mentality; can you, for instance, observe sufficiently correctly to forecast consequences, mental characteristics which you do not yourself possess?"⁴ This is at the nub of debates about the meaning of social science: Can social

sciences predict human behavior using “the objective method, pure and undefiled?” My view can be summed up as follows:

Social scientists should be realistic about the nature of the terrain in relation to the strength of their theories and methods. The data simply do not exist, nor can they ever be collected, which would tell us everything we want to know about every attitude, emotion, and form of behavior of every individual and relevant group in society in such a way that we could use these data to construct models and produce theories that would approach the predictive power of theories in the natural sciences.

The second bad habit of social scientists that is pertinent here is overspecialization. Modern social science is a bubbling pot of disciplines and subspecialties that have compartmentalized human society. A generation ago, economist Joseph Schumpeter said, “Our time revolts against the inexorable necessity of specialization and therefore cries out for synthesis, nowhere so loudly as in the social sciences in which the non-professional element counts so much.”⁵ In a similar way, social theorist Abraham Kaplan was caustic in comments about the fragmented and competitive character of the social sciences. “The fragmentation of science into ‘schools’ is by no means unknown in as rigorous a discipline as mathematics; what is striking in behavioral science is how unsympathetic and even hostile to one another such schools are.”⁶ This bad habit of social science is reflected both in teaching and professional practice. The boundaries between fields and subfields are rooted in reward systems that measure achievement by one’s ability to do independent work in a single discipline. The most common operational mode of modern social science is one computer terminal in one office operating in one discipline.

The third bad habit of social scientists is closely related to the first two, the tendency for social scientists to prefer quantitative research designs and techniques and downgrade qualitative research methods and data. Qualitative research can and does use numbers to interpret observations made by social scientists. It often involves presenting such data and in the form of generalizations with an empirical base, although typically (but not always) short of being able to bring to bear mathematical

proofs based on samples of sufficient size to infer causality. Quantitative studies, on the other hand, may use data that are less than ideally precise, but in this case with the emphasis on having an adequate sample size to be able to attempt to identify causal relationships. Again, Abraham Kaplan was on target when he criticized what he called “the law of instrument” in referring to quantitative studies. Said Kaplan, “Give a small boy a hammer, and he will find that everything he encounters needs pounding.”⁷ The hammer of modern social science is the computer.

This book highlights three types of applied social science that can be useful and used in the governmental process: (1) *demonstration research* to test possible new policies and major programmatic departures; (2) *evaluation research* to assess the effects on ongoing public programs; and (3) *studies of conditions and trends*. The bulk of my attention is devoted to the first two of these categories, demonstration and evaluation research. Four key points are:

1. Demonstration studies to test new policies and program approaches and evaluation studies of ongoing policies and programs are different in ways that have not been sufficiently taken into account by the sponsors and funders of public policy research and by researchers.
2. Evaluation research to assess ongoing public programs is the frontier of applied social science. Social scientists interested in policy research have the most untapped potential and some of the hardest challenges in this area.
3. In designing and conducting both demonstration and evaluation research, greater attention should be given to the missing links of applied social science research. Two missing links highlighted in this book are those between disciplines within the social sciences and those between quantitative and qualitative research methods and data.
4. In selecting the subjects for both demonstration and evaluation studies, priority should be given to situations in which three conditions apply: first, that policymakers and government officials are

genuinely interested in the questions being asked; second, that they are uncertain about the answers; and third, that they are willing to wait for them.

These ideas reflect a view about a role for public policy research that is both positive and limiting. I view applied social science as a supporting player on the political stage. We have come a long way in our thinking from the over-optimism of the post-World War II period, which is discussed in the next chapter. Implicit in the earlier view was the idea that social engineering could replace what many intellectuals viewed as an excessively competitive political process dominated by self-interest. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, whose extraordinary career bridges the worlds of social science and public policy, said in 1969, “the role of social science lies not in the formation of social policy, but in the measurement of its results.”⁸ This is the view of public policy research presented in this book.

In sum, I believe applied social science research should emphasize *how* to do things rather than *what* should be done. Combining social science disciplines in such studies involves much more than bringing additional data to bear. It adds variables to the research equation. When we leave out disciplines, we leave out dimensions of human behavior. Disciplinary compartmentalization rooted in a single intellectual paradigm distorts human experience. Economists, to their credit, have been the dominant players in applied social science, stressing quantitative methods and data. Other disciplines that place greater emphasis on qualitative methods and data need to be brought into the picture, especially political science and sociology.

Ultimately, the kind of applied social science that is conducted depends on the role played by government and foundation officials acting as the sponsors and funders of policy research; they are in the catbird seat. They occupy the critical territory between the producers and the consumers of public policy research. The last chapter of this book considers the role of the sponsors of policy research, how they behave, and how their behavior might change.

Endnotes

- 1 Michael M. Weinstein, "Economists Raise Questions About Educational Priorities," *The New York Times*, 15 October, 1998, p. 28-A.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Professor Irene Lurie of the State University of New York at Albany, recently wrote a paper on this methodology. See "Field Network Studies," forthcoming. See also Richard P. Nathan, "The Methodology for Field Network Evaluation Studies" (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1982).
- 4 Beatrice Webb, *My Apprenticeship* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 139-40.
- 5 Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (London, UK: George Allen and Unwin, 1976), p. 45.
- 6 Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science* (Scranton, PA: Chandler, 1964), p. 39.
- 7 Ibid., p. 26.
- 8 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty* (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 193.

Optimism and Disillusionment

In the immediate post-World War II period in the United States, there were high expectations for applied social science. In the lead essay to a volume on what was called “the policy sciences,” Harold Laswell wrote, “It is probable that the policy-science orientation in the United States will be directed towards providing the knowledge needed to improve the practice of democracy.”¹ Laswell’s co-editor for this volume, Daniel Lerner, wrote that he envisioned a future in which social science would deal with “the new human problems raised by the endlessly changing lifeways of modern society.”² There is, remarked Lerner, “an integral connection between social science and social democracy.”³

Education in the social sciences was infused with the idea of improving social and economic conditions. It was hoped that practitioners of different social science disciplines would work together. Robert S. Lynd, in a book entitled *Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture*, called for merging the work of the social sciences by focusing “on the concept of culture.” By culture, Lynd referred to “all the things that a group of people inhabiting a common geographical area do, the ways they do things and the ways they think and feel about things, their material tools and their values and symbols.” Lynd saw this as meeting “the need for an all inclusive frame of reference for all the social sciences.”⁴

In this period, as efforts to apply social science in government came into vogue, one discipline, economics, increasingly came to have the

upper hand. There are several ways economics is applied in government. Theories of macroeconomics support policies for producing stable, noninflationary economic growth. Microeconomics, in turn, is applied to government in two ways — in budgeting, for example, through the “planning-programming-budgeting” system, and through the demonstration and evaluation research movement involving large research projects to test new program ideas and to evaluate ongoing programs.

Applying Macroeconomics

Under President Kennedy in the 1960s, a feeling of ebullience emerged that the economy could be managed in a way that would repeal the business cycle. In an unprecedented action, Kennedy proposed a large reduction in federal personal and corporate income taxes in 1963 explicitly to apply Keynes’s theories to national economic policy-making by deploying unused resources to create jobs and stimulate growth. After Kennedy was assassinated, Lyndon Johnson carried through on this tax-cut proposal; Congress enacted a \$16 billion tax reduction in 1964. Walter W. Heller, then chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, who was both the principal architect of the tax cut plan and an artful phrasemaker for it, described this economic policy as the nation “declaring a fiscal dividend” to combat “fiscal drag” in a faltering economy.

The following year, Heller delivered the Godkin Lectures at Harvard University on the subject of the new role of economics in government. The first sentence set the tone: “Economics has come of age in the 1960s.” Heller went on, “The age of the economist arrived on the New Frontier, and is firmly entrenched in the Great Society.” The Keynesian influence was clear. “What economists have wrought is not the creation of a ‘new economics’,” said Heller, “but the completion of the Keynesian revolution — thirty years after John Maynard Keynes fired the opening salvo.”⁵

Unfortunately, the business cycle was not repealed. Stagflation (recession and inflation occurring simultaneously) in the 1970s generated major controversies among and between economists and

politicians. Consensus on Keynesian economics fell away. This is not to suggest that economists lost their voice in macroeconomic policy-making. Quite the contrary. At the highest levels, they have gained influence as members of the Council of Economic Advisors and the Federal Reserve Board and as officials of the U.S. Treasury Department, the Office of Management and Budget, and other government agencies.

The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System

A major development of the 1960s for the application to government of microeconomics was Lyndon Johnson's effort in the mid-1960s to remake the budget process by establishing the Planning-Programming-Budgeting (PPB) system. This system, which involved a large number of economists working inside government, was initially applied in the Defense Department by Robert S. McNamara, formerly president of the Ford Motor Company, who was appointed by President Kennedy as secretary of defense. McNamara and his "whiz kid" policy analysts used systems analysis to compare alternative weapon systems in an effort to increase the leverage of the secretary of defense in relation to the individual services. Before the Vietnam War escalated, the McNamara system was riding high. As a result Johnson decided that this approach should be applied, not just in the defense sector, but to all of government. He embraced PPB with typical gusto. An executive order issued in August 1965 directed all agencies to apply the systems' analysis approach to the entire budget process. The government-wide approach announced by Johnson set forth extensive and detailed requirements that were supposed to take effect immediately. All federal agencies were required to prepare planning documents and issue-analysis papers to back up recommendations to the Budget Bureau (the name of the bureau before it was reorganized and renamed the Office of Management and Budget under President Nixon.)

According to the *Bulletin* issued by the Budget Bureau to set up this new system, the objective of PPB was "to improve the basis for major program decisions in the operating agencies and in the Executive Office of the President. Program objectives are to be identified and

alternative methods to be subjected to systematic comparison.” The system consisted of three main reports to be prepared by all government agencies: (1) *program memoranda*, comparing the cost and effectiveness of major alternative programs and describing the agency’s strategy; (2) *special analytic studies* on current and longer-term issues; and (3) *program and financial plans*, multi-year summaries of agency programs in terms of their outputs, costs, and financing needs over a five-year period.⁶

The experience of PPB was, to say the least, disappointing. The paper just didn’t flow. Or else it overflowed. Federal officials used bureaucratic stratagems to continue to manage the budget process in the way that they were used to doing. In some cases, they simply did not submit the required planning memoranda and analysis documents. Agency officials and the staff of the Bureau of the Budget operated in these cases as if nothing had changed. In other cases, agencies swamped the Bureau of the Budget with elaborate planning documents and issue papers that few if any high officials of the submitting agency had even seen. Three years after President Johnson’s bold announcement of a government-wide PPB system, his successor, Richard M. Nixon, quietly issued a presidential memorandum abolishing the system. “Agencies are no longer required to . . .” it stated, and then it summarized the steps of the PPB system. Political scientist Allen Schick observed in an article on this non-event (or at least relatively unnoticed event) called “A Death in the Bureaucracy,” that “No mention was made in the memo of the three initials which dazzled the world of budgeting” when the PPB system was announced.⁷

The unfortunate thing to me is that it seems as if government, at least the federal government, is incapable of learning when it comes to management reforms like PPB. The PPB system was followed by other systems with similarly inflated expectations under Presidents Nixon and Carter. President Nixon’s management reform system was called MBO, standing for “management by objectives.” Carter’s plan was called ZBB, standing for “zero-based budgeting.” Both had ambitious and elaborate requirements and no large or lasting effects. In 1993, Congress got into the act with the Government Performance and Results Act, which requires all federal agencies to produce annual reports

on their progress in converting programs from being process-oriented to focusing on results. Because it is embedded in law with a long lead time for setting it up, and because both the legislative and executive branches are on record as supporting it, there is hope that this new law will have a more lasting influence in enhancing the role of policy analysis and research as inputs to government decision making.⁸

Demonstration and Evaluation Research

The second development in the application of microeconomics to policy-making is the one I am most interested in, the demonstration and evaluation research movement. As emphasized in the first chapter, I make a distinction between these two types of applied social science research — demonstrations to test new programs and evaluations of ongoing programs.

Most observers of government policy-making think the high point of the influence of economists coincided with the Democratic presidencies of the 1960s and fell off when Nixon and the Republicans came into power. It is true that the PPB system died a quiet death during Nixon's presidency, but other applications of economics discussed in this chapter lasted longer.

As it turned out, the timing of the demonstration and evaluation research movement was decidedly different from that of applied macroeconomics and the PPB system. Because of the long period of gestation required to design, conduct, and report on demonstration and evaluation studies, the bulk of the work done under this heading for applied social science was done in the 1970s and afterwards, not in the 1960s. Some of the major demonstration and evaluation studies, notably the negative income tax experiments described and discussed in the next chapter, were begun in the 1960s, but the results of these studies, which were planned and designed under President Johnson, did not emerge until well beyond his presidency. Most of the negative income tax research was carried out in the Nixon years, and in addition a number of large new demonstration and evaluation studies were launched under Nixon and his successors.

Cynics have depicted Nixon's interest and that of other Republicans in social experimentation as a strategy to delay the development of new programs or as an excuse for not enacting them. The same point is made — with more basis for doing so — about the Reagan administration. However, a look at the record of new program adoptions, policy changes, and domestic spending in the Nixon and Ford years casts doubt on this interpretation with respect to them. Large domestic initiatives were adopted under Nixon, and many existing programs were expanded. Nixon did not say so, but he was a big spender on the home front, and President Ford tended to follow suit. Total domestic spending by the federal government under Nixon rose from 10.3 percent of the gross national product at the outset of his presidency to 13.7 percent in 1974. Social Security accounted for less than half (1.4 percentage points) of this increase. Federal aid to state and local governments, which includes the revenue sharing program (mentioned in chapter 1) and block grants and other federal grant-in-aid programs that Nixon advanced, accounted for most of the rest of this 3.4 percentage point increase in the gross national product attributable to domestic public spending.

Although the PPB system is long departed from the scene, it left a legacy. Its legacy was the growth in the size and stature of the planning staffs in federal agencies throughout government, created to participate in PPB processes. In point of fact, PPB and its successor budgetary reforms have made the budget process at all levels of government (federal, state, and local) more analytical. They brought people trained in economics and policy analysis into government big time. Many of these people stayed, and more of them came, and their contributions have been important and lasting. Moreover, government planning and analysis offices often were, and in many cases still are, the sponsors of large demonstration and evaluation research projects.

Outside of government, the legacy of PPB is the army of contract researchers whose role is conducting demonstration and evaluation research — i.e., testing potential new programs and evaluating ongoing programs. Indeed, one reason for treating the demonstration and evaluation research movement separately has to do with precisely this point — its organization. Unlike the PPB system, the operation of the

demonstration and evaluation research movement for the most part involves researchers working outside of government at universities, think tanks, and private consulting firms. Moreover, many universities across the country, seeing PPB and the growth of applied economics in government, public policy analysis, and demonstration and evaluation research as a new market, established and expanded public policy graduate schools in the 1970s. However, doubts rose in the late 1960s and 1970s about the efficacy of social science as a guide to policy-making.

Doubts Arise

The basic question as to whether human behavior can be studied the way it is in the natural sciences was the theme of a popular book in the 1980s on the limits of economics by Lester C. Thurow. Thurow wrote that economists “can’t find hard empirical constants, such as the speed of light in physics, because economists are not studying the immutable rules of nature but the mutable laws that govern human behavior.”⁹ He added that mainstream economics reflected “more an academic need for an internal theoretical consistency and rigor than it reflects observable, measurable realities in the world we live in.”¹⁰

Among the best-known statements associated with such self-criticism in economics was that by Wassily Leontief, a Nobel laureate as the inventor of input-output analysis. In his address in 1971 as president of the American Economic Association, Leontief criticized his colleagues for their overemphasis on theory building and their failure to establish “systematic cooperative relationships across the traditional frontiers now separating economics from these adjoining fields.”¹¹ More than a decade later, Leontief identified his principal concern as the use of deductive models grounded in data inadequate to the task at hand. “Page after page of professional economic journals are filled with mathematical formulas leading the reader from sets of more or less plausible but entirely arbitrary assumptions to precisely stated but irrelevant theoretical conclusions.” These data, he said, “fall short of what would have been required for concrete, more detailed understanding of the structure and function of a modern economic system.”¹²

In a similar vein, a book published in this period by Andrew M. Karmarck complained that economists “insist on quantification but completely overlook the need to understand how much precision is actually attainable in the accuracy of the numbers used. . . . Very little attention is paid to the quality of data — data are dumped into a computer without close examination.” Echoing Thurow, Karmarck said, “Forecasting future parameters or variables, is incomparably more difficult in economics than in the physical sciences. . . . In fields concerned with human behavior like economics, in contrast, constant or stable phenomena can rarely be relied on.”¹³

A good suggestion made in response to Leontief’s 1982 letter to *Science* magazine was contained in an article by Barbara R. Bergmann, who urged economists to broaden their scope of inquiry and rethink their position toward other, and what she called “softer” social science disciplines. “Economists might look with profit to the practice of social scientists in other disciplines, whose lower status and whose methods of research economists have been wont to scorn.”¹⁴ In a similar vein, Robert Kuttner, in the *Atlantic Monthly*, criticized economists for being “highly abstract, mathematical, and deductive rather than curious about institutions.” Kuttner quoted Charles L. Schultze, like Leontief a former president of the American Economic Association, as saying, “When you dig deep down, economists are scared to death of being sociologists. The one great thing we have going for us is the premise that individuals act rationally in trying to satisfy their preferences. This is an incredibly powerful tool because you can model it.”¹⁵

Other Views

At one time, there was an active institutional school of economics in the United States, led by John R. Commons, an economist at the University of Wisconsin. In the 1920s, Commons contended that institutions, as collectivities of people, behave differently than the sum of the individuals within them. Commons believed institutional economics should give greater emphasis to political and organizational behavior. This of course is the point I expressed earlier about the need for inter-disciplinary applied social science, although by no means

gainsaying the fact that economics as a discipline deserve the most credit for the rise of applied social science in government in recent years. In my opinion, other social science disciplines, especially political science, sociology, and psychology now should be involved in a broadened paradigm for public policy research.

In one such effort to tie economics to psychology, Robert E. Lucas, Jr., of the University of Chicago, in the 1980s questioned the ability of economists to forecast the future on the ground that they do not give adequate attention to attitudes and shifts in opinion that influence behavior.¹⁶ Lucas's critique was the key point of the "supply-side" challenge to macroeconomic theory advanced under President Reagan. Actually, Keynes made this same point about the importance of the psychological aspect of economic behavior in assessing economic systems.

Another economist whose work I admire, Albert O. Hirschman, has observed that economists neglect mood and attitudinal variables at their peril. Modern economics, he said, "oversimplifies." Specifically, he criticized "parsimony" in the discipline, asserting that the conventional approach presents "too simple minded an account of even such fundamental economic processes as consumption and production."¹⁷

Donald McCloskey, an economist who became something of a historian of his discipline, traced these and other ideas about the discipline. In the lead article in the June 1983 *Journal of Economic Literature*, McCloskey called the methodology of economics "modernism." Modernism for McCloskey refers to "the credo of Scientific Methods, known mockingly among its critics as the Received View," which "is an amalgam of logical positivism, behavioralism, operationalism, and the hypothetico-deductive model of science."¹⁸ But then McCloskey added a more positive comment. He said that in practice economists do not follow their official rhetoric, and that in his view it is a good thing they don't. "If they did they would stand silent on human capital, the law of demand, random walks down Wall Street, the elasticity of demand for gasoline, and most other matters about which they commonly speak." Looking at the role economists play in government, in business, and in their classrooms, McCloskey argued, "economists in fact argue on far wider grounds. Their genuine workaday rhetoric, the way they

argue inside their heads or their seminar rooms, diverges from the official rhetoric.”¹⁹

For purposes of this chapter, my point is not that economists should lose standing as leaders of applied social science. They have the strongest body of theory and the most workable tools to aid governmental decision making. Walter Heller’s vision in the 1960s of a Keynesian consensus assuring stable, noninflationary economic growth has been tempered, but not in a way that diminishes the influence of macroeconomics in government. In the case of microeconomics, the same situation applies in terms of lowered, but more realistic, expectations.

Demise of the PPB System

Charles L. Schultze, who is mentioned above as suggesting that economists might usefully act more like sociologists, is an important figure in the story of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting system. Schultze was a leader of the effort in the mid-1960s to apply microeconomics in government; he was director of the Bureau of the Budget when the PPB system was put in place.

After leaving the Johnson administration, Schultze in a thoughtful series of retrospective lectures delivered at the University of California in 1968 described his experience implementing PPB.²⁰ Schultze began by describing the aims and elements of the PPB system. But it is what he did next that is most interesting. He addressed the critique of PPB associated with the views of Charles E. Lindblom. Throughout his academic career, Lindblom has emphasized the inherently incremental nature of the American political process and the ways it is antithetical to the planning values embodied in government and management textbooks and in the PPB system.

After setting forth Lindblom’s critique of PPB, Schultze proceeded to wrestle with Lindblom’s incrementalist position. Some readers may find, as I did, that Lindblom seemed to come out the winner. Schultze indicated sympathy with Lindblom’s argument about the difficulty of specifying the objectives of government programs.

Considerable precision, he said, is a necessary precondition for assessing programs rigorously and then comparing them according to the degree to which they achieve their objectives, as the PPB system required. Lindblom on the other hand argued that in most cases the goals of public programs cannot be precisely specified because politicians often are purposefully, and from their point of view, rationally vague about their objectives in the belief that this enhances their chances of putting together a sufficiently broad coalition to ensure that policies they favor are adopted.

Digging deeper into Lindblom's ideas about what he calls "the science of muddling through," Schultze argued that PPB must adapt to, and become part of, the political process. He noted that this is what actually happened under President Johnson. According to Schultze, "program planning and evaluation staffs in the agency head's immediate office, created by the PPB system, strengthen the role of the agency head in relations with the operating units." Schultze observed: "Cynics to the contrary notwithstanding, knowledge is power."²¹ In effect, PPB made economists actors in the political process. This is a good thing, but it is surely a different thing from the exuberance of early advocates of applied social science that it could be the basis for scientific policy-making.

Like Lindblom, Bertram Gross argues that the major problem with PPB was that "microeconomists who have repeatedly used the term effectiveness have been chary about admitting, let alone explicitly stating, that they have been engaging in attempts at cause-effect analysis." Continuing, Gross said, "Once this is brought into the open, it becomes clear that estimates of presumed results must take into account many possible causative factors other than the program under analysis, and that many such factors, being social, psychological, and political in nature, are not readily understandable in terms of economics, or any other single discipline."²² Again, the emphasis is on combining social science disciplines.

An important part of Charles L. Schultze's rethinking of the PPB system in his Gaither Lectures was what he said about the scope of the system. Looking back, Schultze said he saw wisdom in narrowing the

scope of PPB: "I propose as a working hypothesis that analysis can operate with fewer constraints and can profit from a consideration of a wider range of alternatives in programs that produce pure public goods and do not directly affect the structure of institutional and political power than in programs that produce quasi-public goods, and fundamentally affect income distribution, or impinge on the power structure."²³ This is a substantial concession. It is hard to think of government programs, particularly domestic programs, that do not, in Schultze's terms, "fundamentally affect income distribution" and "impinge upon the power structure." In fact, in the earlier development of cost-benefit analysis, the focus was on relatively narrow-gauged studies of public works programs, such as water resource projects. Economist Roland McKean, a pioneer of cost-benefit analysis, contended that this analytical method is generally most useful for lower-level decisions involving "comparatively narrow problems of choice" where "the alternatives are usually rather close substitutes."²⁴

Assessing Demonstration and Evaluation Research

What I call the demonstration and evaluation research movement can be seen as both a reaction to, and an outgrowth of, the PPB system. In effect it was a more modest effort to do part of what the PPB system was supposed to do. It concentrated on a limited number of problems and programs. Properly viewed, the demonstration and evaluation research movement reflects this same idea that some subjects should be selected for serious, rigorous study, and furthermore that this should be done without assuming, as under PPB, that experts can compare all major and related uses of governmental resources. Economist Richard R. Nelson in commenting on the relationship between demonstration and evaluation research and the PPB system sounded very much like Charles L. Schultze and Charles E. Lindblom. "It does seem fair to question," said Nelson, "... whether the new philosophy of experimentalism represents greater sophistication regarding the implications of models of optimization over time under conditions of uncertainty, or disguised acceptance of a strategy of muddling through."²⁵

In reviewing issues raised about applying economics in government, I have relied mainly on the writings of economists, who in many cases were themselves participants in the events described. In considering the demonstration and evaluation research movement, I follow the same practice, beginning with a book published in 1985 by Henry J. Aaron, entitled *Politics and the Professors: The Great Society in Perspective*. Aaron was a high-level official on the policy research staff of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare in the 1960s and served as the assistant secretary for planning and evaluation of the successor department (the Department of Health and Human Services) in the Carter administration in the late 1970s.

The theme and tone of Aaron's book on applied social science were pessimistic. His conclusion was not only that demonstrations and evaluations in the field of social policy are very difficult to do, but that these studies often produce findings about programs that fall far short of what was promised by politicians. Aaron portrayed program evaluation as "a newly developed art" that "certified the ineffectuality of these programs," referring to social programs launched in the Great Society period under President Johnson. "Far from being an instrument for evenhanded, objective deliberation, evaluation was transmuted into 'forensic social science'."²⁶

When I began collecting material for this book, I was aided in doing so by teaching seminars on applied social science at Princeton University. In one seminar session, a participant, a mid-career student from the U.S. Department of Defense, questioned why applied social science is so focused on social programs, particularly programs to aid the poor. "Liberals have shot themselves in the foot," he said, "by emphasizing studies that often show the limits of social programs and only rarely their successes." The image this suggests fits Henry Aaron's critique; applied social science in many instances has ended up undermining the case for social programs. According to Aaron, evaluation studies often revealed modest, if any, program results. Assuming that most researchers believe not only in the utility of applied social science, but also in the value of social programs, this is a gloomy situation from their point of view. Aaron summed up in the following terms: "The role that research and experimentation played in the demise of the simple

faiths of the early 1960s was not accidental. The process by which R&E [research and experimentation] is created corrodes the kind of simple faiths on which political movements are built.”²⁷

Two points in Aaron’s conclusion stand out. One is his accent on “faith” as the basis for political action. The other is his reference to research and experimentation as “corrosive” of the “simple faiths on which political movements are built.” Several years after Aaron’s book was published, he made a tongue-in-cheek comment about the role of demonstration evaluation research, this time directed at the efforts of Ronald Reagan’s budget director, David A. Stockman, to cut spending on social research:

Mr. Stockman is making a grave mistake in trying to put us all out of work. He has not realized that we are the *instrumentality for inaction*. By diverting us to teaching rather than research or even to still more reputable ways of earning a living, he will make easier the growth of ideas for activist social change undisturbed by critical analyses when the mood of the country shifts.²⁸

Aaron was not alone in expressing doubts about demonstration and evaluation research. There were other critics in this period. Sar A. Levitan and Gregory Wurzburg said,

It is not just a question of obtaining better data or spending a few million more dollars on evaluations. The problem lies in the basic assumptions of the methodologies employed by most evaluations, and in the choice of who is entrusted with the task. This entire field remains an art. The much-touted objective scientific conclusions of evaluations are too often found to be based on hidden political and social value judgments or personal interest.²⁹

In a similar vein, Richard F. Elmore reviewed the studies of youth employment programs and concluded: “The fact that we find it easy to discredit interventions that merely deliver services, but difficult to find scientifically valid solutions to chronic social problems, may mean that

we have gotten too sophisticated in using the rhetoric of social science to justify social interventions.”³⁰

On the conservative side, Charles Murray, in his influential book *Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980*, made many of the same points as Aaron, Levitan and Wurzburg, and Elmore. He, too, served as an evaluator of social programs in the 1970s. Murray’s book is best known for his conclusion, presented as a “thought experiment,” that goes one step — a very big step — further than Aaron. He maintained not only that social programs enacted in the 1960s failed, but that in many cases they contributed to the problems they were supposed to solve. Murray said such programs should be abolished. He contended that “white condescension towards blacks” took a form that undermined work incentives, family structure, and self-esteem. His solution was “to repeal every bit of legislation and reverse every court decision that in any way requires, recommends, or awards differential treatment according to race, and thereby put us back on the track that we left in 1965.” Murray was specific in naming programs that should be eliminated.

The proposed program, our final and most ambitious thought experiment, consists of scrapping the entire federal welfare and income support structure for working-aged persons, including AFDC, Medicaid, Food Stamps, Unemployment Insurance, Worker’s Compensation, subsidized housing, disability insurance, and the rest. It would leave the working-aged person with no recourse whatsoever except the job market, family members, friends, and public or private locally funded services. It is the Alexandrian solution: cut the knot, for there is no way to untie it.³¹

Besides lambasting social programs, Charles Murray devoted major attention in *Losing Ground* to applied social science research. One section of his book on the role of research is called “Hard Noses and Soft Data.” In it, Murray said: “In the spirit of cost-effectiveness that McNamara has taken to the Pentagon, the early poverty warriors were prepared to be judged on the hardest of hard-nosed measures of success.” Murray went on, “Social scientists who had been at the periphery of the policy process — sociologists, psychologists, political scientists

— had the answer: scientific evaluation. The merits of doing good would no longer rest on faith.” The reference here to faith parallels Henry Aaron. Murray concluded his critique of applied social science research as follows: “Starting with the first evaluation reports in the mid-sixties and continuing to the present day, the results of these programs have been disappointing to their advocates and evidence of failure to their critics.”³²

If I had scrambled the various quotes about problems of applied social science, the reader would be hard put to sort them out on the basis of which statements had been made by liberals and which by conservatives. One is reminded of the riddle once posed by Aaron Wildavsky: What is the difference, he asked, between the New Deal and the Great Society? The answer, he said, evaluation research.

Of all the critical commentaries cited on the demonstration and evaluation research movement, the most despairing is from a technical paper by Gary Burtless and Robert H. Haveman, “Policy Lessons from Three Labor Market Experiments.” The three experiments considered were the negative income tax experiments conducted in Seattle and Denver, the supported work demonstration undertaken by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, and the Employment Opportunities Pilot Project carried out in the Carter years. Burtless and Haveman drew this conclusion: “Our experience in the last fifteen years has taught us that large-scale experiments can be relied on to teach us something of value about the policy in question, but what we are taught can seldom be relied on to aid the cause of reforming or improving policy.”³³ They went on to say, “There is a moral here, and it is illustrated by the three experiments we have considered: if you advocate a particular policy reform or innovation, do not press to have it tested.”³⁴ The motion picture scene this suggests (Woody Allen should direct it) would have social scientists sitting around a table trying to decide what program ideas they dislike most in order to test them and undermine their chances of adoption, if you will, “corroding the simple faiths” on which they are based. My view, as expressed in Parts II and III of this book is more upbeat, conditioned on realism and a broadened disciplinary perspective. Part II deals with demonstration studies; Part III with evaluations of ongoing programs.

Endnotes

- 1 Harold D. Laswell, "The Policy Orientation," in *The Policy Sciences*, eds. Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Laswell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1951), p. 15.
- 2 Daniel Lerner, "Social Science: Whence and Whither?" in *The Meaning of the Social Sciences*, ed. Daniel Lerner (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973), p. 14.
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- 4 Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1948), p. 19.
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PART II

**DEMONSTRATION
RESEARCH**

The Nature of Demonstration Research

When the members of the House and Senate conference committee worked out a compromise on an emergency jobs bill to combat the 1981-82 recession, they added a provision at the behest of Representative Jamie Whitten, the powerful chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, to include \$33 million for a highway project “demonstrating how a two-lane road can be widened to four lanes.” A reporter for *The New York Times* covering the conference committee noted that “Mr. Whitten refused to say so, but all of the conferees expect that the money will wind up in Mr. Whitten’s home district.” It did. No mention was made in the *Times* story of a research design or a comparison road to be used as a basis for determining the efficacy of this road-widening demonstration.¹

The use of the word “demonstration” in this way is not unusual. In some cases, the guise of research is more elaborate, but the underlying aim is the same — to use the cover of research to obtain funds for a pet project or program even though there is no or very little intention of studying its results systematically to decide whether a particular program idea should be replicated on a broader scale. This is not the meaning of the word “demonstration” used in this book. I am interested in demonstration research as a type of applied social science, conducted under conditions in which trained researchers apply their tools to produce results that can be used by policymakers to decide whether or not to adopt a particular course of action. Unfortunately, the line between real demonstrations and those with an ostensible, but not genuine,

research purpose is often more subtle than in the case of Representative Whitten's highway project.

The next section provides a vocabulary lesson that defines what is tested in a demonstration study, the way social scientists think about program impacts, the "counterfactual" state, control groups, quasi-experiments, comparison sites, simulation techniques, dependent and independent variables, and the replication of the results of demonstration studies. The first and most significant demonstration research projects, which were central to the emergence of this kind of applied social science in the United States, were the negative income tax experiments. The chapter pays special attention to these demonstrations and their influence.

The Vocabulary of Demonstration Research

A potential new program being tested in a demonstration research project is referred to as a *treatment* or an *intervention*. Researchers seek to determine the impact of a particular policy by measuring selected characteristics of the members of the treatment group before, during, and after they have participated in a demonstration project. These characteristics are then compared to the characteristics for an untreated group of similar persons. The acid test is: Did the tested treatment make a difference? If so, what kind of a difference and how much of a difference did it make?

The hardest job is identifying an untreated group to be compared with the treatment group in order to establish the *counterfactual state*. The counterfactual state is what would have happened had there been no tested treatment. It is impossible to know the counterfactual for certain — that is, to have the same people both participate and not participate in a tested treatment. Instead researchers attempt to approximate this condition. One method for doing so is to have eligible participants randomly assigned, as in a lottery, either to a treatment group or to an untreated group called a *control group*. This experimental approach using random assignment in demonstration research was pioneered by

British statistician R. A. Fisher, and was used extensively in medicine before it was applied in the field of social policy.

Random assignment is strongly preferred by most social scientists over other research designs because it enables them to employ statistical techniques to establish causality and to assign a level of probability to the impact of a tested treatment. I am somewhat, but not fully, in agreement with this position. I believe random assignment is a good approach. Nevertheless, in my view many social scientists have gone overboard in advocating it. In other Western countries, the idea of conducting social experiments with random assignment has not taken hold as strongly as it has in the United States.

Random assignment is not always used in public policy demonstrations. Researchers also use what are called *quasi-experimental* methods. Thomas D. Cook and Donald T. Campbell define quasi-experimental studies in precisely these terms, as demonstration studies that do not use random assignment. Quasi-experimental studies, according to Cook and Campbell, "have treatments, outcome measures, and experimental units, but do not use random assignment to create the comparisons from which treatment-caused change is inferred."² The baseline group in a quasi-experiment is usually referred to as a comparison group rather than a control group. Researchers construct comparison groups in various ways. Comparison groups can be groups of people who are similar to treatment groups but are located in other places, for example, in a different city where the treatment being tested is not being administered. A popular alternative approach employs statistical techniques, using available data sets about people similar to the people in the treatment group for a demonstration study. This is the simulation or econometric method for establishing the counterfactual.

In some cases, demonstration studies are conducted without either a randomized control group or a statistically constructed comparison group, the object being to compare the treated group before and after they have participated in a tested program. Most public policy researchers do not like this approach because it is possible that the presumed effects (the before-and-after differences) might have occurred in any event, that is, in the absence of the tested treatment. In the field of job

training programs, this is called “the aging-vat effect,” referring to the idea that certain things happen to people (for instance, they work more and earn more) simply because they get older. This effect could confound a demonstration study that did not have either a randomly assigned control group or some kind of comparison group.

The bottom line is that random assignment is preferred by most public policy researchers because they believe it is the best way to predict whether a tested treatment will work if it is replicated, whereas the techniques used in quasi-experiments are regarded as less certain.

Two key terms need to be added — dependent variables and independent variables. Dependent variables refer to the outcomes of the tested treatment. They are also called “right-hand” variables. Independent variables, which are on the left-hand side of the equation, include two main types of variables, the treatment being tested and the characteristics of the people being treated.³

The Negative Income Tax Demonstrations

The most famous early demonstrations in the field of social policy in the United States that used random assignment were the negative income tax experiments. The negative income tax is an approach to welfare reform. Its aim is to provide financial incentives to working-age, able-bodied welfare recipients to encourage them to enter the labor force and ultimately become self-supporting. In order to provide these recipients with an incentive to work, those who work are allowed to retain some portion of their earnings. The rate at which their earnings are “taxed” (that is, reducing welfare benefits by some portion of each additional dollar earned) is called the “negative income tax rate,” or more understandably the “welfare-reduction rate.” This approach to welfare reform generated great enthusiasm, especially among liberals, in the 1960s and 1970s; some conservatives (notably economist Milton Friedman) embraced it too.

Negative income tax experiments were initiated under President Johnson. The main proponents of the negative income tax, who

originally sought to have this idea adopted as part of President Johnson's "War on Poverty," were economists both inside and outside of government. This group included James Tobin, Robert Lampman, Joseph Pechman, Joseph Kershaw, Robert Levine (Levine was head of research in the Office of Economic Opportunity during this period), and Worth Bateman, a policy analyst in the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. A negative income tax plan was proposed to the Johnson White House staff in September 1965, but, according to Robert Levine, "never taken seriously by the administration."⁴ President Johnson and his secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Wilbur Cohen, were strongly opposed to it.

The most widely discussed and controversial issues about proposals for a negative income tax involved the effects of work incentives on able-bodied, working-age adults: Would a negative income tax increase or undermine work incentives, and by how much would it influence them? Proponents of the negative income tax argued that it would increase work incentives because recipients would be better off if they worked. Their total income (their earnings plus their welfare income) would rise as their earnings increased, so they would work more and work harder. But, as we shall see, this aspect of negative income tax plans also has its downside, and is more complicated than may appear on the surface.

The critical point about the labor-market effects of a negative income tax is that such plans also add people to the welfare rolls by virtue of introducing the work-incentive feature. While a negative income tax may increase work effort of people already on the welfare rolls, at the same time it may reduce the work incentive for people added to the rolls — i.e., because now these people do not need to work as hard to receive their current level of income.

People added to the welfare rolls were not getting welfare payments before, but are now eligible if their earnings from work are below what is known as the "break-even point," that is, the point at which welfare income phases out to zero as income rises. The ultimate question is what is the net effect of a negative income tax. Will the totality of people affected by a negative income tax — both those already on the rolls

and those added to the rolls — work more or less because of the introduction of the negative income tax?

Politically, the negative income tax experiments inaugurated by the U.S. government in the 1960s represented a fallback. Rather than jettisoning this idea when it was advanced by senior officials of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to Johnson's White House staff and rejected by them as the basis for a new national policy, supporters of the negative income tax approach saw a demonstration as a way to keep the idea on the policy agenda, although in a downgraded status. Officials of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), which was the lead agency of Lyndon Johnson's "War on Poverty," advanced a plan developed by Heather Ross, then a doctoral student working for the White House Council of Economic Advisors, to conduct a demonstration with random assignment to test the negative income tax idea. OEO contracted with the Institute for Poverty Research at the University of Wisconsin in Madison and Mathematica Policy Research of Princeton, New Jersey, to design the experiment. Economists at Princeton University's Industrial Relations Section, working with the staff of Mathematica, had a major hand in the design of the experiment.

The role of social scientists in launching the negative income tax experiments raises an interesting political question. Some readers may feel that there is something wrong when social scientists conducting research are testing a policy they themselves favor, which was the case for most of the participants in the negative income tax experiments. Although I do not believe this is a problem, an important point needs to be added here: Social scientists can more legitimately conduct demonstration research to test new ideas they themselves favor if their research uses random assignment. Random assignment protects them. It reduces the problem of bias toward the tested plan on the part of both the researchers and the sponsors of a demonstration research project. But the catch is that randomized tests are expensive, time-consuming, and very hard to conduct.

A negative income tax is best viewed as having a number of movable parts. The design of a particular plan involves arranging these parts in a way that maximizes the objectives of the policymakers who support

it. Invariably, they will want to achieve several purposes simultaneously, purposes that often are not compatible. Three major and frequent purposes are: (1) to establish an "adequate" level of income support; (2) to provide a work incentive for the people receiving this support; and (3) to avoid having a particular plan involve "excessive" costs. Typically, the two most movable parts in determining how these three objectives can be achieved simultaneously are the benefit level and the welfare-reduction rate. Holding the third purpose constant — i.e., setting the cost as a certain fixed amount — policymakers in the 1960s experimented with different combinations of benefit levels and welfare-reduction rates that in turn dictated varied break-even points. (The break-even point, to repeat, is the point at which a person's benefits under the terms of a particular negative income tax plan are reduced to zero. That is, as earnings rise and welfare benefits gradually decline, this is the point at which benefits end.)

Overall, the income-incidence pattern of the U.S. population is diamond-shaped. There are relatively smaller numbers of people in the bottom and top income groups. The largest numbers of people are in the middle ranges. Hence, coverage in population terms under a negative income tax plan increases materially as it adds people higher up the income ladder, into the middle ranges. The people added to welfare rolls in this way under a negative income tax plan receive a smaller benefit than people who are very poor, but the number of people involved can be large. The higher the break-even point under a negative income tax, the greater will be the cost for the people added. This can present problems to politicians who support the basic idea of a negative income tax, that is, if the costs of a given plan are regarded as too big.

The common and not surprising response of politicians in this situation is to compromise. They may, for example, decide to lower the welfare benefit or raise the welfare-reduction rate (say from a 30 percent welfare-reduction rate to 50 percent) in order to fit their plan within a cost parameter they regard as acceptable. The inexorable arithmetic involved here produces a conundrum for the designers of a negative income tax. The problem can be likened to squeezing a balloon: As you squeeze the air out of one area, it goes into another. Each time a compromise is made, such as lowering the basic benefit or raising the

welfare-reduction rate, one of the arguments for the idea of having a negative income tax is weakened.

In the mid-1960s, when the original negative income tax experiments were being advanced, and as these aspects of the negative income tax idea became increasingly well understood, concerns about the impact of such a program in expanding the rolls and raising the costs of welfare gave political leaders cold feet about even testing the concept. When the time came to announce the start of the first demonstration, planned for New Jersey, officials of the Office of Economic Opportunity hesitated. The director of the OEO at the time was Sargent Shriver, John F. Kennedy's brother-in-law and a former head of the Peace Corps. Despite qualms, Shriver decided to proceed, but on a low-key basis. The contract for the first phase of the work on the New Jersey experiment was paid out of previously appropriated funds, so it was not necessary to seek an appropriation from the Congress. And the announcement of the demonstration was held up until after Congress had recessed for Labor Day in 1967. In recognition of potential political pitfalls, Shriver's aides also convinced him to change the name of the program from a "negative income tax" to a "work incentives" program.⁵ The new name, however, did not stick.

The first payments in the New Jersey negative income tax demonstration were made in Trenton, New Jersey, in 1968. This demonstration, which also included other New Jersey cities, along with Scranton, Pennsylvania, focused on two-parent welfare families. Altogether, the demonstration had a total sample of 1,350 families in the treatment and control groups. The families in the treatment group were targeted for varying levels of payments combined with varying welfare-reduction rates applied to the earnings they received from work. Eight negative income tax plans were tested, with ranges of the basic income guarantee from 50 percent to 125 percent of the poverty line and with three welfare-reduction rates of 30 percent, 50 percent, and 70 percent.⁶ The experiment lasted three years.

This capsule description does not begin to do justice to the great complexity of the task of designing and mounting this first big American social experiment. One year into the work, the State of New Jersey

introduced a welfare plan statewide that aided two-parent welfare families on a more generous basis than several of the tested negative income tax plans. As a result, a new negative income tax experimental plan with a higher benefit level had to be quickly instituted. The dispute that arose between the University of Wisconsin's Institute for Poverty Research (which was responsible for designing the New Jersey study) and Mathematica Policy Research (which had the operations contract for this study) about how to do this became so intense that at the last minute it was assigned to an outside expert, James Tobin, a professor of economics at Yale, for arbitration.⁷

Owing to these and other complications of the New Jersey study, experts at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (which inherited the responsibility for the negative income tax experiments from the Office of Economic Opportunity in the Nixon years) took the position that results from the New Jersey demonstrations should not be used for policy purposes. Instead, they said, major policy reliance should be placed on the results from larger successor experiments designed during the execution phase of the New Jersey study. These successor negative income tax experiments were conducted in two cities, Seattle and Denver, as well as a number of smaller rural communities in three states, Indiana, Iowa, and North Carolina.⁸ This expanded negative income tax research is known as SIME/DIME. (The "IME" portion of this acronym stands for "income-maintenance experiment," the "S" for Seattle, and the "D" for Denver.) Planning for this next series of negative income tax experiments began under President Nixon in 1970. Eventually, they included 4,800 families, both intact (two-parent) and single-parent families in both the urban and rural sites; this was over three times larger than the New Jersey sample.

As it turned out, the idea of a negative income tax as tested both in the New Jersey and the SIME/DIME (Seattle/Denver) studies seeped into the policy process long before the final results of the experiments were available. Welfare expert Gilbert Y. Steiner characterized this as "research following reality."⁹ Nixon's welfare reform plan, called the Family Assistance Plan or FAP, was announced in 1969, just as the first payments were being made in the New Jersey and Scranton, Pennsylvania demonstrations. Nixon's plan embodied many of the ideas of a

negative income tax, and it was heavily influenced by holdover policy analysts inside the government.

I was involved in the development of Nixon's proposals for welfare reform as a federal official during this period (assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget and later deputy undersecretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare). Eventually, I came to view Nixon's FAP plan, grounded as it was in the concept of the negative income tax, as the wrong road to welfare reform. However that was later on. For purposes of this chapter, what is most interesting is the way in which the results of the negative income tax demonstrations affected the debates in Congress about Nixon's welfare reform plan.

Nixon's Family Assistance Plan, which he actively and strongly advocated and which received wide publicity at the time, passed the House twice under the strong leadership of Ways and Means Committee Chairman Wilbur Mills.¹⁰ However, it came under fire in the Senate. Several senators, notably Finance Committee Chairman Russell Long (D-LA) and John Williams of Delaware, then the ranking Republican member of the committee, attacked the plan on the grounds that it would undermine, rather than enhance, work incentives. Both senators became astute analysts of the negative income tax idea. Under the pressure of their attacks and those of others, officials in the Office of Economic Opportunity, which still existed at the time (but soon afterwards was abolished), released "preliminary" results of the New Jersey demonstration in February 1970. These results indicated no adverse effects on work effort under the New Jersey negative income tax experiments. The OEO report went so far as to state that there was "in fact, a slight indication that participants' overall work effort actually increased during the initial test period."¹¹ Senator Williams, by then a vociferous opponent of Nixon's Family Assistance Plan, was indignant. He questioned both the veracity and the timing of the OEO report and called on the U.S. General Accounting Office (an investigative arm of the Congress) to review the OEO findings. The GAO responded saying that the report on the New Jersey study was "premature."¹² It is unlikely that this controversy over the early release of the New Jersey findings had an effect on the chances for passage of Nixon's Family Assistance Plan. It was

already in deep trouble; however, it certainly did not help the advocates of social experimentation.

A similar political backfire occurred later over the results of the Seattle/Denver income maintenance demonstration. By now, a coterie of people had experience with the negative income tax experiments. In particular, Daniel Patrick Moynihan's role — always central on these issues — exemplifies the rise and fall of the negative income tax idea. Moynihan had been a senior advisor in the White House during Nixon's first term. Despite the fact that in his prior government service in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and also as a professor at Harvard University he had been a proponent of universal children's allowances (rather than a negative income tax) as the best road to welfare reform, Moynihan became a leading and influential advocate of the negative income tax approach to welfare reform as embodied in Nixon's Family Assistance plan.¹³ He teamed up with the secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and long-time Nixon aide Robert Finch to convince Nixon that this plan, largely drafted by Worth Bateman and other holdover HEW policy analysts, was the best and most dramatic approach for overhauling welfare.

In this period, concern was widespread about the problems of welfare — rapidly rising costs and caseloads and large disparities in benefit levels among the states, with very low benefits in some states. Many observers believed that welfare (then called the Aid for Families with Dependent Children program, AFDC) encouraged families to break up or never form, and that it discouraged work effort. Vincent J. and Vee Burke, in their book on the history of Nixon's Family Assistance Plan, emphasized the part played by fast-rising welfare rolls in getting the issue of welfare reform, "typically shunned by the White House," on Nixon's agenda. In the decade of the 1960s, the Burkes said, the proportion of children on relief had doubled from 3.5 percent of those under eighteen in 1960 to 6.8 percent in 1969 and 8.7 percent in 1970. According to the Burkes, "The welfare explosion angered taxpayers and put severe pressure on state treasuries, especially in states with very big cities, such as Illinois, California, Pennsylvania, and New York."¹⁴

In this setting, Nixon saw welfare reform as an opportunity to surprise and outmaneuver liberals on social policy. He was especially influenced by Moynihan, then a White House aide, whose knowledge of the subject was extensive and whose engaging personality and knack for an elegant turn of phrase appealed greatly to Nixon. Nixon delighted in Moynihan's sprightly memos and conversations on this subject, compared with the buttoned-down style of most of his advisors.* This is not to say that Nixon lacked a personal commitment to his welfare reform plan. I saw him often in this period, and am convinced he was genuinely excited about this plan.

Nixon's Family Assistance Plan was announced in August 1969. As already mentioned, the New Jersey negative income tax experiments were barely under way. Full results of the New Jersey experiments would not appear for another four years. In 1978, a decade after Nixon's welfare reform plan was announced, the results of the Seattle/Denver negative income tax demonstrations became available. By then, the roles of many of the players had changed. Moynihan, now a Democratic U.S. Senator from New York, chaired the welfare subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee. He used his subcommittee as a forum to examine the results of the Seattle/Denver research. The hearing record makes interesting reading.

Moynihan was the only senator in attendance. His exchanges with witnesses (most of whom were social scientists in fields closely related to Moynihan) resembled a graduate seminar in social science more than a congressional hearing. The main idea that emerged from this postmortem on the Seattle/Denver experiments was that the results undercut the idea of a negative income tax. At the hearing, researchers disagreed about the seriousness of the problems involved in ways that generally reflected their political orientation. Liberals among researchers acknowledged that the results undercut the case for a negative income tax,

* I still have a notebook of Moynihan's memos to Nixon. The first line of the first memo, dated January 13, 1969, is pure Moynihan: "Like the girl in the book about the crocodiles, I fear that I may end up telling you more about welfare in New York City than you want to know." The reference to crocodiles eludes me; nevertheless, this reflects the style Moynihan used in establishing an engaging personal relationship with Nixon.

but they tended to downplay the magnitude of these effects. Conservatives on the other hand were almost gleeful in their use of findings from the research to show the futility of the idea of a negative income tax.

Moynihan, in an interesting way, was in the middle. He had supported the idea of the negative income tax in the Nixon years, but now he sided with the conservative analysts in assessing its implications for social policy. Writing to William F. Buckley in 1978, he said, "We were wrong about a guaranteed income. Seemingly, it is calamitous."¹⁵

The results of the Seattle/Denver experiments undercut arguments of the proponents of the negative income tax in two ways. The payment schemes tested resulted in reduced net earnings and hours of work for recipients. They also appeared to have an adverse effect on families, encouraging family break-up rather than enhancing family stability, as was claimed would be the case.

In November 1978, when Moynihan held his second hearing on the experiments, Robert Spiegelman, director of the Seattle/Denver research for the Stanford Research Institute, presented what was treated as dramatic testimony on the adverse effects of these experiments on family stability. The report on the Seattle/Denver study also showed that the tested negative income tax plans caused substantial reductions in labor activity for persons enrolled. Gary Burtless and Robert Haveman, in summarizing these results, wrote that, "prime-aged men reduced their annual hours of work by 9 or 10 percent; . . . their spouses reduced annual hours by 17 to 20 percent; and . . . women heading single-parent families reduced annual hours by more than 20 percent — perhaps as much as 28 to 32 percent."¹⁶ Again, the policy pot was boiling. These findings were issued just when officials of the Carter administration were putting together Carter's welfare reform plan, which like Nixon's had basic features of a negative income tax. The immediate result was a decision to trim back the Carter plan, because the research results increased the cost estimates for its benefit schedule.

Moynihan's view of these events is contained in a book on social policy he published in 1986, eight years after the hearings. In this book, he was especially critical of Carter's secretary of Health, Education and

Welfare, Joseph Califano, for his failure to present an assessment on the adverse effects of the Seattle/Denver demonstration on family stability, calling his behavior "inexcusable."¹⁷ However, the most interesting element of Moynihan's postmortem in 1986 is his comments on the testimony presented by economist John Cogan of the Hoover Institute, which is located at, but not officially part of, Stanford University. Cogan, politically a conservative, testified at the Moynihan hearings in 1978 about his reanalysis of the New Jersey results. He showed much larger reductions in employment and earnings than those reported by the researchers who conducted the experiment. Although Cogan's methodology was debated among researchers, his reanalysis indicated a work-withdrawal effect as much as four times greater than that reported by Spiegelman of the Stanford Research Institute.

Cogan divided the treatment group according to whether people did or did not participate in the demonstration. In the case of the controls, he divided them in a similar way according to whether the members of the control group did or did not receive welfare benefits. Although many social scientists objected to Cogan's methodology and still do, it is notable that Moynihan, both in 1978 and in 1986, did not. At the hearing in 1978, Moynihan expressed indignation at Cogan's findings, remarking that the earlier reports on the New Jersey study were "bordering on malpractice" in light of Cogan's testimony.¹⁸ He asked for, and received, agency comments on Cogan's work. Agency officials believed (at least this is what they told me) that Moynihan later accepted their reasoning as to why Cogan's reanalysis was flawed. However, the written record differs from what agency officials claimed. In his 1986 book, Moynihan described Cogan's testimony as follows: "The subcommittee, which is to say the general public, learned nothing until one afternoon in November 1978 when John Cogan, a young economist from Stanford, came to testify and told us, 'They won't tell you this, but it hasn't worked.'"¹⁹

The little drama was complete. The high hopes of supporters of demonstration research failed to materialize. Henry Aaron was right. The effects of the negative income tax demonstrations were perverse from the point of view of supporters of this approach to comprehensive welfare reform as advanced by Presidents Nixon and Carter. In

retrospect, I believe the negative income tax demonstrations were moderately successful as research projects, although much less successful as an aid to policy-making. Their results came very late in the policy process and were at best ambiguous from the point of view of advocates of the negative income tax concept.

However, the experiments should not be judged solely on policy grounds. The purpose of research is to answer questions. Moynihan put it well in an exchange with Spiegelman of the Stanford Research Institute at the September 1978 hearings. He observed: "The bringing of systematic inquiry to bear on social issues is not an easy thing. There is no guarantee of pleasant and simple answers, but if you make a commitment to an experimental mode it seems to me — I am not enjoying this hearing one damn bit, but if you make a commitment to an experimental mode, something larger is at stake when you begin to have to deal with the results."²⁰ At its roots, the reason for the essentially negative findings of the negative income tax experiments involves the inexorable political arithmetic of this approach to welfare reform.

Policy researchers, although they learned a lot from these experiments, did a great deal of soul searching in the aftermath. Having participated in the appraisal (but not the launching) of the negative income tax experiments, I came away a skeptic. As I see it, the value of demonstrations in the field of social policy is very much a function of the type of programs being studied.

For me, the key distinction is between testing income-maintenance and service-type programs. I have reservations about the usefulness of demonstrations to test programs such as the negative income tax, where the establishment of such a program would be universal* and highly visible. After a national debate on such a policy change where it becomes widely known that the rules of the game have changed because a universal program has been adopted, there is every reason to expect that people "exposed" to the new program would change their behavior in ways that could not be known in a research environment in which such a debate and event had not taken place. You cannot test for such

* By "universal," I mean that if adopted a program would apply to everyone in the country who is eligible.

big-picture attitude and behavioral changes. On the other hand, service-type interventions are not as intrusive. A new service program (involving, say, an intensive job training or a special child care program) is not as likely to change attitudes and behavior in the society, because fewer people will be aware that such a new policy has been adopted.

Demonstration studies are expensive and time-consuming. They should be undertaken, as stated previously, in situations in which three conditions apply: (1) Politicians and program administrators are genuinely interested in the new policies or major new program departures to be tested; (2) they are uncertain as to how they will work; and (3) they are willing to wait for the results of a demonstration study. The negative income tax experiments did not satisfy the first of these conditions. The impetus of the demonstration came from the research community. To the credit of many of the researchers involved, the experiments did show that it is possible in the United States to conduct large-scale demonstration research projects with random assignment, and they provided valuable insights about program design and operations, but in my opinion that was not enough.

An additional important lesson of the negative income tax experiments relates to their disciplinary auspices. At a 1974 postmortem conference at the Brookings Institution on the New Jersey negative income tax experiments, sociologist Peter Rossi said he thought it was "paradoxical" that despite the heavy reliance of sociologists on primary data collection and the extensive use by psychologists of experimental designs, it was economists who "played the major role in designing and fielding the income maintenance experiments."²¹ In a similar vein, sociologist Lee Rainwater complained that what was learned about social behavior in the negative income tax experiments was "remarkably skimpy." In a paper for a conference on the lessons of this research, Rainwater argued that more qualitative data were needed about the people in the experiment and its effect on their lives.²² For such critics, the challenge involved is to devise ways to incorporate other variables — psychological, social, and political — into demonstration research. Among the kinds of questions one would like to have asked in the negative income tax demonstrations were: What were the effects on people's feelings of self-worth and achievement? What were its effects on

children, on families, on communities with a concentration of poor families, on state and local governments, on public agencies, and on the society? I realize that not all such variables can be taken into account. Yet, trying to get at these kinds of questions is basic to the argument of this book about the missing links between social science disciplines in the conduct of applied research. If we leave out disciplines in demonstration research, we are likely to be neglecting important outcomes that are of importance to policymakers.

Other Income Maintenance Demonstrations

The negative income tax studies were the foremost income maintenance demonstration studies, but not the only ones. Other demonstrations have been conducted since the New Jersey flagship study was launched. Such research projects (some of them very large) were initiated, and much of this research was conducted, under the Nixon and Ford administrations. Besides the negative income tax demonstrations, income maintenance demonstrations were conducted to test housing allowances (vouchers to poor people to change their demand for housing and the supply of housing), health insurance for low-income families and individuals, and the use of education vouchers. By far the largest of these demonstrations were the housing voucher demonstrations.

The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970 provided funding to test alternative approaches to converting existing housing programs of the federal government, which focused on producing new units, into housing allowances that subsidized low-income residents. The idea of a housing allowance is to influence the demand for housing by providing low-income people with an allowance that increases their purchasing power for housing. Most housing programs at the time supported the construction of low-income housing, thereby stimulating the supply side of the housing market.

Three housing-allowance demonstrations were conducted. The first was a demand-side demonstration in two sites (the Pittsburgh and Phoenix metropolitan areas), which studied how families would

respond to housing allowances; the second was conducted in two smaller metropolitan areas to assess the effects of housing allowances on housing markets (their supply-side effects). The third was an administrative demonstration to collect information about the management of housing allowances: Could they be implemented effectively?²³ These demonstrations were carried out in the mid-1970s. The largest demonstration in terms of the number of participants was the housing-demand demonstration conducted by the Rand Corporation. Altogether \$160 million was spent on this study. Half of the federal funds were used to pay for the tested programs and half for data collection and research. Some features of the housing-allowance approach have influenced housing policy; however, a number of the main questions raised by the demonstrations were never answered, and controversy still exists within the housing policy community about the design and usefulness of these demonstrations.

Another set of demonstrations, which began in 1974, was linked to proposals that Presidents Nixon and Ford advanced to establish a national health insurance system. (Ironically, Nixon's plan was similar to the plan unsuccessfully advanced by the Clinton administration two decades later.) The aim of the health insurance demonstrations was to answer questions that could not be "reliably resolved through analysis of non-experimental data."²⁴ The demonstrations, conducted in six sites over an eight-year period (November 1974 to January 1982), enrolled more than 7,000 people. The research, conducted by the Rand Corporation, tested a range of health insurance alternatives to determine the effects of different benefit structures and financial features on the utilization of services, the health status of the participants, and the type and quality of the care they received.²⁵ All things considered, these health insurance demonstrations were of questionable value and were very costly. As far as I know, the uses of this research were limited.

Another case in which a demonstration was used to study an income transfer was education vouchers. This was the most flawed of all the studies conducted of income maintenance programs. This demonstration emerged not under Lyndon Johnson's Great Society, but in the Nixon years, to test a favorite idea of University of Chicago economist Milton

Friedman. He argued then (and still does) that governments should promote competition in elementary and secondary education by providing families with vouchers to purchase educational services for their children. The demonstration study of this idea, funded initially by the Office of Economic Opportunity and later by the National Institute for Education, was developed by the Harvard University Center for the Study of Public Policy and was conducted by the Rand Corporation.²⁶ Although six school districts initially came forward as candidates to participate in this demonstration, three of them dropped out when they learned more about the terms. As it turned out, only one school district (Alum Rock in San Jose, California) received research funds. The Alum Rock school voucher demonstration lasted five years and cost \$9 million. The story is long and complicated, but the plot is clear. Just about everything that could go wrong did go wrong. Not only did the project narrow down to one school district, but the State of California failed to pass the necessary enabling legislation, teachers and parents resisted essential features of the voucher plan, and parents were confused by what in the final analysis turned out to be a program with limited variation between the conventional and tested approaches. Although the idea of school vouchers later caught on, it was not because this research showed the way.

Demonstrations of Service-Type Programs

The other major category of demonstration research that has been conducted with random assignment is the study of service-type programs. Although a larger number of demonstration studies have been conducted of service-type programs than in the case of income maintenance programs, in the aggregate the amount of money involved is much less. Some service-type demonstrations predated the New Jersey negative income tax demonstration. The best known project was the Perry preschool demonstration in Ypsilanti, Michigan, initiated in 1962.²⁷ Despite the fact that the sample for the Perry preschool demonstration was very small (123 black children at risk of failing in school), the positive benefits of this program over a long period of time (through age nineteen in the fourth phase of this study as reported in 1984) were widely cited in the media and in the literature on education.

In considering service-type demonstrations in this book, which I argue is the most appropriate area for the application of randomized demonstration research, I rely heavily on the experience of the demonstrations I know best, those conducted by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC). The Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation is a nonprofit intermediary corporation based in New York City.* It conducts applied social science research, using funds from governments and foundations. The studies conducted by MDRC focus on the most disadvantaged groups in society. They emphasize welfare policy, job training, and related social services. MDRC came into existence in 1974 to conduct the national supported work demonstration. The chapter that follows immediately examines the challenges involved in conducting demonstration studies. Chapter 5 then describes several demonstration research projects conducted by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, including the supported work demonstration.

Endnotes

- 1 Steven V. Roberts, "House and Senate Conferees Settle on \$4.6 Billion Employment Plan," *New York Times*, March 22, 1983, pp. 1, 9.
- 2 Thomas D. Cook and Donald T. Campbell, *Quasi-Experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings* (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1979), p. 6.
- 3 Dependent variables are often also characteristics of the people treated.
- 4 Robert A. Levine, "How and Why the Experiments Came About," in *Work Incentives and Income Guarantees: The New Jersey Negative Income Tax Experiment*, eds. Joseph A. Pechman and P. Michael Timpane, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 16.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 21. The delay of this announcement due to Congress's Labor Day Recess was especially ironic in this case.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 25.
- 7 Felicity Skidmore, "Operational Design of the Experiments," in Pechman and Timpane, *Work Incentives*, p. 45.

* The term "intermediary" used in this way refers to organizations that have a linking function between research and public policy. The Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation was one of the first intermediary research organizations; there are now similar organizations in other areas of domestic public affairs.

- 8 Initially, the main urban portion of this next round of negative income tax experiments was planned for only one city, Seattle, but a decline in Washington State's volatile economy led to the decision to add Denver as a major urban site.
- 9 Gilbert Y. Steiner, "Reform Follows Reality: The Growth of Welfare," in *The Great Society: Lessons for the Future*, eds. Eli Ginzberg and Robert M. Solow (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 47-65.
- 10 Julian E. Zelizer, *Taxing America: Wilbur D. Mills, Congress, and the States, 1945-1975* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 316. Mills at that time was considering running for president and, according to Zelizer, "did not want to end up on the losing side" on welfare reform.
- 11 Office of Economic Opportunity, "Preliminary Results from the New Jersey Graduated Work Incentive Experiment" (Washington, DC: OEO, February 18, 1970), pp. 10-11.
- 12 Daniel P. Moynihan, *The Politics of a Guaranteed Income: The Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan* (New York: Random House, 1973) pp. 509-12.
- 13 Children's allowances are paid to all families with children according to the number of children and without regard to income. Many European countries have such schemes, with recoupment from higher-income families achieved through the tax system.
- 14 Vincent J. Burke and Vee Burke, *Nixon's Good Deed: Welfare Reform* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 41. The Burkes' book is the best on this subject, despite the fact that it does not treat my role in a kindly way.
- 15 As quoted in Morton Hunt, *Profiles of Social Research: The Scientific Study of Human Interactions* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1985), p. 292.
- 16 Gary Burtless and Robert Haveman, "Policy Lessons from Three Labor Market Experiments," in *Employment and Training R&D: Lessons Learned and Future Directions*, ed. R. Thayne Robson (Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1984), p. 108.
- 17 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Family and Nation* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), p. 151.
- 18 Subcommittee on Public Assistance, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, Hearing: *Welfare Research and Experimentation*, November 15-17, 1978 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 96-97.
- 19 Moynihan, *Family and Nation*, p. 152.

- 20 Subcommittee on Public Assistance, *Welfare Research and Experimentation*, p. 82.
- 21 Peter H. Rossi, "A Critical View of the Analysis of the Nonlabor Force Responses," in Pechman and Timpane, *Work Incentives*, p. 151
- 22 Lee Rainwater, "Sociological Lessons from the Negative Income Tax Experiment: A Sociological View," in *Lessons from the Income Maintenance Experiments*, ed. Alicia H. Munnell, proceedings of a conference held in September 1986 (Boston, MA: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1987), p. 194.
- 23 See Garland E. Allen, Jerry J. Fitts, and Evelyn S. Glatt, "The Experimental Housing Allowance Program," in *Do Housing Allowances Work?* eds. Katherine Bradbury and Anthony Downs (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 110.
- 24 Larry O. Orr, "The Health Insurance Study: Experimentation and Health Financing Policy," *Inquiry* 11 (March 1974): 28.
- 25 Robert H. Brook, John E. Ware, Jr., William Rogers, Emmett B. Keller, Allyson R. Davis, George A. Goldberg, Kathleen N. Lohr, Patricia Camp, and Joseph P. Newhouse, *The Effect of Coinsurance on the Health of Adults: Results from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1985).
- 26 U.S. National Institute of Education, Rand Corporation, *A Study of Alternatives in American Education*, 7 vols. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1976-81).
- 27 See John R. Berrueta-Clement et al., *Changed Lives: The Effects of the Perry Preschool Program on Youths through Age 19* (Ypsilanti, MI: High Scope Press, 1984).

Hurdles of Demonstration Research

This chapter considers eight hurdles that must be cleared in conducting demonstration research to test possible new approaches to public problems. They involve: (1) selection bias; (2) the null hypothesis; (3) contamination; (4) relations with program operators; (5) the quality and consistency of the treatment being tested; (6) the cost and quality of the data used in demonstration studies; (7) the treatment of human subjects; and (8) the uncertainty of cost-benefit analysis as the final step in the demonstration research process. Taken together, these hurdles indicate the wide range of scientific and operational decisions involved in selecting the subjects for demonstration research, developing the design to be used, and executing such studies.

Selection Bias

Selection bias is the most important challenge in thinking about demonstration research. The aim of such studies is to compare the effects of a tested new program to the counterfactual state — that is, the situation that would have obtained without the treatment. It is necessary to make such a comparison in order to answer the bottom-line question: Did the tested treatment make a difference? And, furthermore: What kind of a difference did it make, and what was its magnitude? An example helps to show what is involved here.

Suppose state education officials are considering a new method to improve the reading proficiency of junior high school students who have reading problems. The new method is a computer-assisted reading-remediation program, which was tried on a pilot basis and seemed to be successful. Further assume that the program was sponsored by the state government, administered in a number of junior high schools, and that the decision to be made now is whether it should be replicated statewide. School administrators seek to compare the reading scores of students in the special program with the scores of students who were not in the program.

One way to do this is to compare changes in the scores of the students in the computer-assisted reading program with the average change in the reading scores for all junior high school students in the school districts in which the pilot program was conducted. But this may not be a good basis of comparison from the point of view of people who like the program. Assume, for example, that the average increase in reading scores for all students was 105 percent compared with 78 percent for the students in the pilot program. School officials may reject this "normal" achievement increase of 105 percent as the standard for comparison, arguing that the proper approach is to compare the results of the pilot program with the scores of other students who have reading problems. Still, would this be a satisfactory baseline for comparison?

Assume the pilot program was offered to all students with reading scores below a certain level in the schools in which it was conducted. Some students applied for the program, some didn't. Maybe what really mattered was the motivation of the students who came forward and the motivation of parents who wanted special help for their children. If we compare the reading scores of students in the program with the scores of apparently similar students who were not in the program, we may find a positive impact, but actually it may reflect the impact of the "M factor" of motivation. This would be unfair in the opposite direction; it would give too much credit to the pilot program. The point is not that motivation may have made the difference, but that we do not know what made the difference. This is what is involved in the idea of selection bias, the possibility that the results of a tested program are biased — consciously or

unconsciously, deliberately or accidentally — because the people selected for the program were special in some way.

This is where random assignment has its great strength. If we had tested the reading program on a basis in which eligible students were randomly assigned (like a lottery) to either a treatment group or a control group, we would be in a better position (not perfect, but better) to say what difference the pilot program made. Random assignment allows school officials to control for a bias that might be introduced either by teachers or parents in selecting the students to participate in the new program from among those who met the program's eligibility standards. This applies either to a deliberate bias, for example, a "T factor," because teachers selected their best or worst students, or the "M factor" whereby students came forward because they were motivated to do so, or because they came from a home environment in which family support and encouragement had more of an effect than the special program being tested. Random assignment solves the problems of T factors, M factors, and X and Y factors because it creates conditions under which, if the sample is large enough and properly drawn, there is just as much chance that a T- or M-factor or other factor student will be in the control group as in the treatment group.

There is little dispute among researchers that random assignment is the best way to deal with the problem of selection bias; however, it is an expensive and often difficult procedure to use. A key question therefore is whether we can find an acceptable alternative when for some reason relating to cost, feasibility, the time frame involved, or the ethics of a given research setting, random assignment is deemed not to be possible. Researchers often use statistical modeling procedures to attempt to control for selection bias when random assignment is not used, but in the opinion of most experts this alternative is not as good as random assignment.

The history of the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation's work is helpful in making this point. The most striking finding from the MDRC supported work demonstration mentioned earlier was that this program showed positive results for two of four tested

participant groups.* Although the participants in each of the four groups were randomly assigned to a treatment group or a control group, the results were by far the strongest for one group — long-term female family heads on welfare. While it gets a little ahead of the story (this research project is described in more detail in the next chapter), it works well here to examine how one expert used this demonstration study to devise an ingenious approach to test the efficacy of random assignment.

Using data from MDRC's supported work demonstration, labor economist Robert J. LaLonde studied whether a research approach other than random assignment could have replicated the supported work control group for female welfare family heads. If LaLonde could have used a statistical modeling technique to identify a comparison group that was just like the supported work control group for long-term welfare family heads, or even very similar to this group, then researchers could have saved themselves a lot of time and expense. They could have used statistical modeling to create a comparison group and measured the impact of the supported work program by comparing the outcomes for the people in the tested program with the people in the statistically simulated comparison group.

According to LaLonde, when researchers do not have a randomly selected control group, "an econometrician must first select a group of individuals from the population to serve as a comparison group and then specify an econometric model that accounts both for the difference in earnings between the treatment and the comparison groups and for the treatment groups' decision to participate in training. . . . MDRC's experimental data offer labor economists an opportunity to test the non-experimental methods of program evaluation."¹ LaLonde used econometric techniques and data from three sources (the University of Michigan's Panel Study on Income Dynamics, the U.S. Bureau of the Census, and the Social Security Administration) to compute the

* The supported work approach tested a way of helping four groups of people with limited employment experience and skills enter the regular labor market. It consisted of a series of gradual steps — called "the graduated-stress approach" — that would get them acclimated to, and prepared for, regular employment. The four treatment groups were long-term female welfare family heads, ex-addicts, ex-offenders, and problem youth.

earnings of a group of people like the female welfare family heads in the MDRC supported work program.

In short, LaLonde's experiment on experimentation did not work. He concluded: "The econometric models used to evaluate training programs generate imprecise estimates of training effects. This imprecision underscores the importance of a classical experimental design both to the evaluation of the national supported work program and perhaps other programs as well. Without random assignment an econometrician faces a considerable range of training effects; it is unlikely he will choose the correct one."² The MDRC supported work demonstration showed net additional earnings of \$851 per year for female family heads on welfare, the group most aided by the supported work program being tested. LaLonde compared this outcome with the earnings of four simulated comparison groups of poor women. The result for one of his four groups was close to the findings from the MDRC study; it showed a net gain for program participants of \$1,090. A second simulation was also positive, but exaggerated the benefits for supported work, showing an earnings gain of over \$3,000. Two other simulations showed negative results. The women in these simulated comparison groups earned less than participants in the demonstration. In one case the negative earnings difference was \$2,822; in the other, \$3,357.

The clinching argument for LaLonde on the desirability of using random assignment in demonstration research was that he could find no basis on which to know how to select the right comparison group from among these possible simulated comparison groups. Labor economist Orley Ashenfelter, head of the Princeton University Industrial Relations Section, of which LaLonde was a member, commented as follows on his study: "The evaluation of the economic benefits of training programs will be greatly enhanced by the use of classical experimental methods. . . . Much of the non-experimental estimation of the effects of training programs seems dependent on elements of model specification that cannot be subjected to powerful statistical tests. . . . In sum, it appears that in the area of analysis of training programs the econometric methods available may not be able to deliver the benefits that randomized trials offer."³

LaLonde's work stimulated other researchers to examine alternatives to random assignment. Labor economist Rebecca Maynard, who had a long-standing interest in this subject, co-authored an article with LaLonde supporting his skeptical view of alternative methodologies. Later, a special issue of the journal *Evaluation Review* (August 1987) was devoted to this subject, including the LaLonde-Maynard article and a contrary position advanced by James J. Heckman. Heckman's article, written with associates at the University of Chicago, expressed his belief that "reliable non-experimental evaluation methods can and will be developed in the future for all subsidized employment and training programs."⁴

As previously stated, I believe random assignment is the best methodology for demonstration research. It was already observed that researchers who conduct demonstration research, especially in the field of social policy, often test programs they favor. One can think of this as a potential problem of selection bias — selecting programs they like — on the part of the researchers. The best way to deal with this problem is to use random assignment. Once researchers have designed a demonstration research project with random assignment, it greatly limits their opportunities (consciously or unconsciously) to manipulate their data.

Nevertheless, random assignment, because of its high cost and the difficulties involved in using it, is not the only way demonstration research is conducted. Researchers sometimes compare people in other places with those in the places in which a demonstration is carried out. This is called the "comparison-site" approach. Also, researchers sometimes use a before-and-after design to assess a program. This approach is especially flawed because we don't know if an observed effect would have occurred anyway over time. In still other studies, people who fit the eligibility standards of a particular program, but for some reason did not participate in it, are used as the comparison group. They may be applicants who initially came forward but eventually did not apply, or they may be applicants for whom space was not available. In other studies (and this, as already mentioned, is the most common alternative approach used), econometric

techniques are applied to data sets as LaLonde did statistically to simulate a control group.

My view is that some of these “less-good” approaches (that is, less good than random assignment) are better than others. The research hurdle of selection bias is high and crucial. However, I do not believe it justifies the rigid position, which unfortunately is widely held by public policy researchers, that there are no acceptable alternatives to random assignment for demonstration research. For now, suffice to say that the problem of selection bias is important enough to make random assignment the best methodology for demonstration research.

The Null Hypothesis

The second hurdle for demonstration research is the “null hypothesis.” This has to do with the choice of programs to test, not the choice of the method to test them. The key point here is that in real world settings in which many factors and forces impinge in rapid fire fashion on people’s lives, the only kind of program one can test is one that is big enough to make a detectable difference.

Again, the history of the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation’s supported work demonstration helps to explain what is involved here. When MDRC was designing the supported work demonstration, Robert Lampman, a welfare economist at the University of Wisconsin and an MDRC board member, stressed that this intervention must be large enough and last long enough so that it could reasonably be expected to have a significant impact. Lampman wanted to be sure we did not load the deck in favor of the null — or no-effect — hypothesis. Lampman said: “When persons with severe employment handicaps and disabilities are singled out for remediation, positive and lasting effects are not likely. In the case of supported work, the odds in favor of the null hypothesis were even greater . . . since the four groups chosen were from among those least likely to succeed in the labor market.”⁵ Lampman was right. If funders are going to the expense of conducting a demonstration research project with random assignment, such

studies should be of policy interventions that can be expected to make a discernible difference in the lives of the people treated.

Contamination

Contamination is the third hurdle of demonstration research. In high school chemistry classes, students are often told about the need to avoid contamination by conducting experiments in an airtight chamber to avoid having contaminants in the air impair its results. In demonstration research, we use the word "contamination" in a way that some people may find objectionable. If, for example, we are testing a program to provide health care for infants, on scientific grounds we would like the treatment and control groups to be "pure" in the sense that one group gets the treatment and the other does not. But what if we are studying such a program in a particular community, and while the study is under way a local group decides that it should open a clinic to provide similar health care services for infants? If we are using a research design with random assignment, the result might be that the treatment would have no or a small impact because the infants in the control group are receiving services similar or identical to those provided to the infants in the treatment group. Occurrences like this are not unusual. Under such conditions, we are comparing apples with apples. We are comparing the treatment that is the subject of the demonstration with other treatments provided in the community in which the demonstration is being conducted.

In another of MDRC's studies, this issue came into play in an important way. The case involved Project Redirection, a program to provide integrated, intensive social services to young welfare mothers. (The treatment group can be thought of as "children with children.") The research design in this case was a quasi-experimental approach using comparison sites. What MDRC found in this case was that the impacts of the program were "mixed but disappointing." Overall, its report said, "the early benefits proved to be largely transitory: By twenty-four months after baseline, most had disappeared."⁶ The apparent reason for this was that the people in the comparison sites received services like parenting classes, medical care for the baby, birth control counseling,

educational counseling, and employment counseling — similar to those provided to the participants in Project Redirection. The MDRC report said: “. . . the comparison teens received many more services than had been anticipated. For example, 43 percent of these teens were enrolled in a special teen parent program after their entry into the research sample and during Redirection’s first operational period.”⁷

This situation is referred to as contamination, although this use of the term should not imply that there is something wrong. It should be noted that this problem was not a function of the decision to use comparison sites. Random assignment was found to be infeasible for political reasons. The participating organizations in the demonstration were small. MDRC staff members faced resistance from program administrators on the grounds that they did not have a large enough pool of applicants to select randomly for treatment one out of every two (or some other proportion) of applicants. Actually, program operators often have a different point of view from researchers about research methods. In any event, the contamination that occurred in the case of Project Redirection could just as easily have occurred with a research design that used random assignment.

Relations with Program Operators

The hurdles discussed in this chapter indicate the kinds of research compromises that often are necessary in demonstration research because of the complexity of the real world. In the case of MDRC’s Project Redirection, the reason for using a comparison-site design, as opposed to random assignment, was that program operators objected to random assignment. In discussions with MDRC staff, they maintained that the limited size of the pool of eligible young welfare mothers who could be expected to come forward would not allow them to run a program that required them to turn away some applicants. Besides, they did not want to do this. It is not unusual for program operators to resist having to assign needy people who are otherwise eligible for a social service they provide to a no-treatment group. The challenge to researchers under these conditions is to convince the operators of a program to be tested that they should participate in research that employs random

assignment. This can require extensive and complicated negotiations. MDRC staff members are very good at this, but they don't always succeed. Program operators in this situation are being asked systematically to reject eligible applicants who, they argue, are *people*, not research objects.

Researchers have two main types of leverage under these conditions. One is money. Typically, the sponsors of a demonstration pay for the tested program. This may influence program operators to join a demonstration project despite their misgivings. Their reasoning in this case could be that they are getting something extra for people they want to serve in a situation in which they could not otherwise afford this service. Indeed, the rationing of this service on a random-assignment basis can be viewed as justifiable. One can argue that random assignment, like a lottery, is the fairest method of rationing a service under conditions of limited resources. The second argument that the managers of a demonstration can bring to bear in this situation involves the case for research. If the people who provide a service can help to prove that it works, then that service eventually may be provided on a broader basis to more people who need it because of the effect the research findings have on policymakers and on the political process.

Quality and Consistency of Treatment

Once a research purpose and design are decided upon and a sponsor agrees to pay for a demonstration study, other critical issues come into play. Consider, for example, the case in which a preschool education program being tested in a demonstration project is not being provided in the way the researchers intended. It may be because the staff of the organization providing the service do not like the research specifications, or it may be because they simply do not perform well. What is a researcher to do under such conditions?

We have what might be called, "the repair dilemma." Should researchers see to it that the quality of the program is maintained at a high level? In this case, researchers would be taking the position that what they are testing is a treatment that is well administered. This issue arose

in one of MDRC's demonstrations, the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Project. This demonstration was mandated by Congress to test a "saturation" program in selected communities designed to provide employment to all disadvantaged youth, both those in school and school dropouts, on the condition that the participating youth remained in or returned to school. Over a period of two-and-a-half years, a huge sum (\$240 million) was spent on this demonstration study in seventeen communities in which 76,000 persons were program participants. The U.S. General Accounting Office reported that this demonstration was well managed by MDRC, but they said the demonstration was artificial.⁸ GAO said MDRC's management oversight was too intrusive. The argument GAO made was that in the conduct of this program, were it to be replicated on a broad basis, the responsible authorities (mainly states and localities) could not be expected to be as demanding and rigorous in maintaining the quality of the program as was MDRC. My view is that this is one research hurdle we can't clear, namely to improve the standards of ongoing governmental program management. The main lesson of this experience is that it points up the challenge of maintaining acceptable standards with respect to the character and consistency of the treatment in a demonstration study.

Cost and Quality of Data

Almost any large-scale demonstration project is bound to confront mundane but crucial problems involving the data needed to conduct the research. Data must be collected in three time periods for both the treatment group and a control or comparison group in a demonstration: (1) a baseline period before the program starts up; (2) the in-program period (that is, the period during the demonstration); and (3) a post-program period. This third period, after the tested treatment is administered, can last a long time, sometimes five to seven years, sometimes longer, as in the case of the Perry preschool demonstration described in chapter 3. The data needed for both program participants and controls often must be obtained from a number of sources, for example, program operators, surveys, and governmental records and statistics.

Data collection tasks associated with a demonstration study are easiest to carry out for the people in the treatment group while they are participating in the tested program. But even this can be difficult. Researchers and program operators often do not see eye to eye. Conflicts can arise about what program sponsors regard as intrusive data requirements. Other problems can also arise. An example is the requirement in research protocols for program sponsors to collect data for the people in the research sample who are selected as participants but do not show up and participate in the program being tested.

However, compared to the in-program period, it is more difficult to obtain data for participants *after* they leave a program. Program operators usually cannot be enlisted to administer questionnaires to this group, so it is often necessary to employ a survey firm to obtain information from participants in the post-program period. Surveys are expensive, and if former participants cannot be located, the success of a demonstration may be threatened.

Still, all of the problems of collecting data on the participants engaged in a demonstration project pale in significance in comparison to those involved in collecting data on the people in control or comparison groups, people who were not in the tested program at all. Data for them are needed for all three time periods — baseline, program, and post-program. Often, the members of control groups are paid when they are interviewed, but this is not always or necessarily enough to overcome the problems of finding them and winning their cooperation. The people in control or comparison groups are likely to be highly mobile and hard to locate; they may also have limited language skills, which can add to the difficulty of obtaining information about them. Compromises are often made. Data elements that are considered desirable are dropped in order to reduce the time needed to conduct interviews and the costs involved in doing so. In other cases, the frequency of data collection is sacrificed to cut costs or to limit the intrusiveness of the research process. In still other cases, public data files are used instead of interviews in the follow-up period, in which case the data may be less complete and accurate than in situations where a survey is administered. Wherever compromises are made, questions arise about the effect such decisions have on the integrity of the research. These nitty-gritty

issues are not the kinds of challenging issues that fascinate social scientists. They are nonetheless crucial in the conduct of demonstration research.

Treatment of Human Subjects

As demonstration research gained ground in the U.S. in the late 1960s and 1970s, so did concerns about the protection of human subjects in such studies. In 1974, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued regulations that required researchers receiving HEW research funds to establish "institutional review boards" to ensure that demonstration research projects protect the rights of human subjects.⁹ At first, the President's Office of Management and Budget required that these regulations be applied on a government-wide basis. Later, this policy was changed, and the regulations were applied only to demonstrations (and even then not all demonstrations) paid for by HEW or its successor department, the Department of Health and Human Services.

Two main premises are reflected in the HEW rules for dealing with human subjects and in the similar standards of other groups. Both premises are derived from medical research. One premise is that social program operators, like medical practitioners, should *do no harm*. They should make certain that no one is disadvantaged by virtue of being a member of a treatment or control group for a demonstration study. The second premise is positive, requiring that researchers obtain *informed consent*, that is, that participants in a demonstration study (both those treated and the members of a control group) should be given an explanation about the research and should be asked if they are willing to agree to participate in it. Writing in the mid-1970s, P. Michael Timpane and Alice Rivlin said that "informed consent is by now an entrenched canon of medical experimentation and has been adopted implicitly by most social experimenters."¹⁰ Although few policy researchers quarrel with these premises, their implications for both the substance and process of demonstration studies are considerable.

The Brookings Institution held a conference in 1975 on the ethical and legal issues of social experimentation. The conference considered a

number of questions: Can children be the subject of a social experiment? Who can give informed consent for them? Their parents? School officials? Some participants at the conference ruled out all social experiments involving children, along with other groups for whom it was argued informed consent cannot be obtained effectively, such as prisoners and mental patients. This view was challenged by other participants at the conference who saw little risk, only potential gains, for the subjects of social experiments. They argued that all decisions involving social programs involve risks similar to those of a social experiment, yet we do not require informed consent in every case in which society intervenes in a life situation.

Despite the fact that the requirement to obtain informed consent is now widely accepted by researchers, questions of execution (how researchers tell potential participants about a research project and how much they tell them) can introduce problems. For example, people may react to a social experiment in a way that reflects what they perceive to be the expectations of its sponsors as expressed in what they are told in obtaining their informed consent. They may try to “prove” that a program works regardless of whether they are in the treatment group or the control group, thus confounding the research. Or members of the treatment group may decide to undermine the program for reasons having to do with their attitude toward what researchers tell them, toward program operators, or toward social programs generally. This is called the “Hawthorne effect,” people reacting simply to being the subjects of an experiment.*

Although issues having to do with obtaining informed consent are important, the most serious ethical issues concerning the treatment of human subjects come after informed consent has been obtained. Suppose we are testing a home health care program for the elderly with a

* The Hawthorne effect occurs when behavior is altered because people know they are being observed. Its name derives from studies at the Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric Company during the 1920s and 1930s. The studies showed productivity increased when lights were darkened and rest periods shortened, which researchers attributed to the extra effort made by workers who knew they were part of an experiment. See Theodore H. Poister, *Public Program Analysis: Applied Research Methods* (Baltimore, MD: University Park Press, 1970), pp. 266-67.

demonstration using random assignment. Assume the service is expensive and that the key dependent variable of interest to the funders and the researchers is whether the service over the long run reduces the costs of institutionalization in a nursing home or hospital. An older person comes into a senior citizen center and finds that she is eligible for "Home-Help." She is urged to sign up but she is told that she may or may not be one of the participants selected. She decides to apply and fills out the necessary application and certification forms and also an informed consent agreement. The program director then checks by phone with the research staff and is told that this particular participant is assigned to the control group. The director is face to face with the applicant and must tell her that she was not selected for the program. Assume the applicant asks, "Is there another program I can get into?" This raises a troublesome, yet not unusual, issue. The program director knows that if the applicant is referred to another program and is aided, this could reduce the likelihood that the program that is the subject of this demonstration will have an impact, because the difference between the treatment and control group is likely to be less than what it might otherwise be. Moreover, showing that there is a big difference between the two groups often is precisely the reason the program director agreed in the first place to join the research project.

This is the "program director's dilemma." The director is between a rock and a hard place. We can make this dilemma even more difficult if we assume that the program director is sitting across the desk from an applicant who does not ask about another program, yet the director knows about one that exists and has openings. Should she make a referral even though it wasn't solicited? There are no easy answers to these questions.

The Uncertainty of Cost-Benefit Analysis

The eighth hurdle of demonstration research concerns cost-benefit analysis, appropriately treated here as the final hurdle because it is the last step in the demonstration research process. In this final step, information about all of the costs of a program being tested and all of the benefits are combined in an effort to come to a bottom-line number,

which identifies the full and long-term impact of the program. Researchers typically present their cost-benefit findings according to three perspectives — to participants (were they better off?), to taxpayers (that is, nonparticipants as a group), and to the society as a whole. Often, big assumptions are needed to do cost-benefit analysis.

The aim of a cost-benefit analysis is appealing. In an ideal world, one would want policymakers to be in a position to compare the cost-to-benefit ratios for all, or anyway a number of, program alternatives designed to achieve a particular policy objective, and then select the most effective one. Cut down to size, this was the aim of Lyndon Johnson's Planning-Programming-Budgeting (PPB) system described in chapter 2. But, as we have seen, the task of conducting demonstration research is so complicated, time-consuming, and expensive that we can only study the effects of those few programs where we decide circumstances warrant the conduct of rigorous research. No matter how good our intentions may be to use social science in making social policy, decision makers will never be able to choose among all possible government programs to achieve a given purpose on the basis of definitive cost-benefit findings.

Where demonstration studies are carried out, the immediate purpose is to determine whether the tested program had a sufficiently strong measurable impact when it was tested to justify its replication on a broader basis. Unfortunately, this is not enough for policymakers who want to know the long-term costs and benefits of the program.

My view is that this step often involves problems that go beyond what researchers can do in a demonstration study. Frequently they do not have sufficient data for the far out years — that is, projected way beyond the study period. Attempts to ascertain the cost-benefit ratio of a tested program often require going beyond the time period of observed variables in a demonstration project.

It is wise to be cautious about cost-benefit analysis, and indeed many governmental and foundation research sponsors take this position. Cost-benefit analysis is an uncertain art form. Policy researchers and the sponsors of policy research are best advised to stop at the point

of ascertaining the observed impacts of the tested program and let the political process take it from there.¹¹ There are two reasons for this conclusion: (1) that there are likely to be costs and benefits of a social demonstration that are left out of the cost-benefit equation, or are included with such rough approximations as to be of questionable value; and (2) that the methods for estimating the effects of a tested program way beyond the study period are often highly uncertain.

On the first point, the problem is that outcome variables that are omitted from a demonstration often are left out precisely because they are difficult to measure. In the case of the "Home-Help" program for the elderly mentioned earlier, we may decide that the fact that participants are happier in their own home is a very important benefit. Yet, how would we monetize this variable for a cost-benefit analysis, which some readers of research results are likely to think should be or is part of the analysis? This point can be shown using MDRC's supported work demonstration as an illustration. Policymakers may be interested in the effects of supported work on distressed communities. They may believe that in the long run a positive and cumulative community effect is desirable for the society, and they may also believe that over time this will result in lowering welfare costs. However, we would be hard put to measure these community-improvement and long-term welfare cost-reduction outcomes of supported work. The same holds for the effects of supported work on the children of program participants: Are they better off, happier, more or less successful in school? These dependent variables (effects on communities, the society, and children) were not included in the design for the MDRC supported work demonstration. But, the idea of a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis that purports to show the whole picture may suggest to some readers that factors such as these were included.

Other types of benefits are often included in a cost-benefit analysis that are very hard to measure. A good example is the cost-benefit study that was conducted of the Job Corps. Researchers reported a favorable cost-benefit ratio for the society as a whole of \$1:1.46 — that is, \$1.46 in benefits for every \$1.00 spent on the Job Corps. This was regarded as a very good result. However, 40 percent of these benefits came from reductions in criminal behavior; accordingly, the values assigned to

reduced injuries and loss of life due to reduced criminal behavior had a very large effect on the cost-benefit findings. A murder was estimated to cost society \$125,305.¹² The cost-benefit ratio of the Job Corps would have been negative (.8:1) if crime reduction had not been considered.¹³

Long-term impacts also can be hard to assess. As already noted, the follow-up data collected in a demonstration study often do not cover as long a time period as is believed to be needed for a cost-benefit analysis. Because of this, researchers sometimes make assumptions about what are known as the "decay rates" of program benefits over time. They measure the benefits for a given period and then estimate or assume how they will be sustained or taper off in future years. The literature on this subject is complicated, but the point is that decay rates are extremely difficult to measure. This is another soft ingredient that goes into some cost-benefit analyses.

In sum, the task of assigning a single overall cost-benefit ratio to programs tested in demonstration studies often gets researchers into difficult terrain. This is not to say that costs and benefits should be ignored, but only that public policy researchers should focus their attention in demonstration studies on measured impacts. They should tell policymakers what they measured, how and for how long they did so, and what they found. This knowledge can be combined by policy analysts with other types of information, including what is known or believed about longer-term program effects. But this should be done in a more modest way than is the practice in cost-benefit analyses, often performed with high levels of precision, as the final step in the conduct of social experiments.¹⁴ Some readers may acknowledge the validity of these admonitions, but take the position that politicians want — some even demand — one clear, simple, bottom-line number. This is true. But I would argue that scientific considerations should outweigh these political exigencies. Candor is required on the part of researchers in their discussions with policymakers about the strengths and weaknesses of the findings from demonstration research.

Since I rely heavily on the research conducted by MDRC, I feel obliged to discuss MDRC's practice in the use of cost-benefit analysis.

In most of its studies, the MDRC has presented cost-benefit findings, but with considerable care and soul searching. When the corporation issued its summary report on the national supported work demonstration, its first demonstration study, a carefully crafted statement about the limitations of cost-benefit analysis was included:

Although the approach is useful in providing an overall assessment of supported work's effectiveness, it has limitations and risks. Certain important benefits and costs simply cannot be accurately measured and are therefore not included in the summary estimates. Moreover, this type of analysis calls for assumptions about the value of specific items and for judgments on the longer term extrapolation of benefits and costs that were directly measured only for up to 27 or 36 months.¹⁵

Perhaps MDRC should have stopped there and not presented an overall cost-benefit analysis. Labor economist Lloyd Ullman argues that the uncertainty of cost-benefit analysis produces an "expert witness" mentality whereby the proponents and opponents of a given program can trot out experts to argue both sides on a basis that often undermines the value of a well conducted demonstration.¹⁶ At the very least, researchers should express cost-benefit findings using ranges of numbers for their findings, and also should present tables and text that clearly and prominently indicate qualifications.

Conclusion

These eight hurdles to demonstration research point to the same conclusion: Rigorous research on what works can be a useful and important input to the policy process, but it is not easy to do. Understandably, politicians and policy makers are bound to ask: Does a given new program idea work? Demonstration studies are most effective when policymakers care about a particular issue, are genuinely uncertain about how to handle it, and are willing to wait for the findings of a research project.

It needs to be added that the demonstration research has an important byproduct: *It teaches*. The history of MDRC is a success story in these terms. It has deepened understanding of social programs — what they are, how they work, and how they should be assessed. This is an important outcome in and of itself. The next chapter carries the MDRC story further and shows how the results of demonstration studies can be and are used in the policy process.

Endnotes

- 1 Robert J. LaLonde, "Evaluating the Econometric Evaluations of Training Programs with Experimental Data," Working Paper No. 183, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, October 1984, p. 183.
- 2 Ibid., p. 67.
- 3 Orley Ashenfelter, "The Case for Evaluating Training Programs with Randomized Trials," Working Paper No. 203, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, January 1986, pp. 1, 8.
- 4 James J. Heckman, V. Joseph Hotz, and Marcelo Dabos, "Do We Need Experimental Data to Evaluate the Impact of Manpower Training on Earnings?" *Evaluation Review* 11 (August 1987): 395-427.
- 5 Robert Lampman, as quoted in Eli Ginzberg, Richard Nathan, and Robert Solow, "The Lesson of the Supported Work Demonstration," in *The National Supported Work Demonstration*, eds. Robinson G. Hollister, Jr., Peter Kemper, and Rebecca A. Maynard (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), p. 308.
- 6 Janet C. Quint and James A. Riccio, *The Challenge of Serving Pregnant and Parenting Teens: Lessons from Project Redirection* (New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, April 1985), p. 15. New MDRC follow-up data for five years indicate positive longer-term impacts of Project Redirection.
- 7 Ibid., p. 16.
- 8 U.S. General Accounting Office, "CETA Demonstration Provides Lessons on Implementing Youth Programs," *Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States*, HRD-81-1, 8 December 1980, p. i.
- 9 See Marshall J. Breger, "Randomized Social Experiments and the Law," in *Solutions to Ethical and Legal Problems in Social Research*, eds. Robert F. Boruch and Joe S. Cecil (New York: Academic Press, 1983), pp. 106-7.

- 10 See Alice M. Rivlin and P. Michael Timpane, "Introduction and Summary," in *Ethical and Legal Issues of Social Experimentation*, eds. Alice M. Rivlin and P. Michael Timpane (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 7, 15.
- 11 I am indebted to my MDRC board colleague Eli Ginzberg for having patiently planted the seeds of doubt expressed in this analysis, although many readers will quarrel with the position taken here. Lloyd Ullman also helped me in working through these issues. Neither Ginzberg nor Ullman are responsible, however, for the statements made in this section.
- 12 Office of Research and Evaluation, Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, "Evaluation of the Economic Impact of the Job Corps Program," September 1982, p. 230.
- 13 Michael E. Borus, "Why Do We Keep Inventing Square Wheels? What We Know and Don't Know about Remedial Employment and Training Programs for High School Drop Outs," paper prepared for the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, New York City, June 1984, p. 9.
- 14 While it is not my area of expertise, it would seem that for physical (public works-type) policy studies, cost-benefit analysis is more feasible.
- 15 Board of Directors, Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, *Summary and Findings of the National Supported Work Demonstration* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1980), p. 135.
- 16 I am indebted to Lloyd Ullman for suggesting the expert witness metaphor.

Welfare Demonstration Studies

This chapter uses studies conducted by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation to show how demonstration research affects public policy. The way the corporation developed was very much a function of decisions made about the conduct of the original supported work demonstration. The supported work program was developed by the Vera Institute of Justice in New York City to provide employment for people accused of minor offenses in the criminal justice system. The aim was to provide participants with work experience in a group situation, under conditions of gradually increasing stress, as an alternative to incarceration. An operating subsidiary of the Vera Institution, the Wildcat Service Corporation, was established in 1969 to run the supported work program; its roster grew from six participants in the fall of 1969 to nearly 1,400 in mid-1974. Participants worked in jobs such as cleaning, plastering, and painting buildings being restored; clearing refuse from vacant lots; serving as messengers; providing building- and park-maintenance services; clearing construction sites; interpreting for Spanish-speaking hospital patients; and driving for the elderly.

Early studies of the Vera Institute's supported work program showed promising results.¹ As a consequence, Mitchell Sviridoff, vice-president for national affairs of the Ford Foundation, decided to set up a national test of the supported work idea. Sviridoff sought assistance from a number of federal agencies and established a research committee, on which I served, to advise the Ford Foundation. The

advisory committee, headed by economist Eli Ginzberg of Columbia University, recommended a multi-site national demonstration with participants randomly assigned either to a supported work program or to a control group. Six federal agencies, with the Department of Labor as the lead agency, committed funds to this research, which began in March 1975. Over the full three-year period of the supported work demonstration, 6,616 people were in the research sample — 3,214 as participants and 3,402 in the control group.

As planning for this national demonstration moved forward, it became apparent that the management tasks involved were formidable. The list of participating organizations was growing — the Ford Foundation, six federal agencies, the fifteen sites operating the program, the research contractors, plus a central staff to coordinate and manage the demonstration. By mid-1974, the total cost of the demonstration, including funds from local sources, was estimated at \$80 million, most of which was to be spent on participants.

The assumption up until this time had been that an interagency committee of federal officials would administer the supported work demonstration. However as the planning proceeded, it became increasingly clear that an interagency committee would have great difficulty managing such a multi-pronged, dispersed project. Hence, it was decided in mid-1974 to convert the advisory committee for the study into a nonprofit corporation, chartered in Delaware, which would receive funds from federal agencies and the Ford Foundation to manage the supported work demonstration. Because the intermediary corporation formed for the supported work demonstration proved to be an effective device, it has continued in existence (now in its 26th year) to conduct many other large demonstration studies.

I was an original member of the corporate board, as were Eli Ginzberg, Robert Lampman, Robert Solow, Gilbert Steiner, and Phyllis Wallace (all academic social scientists). Ginzberg chaired the board from 1974 to 1981, when I succeeded him. I served as chairman until 1997. The first president of MDRC was William G. Grinker. He was followed in 1982 by Barbara B. Blum, who served until 1986, when she was succeeded by Judith M. Gueron, who has been an

officer of the corporation from its inception. MDRC has had an increasingly diverse research portfolio and a staff in some years as large as 200 people.

In addition to the supported work demonstration, other demonstration studies conducted by MDRC include: (1) a study of the tenant management approach for administering public housing projects; (2) a saturation guaranteed-job program known as the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Project, which was established by federal law as a demonstration project; (3) Project Redirection to provide services to very young women receiving welfare benefits; (4) an employment and training program (called the WIN-Laboratory or WIN-Lab project²) conducted in Denver; St. Louis; Madison and Racine, Wisconsin; and Louisville, Kentucky; (5) the Structured Training and Employment Transition Services (STETS) demonstration (a program similar to supported work) for young mentally retarded workers; (6) an eight-state test of work/welfare as an approach to welfare reform in the early 1980s; (7) an intensive remediation and training program for school dropouts called Jobstart; (8) New Chance, a comprehensive service program for very young welfare mothers; (9) the Parents' Fair Share Demonstration project for noncustodial welfare family heads (mostly fathers); (10) a study of a large employment subsidy program in Canada; and (11) a study of the effects of welfare reform in distressed neighborhoods in four large urban counties after the enactment of the 1996 national welfare reform law.

As the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation gained experience, it moved from relatively small and focused demonstration projects to broad-scale evaluations of large ongoing programs. Examples of the latter are the corporation's evaluation of the statewide work/welfare program in California and its "Urban Change" study of the effects of the 1996 national welfare reform law on distressed neighborhoods in large urban counties. The discussion of MDRC's experience in this chapter highlights the corporation's demonstration research. Later, in chapter 7, the discussion considers MDRC's evaluations of large ongoing social programs.

Supported Work

Since the early 1970s, welfare reform for able-bodied, working-age adults and their children has been the Mount Everest of U.S. social policy — climb it if you can! Two different approaches to welfare reform have been championed. One is the *income strategy* as embodied in the negative income tax idea discussed in chapter 3. (The aim of this approach is to structure welfare benefits so they provide an incentive for working-age, able-bodied parents to enter and stay in the labor force.) The other major approach is the *service strategy*. It emphasizes services, such as job placement and counseling, child care, transportation, and training and education to enable poor family heads to move off welfare and enter and stay in the regular labor force. The two approaches can go together, but the emphasis of different plans advanced or tested tend to be very different.

In 1962 under President Kennedy, the federal government first enacted legislation embodying the service strategy — to provide job counseling, job training, and related rehabilitative services to welfare family heads. Then, toward the end of the 1960s, the emphasis of national welfare policy-making shifted to the income strategy. The negative income tax demonstrations were initiated in 1968; and in 1969 President Nixon proposed the Family Assistance Plan (FAP) for welfare reform. Although Nixon's proposal was a hybrid of the income and service strategies, the newest and most controversial features of his plan incorporated the negative income tax approach. Nixon's plan died in the Congress in 1972 just before his re-election as President. Because of Watergate, it could not be revived afterwards, despite efforts to do so. President Carter later went down this same road, also unsuccessfully.

MDRC's supported work demonstration, although not initiated with the main purpose of studying welfare policies, reflects the service strategy as an approach to welfare reform, which is the approach that has come to dominate nearly three decades later under President Clinton. The supported work demonstration began operations in 1974, not long after last rites were administered for Nixon's Family Assistance Plan. The idea of supported work, as its name implies, is that

disadvantaged people of working age should be “supported” as they enter the workforce. As they increasingly become adjusted to the workplace, this support is gradually withdrawn, the goal being to help participants acquire work experience and job skills so eventually they can become regular members of the labor force. Presumably, experience interacting and working with peers, meeting deadlines, and relating successfully to supervisors are skills that later on will help people with limited work experience obtain and stay in unsupported jobs.

The supported work program as originally developed by the Vera Institute of Justice did not apply to welfare family heads; it was focused on criminal justice offenders as an alternative to incarceration. The aim of MDRC’s national demonstration was to test the supported work approach on a broader basis, both geographically and in terms of the groups aided. Question number one was: What groups should be aided? A key factor was money. The funders of the demonstration, particularly the federal agencies involved, had different interests and constituencies. The Labor Department was interested in youth. The Department of Justice was interested in previous offenders. The drug-abuse prevention agency was interested in former addicts. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the Department of Health and Human Services) initially was reluctant to participate in the funding consortium for the national supported work demonstration. Caspar Weinberger, at that time secretary of HEW, had reservations about the administrative arrangement whereby a nonprofit intermediary would coordinate and manage primarily federal funds for the demonstration. Although HEW eventually provided money for the supported work demonstration, a decision was made by MDRC prior to HEW’s decision to participate to include long-term female welfare family heads as one of the target groups in the demonstration. This was done on the assumption that MDRC could use Ford Foundation and some federal funds to serve this group. As it turned out, this was a fortunate decision.

Altogether, there were four target groups in the supported work demonstration — problem youth; former offenders (that is, persons who had previously been incarcerated as a result of a conviction for a criminal offense); former narcotic addicts; and long-term female welfare family heads. (See Table 5.1.) The definition of the target groups

Table 5.1
Supported Work Eligibility Criteria, by Target Group

<i>Target Group</i>	<i>Eligibility Criteria*</i>
AFDC	Women on AFDC both currently and for 30 out of the preceding 36 months; youngest child 6 years old or older
Ex-addicts	Age 18 years or older; enrolled in a drug treatment program currently or within the preceding 6 months
Ex-offenders	Age 18 years or older; incarcerated within the last 6 months as a result of a conviction
Youths	Age 17 to 20 years; no high school or equivalency degree; not in school in the last 6 months; delinquency record, conviction, court appearance, or similar (for at least 50% of the youth)
All groups	Currently unemployed [†] ; spent no more than 3 months in a job during the past 6 months

Source: Board of Directors, Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, *Summary and Findings of the National Supported Work Demonstration* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1980), p. 23.

* Supported work eligibility criteria refer to conditions prevailing at the time of application to the supported work program. If a person in supported work voluntarily or involuntarily leaves the program and subsequently reapplies for a supported work job, he or she is not reviewed again for acceptance under the eligibility criteria.

† Worked no more than 10 hours a week for the last 4 weeks.

was only the beginning. Many other decisions had to be made. Since this was the first demonstration conducted by MDRC, the learning process was more challenging and time-consuming than for later demonstrations.

As the supported work demonstration got under way, discussions within the corporation came to reflect an increasingly cautious view about the challenges to be faced. Eli Ginzberg, the first chairman of the board of MDRC and a master at getting to the heart of issues, produced the following wise admonitions based on the discussion at one of the early meetings in this planning process:

- ❖ The best-designed and controlled social experiment can never take account of exogenous factors.
- ❖ The odds are very strong that any social intervention will be too weak to show clear-cut positive effects.

- ❖ Many types of effects cannot be caught in even the most sophisticated evaluation.
- ❖ Because of hidden bias in clients and selectors, the matching of experimentals and controls is likely to be flawed.

As implied by Ginzberg, all the hurdles discussed in the previous chapter had to be dealt with in planning this research. At the outset, concern about selection bias and the null hypothesis led to a decision to test what was regarded as a relatively long (nine months to one year) treatment, and to compare the experience of the treatment groups with that of randomly assigned control groups. (Actually, the decision to adopt random assignment was an integral part of the research design for this study from the very start.)

Despite the fact that HEW funds were not initially included in the demonstration, the corporation decided to set up its own human subjects institutional review board, headed by MDRC board member Gilbert Y. Steiner. (None of the other members of the institutional review board were members of the MDRC board.) In turn, the MDRC institutional review board decided to adopt HEW's rules for the treatment of human subjects. This meant that an informed consent agreement had to be obtained from all participants in the demonstration.

The sponsoring organizations of supported work projects at the local level were mostly small nonprofit organizations. The possibility always existed that the project would suffer from what was described in chapter 4 as service contamination; however, the fact that most other employment and training programs for the eligible population in the communities studied tended to be shorter in duration and less intensive was seen as a factor that would mitigate this problem.

At the outset of the research, considerable staff and board time were devoted to the selection of research contractors. Later, the relationship with contractors was the focus of a major controversy over prospective cost overruns that resulted in protracted bargaining to prevent this from happening. Robert Solow (then vice-chairman of the MDRC board) and I (then treasurer) participated in intense negotiations with the research contractor, Mathematica Policy Research of Princeton,

New Jersey. We won. Mathematica researchers conducted the baseline and follow-up surveys of supported work participants and controls and were responsible for the impact and cost-benefit studies, with assistance provided by researchers at the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin.

Results Focus on Welfare

The most important findings from the supported work demonstration involved differences among the four treatment groups. The impact of supported work was largest for the welfare group. The report on the demonstration stated, "The program has proved most effective in preparing for employment a substantial number of women who have been on welfare (AFDC) for many years."³ Table 5.2 shows the results by time period for this group. The most important period is the nineteen to twenty-seven month post-enrollment period. The differences between the experimentals and controls in the earlier periods (one to eighteen months) in hours worked and earnings were likely to have been a result of the fact that the welfare family heads in the treatment groups were enrolled in the supported work program during this period.

The 8.5 percent difference (bold and underlined in Table 5-2) in employment between the AFDC treatment and control groups in the period nineteen to twenty-seven months after enrollment is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The treatment group worked nearly sixteen hours more per month in this period than the controls and earned an average of \$77 per month more than the controls. Their AFDC benefits were reduced by an average of 14 percent, and a like proportion for food stamps. In short, supported work was successful for the welfare group, although the gains made were not large or dramatic. For the former-addict groups (see Table 5.3) the results were also positive.

A close reader of these two tables will notice an important point. The impact of the supported work program on the welfare (AFDC) group is in large part a result of the fact that the controls fared relatively poorly in the labor market. (Compare the labor market experience of the AFDC and former-addict control groups in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.) Similar

Table 5.2
Experimental-Control Differences During 27 Months Following
Enrollment in Supported Work Demonstration; AFDC Group

<i>Outcome Measure</i>	<i>Experimentals</i>	<i>Controls</i>	<i>Difference</i>
Percentage employed during period			
Months 1-9	96.3	36.5	59.8*
10-18	76.5	39.4	37.1*
19-27	49.1	40.6	<u>8.5*</u>
Average monthly hours worked			
Months 1-9	135.3	26.6	108.7*
10-18	79.4	40.3	39.1*
19-27	60.9	45.2	<u>15.7*</u>
Average monthly earnings (\$)			
Months 1-9	400.44	78.28	322.16*
10-18	274.06	131.08	142.98*
19-27	242.89	165.88	<u>77.01*</u>
Cash welfare payments † (Percentage receiving)			
Months 1-9	93.8	97.7	-3.9*
10-18	82.4	80.1	-7.7*
19-27	71.4	85.1	<u>-13.7*</u>
Average monthly amount (\$)			
Months 1-9	169.82	277.90	-108.09*
10-18	164.28	246.60	-82.32*
19-27	172.06	224.00	-51.94*
Food stamps: average monthly bonus value (\$)			
Months 1-9	44.83	63.46	-18.63*
10-18	42.15	58.02	-15.87*
19-27	47.14	60.25	-13.11*
Average monthly total income (\$) ††			
Months 1-9	628.06	435.10	192.96*
10-18	524.47	454.44	70.03*
19-27	497.50	470.14	27.36

Source: Board of Directors, Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, *Summary and Findings of the National Supported Work Demonstration* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1980), p. 153.

Note: Averages are calculated for all members of the sample, including those with no employment or transfer payment receipt in the covered period.

* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

† Welfare includes AFDC, General Assistance, Supplemental Security Income, and other unspecified cash welfare.

†† Total income includes earnings, unemployment compensation, welfare, food stamp bonus value, and other unearned income (Social Security, pensions, alimony, and child support).

Table 5.3
Experimental-Control Differences During 36 Months Following
Enrollment in Supported Work Demonstration; Ex-Addict Group

<i>Outcome Measure</i>	<i>Experimentals</i>	<i>Controls</i>	<i>Difference</i>
Percentage employed during period			
Months 1-9	95.0	50.2	44.8*
10-18	63.9	53.1	10.8*
19-27	56.5	53.0	3.5
28-36	64.0	53.9	10.1 [†]
Average monthly hours worked			
Months 1-9	118.7	40.5	78.2*
10-18	66.4	50.0	16.4*
19-27	60.1	58.6	1.5
28-36	70.9	52.6	18.3*
Average monthly earnings (\$)			
Months 1-9	361.23	159.79	201.44*
10-18	259.62	220.42	39.20 [†]
19-27	277.75	261.33	16.42
28-36	326.09	224.36	101.73
Average monthly welfare and food stamp benefits (\$)††			
Months 1-9	57.97	115.17	-57.20*
10-18	92.42	110.89	-18.47*
19-27	89.90	93.94	-4.04
28-36	94.34	103.79	-9.45
Percentage using any drug other than marijuana or alcohol			
Months 1-9	36.1	38.2	-2.1
10-18	34.1	32.7	1.4
19-27	28.0	27.5	0.5
28-36	23.4	20.7	2.7
Percentage using heroin			
Months 1-9	20.2	21.5	-1.3
10-18	16.8	17.8	-1.0
19-27	13.4	11.7	1.7
28-36	10.1	8.8	1.3
Percentage arrested			
Months 1-18	25.3	33.5	-8.2*
1-36	35.0	53.1	-18.1*
Percentage arrested for robbery			
Months 1-18	2.3	7.5	-5.2*
1-36	0.2	13.4	-13.2*

Continued

<i>Outcome Measure</i>	<i>Experimentals</i>	<i>Controls</i>	<i>Difference</i>
Percentage arrested on drug charges			
Months 1-18	4.1	7.9	-3.8*
1-36	6.8	14.0	-7.2
Percentage convicted			
Months 1-18	13.5	17.8	-4.3 [†]
1-36	19.3	32.9	-13.6 [†]

Source: Board of Directors, Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, *Summary and Findings of the National Supported Work Demonstration* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1980), p. 155.

Note: Averages are calculated for all members of the sample, including those with no employment or transfer payment receipt in the covered period.

* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

[†] Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.

^{††} Welfare includes AFDC, General Assistance, Supplemental Security Income, and other unspecified cash welfare.

findings have been made in other studies. As it turns out, the problems of female welfare family heads with children are so serious in terms of their ability to enter and participate in the labor market that an intervention for this group is likely to have a bigger impact than for other groups. Society, in effect, gains more from investing in programs for this hard-to-serve group.

This finding that the most disadvantaged groups gain the most from job training programs has to do with what is known in employment and training parlance as “creaming.” Many employers and also the managers of training programs intuitively see themselves as benefiting the most from a focus on the most job-ready people — that is, the people most likely to make it in the labor market. Helping them, it is felt, can provide employers with reliable workers at minimal cost and put program sponsors in a strong position to claim success for their efforts. But the point that is often missed is that the most job-ready participants are likely to make it anyway. The tested program is not providing added value for the society. Thus, targeting, as in this case on disadvantaged long-term welfare family heads, should have been expected to produce a positive program impact — and it did.

For two groups in the demonstration (problem youth and previous offenders) the results showed no or very little impact of supported work. According to MDRC's first report on the demonstration, the program did not yield long-term positive results for the youth group. It had a marginal positive impact on the offenders group.

Implications for Welfare Reform

The supported work demonstration was initiated in the mid-1970s, a period in which generally liberal attitudes on social policy predominated. But, by the time MDRC had completed the demonstration and published its results, it was 1980. The tide had turned. Supported work had been successful for disadvantaged welfare family heads. However, it was seen by many politicians and public officials in 1980 (the year Ronald Reagan was elected president) as too expensive to be replicated on a broad basis.

This initial reaction to the findings of the supported work demonstration vis-à-vis welfare family heads proved to be short-lived however. As the results became more widely known, government officials at every level (national, state, and local) began to notice the finding about the employability gains for long-term welfare recipients and sought to replicate supported work and derivative concepts. In 1981 and following, as President Reagan's plans for welfare were advanced, the lessons of the supported work demonstration came to play an increasingly important role in policy processes.

Actually, welfare reform had long been a priority policy area for Reagan. In his second term as governor of California, Reagan made welfare reform the central issue of his administration. Experts debate the degree to which he succeeded, but for Reagan there were no doubts: "When I took office, California was the welfare capital of the nation. The caseload was increasing 40,000 a month. We turned that 40,000 a month increase into an 8,000 a month decrease. We returned to the taxpayers \$2 billion and we increased grants to the truly needy by forty-three percent."⁴ According to Fred C. Doolittle, the California

Welfare Reform Act, passed in 1971, “marked a turning point in the political career of Ronald Reagan.”⁵⁵ Reagan biographer Lou Cannon agrees. He viewed the battles about welfare reform in California as “Reagan’s transformation from communicator to governor.”⁵⁶ Reagan’s initial involvement in welfare reform at the state level coincided with the decidedly more liberal welfare reform efforts of the Nixon administration at the national level beginning in 1969.

Throughout the Nixon period, Reagan challenged Nixon’s views on social policies, and was a leading proponent of a conservative state-centered position. His advocacy of “workfare” and state authority over welfare met with strong resistance generally from liberals and from officials in the Nixon administration. Later on, in discussing the national welfare reform act signed by President Clinton in 1996, we shall see that Reagan’s views regarding both his focus on work and workfare and decentralizing social programs largely prevailed in America. Nixon’s and Carter’s centralized and more liberal proposals to replace the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program with a comprehensive national payment system, heavily embodying the income-maintenance approach, were stymied, although important liberalizing changes were made. The most notable liberalizing and centralizing change involved the nationalization under Nixon of cash assistance for the disabled and the elderly poor.* However, in the case of the most controversial welfare program — AFDC — major changes were resisted up until the Clinton presidency. Financial responsibility for the AFDC program continued to be shared by the federal government and the states on a matching basis.**

* Under Nixon, federal grants-in-aid to the states for welfare programs to aid the aged poor, blind, and disabled were converted into centralized programs with uniform eligibility requirements, administered, not by the states, but by the U.S. Social Security Administration. This is the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. The food stamp program, begun as a pilot program under President Kennedy, also was expanded greatly under Nixon. It was made automatic and universal, in effect, becoming a mini-negative income tax operating on a uniform basis throughout the country.

** In 1996, welfare became a block grant to the states, rather than a matching grant-in-aid, as explained in chapter 8.

As governor of California, Reagan along with other conservatives, strongly opposed the overhaul of the AFDC program along the lines of a negative income tax as embodied in Nixon's Family Assistance Plan (FAP). In fact, although both Nixon and Reagan were Republicans, they had a history of frosty relations.* Reagan not only was a leader among conservatives in opposing Nixon's welfare reform plans, he offered his own counterproposals. In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee in 1972, Reagan presented his state-based California approach to welfare reform as a better model for national legislation. He boasted that these proposals "are the product of our experience with an actual reform program that is succeeding in California, they are not a theory."⁷ Reagan's California program consisted of increased benefits for the "truly needy," reduced benefits or no benefits for the "working poor," and "workfare" (the mandatory-work-for-you-benefits approach). Rather than centralizing the AFDC program, Reagan favored turning it over to the states in the form of a block grant (shades of 1996!) whereby states would receive a lump-sum amount of money to use on a flexible basis to aid poor families.

There is a paradox in Reagan's role in the debate on welfare policy. Despite his strong support for decentralizing welfare, Reagan was much more successful as president than he was at the state level as governor in advancing his welfare reform ideas. Controversy exists over whether Reagan's California reforms reduced welfare costs and case-loads; his "workfare" plan resulted in minuscule participation in mandatory public jobs. On the other hand, Reagan made major gains advancing his welfare goals at the national level when he was elected president in 1980. As part of Reagan's 1981 changes to the budget President Carter had submitted in his final month in office, Reagan won approval for welfare policies that tightened eligibility and benefit rules in ways that reduced the number of family heads on AFDC and Medicaid, and cut benefits for many other families.⁸ For purposes of this book, the most important element of the Reagan welfare reform strategy was workfare.

* I attended meetings between the two men on welfare reform in the early 1970s. You could cut the tension between them with a knife.

The word “workfare” has an interesting history. It was used by Nixon in his national television address in 1969 presenting his “New Federalism” domestic program. “What America needs now,” said Nixon, “is not more welfare, but more ‘workfare.’”⁹ Nixon intended that his welfare reform plan should be known by this term.* But “workfare” as a label did not catch on in the way Nixon intended. The word in 1970s usage came to have a harsher meaning than Nixon called for in his 1969 speech on the “New Federalism.” I have never been able to pin down why this happened. The most plausible explanation is that the press attached the term “workfare” to what was viewed as a conservative alternative to Nixon’s welfare plan advanced by Senator Russell Long (D-LA), then chair of the Senate Finance Committee. Senator Long proposed to limit cash assistance payments just to employable needy family heads to compensate for work performed. This kind of workfare was an anathema to liberals in the 1970s; they lambasted it as “slavefare,” although later it became the central concept of Wisconsin’s far-reaching welfare reform of the mid-1990s.

In California in the 1970s, Reagan had strongly advocated this mandatory work-for-your-welfare approach. Again, a decade later as president he made this concept a key point, proposing that workfare be made compulsory and nationwide. Although many of Reagan’s 1981 welfare reform proposals were incorporated in the budget act passed that year, Congress was reluctant to go all the way with his version of workfare.¹⁰ Congress would only agree to give the states authority to implement a watered down version of Reagan’s workfare proposal, and only on a trial basis. But even though in 1981 workfare under Reagan was permissive to the states, it did not get off the ground rapidly in any state.

Up to now, I have referred to the workfare part of Reagan’s 1981 welfare reform efforts in the singular. Actually, there were several such provisions included in the budget act passed in 1981. One provision authorized the Community Work Experience Program (CWEP), the strict work-for-your-welfare alternative to cash payments. The law in this case authorized the states to use AFDC funds to pay eligible family

* William Safire, then a Nixon speechwriter, wrote this speech and boasted about this effort at wordsmithing.

heads in exchange for mandatory public employment. Another employment and training provision of the 1981 budget act was sponsored by Senator Long, then ranking minority member of the Senate Finance Committee (he was no longer chair, because the Republicans had taken over the Senate). Long's plan gave the states authority to subsidize on-the-job experience for AFDC recipients by "diverting" welfare grants to wage subsidies to private employers. This came to be known as "grant diversion" in the 1980s.* The third pertinent provision in the 1981 budget act, inserted by Senators Moynihan (D-NY) and David Boren (D-OK), turned out to be much more important than was originally expected. Its purpose was to overhaul the Work Incentive Program (WIN), enacted in 1967 under President Johnson to provide funding and authority for the states to run job placement, training, and related service programs for welfare family heads.¹¹ Up until 1981, WIN programs conducted by the states had been required to be jointly administered by a state's employment service (the labor-exchange agency) and its welfare agency. Moynihan argued that this requirement for joint management, which he said often resulted in "byzantine administrative arrangements," should be changed to allow states to apply for waivers to administer the WIN program just under the state's welfare agency. This provision, called "WIN-Demo" authority ("Demo" standing for demonstration), turned out to be very important.

MDRC's Work/Welfare Demonstrations

In the changed and more conservative social policy environment of the early 1980s, the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation had to change too. It shifted its focus from Washington to the states. The corporation began work with states on a series of work/welfare demonstrations. MDRC used a challenge grant from the Ford Foundation to pay part of the costs of demonstrations, and the states (or, in some cases, other foundations) provided the remaining funds needed. MDRC demonstrations in eight states, using the "WIN-Demo" authority described above, tested different ways states reformed their welfare systems. This

* The term "diversion" has a different meaning now in the welfare field, referring to "diverting" people from welfare to jobs. See chapter 10 for a discussion of this point.

relationship between social science and social policy was very different from the case of the negative income tax experiments a decade earlier. Then, the research agenda was set at the federal level mostly by social scientists to test ideas that in the main originated with them. This time, state political leaders were setting the agenda.

Not surprisingly, the first state to have an MDRC work/welfare demonstration was California — in San Diego County. Beginning in August 1982, San Diego County assigned 5,000 AFDC family heads to two work/welfare programs. Another 2,000 people were randomly assigned to a control group. The two programs tested were group job search (called a “job club”)* and a combination of a “job club” followed by assignment to community work experience in cases where participants in the “job club” did not find employment.¹² The community work experience component of the San Diego demonstration lasted thirteen weeks and had a time limit of thirty-two hours per week. Actually, officials of San Diego County had a long-standing interest in programs of this type. In the case of this new work/welfare demonstration, the state Employment Development Department (California’s employment service agency) contracted with MDRC to conduct the research. The seven other states that later joined with MDRC in work/welfare demonstrations were Arkansas, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Virginia, and West Virginia. Altogether, 35,000 people participated on a random assignment basis in these eight state-based work/welfare demonstrations.

Although the nature and scope of these state demonstrations were varied, there were common elements. In all of them, with the exception of New Jersey and Maine where the demonstration was of private-sector grant diversion, there was some degree of obligation. That is, welfare family heads in the treatment group were required to do something in order to receive their AFDC benefits. “Doing something” could mean engaging in a job search or participating in a “job club” or in a training or education program. It could also include a period of

* A job club is a group activity with a trainer-instructor in which welfare recipients develop skills in preparing applications, locating job openings, and being interviewed for employment. Often banks of telephones are used in the job search, and in some cases training sessions for job interviews are videotaped as part of an instruction-feedback process.

community work experience or some sequenced combination of these program elements.

There was considerable variation among the states in the MDRC work/welfare demonstrations, particularly in the character and degree of obligation in the tested programs. The San Diego project and the West Virginia project, both for male welfare family heads, had a strong mandatory character; whereas in Maryland, there was an obligatory feature of the program, but it was not strong. These state demonstrations did not represent an altogether new idea. Efforts had been made in the past at both the national and state levels to require welfare family heads (usually those with children above preschool age) to search for employment, accept a "suitable" job if one was offered, and, if not, to participate in a job training program. What was distinctive about these demonstrations was that the obligation part was supposed to be taken seriously. People who did not cooperate were supposed to be sanctioned.* One can think of these demonstrations as ratcheting up efforts to convert the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program from an entitlement to a conditional program, which is precisely what was done in the national welfare reform law enacted in 1996.

In most cases, these MDRC work/welfare demonstrations showed positive impacts, although the results generally were modest. (In fact, this point about modest results is very important in the policy process. My reading of this history is that the research worked. It was useful and used. Politicians concluded, not incorrectly, that the basic policy — focused as it was on the human-capital (training and education) approach to welfare reform — was not big enough or bold enough to produce what to political leaders regarded as satisfactorily positive outcomes. The result in the 1990s was the adoption of a stronger work, and specifically a "work-first," approach to welfare reform, as opposed to the softer human-capital approach. The research lessons learned had big reverberations, first at the state level in California and other states and

* Sanctioning procedure varied in these demonstrations. Usually, they involved a partial reduction of the family's welfare benefit for a period of time. Welfare recipients could also be required to have social workers manage their finances as a sanction for noncompliance. For a discussion emphasizing the importance of sanctioning in welfare programs, see Lawrence M. Mead, *Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship* (New York: Free Press, 1986).

ultimately nationally in 1988 and 1996. In the near term, state leaders in California, in large part on the basis of the results in San Diego, decided that the obligatory employment approach to welfare should be adopted statewide. Eventually, this led to a new role for MDRC, conducting a statewide evaluation of this ongoing program, called "California's Greater Avenues to Independence" or GAIN program. Part III of this book, which deals with evaluation studies, includes a chapter on the experience of MDRC in evaluating the GAIN program and also chapters on evaluations of the federal welfare reform laws enacted in 1988 and 1996.

Endnotes

- 1 Lee S. Friedman, "An Interim Evaluation of the Supported-work Experiment," *Policy Analysis* 3 (spring 1977): 147-70; and "The Use of Ex-Addicts to Deliver Local Services: The Supported-work Experiments," in *Urban Problems and Public Policy Choices*, eds. J. Bergman and H. Wiener (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 58-71.
- 2 WIN is an acronym for the Work Incentive Program, a federal grant-in-aid program to the states to provide employment and training services to welfare family heads.
- 3 Board of Directors, Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, *Summary and Findings of the National Supported-work Demonstration* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1980), p. 2.
- 4 Fred C. Doolittle, "Ronald Reagan and Conservative Welfare Reform," Princeton Urban and Regional Research Center, July 1986, p. 1-3.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 1-3.
- 6 Lou Cannon, *Reagan* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1982), p. 183.
- 7 Doolittle, "Ronald Reagan," pp. 3-20.
- 8 A number of studies have been conducted of Reagan's changes in domestic policy. Studies funded by the Ford Foundation conducted at Princeton University and the Urban Institute produced reports and articles describing the Reagan changes and evaluating their effects in the terms discussed in this chapter. See Richard P. Nathan et al., *Reagan and the States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), and George E. Peterson and Carol W. Lewis, eds., *Reagan and the Cities* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1986).

- 9 The President's Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs, August 8, 1969, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 5, no. 32, Monday, August 11, 1969 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 1111.
- 10 Wonder of wonders. It was President Clinton's welfare reform in 1996 that most closely approximates Reagan's ideas. See chapter 9.
- 11 When it was first enacted, the Work Incentive Program was known by the acronym WIP (as in whip) but this identifier was soon changed to WIN.
- 12 The Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) has issued several reports on the California demonstration. See Barbara Goldman, Judith Gueron, et al., *California: The Demonstration of State Work/Welfare Initiatives; Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Job Search and Work Experience Demonstration* (New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, February 1984); Barbara Goldman, Daniel Friedlander, et al., *California: The Demonstration of State Work/Welfare Initiatives; Findings from the San Diego Job Search and Work Experience Demonstration* (New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, May 1985); and Barbara Goldman, Daniel Friedlander, and David Long, *California: The Demonstration of Work/Welfare Initiatives; Final Report* (New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, February 1986).

PART III

**EVALUATION
RESEARCH**

The Nature of Evaluation Research

Eugene Bardach, in a book on what he calls “the implementation game,” made a point that is recurrent in the political science literature. It is hard enough, he said, to design public policies that look good on paper. It is harder still to sell them to the public. “And it is excruciatingly hard to implement them in a way that pleases anyone at all, including the supposed beneficiaries and clients.”¹ In a similar vein, political scientist Clinton Rossiter said many U.S. presidents found their hardest job is “not to persuade Congress to support a policy dear to his political heart, but to persuade the pertinent bureau or agency — even when headed by men of his own choosing — to follow his direction faithfully and transform the shadow of the policy into the substance of the program.”² According to Angela Browne and Aaron Wildavsky, “Policy implementation is hypothesis testing: It is *exploration*.”³ An explorer cannot predict what will be discovered. Every voyage is different.

As compared with a demonstration study of a potential new policy, researchers have less control over the conditions under which an evaluation study of an ongoing program is carried out. This is true, despite the fact, as we have seen, that the ability of researchers to control the environment in a demonstration study is much more limited and constrained than might at first blush appear to be the case. However, the control problems of demonstration research pale in comparison with the environment of an evaluation study in which the purpose of the policy or program being studied is not to learn something but to do something.

Under these kinds of real world conditions policymakers and administrators often have other, and for them much more critical, needs to take into account than those of researchers. They are unlikely to be moved by arguments that the policy being implemented must be carefully specified, closely monitored, uniform everywhere, and sufficiently distinguishable from other policies in order to clear all the research hurdles described in chapter 4. There are sure to be players in the governmental process who regard the evaluation of a program as an intrusion that will delay, complicate, or even undercut the achievement of their policy goals. They may be antagonistic to researchers as a species. Or they may not want research to be conducted for political reasons — because they fear it will show a policy they favor to be ineffective, or if it works, to have results that fall far short of what they had promised. Overpromising is endemic in American government. In fact, some participants in governmental processes argue that it is essential to overpromise in order to get anything agreed to.

Even when policymakers are sympathetic to the purposes of evaluation research, differences in perspective between policymakers, program operators, and researchers are likely to be substantial. The essential point is that, because of these and other factors, social scientists doing evaluation research do not have the same kinds of opportunities they have under the more controlled conditions of a demonstration study to test new program ideas.

The most important consequence of the more limited control researchers have in an evaluation study as compared to a demonstration study is that it is much more difficult to know the counterfactual. Demonstration and evaluation researchers ask the same bottom-line question: What happened as a result of this pilot or ongoing program that would not have happened if the program being studied had not existed? We can never have a perfect situation, as we have seen — one in which the same person or group is both treated and untreated by a given program. The next best solution is randomly to assign a number of eligible persons to treatment and non-treatment groups and compare the differences between the two groups in terms of the outcomes a given program is supposed to produce. However, in the case of an evaluation study of an ongoing program where research is a much lower-order objective,

the suggestion that a research design should be adopted that will evaluate the program by randomly excluding some participants from it is frequently and strongly resisted. Moreover, on ethical grounds, if the policy being evaluated is universal (that is, if it applies to all eligible persons), one is hard put to argue that the policy should be suspended for some otherwise eligible participants in the interest of research.

As has been discussed, less good alternatives compared to random assignment exist for establishing the counterfactual. If the policy we are evaluating is selective on a geographic basis, one could argue that the government should select some places as comparison sites. Although such an approach may make sense to researchers, it, too, can involve formidable problems for public officials. They may feel that it is politically unwise to have comparison sites because this would be perceived as unfair and be a source of controversy.

The previous discussion in Part II of this book on demonstration research considered statistical simulation techniques to create a baseline for comparison in studies to test new policy approaches. Despite the problems involved, this is often the approach used in evaluation studies, especially to study impacts on people. This approach involves predicting a particular set of dependent variables (that is, dependent on the policy being studied) for a population eligible to be treated by the policy. A variant of the statistical analysis approach is to use benchmarks based on past research, or on the views of experts, as the standards against which to evaluate the impact of an ongoing program on individual participants. None of the previous evaluation studies of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs that I know of had a randomly assigned control group.⁴ Some studies of Great Society programs, as in the case of the Job Corps mentioned in chapter 4, used comparison sites, and a new evaluation of the Job Corps now in progress uses random assignment. However, most evaluations of Great Society programs used econometric or other statistical and comparison-group techniques to evaluate program effects on people. This is not to argue that there never can be value added through rigorous randomized studies of the effects on individuals of ongoing programs, and especially of planned variations in their implementation. But I maintain that such studies are extremely hard to design and carry out in the constantly shifting policy terrain of most U.S. domestic programs.

Moreover, a big difference between demonstration and evaluation research is that the latter is more likely to focus on *institutional* as opposed to *individual* effects. The reasons for this and the importance of this point can be shown by again using the example of a computer-assisted remedial reading program. I stipulated in chapter 4 that this was a state government demonstration that aided school districts and local schools. Assume now, as is not unusual in American government, that the federal government is providing grant-in-aid money to the states for this type of special reading remediation. Assume further that earlier randomized tests (demonstration studies) were conducted to show that this approach worked, and now the tested program is being generalized (or what social scientists call “replicated”) — but that the policy specifications in the federal legislation enacted to accomplish this purpose are very general. This is often the case. And add one more complication: In most states, this federal aid is incremental — that is, in addition to money provided by state and local governments for the same or similar purposes.

Policymakers in Washington who provide grant-in-aid funds to the states for reading remediation understandably have an interest in the response to “their” program. However, the questions they want answered are likely to center on the behavior, not of individual students, but of different levels of government and types of organizations, especially schools and school districts, which are the recipients of these federal grants-in-aid for reading remediation: What did states, school districts, and schools do with these funds in terms of the types of services provided and the number of schools aided? Were the funds additive? Were computer companies, consultants, experts, etc., important actors in using these grant funds? These are important policy effects, but they are different from those we focused on in our consideration of demonstration studies. They are, to repeat, *institutional*.

The Federalism Barrier Reef

This discussion dramatizes what I believe is the crucial intellectual difference between demonstration and evaluation research. Demonstration research focuses on *individual* outcomes: Will a computer-assisted reading remediation program help children learn to read? If it is shown in a

demonstration that a particular approach has significant positive effects, it may well be decided to adopt a national program in the form of a grant-in-aid from the federal government to the states to advance this purpose. However, once such an intergovernmental aid program exists, political leaders are likely to be especially, and for practical reasons, most interested in whether and how it changes the behavior of the institutions that provide this service. As these and other funds trickle down in the American intergovernmental system, it would be extremely difficult (even if higher level officials wanted to do so) to learn how the policies involved could be shown to have affected the reading scores of individual students.

Most of the business of providing public services in the domestic public sector in the United States is conducted in this way — *indirectly* — that is, *intergovernmentally* through grants-in-aid to states and localities. Localities, in turn, frequently contract with nonprofit and for-profit organizations for the services provided. In essence, politicians are seeking to affect the behavior of institutions through these grants-in-aid in the belief that this will influence the activities of the recipient institutions in ways that ultimately affect individuals. This is the federalism barrier reef of American public policy. It is highly underappreciated. In fact, it is often just plain ignored in studying the effects of U.S. domestic policies and programs.

Researchers must watch this reef carefully, for it can ruin their voyages if they do not take it into account. The federalism barrier reef affects decisions about public policy research in many ways. An intervention in the form of a grant-in-aid from one level of government to another may be small. It may in fact be so small that, picking up on the reasoning stated in chapter 4 in regard to the null hypothesis, we could not possibly expect to find detectable effects on individuals of one such stream of money as opposed to other streams of money from a different level of government or from foundations or private citizens or from fees and charges.

Scientific Implications

These observations about the political and federalism terrain of the evaluation of ongoing programs bring into play other major themes of this

book about the need for linkages between social science disciplines and between quantitative and qualitative research designs and methods. Many of the kinds of observations that researchers are called upon to make about institutional behavior in response to a given policy involve the way different types of organizations behave.

In theory, we could study differences in organizational behavior by randomly selecting a sample of a given type of organization (for example, school districts or schools in the previous illustration of a computer-assisted reading remediation program), treating them in different ways, and then analyzing their responses to the policy being evaluated in order to generalize about their institutional effects. We don't do this. One of the reasons we don't is that the study of the effects of public policies and organizations does not lend itself to such experimental research. We lack sufficiently strong and widely agreed upon theories about organizational behavior on which to base rigorous comparative research. We also lack agreed upon, available, and measurable statistics on which basis we could assess and compare organizational behavior. Other reasons, too, come into play.

Organizations are harder to manipulate in a research environment than individuals, although the latter is hard enough to do. Consider the difficulties that would be involved in seeking informed consent from a local government to subject itself to a random selection procedure that would determine whether it would receive, or not receive, a particular grant-in-aid. Local governments are simply too complex, and most are too politically assertive, to give informed consent to participate in this way in a tightly structured evaluation study. The same point can be made about the nonprofit organizations that operate most social programs.

We need next to look at the way researchers deal with causality in studying institutional as opposed to individual behavior. The most common method for studying the behavior of institutions is to observe them closely in order to make informed judgments about how a given stimulus or event (e.g., a policy change or a new program) appears to have affected their behavior. What researchers do in such a situation is model the counterfactual on the basis of their understanding of the behavior of the types of organization being studied. They observe the behavior of a

particular organization or groups of organizations under conditions in which a new policy or program is operating and compare that behavior to what they expect would have been their behavior without the new policy. The catch — and it is a significant one — is that this reasoning process cannot be either specified or replicated.

Consider next the perspectives of different social science disciplines. Since the mid-1960s, as social scientists increased their role in public policy research, economists have had the upper hand. This is very much to their credit as I stated earlier. Political scientists and sociologists on the other hand have not played anywhere near as big a role. In fact, and I think this is regrettable, the study of public administration as a sub-field of political science has relatively low status in the discipline. Moreover, management studies in general tend not to have an extensive or well developed intellectual base, although recently there has been new interest in institutional studies in political science.*

Sociologists, as suggested earlier, also have a claim on the field of organizational behavior. Robert A. Scott and Arnold R. Shore, in their book *Why Sociology Does Not Apply*, concluded that sociologists, insofar as they have been involved in policy-related research, have done studies to analyze policy problems and prescribe solutions, but that the results of these studies have been disappointing. They said they are “politically unrealistic, administratively unworkable, or simply impractical.” They also complained that policy-relevant sociological research is often theoretical and removed, “stimulated by a desire to advance disciplinary knowledge.”⁵ Social psychologists, too, have a claim on organizational behavior. Thomas F. Pettigrew, a leader in social psychology, while not optimistic about what could be achieved, reached similar conclusions to Scott and Shore about the need for greater attention to the development

* A seminal article by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen in 1984 called for “a new institutionalism” in political science. The authors maintained that because institutions are not the sum of the actions of their members, their behavior is not easily predicted. (James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” *American Political Science Review*, 1978.) March and Olsen held that organizational behavior is *ahistorical*, hard to measure, and characterized by symbolic action. They called for greater emphasis in political science research on studies that take cognizance of these characteristics of organizational behavior. This position is similar to that of institutional economist John R. Commons described in chapter 2.

and application of research techniques for organizational studies. Pettigrew advocated "more interdisciplinary work within social science" and efforts to merge inductive and deductive methods.⁶

The essential point of this chapter is that many of the critical questions asked in evaluation research on the effects of ongoing public programs do not lend themselves to research approaches as rigorous as those used in studying the impacts of pilot programs on individuals in the more controlled and more controllable conditions of a demonstration study. My further contention is that a careful view of the way causation is inferred and proof is built up over time in other scientific disciplines (physics and cosmology are good examples) shows that the methods used in evaluation research, which is often inductive, are legitimately scientific. I turn next to specific studies to amplify this point in examining the challenges involved and techniques used in assessing the effects of ongoing social programs in the real world of American federalism.

Endnotes

- 1 Eugene Bardach, *The Implementation Game: What Happens When a Bill Becomes a Law* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977), p. 3.
- 2 Clinton Rossiter, *The American Presidency* (New York: New Amsterdam Library, 1956), p. 42.
- 3 Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, eds., *Implementation*, 3rd ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), p. 254. Emphasis added. Angela Browne co-authored chapters 9, 10 and 11.
- 4 The two MDRC research projects considered in Part III on evaluation research, the evaluations of the California work/welfare program and the Job Training Partnership Act (the latter is conducted jointly with Abt Associates), are the only efforts I know of that used random assignment in evaluating a large-scale ongoing social program.
- 5 Robert A. Scott and Arnold R. Shore, *Why Sociology Does Not Apply: A Study of the Use of Sociology in Social Policy* (New York: Elsevier, 1979), pp. 12, 28.
- 6 Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Can Social Scientists Be Effective Actors in the Policy Arena?" in *Social Science and Social Policy*, eds. R. Lance Shotland and Melvin M. Mark (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1985), p. 132.

Evaluating the California GAIN Program

California's 1985 welfare reform law setting up the Greater Avenues for Independence program (GAIN) reflected an intricate political balancing of legislative interests and concerns rooted in San Diego County's experience, the subject of an earlier demonstration study conducted by MDRC. The essential purpose of this 1985 statewide legislation was to convert the administrative system for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) category of welfare from a cash payment process into a service system for job preparation and work facilitation in order to reduce dependency. Family heads whose youngest child was six years of age or older were required under the GAIN law to participate in this program if child care was available. (Welfare family heads with children under six years of age could volunteer to participate in the program, but were not required to do so.) The authors of the 1985 California legislation specified each component of the GAIN process in excruciating detail in order to win and hold the political support of a fragile coalition of liberals and conservatives.

The two leading players in crafting the legislation were David B. Swoap, secretary of California's Health and Welfare Agency, and State Assemblyman Arthur Agnos. Swoap was the principal negotiator for Governor George Deukmejian, a conservative Republican who served as California's Governor for eight years. Previously, Swoap held a similar job as director of welfare in California under Ronald Reagan; he also served in Washington in the Reagan administration as undersecretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. Swoap's

counterpart in the negotiations, Arthur Agnos, was a Democratic member of the state legislature who represented San Francisco when the GAIN program was enacted. Agnos later was elected mayor of San Francisco in 1987, serving until 1992.

Shortly after the California GAIN law was enacted, Swoap described the delicate political balancing act involved in its enactment by saying the program “incorporates a unique blend of what have traditionally been considered ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ attitudes towards caring for the poor.” Swoap credited the San Diego County work/welfare demonstration conducted by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation with showing the efficacy of the GAIN approach. “The seeds of California’s reform were planted over the last three years, by the success of San Diego County’s Experimental Work Project.”¹

The debate on the GAIN program in the California legislature focused on participation requirements as the key to the political compromise of the new program. Again according to Swoap, “the opposition of many legislators to the mandatory component began to fade as results from San Diego showed that the overwhelming majority of participants themselves felt the program should be mandatory, because, had it not been, they never would have participated, and acquired valuable training and experience.”²

Although Swoap, on behalf of the Deukmejian administration, underscored the obligational character of the GAIN program as embodied in the San Diego work/welfare demonstration, Agnos and other members of the legislature had a different set of values and preferences. They stressed the services provided, and drew heavily on Massachusetts’s E.T. (Employment and Training) Choices program sponsored by Governor Michael Dukakis and initiated two years prior to the enactment of the GAIN program in 1983. Dukakis publicized this program widely, stressing that it involved *voluntary* participation. Recipients had a “choice” of what “E.T.” services they wanted to select.³ A delegation of California officials, including Swoap and Agnos, visited Massachusetts while the California legislature was working on the GAIN legislation. They also visited other states with more conservative welfare programs.

The GAIN Process

The legislation establishing the GAIN program had an elaborate step-wise structure. The description of the steps dramatizes the research task MDRC faced in mid-1986 when the corporation entered into a contract with the state to evaluate the GAIN program, a contract negotiation in which this author played a role.⁴ In effect, this was an interesting two-step dance by social policy researchers. First, they conducted a demonstration in San Diego based on randomized assignment to test a new program focusing on the welfare system providing work. Now they were being asked to evaluate a similar new program after it was enacted in a statewide law to do the same thing.

The first requirements of the GAIN process were registration and orientation. All welfare family heads with children six years of age and older were required to register. The second step was applicant appraisal.⁵ Applicants who passed literacy and skills tests were expected to engage in a job search either on an individual basis or in a group setting in a so-called "job club." (A "job club" is group work-preparation and job search often in a classroom setting using phone banks and sometimes video teaching techniques.) For eligible applicants who failed literacy or skills tests as step one, the law required that remedial education or special language training be provided.

For those GAIN participants who did not secure employment after a job search or after they had gone through a remedial education or an English as a Second Language (ESL) program, a service plan was required to be drawn up and signed by the participant and a caseworker. These contracts embodied the so-called "mutual-obligation concept" central to the GAIN program. This concept, in effect, involved a bargain between the client and the state, whereby recipients of aid had to agree to participate in services tailored to their needs and in turn the welfare agency had to agree to provide these services. Determination of the types of services appropriate in a given case in California was to be based on a needs assessment, also spelled out in detail in the GAIN legislation. The law prescribed a specific time period for job search. If

participants were not employed after this time period, they then could be assigned to a community work-experience job.

Work-experience jobs, again as specifically described in the GAIN law, were called PREP, standing for pre-employment preparation. There were two types of PREP. One was "basic PREP," which provided work experience that was supposed to help participants obtain references that could assist them in obtaining unsubsidized employment. The other was "advanced PREP," which was supposed to enhance their job skills.⁶ The law stipulated that PREP assignments could be short term (lasting up to three months) or long term (lasting up to a year) and that work assignments could not exceed thirty-two hours per week. Publications describing the GAIN program included the flowchart on page 115 showing the steps and branches in the GAIN process.

The MDRC Evaluation

MDRC began its evaluation of the GAIN program in March 1986, six months after the enactment of the legislation. The corporation's first report on the planning and early implementation of the GAIN program was issued in April 1987. It characterized the new program as "one of the broadest arrays of services and support ever offered in a welfare employment program."⁷ The implementation process involved literally thousands of public agencies and nonprofit organizations at the state and county levels. According to MDRC, the lead role assigned to the state's Department of Social Services was "to harness the resources and expertise available from the community colleges, adult schools, regional occupational centers and programs, child care agencies, Job Training and Partnership Act (JTPA) programs, and the local offices of the employment services (administered by the Employment Development Department in California)."⁸

The first MDRC implementation report on the California GAIN program identified four features that distinguished the program: (1) its wide array of services; (2) the mandate to participate, projected to involve more than 200,000 welfare family heads by 1990; (3) the




FIGURE 7.1
GAIN Flow Chart

Source: State of California, *GAIN Participant's Manual*, sec. 4, p. 5.

individualized character of participation; and (4) the anticipated continuous nature of the participation process.

The fourth feature of the GAIN program, the requirement that it be operated as a continuous process with no unassigned pool of registrants (as had been the case of many past welfare employment programs), has to be viewed as a major policy departure on a statewide basis. There almost always was a large "holding" category in most states under the federally aided Work Incentive Program (WIN) enacted in 1967. (This aspiration of continuous and obligational GAIN participation had an important effect on the federal laws passed in 1988 and 1996.)

Referring to this commitment to provide continuous services on a mutual-obligation basis to all eligible participants until they exited from welfare, the MDRC early-implementation report noted that "welfare payments to this portion of the caseload would no longer be an unconditional entitlement, but become, instead, a reciprocal obligation."⁹ When the GAIN program was enacted, it was projected that when it was fully operational employment and training services would cost \$335 million per year. This represented almost as much spending for employment and training services associated with AFDC in one state as there had been for the whole country under the federally aided WIN program at the peak level of its spending.

Adding to the challenge of implementing the goals embodied in the GAIN legislation is an important point about governmental structures going back to the discussion in chapter 6 of the federalism barrier reef. Welfare is administered by *county* governments in California. There are fifty-eight counties in California, ranging in population from Los Angeles with over eight million people (the largest county in population size in the nation), to rural Alpine County in northern California with 1,113 people in 1990. The law establishing the GAIN program gave counties two years to develop their plans, which were subject to review and approval by the state. The goal was to have the full statewide caseload phased into GAIN over five years, from 1985 to 1990.

The initial MDRC report on GAIN was completed as the first nine counties were beginning to participate in the program. The authors of

the report had to walk a fine line. They found the state Department of Social Services to be taking a “strong leadership role.” They also found “broad support” for the program and enthusiasm on the part of county welfare directors “about playing a leadership role that could reduce the stigma attached to both welfare agencies and recipients.” But despite these positive findings, the report indicated that the participating counties had discovered the planning process to be “far more complex, demanding, and time consuming than originally envisioned.”¹⁰

The Research Challenge

When the earlier edition of this book was published, the implementation of the GAIN program had been under way for two years. Even then, in mid-1987, the lessons from this experience reflected the wisdom of Aaron Wildavsky’s observations about implementation being a discovery process. The statute establishing the GAIN program indicated the way the program was supposed to work. But is that what actually happened? Would the prescribed services be provided on an interconnected, sequential, and continuous basis that eventually would reach all of the intended participants?

In all of its demonstration studies, MDRC researchers collect what they refer to as “process data” to understand the “black box” of program operations. But for the GAIN study, this part of the task was a bigger deal than usual. The early phase of the research was exclusively a process study. It was not possible, as in the smaller confines of a controlled setting in a demonstration study, to immediately initiate research on impacts on individuals. Later on as described below, a study of the impacts of the GAIN program on individual participants was conducted as a component of MDRC’s full GAIN research plan.

The MDRC California GAIN research plan stands out for the way it included three components — an implementation or process study (I prefer the term “implementation study”) an individual-impact study, and a cost-benefit analysis. Earlier, in describing evaluation studies, I said I did not know of previous studies of the social programs adopted as part of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society program (the “War on

Poverty”) that involved randomized tests to assess the impact on individuals of an ongoing social program. The GAIN project stands out as an example of a broad-gauged evaluation that looked both at the institutional implementation and the impact of an ongoing program, in the latter case using a random-assignment design. This is the “five-star” version of applied social science. But a caution is needed. Such comprehensive, full-service applied social science is expensive. It takes a long time. It is very hard to do. Final results are likely to come out late in the political cycle. Once a program is enacted and it is ongoing, research on its effects usually involves faster, cheaper, less elaborate research designs than that adopted for the California GAIN program. As a general rule, I do not advocate this kind of full-service, applied social science in the fast-paced, complex world of ongoing programs in which there are so many and constantly changing variants of every public policy under the American sun! The federalism barrier reef discussed earlier is my main reason for this conclusion. Another reason is the service-contamination hurdle described in chapter 4, which is very high — often too high to surmount — in complex program settings like that of the California GAIN program.

Implementation as studied in the GAIN program had several dimensions. One was political and organizational: Did the agencies that were supposed to carry out the requirements of the new program do so in a way that resembled what was envisioned in the legislation? There is also a second dimension, what one might call the psychological or attitudinal dimension: Did the attitudes of the people in the agency and of the recipients of welfare benefits change in the ways they were supposed to change? Did county governments and key groups in the state make it clear (I like to call this *signaling*) what was expected of welfare recipients, and did recipients understand and accept these new signals?

Actually, the full MDRC research plan (studying participant progress, gauging staff and participant attitudes, measuring individual program impacts, and conducting a cost-benefit analysis) was not carried out on a statewide basis. Rather it was conducted in selected counties. The implementation research was conducted in eight of the first ten counties to start up the GAIN program. These were designated as “Tier I” counties. Another group of six “Tier II” counties (surprisingly from a

design perspective, with only one overlap county) was the subject of the individual-impact part of the study. Aggregate data were collected for the rest of the counties in the state. The individual-impact study with randomized assignment involved more than 33,000 people in the Tier II counties.

The implementation portion of the GAIN study was based on interviews and on program and survey data. The bulk of the interviews were of administrators in county welfare departments. A smaller number of interviews were conducted of the staffs of education, training, and child care (mostly nonprofit) organizations, and other service providers. This research, to MDRC's credit, was multidisciplinary. MDRC staff worked with sociologists, social psychologists, political scientists, and specialists in organizational behavior and program management in the design and execution of this evaluation. The study of the participant flow through the GAIN system focused on data about the types and length of the services provided.

Initially, it was hoped that there would be a uniform statewide data system on the status of GAIN participants and the content of the services provided. This, as we shall see later on, is one of the most crucial aspects of social programs, both for social policy research, and even moreso for program operations. However, efforts to set up a new uniform statewide data system historically have come to naught in California. In the mid-1980s, they came up against not just a federalism barrier reef, but a brick wall — the long-standing dug-in position of county officials in California about local control. The result for the MDRC research on the GAIN program was the need to work out individualized data systems in each of the research counties.

The components of the MDRC evaluation plan for the GAIN program were designed to reinforce each other. The survey research on the attitudes of welfare personnel, for example, included questions about the tasks performed (how they were conducted and viewed), which in this multifaceted design was also used in the analysis of administrative processes.

Discoveries in the Implementation Process

The findings from MDRC's GAIN evaluation, as stated earlier, confirm Aaron Wildavsky's point about implementation being a discovery process. Education as a component of the GAIN program is a good example of this point. In the planning process for GAIN, state officials estimated that one-fourth of the participants would need remedial education. As the first counties began to operate under the GAIN program, however, it became apparent that these estimates were way off the mark. This discovery was made in the development of the testing instruments for the GAIN program.

Literacy and skills testing was an early prescribed step in the GAIN process. Examinations were to be administered to all participants. Test instruments were developed by the California departments of Education and Social Services, and pilot tests were administered in five counties. Over 6,000 people participated in the pilot tests between July and December 1986.

A report on these tests was issued in April 1987. It indicated that 57 percent of the people who took the pilot tests required some form of remediation in literacy or arithmetic skills. The purpose of these tests was to validate the exams used. According to Carl Williams, director of the GAIN program, the results of the pilot tests showed that the "testing instruments selected will perform successfully."¹¹ Neither this statement nor the report released to the press at the time commented on the large size of the group that required remediation. However, newspaper reporters used these results, not primarily as a validation of the tests, but as an indication of the seriousness of the problem of inadequate literacy and arithmetic skills on the part of welfare family heads. In one newspaper account of the results, Carl Williams was quoted commenting on the broader significance of these results.¹² The GAIN program, Williams observed, needed some remediation of its own. "The message is pretty clear that we have one heck of a population out there that's in need of remediation." The welfare system, said Williams, "is a holding area for people who did not get a good enough education."¹³ This was not a surprise to experts in the field. Gordon Berlin and Andrew Sum had earlier

described “the basic skills crisis” as the single most important national social problem. “Inadequate basic skills — the ability to read, write, compute, and communicate — is a common thread running throughout the web of social problems.”¹⁴

Publication of these test scores had a big impact. At the highest levels of state government, it caused concern in the legislature, particularly among conservative members who had supported the GAIN program and were worried about the cost implications of the test results. Public programs in sensitive areas like this are constantly subject to scrutiny, debate, *and change*. This is true at both the state and local levels. As it turned out, the ultimate effect of the controversy about test scores was a good outcome for supporters of the GAIN program. An additional appropriation of \$41 million was provided, with support from Governor Deukmejian, for remedial education.

This incident also cast light on the crucial role schools played (or didn't play) in the GAIN program. The linkage between welfare and education was found to be problematic at precisely the time remedial education was discovered to be even more important than had originally been anticipated. The GAIN law required that in counties in which there were unused funds that had been allocated by the state to local school districts under the state's education aid program, these funds should be used for remediation under GAIN. On the surface this sounds logical. In effect, the law said that rather than having the state appropriate new funds for remedial education, counties should use available unused funds already allocated to school districts. The “Catch-22” was that school districts didn't like this idea at all. Furthermore, they were not used to serving adult welfare recipients.

Timing was a glitch too. Schools operate on a September to June calendar. GAIN participants who were referred to local schools toward the end of the school year (for example, in March or April) for remedial education were told that class space would be available in September. This defeated the whole idea of continuous participation with no unassigned pool of participants. A thirty-year-old welfare mother was unlikely to believe (and understandably so) that GAIN was a new regime signaling and entailing a serious and active commitment to her future if

she was told that there would be a five-month delay between her first experience under the program and the availability of its services.

This problem constituted a special challenge in urban areas. In Santa Clara County, one of the first urbanized counties to enter the GAIN program, the press reported that the failure rate for the literacy and skills test was 76 percent. The challenge involved in integrating the school and welfare systems was brought to light in a press account of one recipient's experience.

Nancy, a 37-year-old mother of three boys who has been on welfare for five years, said she has refused to join the workfare program because of her job experience. The San Jose woman, who said she has been a waitress and a candy store clerk, asked that her last name not be used because she feared that her welfare check would be cut off.

"I went down one day, and they had an (orientation) class for me," she said. "Then I was supposed to see a social worker a few days later. But no one called me for about three weeks. When they finally called they said I had to learn how to read and write better to get a job."

"Listen," she said. "I've worked before. I have three sons. I haven't been to school since I was 15. It's too late for me to learn, but no one down there will listen to me. I can work; I know I can. But they say they have their rules and that's that."¹⁵

Other discoveries made in the GAIN implementation process provided useful (though not always appreciated) lessons. An MDRC report on implementation, for example, uncovered a problem of "no-shows" when welfare family heads were referred to the GAIN program. The report described the lower-than-anticipated enrollment levels as follows: "In some cases it was 40 to 80 percent below projections early on, and as high as 25 to 50 percent after several months of operation."¹⁶ Some explanations for this were obvious. In the past, requirements that welfare family heads show up for counseling and service programs (and

there had been many such requirements in the law for a long time) were not enforced, and both local welfare workers and recipients knew this to be the case. Under the GAIN program, welfare workers were told to refer recipients to the program, and to stress that their attendance was required. The workers had to be convinced that this was serious, which of course is a familiar bureaucratic challenge that is easier to state than effectuate.

In short, it is extremely difficult to change the culture and behavior of large public bureaucracies. Furthermore, when it happens, and it does happen, it is often uneven and varied in character and intensity. Attention to, and the acceptance of, changed signals (people must work or be trained) meant that ingrained attitudes had to be changed both for the people who administered the program and for the people who received aid under it. It was early evident in the GAIN implementation process that big efforts (really big!) would be needed to change deep-seated bureaucratic and personal attitudes and procedures in this way. Passing a law was only the beginning.

MDRC's evaluation of the California GAIN program lasted for over a decade and, as stated earlier, covered the research waterfront. It included a randomized impact study and a cost-benefit analysis. Three years out, randomized follow-up data for 33,000 people showed a 22 percent gain in average earnings and a corresponding 6 percent reduction in payments.¹⁷ The most impressive results were found for Riverside County, California (one of MDRC's six "Tier II" counties), which had long been, and continued afterwards to be, a showplace county in the nation for the "culture change" of welfare reform. Many government leaders, Presidents Reagan and Carter included, and journalists, traveled to Riverside to hear about this county's "success story" in creating a new job-focused regime for social programs. Correspondingly and in a reassuring way, MDRC's cost-benefit results for Riverside County were described as "exceptionally large" — a \$2.84 return for every \$1 invested. Three of the six counties in which the impact research was conducted showed positive results in these terms. *Three did not*. In describing these results, the MDRC report said, somewhat defensively: "It is worth mentioning that return per net dollar invested is a standard of success by which few social programs are assessed."¹⁸ It is

important to note that MDRC's impact findings from the GAIN research were not published until well after the Family Support Act, the national welfare reform law passed in 1988, had been enacted, which largely mirrored the California GAIN law. Again, as Gilbert Steiner observed, "research followed reality."

From the vantage point of applied social science, several observations should be made. One is that we needed to know the implementation story. Second, the nice model of MDRC's full-service research design for the GAIN study sets an extremely high standard. In part owing to the costs involved, and in part owing to research-timing considerations and the political hurdles discussed earlier, it is not a standard that can be easily applied. In the case of the 1988 and 1996 national welfare reform laws described in the next chapter, we shall see that evaluation studies of many types and under many auspices have been conducted to assess both the institutional and individual effects of these two national welfare reforms. Their results are important, but one would have to say, limited — that is, limited in terms of how much actually can be known about what governments do and achieve in the complex lives of their citizens.

Endnotes

- 1 Statement made by David B. Swoap, Secretary, Health and Welfare Agency, State of California, Sacramento, September 24, 1985.
- 2 Ibid. The San Diego work/welfare study conducted by MDRC included a survey asking participants about their attitude toward a work requirement. Recipients interviewed six months after entering the work experience component of San Diego's work/welfare demonstration were asked how fair it was that "you must accept a job assignment in order to receive or keep receiving [welfare] benefits?" Of the 49 respondents, 84 percent said, "It's perfectly fair." A larger sample in a related survey produced similar results. Of 311 persons interviewed on the general question of the fairness of a work requirement, 69 percent of those aware of the requirement said it was fair. See Goldman, Friedlander, et al., *California: The Demonstration of State Work/Welfare Initiatives, Findings from the San Diego Job Search and Work Experience Demonstration* (New York: Manpower Demonstra-

- tion Research Corporation, May 1985) chapter 4, "Program Requirements and Noncompliance."
- 3 See Richard P. Nathan, *Turning Promises Into Performance: The Management Challenge of Implementing Workfare*, (New York: A Twentieth Century Fund Book, Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 39-43, 97-106. The Massachusetts welfare reform program, along with Massachusetts's booming economy in the mid-1980s were keys to Dukakis's nomination in 1988 as the Democratic Party's candidate for President.
 - 4 At the time I chaired MDRC's board and was on a sabbatical leave from Princeton University at the University of California at Berkeley working on the original version of this book.
 - 5 I treat GAIN in the past tense because it was later replaced with a new program under the 1996 national welfare reform law enacted under President Clinton.
 - 6 John Wallace and David Long, *GAIN: Planning and Early Implementation* (New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, 1987), p. 29.
 - 7 *Ibid.*, p. v.
 - 8 *Ibid.*, p. vi.
 - 9 *Ibid.*, p. ix.
 - 10 *Ibid.*, pp. xiii, xvi.
 - 11 "GAIN News," Sacramento, California, April 24, 1987, p. 1.
 - 12 Carl Williams was especially cooperative with and supportive of MDRC's research. In fact, it was Williams who originally broached the idea of an MDRC evaluation of the GAIN program in 1985.
 - 13 Richard C. Paddock, "State Finds 57% on Welfare Lack Basic Job Skills," *Los Angeles Times*, April 27, 1987, p. 1.
 - 14 Gordon Berlin and Andrew Sum, "American Standards of Living, Family Welfare and the Basic Skills Crisis," New York City, Ford Foundation, December 1986.
 - 15 Gary Richards, "Three-Fourths of Those in Workfare in Santa Clara County Lack Skills," *San Jose Mercury News*, July 26, 1987, p. 1-A.
 - 16 Wallace and Long, *GAIN*, p. 185.
 - 17 James Riccio, Daniel Friedlander, and Stephen Freedman, *GAIN: Benefits, Costs, and Three Year Impacts of a Welfare-to-Work Program* (New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, September 1994), p. xxi.
 - 18 *Ibid.*, p. xxiii.

The 1988 and 1996 National Welfare Reform Laws

The Family Support Act of 1988

Having tasted victory enacting welfare legislation as part of the budget act in Reagan's first year as president, four years later, when he had just been re-elected and his popularity was at its highest point, administration officials decided to go to the well again for work-oriented welfare reforms. In his 1986 State of the Union message, Reagan called upon Congress to cooperate with his administration to enact welfare legislation "to escape the spider's web of dependency." Quoting Franklin Roosevelt, Reagan described welfare as "a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit." He directed the White House Domestic Policy Council to conduct "an evaluation of programs and a strategy for immediate action to meet the financial, educational, social, and safety concerns of poor families." He said: "I'm talking about a real and lasting emancipation because the success of welfare should be judged by how many of its recipients become independent of welfare."¹

This time Reagan intended more far-reaching changes. Soon, however, prospects dimmed for this. The administration's standing was tarnished by accounts of the President's role in the Iran-Contra controversy.* Also, the House and the Senate were sharply divided.

* The Iran-Contra affair involved covert operations coordinated by National Security Council staff to obtain the release of American-held hostages in the Middle East by selling U.S. weapons to Iran, despite the embargo on such sales. This operation, from 1984 through most of 1986, involved secret U.S.

Both were controlled by the Democratic party. In this setting, Reagan's White House staff decided that at the outset of the 100th Congress it would be best to seek modest instead of more sweeping changes, essentially expanding already-existing authority for state demonstrations of work-oriented approaches to welfare reform. But this was not the road taken. Instead, the Family Support Act of 1988 consisted of an amalgam of new substantive authority and associated funding. The key power broker in working out the ultimate political compromise was Daniel Patrick Moynihan, now chair of the welfare subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee.

With the administration officially supporting welfare reform and Moynihan working on a compromise, the spoiler role at the outset was played by the House of Representatives. Democratic leaders in the House refused to work with, or even talk to, Republicans. They adopted a bill containing major liberalizations of welfare benefits along with a generous new program of grants to the states for training, education, child care, and other services. The employment and training provisions of the House bill were tightly prescribed. This engendered opposition by governors who wanted flexibility for the states.

At this point, Moynihan stepped up his efforts working with the governors. The Senate enacted a bill that took a middle-of-the-road position between the president and the House. It provided flexible grants to the states for employment and training programs and also for other services to welfare recipients, proposed limited benefit liberalizations as compared with those proposed by the House, and called for strict requirements for child support payments by absent (noncustodial) parents, mainly the fathers of children on welfare.

In the negotiations, the bill that emerged most closely resembled the Senate bill. Seemingly, the key to the agreement was a compromise on the Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program for two-parent families, called AFDC-UP (the "UP" standing for

governmental support of the Contra military and paramilitary forces in Nicaragua fighting the Sandinista regime. This was after the Congress had ended aid to the Contras (in October 1984). Funds generated from the sale of weapons to Iran were diverted to support the Contras in Nicaragua.

unemployed parent). Democrats in the House and Senate wanted to make the provision of welfare cash benefits to two-parent families mandatory on the same basis as aid to single-parent welfare families. But officials of the Reagan administration (especially White House aide Charles Hobbs) would not go along. The compromise extended the AFDC-UP program to all states, with a requirement that one parent in each covered family engage in community work experience for at least sixteen hours per week. Although this work obligation for the heads of two-parent families was ostensibly the reason the administration went along on the final bill, its impact was limited; it affected only a small portion of the caseload. The more important basis for compromise was the concept of "mutual obligation" in much the same way it was embodied in the California GAIN program.

Under the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) program, the most important programmatic component of the 1988 Family Support Act, states were required to achieve a 20 percent level of program participation for all eligible AFDC family heads on a phased basis over a period of five years. The JOBS program provided \$1 billion annually to the states in the first four years (fiscal years 1991-1994) for training, education, job search, assessment, and other supportive services, and \$1.3 billion in the fifth year. The 20 percent participation requirement applied to all welfare family heads who had children three years of age or older. The compromise on this age level was reached after considerable debate similar to the way California legislators had brokered this issue four years earlier.

The 1988 Family Support Act contained authority for Community Work Experience (called CWEP) as in Reagan's 1981 budget.² However, unlike the way this was done in the case of two-parent welfare families for which the law mandated up to sixteen hours of participation in CWEP by one parent, the law left the decision as to the required amount of participation (if any) in CWEP by female welfare family heads up to the states. The inclusion of education and training as eligible activities under the JOBS program and the law's emphasis on young welfare mothers going back to school were major themes of the 1988 law, which can be described as adopting the human-capital approach to welfare reform, stressing education and training. It is ironic that this

was happening at precisely the time the GAIN program in California was revealing the pitfalls of the relationship between schools and welfare agencies. The Family Support Act required states to devote at least 55 percent of their federally aided JOBS expenditures to the "hard-to-serve" part of their caseload, i.e., unwed teen mothers and long-time welfare recipients.

A close reading of the 1988 Family Support Act suggests that both sides achieved something. Liberals won additional funding for education and training for welfare family heads. They also won on another important point, the extension of child care and Medicaid benefits for one year after a welfare family head entered the labor force and was no longer eligible for cash assistance under AFDC. These were called "transitional benefits." Conservatives on the other hand put their stamp on the bill in the way work requirements and mandatory participation were highlighted.

President Reagan signed the Family Support Act with a flourish at a ceremony in October 1988 in the White House Rose Garden attended by governors and other guests. "This bill, H.R. 1720," the President said, "represents the culmination of more than 2 years of effort and responds to the call in my 1986 State of the Union Message for real welfare reform — reform that will lead to lasting emancipation from welfare dependency."³

Before the ink was dry on Reagan's signature, however, ideological differences emerged. The law, as indicated, provided one year of transitional benefits for Medicaid and child care after a welfare family head went to work and earned enough money so that she was no longer eligible for welfare benefits. This provision, which was not a matter of contention in the Congress, quickly emerged as controversial. In an article in the *Wall Street Journal*, which appeared on the very day Reagan signed the bill, conservative welfare expert Charles Murray took aim at this entitlement, which he claimed would cause more people to enter the welfare system. According to Murray, "Once again, we have adopted a policy on the basis of people who already exhibit the problem we want to solve, while being blind to the effects of the policy on people who do not yet exhibit the problem."⁴

Although the Achilles heel of the 1988 law did not turn out to be the one identified by Murray, the act disappointed its proponents for two reasons. One reason, as stressed in the next chapter, was that its execution was pretty half-hearted; it fell far short of the law's spirit and main purposes. A second reason was that the idea of emphasizing the human-capital approach (featuring education and training) did not live up to expectations. Eight years later, out of frustration with past efforts, Congress enacted a stronger, bolder, substantially different national welfare reform law.

The Personal Responsibility Act of 1996

In this book, the 1996 welfare reform act (officially the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act) is referred to as the "Personal Responsibility Act." These first two words are key. Policymakers were making an effort to change the way society defined personal responsibility for poor family heads. The focus was on *work first*.

However, in federalism terms, the new law is schizophrenic. Did it liberate the states or tie them down? The law is 250 pages long. It contains detailed behavioral requirements with respect to work and school responsibilities for children in welfare families. At the same time, it provides block grants to the states to give them increased fiscal and program flexibility. I view the law as essentially devolutionary, passing power down to the state and local levels, but the answer to the question about its effects on U.S. federalism is by no means cut-and-dried. In this setting in which the buck is being passed down, important questions are raised about the roles of the federal government, the states, localities, and service providers (both nonprofit and for-profit) in implementing the 1996 law.

The Personal Responsibility Act limits to five years the time that a family head can receive federal funds for cash assistance, with states being permitted to exempt 20 percent of their case load from this requirement. Under the new law, welfare is renamed the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program. The old program, AFDC (Aid for Families with Dependent Children), is no more.

The history of the new law is interesting. President Clinton in his 1992 campaign for the presidency promised to “end welfare as we know it.” He said this over and over again. Clinton featured this phrase in TV spots, in his Inaugural address, in his first State of the Union message, and on many other occasions. As president, he did end “welfare” semantically in the 1996 Personal Responsibility Act. The word “welfare” doesn’t appear in the law, and as far as I know, no states use this word in the name of the agency that administers the TANF program for temporary cash assistance and the related job-facilitation programs and services. The American Public Welfare Association representing state welfare officials changed its name in 1998 to the American Public Human Services Association.

When the Republican-controlled 104th Congress finished its handiwork on the 1996 welfare reform act, it was touch and go as to whether President Clinton would sign it. The Personal Responsibility Act, featuring the block grant approach to federal aid to the states, was the product of a Congress with both bodies controlled by the opposition political party. Inside the administration, there was an intense debate for the soul of the President on this bill, with liberals strongly urging a veto, despite the President’s campaign promise to end welfare and despite the fact that 1996 was a presidential election year when it would be awkward for him to veto legislation that was supposed to achieve a goal he had so vociferously championed for four years.

The Personal Responsibility Act, which of course Clinton did sign, sets work requirements that are ratcheted up over time so that when the law is fully implemented, half of all single parents must be working. In two-parent families, at least one parent is required to be working in 90 percent of the assisted families. The law tightly defines work activities, spelling out twelve qualifying types of activities. Also tightly defined is the way caseload calculations are to be made for fulfilling these and other participation requirements. Unwed teenaged parents are required to live at home or in an adult-supervised setting and to be in school in order to receive benefits. There are stringent requirements for establishing the child support responsibilities of noncustodial parents and collecting payments from them, including a requirement that states suspend the driver’s and occupational licenses of individuals overdue in their child support

payments. Sanctions accompany all of these requirements. For immigrants the law was especially strict, denying eligibility to large classes of people — provisions which later were significantly rolled back.

At the same time that the new law sets these and other personal behavioral requirements, it provides block grants to the states. In doing so, the TANF program eliminates the states' entitlement to federal payments for a fixed share of all welfare cash benefits, as was the case under the predecessor AFDC program. (Under AFDC, states were entitled to a percentage of all AFDC payments they made, the percentage depending on state personal income levels. The minimum state matching requirement was 50 percent in better-off states, and as low as 25 percent in the poorest states.)

Under the Personal Responsibility Act, states also receive a child care block grant, and are given the flexibility to transfer up to 30 percent of their TANF block grant funds to the child care block grant and up to 10 percent of their TANF block grant funds to the pre-existing social services block grant.

This description of the act, while not complete, suggests the spirit as well as the complexity of the new law, which is often treated summarily as a breakthrough in simplicity. The Personal Responsibility Act also represented a shift in management philosophy from a regulatory approach to an approach that the law says is supposed to emphasize results as opposed to administrative-process requirements. It does this by setting reporting requirements for activities like job placement and retention, the premise being that governments and the public can use such data to assess whether states are achieving the goals of the new law. What was formerly the quality-control ("Q.C.") approach to enforcement, whereby states had to report according to detailed federally prescribed categories of administrative processes, was supposed to be eliminated.*

* Actually, "Q.C." lives on. This is most clearly the case for the closely related food stamp and Medicaid programs, and pretty much the case, too, for determining eligibility for TANF cash assistance benefits.

For social policy and American federalism, the new law is a big deal. Most observers of U.S. domestic affairs probably would agree that the basic contours of welfare policy since the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935 involved the national government setting a framework for the states that on the whole has been liberal. This framework with its entitlement to the states to match cash assistance payments to poor families undoubtedly caused many politically conservative states to provide aid above what they would have provided on their own to this most controversial needy population, i.e., nondisabled, working-age parents and their children.

In 1996 the ideological tables were turned. The framework of the new law and the pressure it applies from Washington is conservative. Pressure is put on liberal states to terminate welfare benefits for cause or after a required time period in order to put teeth into the work, family, school, and reproduction behavior-changing requirements of the Personal Responsibility Act.

This turnabout should not have come as a surprise. American federalism is not, and never has been, intrinsically liberal or conservative. The ideological character of centralizing forces has varied over time. In the nineteenth century the federal government was dominated by pro-business, anti-government social values. Not until Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal in the mid-1930s was there a shift to a socially activist role for the federal government. Many people who follow U.S. domestic policies have lived their whole lives under this centrist-liberal regime. For them, there was always an easy assumption that liberal activism is dominant in Washington and that more conservative, anti-government forces have their political base in states and localities.

The welfare policies advanced by the Republican-led 104th Congress in Washington represented a turning point in these terms. The most dramatic signal was the five-year lifetime limit for a family head to receive federally aided welfare cash benefits. Welfare, so it was claimed, would no longer be a way of life — no longer a permanent condition.

To me, the most surprising thing about the 1996 law, especially compared to the 1988 law, is how much and how deeply it has penetrated America's governments and changed the character and operations of a wide range of social programs and public agencies. The next two chapters compare the effects of the two federal laws (1988 and 1996). The field evaluation study we conducted of the implementation of the Family Support Act of 1988 is described in chapter 9. A similar field evaluation we are presently conducting of the 1996 law is described in chapter 10.

Endnotes

- 1 "The President's State of the Union Address, Delivered before a Joint Session of the Congress, February 4, 1986," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 22, no. 6, Monday, February 10, 1986. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 138.
- 2 A number of caveats were added in the House. The law required that after nine months of participation in CWEP, workers should receive "prevailing wage rates" rather than minimum wage. It also prohibited requiring more than twenty hours of participation per week in CWEP from AFDC participants with a child under the age of six.
- 3 Remarks on signing the Family Support Act of 1988, October 13, 1988, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 14, no. 41, Monday, October 17, 1988 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 1313.
- 4 Charles Murray, "New Welfare Bill, New Welfare Cheats," *Wall Street Journal*, October 13, 1998.

Evaluating the Family Support Act of 1988

with Irene Lurie

This chapter on the Family Support Act of 1988 begins with a brief detour on the history of the law, focusing on its roots in public policy research. The description of the evaluation of the act which follows is based on an article by Irene Lurie, one of the two principal investigators for the field network evaluation of the 1988 law conducted by the Rockefeller Institute of Government. Jan L. Hagen co-directed this research.



Ron Haskins, a Ph.D. developmental psychologist who served for thirteen years as the main policy advisor on welfare to Republicans on the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, played a major role in the enactment of the Family Support Act of 1988. In 1991, he published an article on the role research played in the enactment of this legislation. Overall, he said the role of research was “important but limited.” He added that a large number of committee staffers were knowledgeable about the most pertinent public policy research. Haskins cited the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service, and the General Accounting Office. Staffers in these offices, he said, “constantly seek out research on issues of interest to Congress and employ all conceivable means of conveying the findings

to Congress.” In Haskins’s opinion, “analysts in each of these organizations are top-notch thinkers, well versed in the art of translating research into policy implications.” He added his view, which I agree with, on the need for impartiality on the part of researchers.

Researchers who would apply their knowledge to public policy have an obligation to avoid advocacy. Unfortunately, social scientists, like politicians themselves, are not neutral on the contentious issues of social policy. They must be watched and their ideas subjected to intense scrutiny by their colleagues and by the political process.¹

In his article, Haskins discussed the studies of the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation as well as other studies. To me, the notable thing about Haskins’s role is that it is not uncommon. Hundreds of Congressional and agency staffers, in different ways and to different degrees, bridge social science and social policy, thus constituting the policy research movement in action. Haskins’s article focused on the House of Representatives. It hardly needs to be added, as many of the events described in this book attest to, that the role of social science in the Senate in this period was appreciable because of the presence of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a ubiquitous and important figure in almost all of the events described in the book, and himself a noted social scientist.



The description of the effects of the 1988 Family Support Act contained in this chapter is based on Irene Lurie’s article, “A Lesson from the JOBS Program: Reforming Welfare Must Be Both Dazzling and Dull,” which appeared in the Fall 1996 issues of the *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*. Using a uniform analytical structure, Rockefeller Institute field researchers studied the implementation of the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program in ten states — Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas — a representative cross-section of states in terms of their per capita income, poverty rate, level of fiscal stress, and geographical region. The research, conducted

between 1990 and 1995, was funded by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

Since 1967, when the Work Incentive Program (WIN) was created, federal law required states to operate employment and training programs for recipients of cash benefits under the Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Congress intended that the WIN program would require recipients to work or prepare for work. But insufficient funding and inadequate motivation on the part of the agencies operating WIN dashed its expectations, despite repeated efforts at reform. States could impose fiscal penalties or sanctions on all welfare recipients registered for WIN services as a condition of eligibility for assistance unless they were exempted. But the federal government did not set goals for the states regarding actual employment or participation in an employment or training activity. So for many people the WIN program was nothing more than a paper process of registering for services that were never provided.

In drafting the Family Support Act of 1988, Congress expressed its intention that participation in the JOBS program “must be something more than simple registration for the program”² To encourage this, the act mandated states to serve a minimum percentage of their caseload, which rose from 7 percent of individuals who were required to participate in the program in 1990, the year of mandatory state implementation, to 20 percent of nonexempt individuals by 1995. Beginning in 1994, the act mandated considerably higher participation rates for two-parent families in which the principal wage earner was unemployed: 40 percent in 1994, rising to 75 percent in 1997. If a state failed to meet these mandates, the federal matching share of JOBS expenditures was to be cut from between 60 and 80 percent, depending on a state’s per capita income, to 50 percent.

In writing the federal JOBS regulations, the critical task of defining the term “participation” was left to the federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS viewed the participation mandate as an expression of Congressional intent that JOBS be a more “meaningful” program than WIN, not a “token effort,” and toward this end defined participation in terms of a twenty-hour-per-week standard.³ The

“twenty-hour rule” set a high goal for the states, one that placed great pressure on them to offer more intensive services.

Three Strategies

In the ten-state Rockefeller Institute evaluation, the mandated participation rate and its twenty-hour rule were found to be at the forefront in the minds of state policymakers and administrators as they shaped their strategy for implementing the JOBS program. State welfare agencies pursued three strategies for achieving the participation goals. The first strategy, simply funding a supply of services for JOBS participants, was most straightforward and gave welfare agencies the greatest control over the design of their program. State welfare agencies used JOBS funds to provide JOBS services in-house or to purchase services from other organizations, generally designing programs to meet for at least twenty hours per week. Many organizations were willing and even eager to serve JOBS participants. The supply of services from local school districts, community colleges, nonprofit community agencies, and for-profit education and training firms was found to be quite elastic in response to increased funding.

But funding for JOBS was scarce. In 1993, only about one-third of the states nationwide spent enough to draw down their full federal allocation of JOBS funds; overall, states drew down 75 percent of the \$1.1 billion in federal funds available. In the ten-state study, administrators argued that lack of funding was the most severe impediment to program implementation. In Oregon, which spent enough to draw down all of its federal allocation and even used unmatched state funds, the field researcher argued that “under-funding of the entire program is a persistent and chronic problem.”⁴

A second strategy, one of cost shifting, was to obtain resources from other organizations through “coordination,” a practice encouraged by the Family Support Act. In all ten states, to varying degrees, welfare agencies shifted costs to other organizations by negotiating formal interagency agreements or striking informal bargains. An array of federally aided programs assisted JOBS participants, including the Job

Training Partnership Act (JTPA) program, the Adult Education Act, the Perkins Vocational Education Act, the Higher Education Act's Pell grants, and guaranteed student loans, along with local public schools, state and local postsecondary educational institutions, and the programs of private nonprofit organizations.

Such interagency coordination, however, is often considered to be difficult, and likely to be hindered by turf battles, conflicting agency goals, differing constituencies, and varied eligibility rules. It is surprising therefore that in the ten states in the study, the degree of coordination emerged as one of the success stories of JOBS implementation. Collaborative planning was extensive. The JOBS program created or strengthened an array of interagency planning groups, task forces, advisory committees, policy committees, management committees, and coordinating councils. In some states, the program produced arrangements for pooling resources and sharing credit for positive outcomes so that each agency saw joint action as being to its advantage or, at least, leaving it no worse off. The combination of a lack of funds for JOBS and the federally mandated participation rate was a powerful incentive for welfare agencies at both the state and local levels to develop formal and informal linkages with other agencies.

The downside of reliance on other organizations for a supply of services was that in many areas the JOBS program lacked control over the availability of services. The people served and the types of services offered were based not solely on an assessment of each individual's need for services, but on the existing infrastructure of organizations and programs. Some sites did not even have the resources to assess all individuals, and instead devised ways to count people engaged in other programs as JOBS participants. In New York City, to take an extreme example, in 1995 two-thirds of JOBS participants were classified as being in "self-initiated" education and training programs that they had located on their own. So, rather than implementing a clear program model, the programs of many states were "service-driven," placing or counting recipients in services that were already available.

Finally, exempting recipients from mandatory participation and thereby lowering the denominator of the participation rate appeared to

be a practice in a few of the ten states. Recipients were automatically exempt from participation on account of personal factors such as age, illness, or incapacity; they could also be exempt for quite different reasons such as a lack of state resources for funding necessary child care. Nationally, 56 percent of total adult recipients were exempt in 1994. Among the ten states, this proportion ranged from 36 percent in Michigan and 43 percent in Oregon, states that gave high priority to the JOBS program, to 67 percent in Texas and 78 percent in Tennessee, states that did not. This wide range suggests that some states exempted large numbers of recipients because they did not have the resources to serve them.

Little Fanfare or Rhetoric

The strong rhetoric of the authors of the Family Support Act — that it would instill a sense of obligation in recipients and would transform the AFDC program into an employment and training program that provided income support — raised lofty expectations with respect to cultural change in welfare systems. In implementing the provisions of the JOBS program, however, most of the ten sample states attempted to meet the letter of the law (as stated in the mandates), but not the spirit of the law (as stated by its authors). Most states introduced JOBS with little fanfare or rhetoric about the obligation of recipients to assume more responsibility for becoming self-sufficient, or about a changed role for welfare agencies.

Part of the fascination of welfare programs for policy and management analysts is the challenge of motivating the multiple layers of actors who play a role in determining the success of these programs. Motivation must be instilled at every point in a multilayered system: Federal leaders and policy must motivate elected and appointed state officials to design and fund programs; state leaders must in turn motivate welfare agency administrators at both the state and local levels; local welfare commissioners must motivate their staff to take the program seriously; and, finally, front-line staff must motivate the individuals in their caseloads to participate in these programs, place their children in child care if necessary, and seek and accept available employment.

Opinions differ about how to motivate welfare recipients to prepare for work and enter the labor force. Mary Jo Bane and Robert Behn argue that good management, with a high-energy staff and an employment-focused organizational culture, makes the threat of financial sanctions unnecessary.⁵ Yet, we found states operating demonstrations that increased sanctions for failure to comply with the mandate to participate in the JOBS program, suggesting they either disagree with Bane and Behn or could not achieve their vision. Field researchers found that encouraging recipients who are not motivated to participate takes resources, in terms of both staff and JOBS services. Few states hired additional staff for their welfare agencies, reflecting the unwillingness of state and local legislators to devote more funds to what they often viewed as a "bloated" welfare bureaucracy. Training staff to focus on employment was limited, since it took time away from other pressing tasks. No states rewarded staff financially for good performance. Even imposing sanctions can be costly, since a welfare agency must devote staff to monitoring participation and to operating a conciliation and fair hearing process for people who refuse to participate without good cause. Some caseworkers thought the conciliation and sanctioning process was too time-consuming, too much of a hassle, so they made only a minimal effort to follow the rules.

In Riverside, California, one of the sites in the MDRC evaluation of the California GAIN (Greater Avenue for Independence) program, welfare administrators created an agency culture that achieved considerable success in moving recipients into jobs.⁶ Welfare administrators from around the country visited Riverside to learn how they did this. Yet Riverside was found to be especially successful. The Rockefeller Institute's ten-state implementation study of the JOBS program, which did not include California, but did include Michigan, found that another MDRC evaluation site, Grand Rapid, Michigan, had a "tough" program, achieved high rates of participation, and was in both respects atypical of the Rockefeller Institute's three local sites in Michigan.⁷ MDRC study sites agreed to be evaluated; administrators were confident enough of their programs to showcase them presumably because they had activist programs. In contrast, the sites in the Institute's JOBS study were, with only a few exceptions, selected by the field associates and central staff with the goal of including "garden-variety" programs.

A survey of front-line staff in these sites revealed generally broad support for the JOBS goal of promoting recipients' self-sufficiency, but a rather "lukewarm" agency context for implementing the program.⁸ How to instill broad enthusiasm in a frequently overworked and underappreciated staff is the key challenge.

Although instilling a sense of obligation on the part of recipients was a goal of the Family Support Act, the act did little to change the financial rewards or penalties facing them. The only significant change was to reward work by providing transitional child care and Medicaid benefits for people leaving welfare for employment, thereby preventing the total loss of these subsidies when earnings made a family ineligible for welfare. The problems of what economists call "moral hazard," always inherent in the structure of the AFDC program, continued to exist.

A final lesson from the history of JOBS implementation concerns the politics of welfare reform. Governors and welfare commissioners like to take initiative in this area. When federal legislation in the early 1980s gave states the option to operate new welfare employment programs, many state leaders were enthusiastic about designing new programs and taking ownership of them. But when federal legislation required states to implement the JOBS program, embracing services that many states were already providing, JOBS became just another federal mandate requiring program changes and additional expenditures. Rather than devoting political capital to increasing expenditures for the JOBS program, state leaders obtained waivers from federal law to restrict welfare eligibility and benefits as a way of generating political capital. One state welfare commissioner explained that officials stand to benefit from this tough approach because "the public blames the welfare system for problems in their own life." A hard line on welfare policy appeared to offer state leaders an opportunity for political gain. In this respect, the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996 can be seen as a response to the findings of the JOBS program research and other studies of welfare employment programs, research which set the stage for debate about welfare reform strategies that eventually led to the 1996 Personal Responsibility Act.

Endnotes

- 1 Ron Haskins, "Congress Writes a Law: Research and Welfare Reform," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 10, no. 4 (Fall 1991), pp. 617-631.
- 2 U.S. Congress House of Representatives, *Conference Report on the Family Support Act of 1988*, Report 100-998, September 28, 1988, p. 148.
- 3 *Federal Register*, 54 (197), (October 13, 1989), pp. 42,201, 42,203.
- 4 Jan L. Hagen and Irene Lurie, *Implementing Jobs: Case Management Services* (Albany, NY: The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, 1994), p. ix.
- 5 See Mary Jo Bane, "Welfare Reform and Mandatory versus Voluntary Work: Policy Issue or Management Problem?" *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 8, no. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 285-289; see also Robert D. Behn, *Leadership Counts: Lessons for Public Managers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
- 6 The GAIN program is discussed in chapter 7. See James Riccio, Daniel Friedlander, and Stephen Freedman, *GAIN: Benefits, Costs, and Three-Year Impacts of a Welfare-to-Work Program* (New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, 1994).
- 7 Gayle Hamilton, *Executive Summary, The JOBS Evaluation: Monthly Participation Rates in Three Sites and Factors Affecting Participation Levels in Welfare-to-Work Programs* (New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, 1995).
- 8 Jan L. Hagen and Irene Lurie, *Implementing JOBS: Progress and Promise* (Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 1994), p. 205.

Evaluating the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996

with Thomas L. Gais

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act of 1996 (called the Personal Responsibility Act in this book) has two main purposes. It is intended to discourage welfare reciprocity by promoting work, and to reduce out-of-wedlock births and teen pregnancies. The first report on the twenty-state evaluation of the implementation of the Personal Responsibility Act conducted by the Rockefeller Institute of Government, based on field research conducted in 1997 and 1998, showed that governors and state legislators adopted enabling legislation for their welfare reforms that strongly discouraged welfare dependency and strongly signaled the importance of work.¹ And they followed through on a basis that often involved wide political and organizational support. We did not, however, find similar widespread political or administrative support for the act's anti-reproduction goals. Legislative proposals and tentative administrative policy initiatives to change sexual behavior were advanced in some states, but often they were dropped, watered down, or de-emphasized before state welfare reform legislation was passed or broad executive orders promulgated.

In the work area, the enactment of the Personal Responsibility Act in 1996 was a result both of the disappointment with the response to the 1988 Family Support Act and the results of research showing only

modest effects of education and training (the human-capital approach to welfare reform) and much stronger results from work-first strategies.

The juxtaposition between the impacts of rigorous demonstration studies of the two approaches — one emphasizing education and training and the other emphasizing work — showing the latter to be more effective had a strong effect on the decision in the 1996 welfare reform act to downplay education and focus on work first. Questions about this choice of strategies came up frequently in committee hearings. Relevant research findings were a major subject of the deliberations in House Ways and Means Committee meetings to hammer out the final legislation. In particular, findings on the demonstration supported by the Rockefeller Foundation in San Jose, California, were mentioned, which concluded, “The findings of the evaluation suggest that immediate, job-specific training with a strong focus on getting trainees into jobs is a more effective way to improve the earnings of single mothers than are alternative strategies to seek to improve basic skills before offering job training.”² Similar findings from the work/welfare demonstrations conducted by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation were cited in this context.

The 1996 Personal Responsibility Act seeks to modify two kinds of behavior — the personal labor force and family-forming behavior of poor family heads, and the bureaucratic behavior of the agencies that administer welfare and employment and other job-related social programs. The field network evaluation research conducted by the Rockefeller Institute focuses on the second of these two types of behavior modification — the effort to change the behavior of the *bureaucracy*.

The principal finding of our first look at the implementation of the 1996 act, conducted mainly in 1998, was that a lot was happening. As researchers who have been in this field for a long time, we had not seen (or expected to see) so much and such pervasive institutional change in social programs on an across-the-board basis.

Why did this change occur, especially since it is customary to label bureaucracies as hidebound and resistant to change? There were good reasons to be skeptical. Work requirements had been part of welfare

since the early 1970s. The 1988 Family Support Act creating the JOBS program had been in effect since 1990 with little to show for it. Yet things were different under the Personal Responsibility Act.

Say what you like about the five-year time limit applying to federally funded cash assistance, it got the attention of the public and of potential and current welfare recipients in a big way. (Some states adopted shorter time limits, as the law allowed.) Moreover, as opposed to the response to the 1988 act, states did not simply layer on new responsibilities to public employees; in many places, they completely reorganized how they operated welfare and related employment and social services. The face of welfare changed for families as states altered the delivery of welfare benefits and services. The work first philosophy dominated, stressing immediate attachment to the labor force rather than training and education.

The flexible structure of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant created in the 1996 act, fortuitously coming at a time when the national labor market was buoyant, had an immense effect on intergovernmental finances. The decision to use 1994 as the base year for calculating the amount of money to be provided in these state block grants produced a fiscal windfall for all states. This is because caseloads declined by close to 50 percent on average from the 1994 base year; all states had material declines. In addition to receiving TANF block grants from Washington, states are required under the 1996 act to maintain no less than 75 percent of their previous AFDC matching funds to be used to aid the TANF-eligible population, adding this money to the TANF block grant funds available to aid poor families. A fiscal study by the Rockefeller Institute of these new financing arrangements, initially conducted in four states, showed a major shift in spending away from paying cash assistance towards additional spending for child care and employment services.³

The organizational implications of the new law turned out to have widespread reverberations and multiple variations. In response to the act, new agency missions and arrangements were adopted. Delivery systems became more complex and diverse, and there was a redistribution of discretion, pushing downward to local offices, and ultimately to case managers. Local offices operating under new institutional arrangements,

spurred by the federal block grant, came to have a wide range of tools and services available for assisting families and greater discretion in how to use them. A major consequence was the emergence of considerable diversity in local systems — diversity that has had an important effect on how people are treated, and that is influenced by a variety of factors, such as administrative resources, organizational style, and community capacity and values. This combination of programmatic flexibility and greatly increased local discretion posed huge management challenges for states to create and operate management information systems to provide accurate data to serve local case-management, as well as to meet federal and state needs for assuring accountability. All things considered, the task of moving a large and heterogeneous population out of dependency on public aid and into the workforce created a host of challenges with respect to program and case management, accountability, and program equity.

Changed Signals

We found that workers in social programs were not as opposed to the behavior change purposes of the 1996 act as many people had expected they would be. In fact, front-line workers were often strongly in support of the law's emphasis on work and reducing dependency. As one case manager said, "This is what I was trained to do. Now I have some leverage. I love it." Many ground-level workers themselves have a relatively low income and a strong work ethic, which in many instances are shared by welfare applicants and recipients. Devolution to the front lines is the subject of a special federally funded component of the Rockefeller Institute field evaluation focused on culture change and signaling by front-line workers: Did they get and transmit the new message? Irene Lurie directs this research.⁴

We found that signals about the importance of work and self support changed after 1996, despite the fact that work/welfare initiatives conducted under federal waivers had been under way in many states before the new federal law was passed. However, the other strong policy signaling in the 1996 act — that applying to pregnancy prevention — was found to have had little initial effect on bureaucratic behavior, although there are grounds for expecting that behavior in this area will

change, too, as a result of the act. In this area, the change is more likely to be personal than bureaucratic. Poor family heads (most of them female and unmarried) face the new reality of time-limited cash assistance and strong requirements for work and participation in active job search and job-related activities. They have to participate for fixed amounts of time under "Personal Responsibility Agreements" specified in the 1996 law, which they are required to sign before a cash-assistance case can be opened. If there is a non-custodial parent (usually a male), there is a new social dynamic: "If he isn't required to do anything, why should I be; why shouldn't he be responsible too?" Many state officials predicted that the resentment by poor female single parents because of the reality of time-limited cash assistance will ultimately affect child-bearing behavior. There is in fact suggestive but no definitive evidence, that this is already occurring.

For policy implementation, the lessons are obvious. Changes in bureaucratic behavior are more likely to happen when there is a clear policy signal that is strong enough to be widely noticed both within the pertinent political subsystem and in the larger community. But this is not enough. Change, when it occurs, happens more easily and widely when it is in line with the dominant social values. In the case of the Personal Responsibility Act, we found bureaucratic behavior to be changing in one area and not another in a way that reflects the "political correctness" of one signal (the work signal) and not of the other signal about pregnancy prevention. These changes in signaling and bureaucratic behavior occurred in large part because many political leaders, especially governors, stressed that a work-based approach to welfare reform was not just one policy priority among many but the central objective of welfare reform. Furthermore, it commanded support from a broad and enduring political coalition.

One of the intriguing characteristics of the politics of the implementation of the 1996 law was how little debate it generated. Partisan fights erupted in some states and on some issues, but such divisions were more the exception than the rule. The broadest support was for imposing time limits and strict and extensive employment obligations on adult recipients of welfare benefits. As Thomas Kaplan said in describing the Wisconsin field research for this study:

A striking feature of this abrupt change in approach toward AFDC has been the apparent breadth of acceptance of that change in the state. From the governor's first proposals to reduce AFDC benefits in families with teens not attending school (Learnfare), many (though by no means all) representatives of the inner city poor in Milwaukee have endorsed the changes. Wisconsin's Democrats were the initial proponents of "ending welfare as we know it" in this state, and very little opposition has arisen to the requirement of W-2 [Wisconsin Works] that public assistance cash income must derive only from participation in work or work-like programs. . . . With the prominent exception of the Catholic archdiocese of Milwaukee, the central notion of Wisconsin's welfare reform — that "welfare as we knew it" was bad for both its recipients and the broader society — has been little questioned in this state, despite the sharp difference of this new consensus from the apparent consensus of 15 years.⁵

Wisconsin is the state with the most radical welfare reform, but the story was similar in other states. Despite the fact that the sample states enacted very different welfare laws, most were variants of the work first approach, which stresses moving a large proportion of adult recipients into jobs as quickly as possible. Florida enacted its work first program (entitled WAGES, standing for Work and Gain Economic Self-Sufficiency) with little controversy about the nature of benefits or their tight time limits.⁶ The debate over welfare reform was "moderate in both tone and content," and the final bill passed both legislative chambers with unanimous support. In Texas, the policy process was "highly inclusive, deliberative, factually based, and surprisingly bi-partisan." In Kansas, policymakers "generally agreed that the major objective of reform was employment and reform." The political debate in Ohio saw some dissension over family caps and the two-year time limit rather than the federally mandated five-year limit, but after these and a child-support tracking requirement were modified, the final enabling legislation was enacted with only one dissenting vote in both legislative chambers. Broad support was also found for the work first philosophy in Michigan, Arizona, North Carolina, Washington, Utah, and West Virginia.

Not all states avoided conflict over welfare reform. But even where political divisions existed, the focus on jobs commanded broad support. Urban Democrats in Georgia unsuccessfully opposed the stringency of time limits and the strength of the sanctions in Democratic Governor Zell Miller's welfare bill and wanted the state to provide a more expansive safety net, but they did not repudiate the bill's work requirements. The debate in Rhode Island produced conflict over its reforms, and in the end the state rejected time limits and retained the entitlement status of welfare benefits, but work requirements were generally accepted. Flush state treasuries helped in Rhode Island and other states where there was political concern about the employability of parents. Demands that parents work were made more acceptable by giving working parents more help, such as a new entitlement in Rhode Island for unlimited child care and health care for children in families with incomes up to 250 percent above the poverty level.

There were other factors behind the shift in political support to work first. The 1994 elections were important in some states. In North Carolina, for example, Governor Jim Hunt's approach to welfare reform shifted from one that was centered on child well-being to one that emphasized work after the Republicans made large gains in the state legislature. In many states, administrators and policy staff may have been influenced by studies by MDRC and other researchers that showed the relative weakness (or at least lack of decisive strength) of job training and education-based programs in reducing welfare dependency. The five-year time limit in the 1996 act gave work-based reforms heightened seriousness, signaling that income support would no longer be provided on a permanent basis by the federal government for able-bodied, nonelderly, nondisabled parents. If state and local governments were going to support such families beyond the federal time limits, they would have to assume the full financial burden of doing so.*

As an outgrowth of the interest by national and state policymakers in changed signaling and agency culture change, a spin-off added to this

* Among the sample states, Michigan and Rhode Island took the position that the state would fund benefits for the most needy families beyond the five-year limit. In New York, a similar decision was made to do so through a system of vouchers to meet essential needs.

field evaluation, mentioned earlier, is an examination of the behavior of front-line workers in twelve sites in four of the sample states for the Rockefeller Institute's implementation study. This is the ultimate test of a new policy — how it affects people at ground zero. In a presentation on this research at a conference sponsored by the Administration for Children and Families of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Irene Lurie suggested that the old welfare is not so much replaced as that a new one has been added on.

So we've seen, and to the credit of the agencies we have visited, that to guarantee that the client does get the message about the importance of work that there is a process they go through where a specialized worker — maybe it's someone from the Department of Labor, maybe it's someone from a not-for-profit organization, or a for-profit, or a specialized worker in a specialized agency — has sole responsibility to tell people about work and about the importance of work. And we've seen this virtually every place we've been.⁷

New Partners

One of the most widespread strategies for changing the purposes and signals of welfare, as just noted, was to give employment bureaucracies greater control over program operations. This was done in various ways. Employment bureaucracies were seen as having the expertise, data, and institutional missions for getting people jobs, assessing skills, providing job-readiness training and other training services, working with employers, setting up work-experience opportunities, and finding and overseeing local job service contractors. One way of viewing what was happening here is that political leaders decided that if they wanted to change the signaling of welfare — they had to change the signalers. New arrangements between employment bureaucracies and welfare agencies changed the character of welfare. By locating welfare offices in job centers and/or having employment agencies serve as the front door or first step in the application process for cash assistance for poor families, states signaled administratively that people could and should

get a job and that in many places welfare cash assistance was part of a new service system for job seekers, rather than a program unto itself.

Wisconsin was the most active state in transforming administrative structures in order to put welfare in an employment context. It began the process of creating closer connections between its public assistance agency and its Department of Labor (which used to be called the Department of Industry, Labor, and Human Relations) when it co-located county welfare offices with what are called "Job Service" offices in job centers. Co-location gave way to consolidation in 1996 when the state's Wisconsin Works (W-2) program was enacted and all public assistance functions except Medicaid were transferred out of the state's welfare department into a renamed Department of Workforce Development.

Not only were labor and employment bureaucracies given greater responsibilities for carrying out welfare programs, in many states their activities were integrated with cash assistance and social services. This local presence, in terms of staff playing a central role in the program, is much greater than in the past, when such job-stressing efforts were often half-hearted. Georgia was particularly successful in incorporating work activities and expertise in its TANF program. According to the Georgia field researcher, in the AFDC/JOBS era (1990-1995) there was a "complete separation" of eligibility determination and employment services. "AFDC and JOBS were located in separate offices, often several miles away from each other."

Although there was no stated animosity between these two staffs, state officials acknowledged that the two programs seemed to exist in separate worlds. Eligibility workers appeared concerned only with the determination of benefit eligibility for individuals; employment services were only focused on securing a job for a client. In fact, it ran counter to the organizational interest of local AFDC offices to place clients in jobs — since diminished caseloads resulted in a need for fewer employees.⁸

Formerly, there were eight AFDC caseworkers for every employability specialist in the Georgia JOBS program, creating a situation, as one senior official put it, comparable to “eight people loading the truck and only one person unloading it.” In 1997 this situation changed after the Department of Human Resources contracted with the Department of Labor to place 18,000 TANF recipients in jobs and provide training and education services to an additional 40,000 clients. Under this contract, Department of Labor staffers were “physically located within welfare offices throughout Georgia, handling the job placement tasks formerly performed by the Department of Child and Family Services.” In some counties, front-line staff were organized into teams; in others, staff were cross-trained as generic workers with proficiency in work assessment and employment monitoring, as well as case management and child care functions. In one local site, there were nearly five workers who tracked work-related activities for every one who determined eligibility and benefits.

Such new partnerships for the job-service strategies of the 1996 law and precursor state work/welfare initiatives put a high premium on *connectivity*. The term refers to three important types of connections — those between programs; these between institutions (i.e., jurisdictions, public agencies, and contracted service providers); and connections between information systems. The third area (information systems) became another special subject for examination by Rockefeller Institute field researchers working jointly with evaluators from the U.S. General Accounting Office. Together, the two organizations have studied six state systems in depth and another nine states less intensively as part of the program of the Working Seminar on Information Systems for Social Programs.⁹ Increasingly, the development of information systems for managing work-focused social systems has emerged as critical for policy oversight and program planning, and, as noted, is especially needed by front-line workers to link and track benefits and social services for individual cases.

“Diversion”

Although not mentioned in the 1996 welfare reform law, “diversion” emerged as a major new term of reference and a strategy for

administering human services that produced a great deal of expanded discretion and variation in operations at the local and caseworker levels. The term is used in several ways. One way is to refer to one-time cash payments or other inducements given to families in exchange for limiting their eligibility for continuing cash assistance. The term, diversion, is also used to refer to activities intended to have the effect of diverting families from receiving regular cash assistance. The initial field reports showed that this latter form of diversion is much more important than lump-sum payments. As a result, it is not always easy to identify what is diversion and what it is not. An activity like eligibility screening may be a form of diversion when it is carried out in certain ways, whereas sometimes it may simply be part of an eligibility review.

In Florida, as an illustration, two types of diversion were explicit — non-cash and cash. Non-cash diversion involves telling applicants of their responsibility to work if their application is approved and requiring them to look for work before their eligibility for assistance is determined. Cash diversion on the other hand can provide two months worth of cash assistance in exchange for which the client must agree to forego ongoing cash assistance for a specified length of time, the length being set by the local office. However, there was little cash diversion initially in Florida at the outset because the state's information system could not keep track of who had received cash grants in order to be able to prevent people from receiving repeat diversion payments. At the same time, non-cash diversion in one region of the state was reported to have affected as many as 20 percent of the applicants.

As compared with lump-sum cash diversion, states generally make greater use of non-cash diversion on a basis that increases the discretion exercised by local agencies and front-line workers. One of the most elaborate diversion programs we found is called "Texas Works." It aims to get people a job or needed services before they apply for TANF benefits in order to make sure that "the only people coming onto TANF are those who need more in-depth help." Clerical staff may route potential applicants to employment counseling with a Texas Works advisor, to a group intake interview, or to an employment resources center. Advisors may also make referrals to public or private agencies, such as those for family violence intervention, local women's shelters,

disability benefits, drug and alcohol treatment, protective and regulatory services (for child abuse and neglect), and various health services. The state's welfare program thus has a new emphasis. The commissioner of the Department of Human Services awards a "Commissioner's Cup" to the region that has diverted the largest number of clients.

In sum, diversion can serve different purposes; actual practices often depend on local interpretation and implementation. Some states use diversion to erect a fortress-like welfare system, instead of expanding the options available to families. In doing so, they use diversion to minimize caseloads — to discourage applicants, whatever their needs happen to be. Because diversion can be ad hoc, dependent on local resources and on front-line workers' judgment, knowledge, and objectives, it has a highly devolutionary effect. Local offices and case managers have decisions to make and leeway in making them. Diversion also produces considerable variation in how people are treated, and therefore poses enormous challenges for monitoring the ultimate effects of welfare and social service programs on families, as families move across a wide variety of public and private institutions.

In some states, we found personal responsibility agreements to be the main tool for structuring the relationships between families and welfare agencies. In other states, these agreements are little more than a standardized list of program requirements and benefits, along with a vague commitment by the state to provide TANF benefits to eligible persons. However, in some cases, these agreements can be specific and highly individualized. Promises may be made by the state to provide particular services, with the resulting mutually signed agreement used to review progress and guide case management. Such agreements are not only important signaling devices regarding client obligations; they contribute to the shift by local agencies from a rule-driven administrative culture to one that is structured around solving problems and preventing dependency. In Ohio, for example, TANF participants are required to sign what are called "self-sufficiency contracts." They specify what kinds of work activities the head of household plans to perform, for how many hours per week, and when the activities will begin and end. Specific expectations may include paternity establishment,

securing child support, reporting “everything known” about absent parents, and complying, where relevant, with a reunification plan developed by the Ohio Children’s Service Agency. The plans are reciprocal; they are viewed as binding contracts between county agencies and participants. They are taken seriously enough that counties are “strongly encouraged” to seek the advice and approval of county prosecutors if they choose to design their own contractual arrangements, which they may do. Participants are advised of their rights, including the right to assistance in locating employment within the state’s thirty-six-month time limit, filing grievances about work assignments, appealing county actions to the state, and maintaining eligibility for Medicaid, child care, and food stamps even if they are no longer eligible for cash welfare benefits.

Sanctioning

In the first round of the Rockefeller Institute field research, we found that personal responsibility agreements and program requirements were enforced by the more frequent, albeit selective, use of sanctions. In site visits and field researcher interviews, caseworkers and agency personnel maintained that sanctions were critical to the new message, and that the threat of full family sanctions in particular was important in getting clients to show up for orientation meetings and job interviews and to meet their minimum-hour participation requirements. At the same time, the evidence was unclear as to whether sanctions actually resulted in case closings in large numbers — that is, whether they were used essentially as signals of the seriousness of work and other requirements or more strictly to discipline cash assistance recipients.

States tended to impose less than full sanctions on families, perhaps because these sanctions are regarded as commensurate with the issues in question and thus more appropriate for bringing recipients into compliance. They were likely to impose graduated, calibrated, or even “vanishing” sanctions to focus parents’ attention on program requirements without removing them from the program. Graduated sanctions are increased if violations are repeated or ignored. In the Rockefeller Institute sample, fourteen states were found to have adopted provisions

for some form of graduated or part-time reduction of benefits. Minnesota, for example, reduces a participant's grant by 10 percent for at least one month as a first sanction; the second sanction results in taking away whatever remains of the cash grant after rent (and in some cases utilities). Less common were time-calibrated, participation-related sanctions. Wisconsin was the only state in 1998 using this approach. Under Wisconsin's W-2 program, cash payments are calculated in relation to the number of hours of program participation.

Political "Detoxification"

The work first approach, combined with time limits, affected not just what state and local welfare agencies said, but what they did: Agencies could do more because case managers had fewer TANF clients owing to the declines in caseloads. Local agencies could also do more as a result of changes in the political climate. We observed a new politics of welfare — indeed, what might be called a "detoxification" of welfare politics in the sense of its no longer being a big-time political issue. This is because of the greater public acceptance of welfare programs that help people go to work, stay at work, and thereby limit their time on cash assistance. The combination of changed signals, smaller caseloads, and new politics enables many social agencies to do more and to work together more easily on a range of service programs involving employment assistance, child care, transportation, health, food stamps, and other social services.

Field researchers were asked to describe the mix of services and benefits offered at the local sites they studied. We found an extraordinary range of often highly specialized services. The most common were child care, employment services, aid in child support enforcement, and transportation assistance; but we also found a number of sites offering such services as:

- ❖ educational services, the most common being remedial education, GED preparation, and English as a Second Language;

- ❖ substance abuse counseling, usually via contracts with community-based organizations;
- ❖ family support services, including a Teen Parent Center and Pediatric Care Center that a local state agency developed on its own (in Bibb County, Georgia);
- ❖ emergency housing, ranging from state-subsidized housing assistance to contracts with local churches to assist with recipients' housing needs;
- ❖ domestic violence and emergency intervention; and
- ❖ mental health services.

One-stop job centers in Wisconsin offer an especially wide range of services. The Wisconsin Works program (W-2) is fully integrated with other services at the most developed job centers, such as in Kenosha County. Participants in W-2 not only draw on employment and training services, employment support, and other services and benefits specific to the program, they also can use the job center to access a wide range of services, such as child care, child health checks, Children First (an employment and training program for noncustodial parents), a dislocated worker program, economic support programs (such as Medicaid and food stamps), Head Start, the Job Corps, Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) programs, paternity establishment, Supplemental Security Income advocacy, and a feeding program for infants. In some of its local offices, Kenosha County's W-2 program provides these services by using "integrated service teams" of co-located staff members.

States are not merely adding services and forming new alliances; they are also making new financial commitments. Minnesota, for example, decided to fully fund a universal sliding fee for child care for the first time. The program had offered subsidies to welfare and low-income working families since 1986, but in the past waiting lists had been as long as three years. The coalition behind welfare reform, however, along with a large budget surplus in 1997-98, and the belief by the governor and the legislature that affordable child care was crucial for welfare recipients, led the state to spend an additional \$60 million on child care.

While many innovations were found in the initial round of field research, the overall national picture for program finances highlighted not spending, but the lack of spending or the slow pace of the use of available funds. This led to the adoption of the fiscal-effects component of the Rockefeller Institute research on the welfare reforms.¹⁰ States in 1999 had accumulated large balances of unspent and unobligated federal TANF funds. As a result, they were admonished by the chair of the House Subcommittee on Human Resources that “unless states begin spending more money, we will eventually lose the battle to protect it here in Washington.” In the Institute project to find out how state social services spending priorities have changed in the wake of welfare reform, we focus on three key questions about state spending.

- ❖ *How has overall state spending on social services changed as a budget priority?* Is social services spending a greater proportion or lesser proportion of the state budget than before? What insights can we glean about the extent to which states have used a welfare surplus for other state priorities outside the realm of social services, such as tax cuts, education spending, or other purposes?*
- ❖ *How have priorities shifted within social services?* In what ways have states shifted their spending among program categories within social services? What are they spending more money on, and what are they spending less on? Why? Why are they finding it difficult to spend all of their TANF grants?
- ❖ *How have federal-state financial relationships changed?* How has the federal share of spending on various programs changed? Are states supplanting state money with federal money in some programs? How does this vary across states?

To answer these questions requires assembling a data set with two main features. First, we need data for the pre- and post-welfare reform period. Second, we need to put the entire social services pie on the table so that we can see how states have shifted spending among social

* Chapter 11 deals with an earlier field network evaluation, focused in this way on the issue of supplantation of federal aid funds for state expenditures and/or tax reductions.

service categories, how they have shifted reliance from state to federal funding or vice versa, and so that we can gain insights into how states used welfare savings to provide general budget relief. Many of these questions cannot be answered using federal data; they require field research.

Second Order Devolution

Although devolution to the states has been widely cited in describing welfare reform, the big story of welfare reform is not the states, it is local. Even in what are defined as state-administered welfare systems, we found major changes to devolve welfare and social program responsibilities to local entities.* This local devolution includes more than counties. In many states, new or relatively new regional entities now are responsible for welfare and related workforce services — second order devolution. One might be skeptical about this finding. By law, states over the years have assumed increased responsibility for welfare. Thirty-eight states now have what are legally “state-administered” welfare systems. The remaining states (including some very big ones — California, New York, and Ohio) have state supervised/county administered systems, under which states set policy goals, prescribe administrative arrangements, and provide funds, but the basic legal responsibility is at the county level.

The driving force behind second order devolution is intrinsic to the nature of the tasks involved. The 1996 shift to work first and a service strategy for welfare inexorably pushes decision making downward. This is because so much of what needs to be done to prevent welfare dependency and to keep people off of cash assistance has to be decided, arranged, and carried out locally. The biggest increase in discretion under the new regimes for welfare policy occurs at the point of contact between local case managers and the individual applicant or recipient.

In past periods in U.S. history, the idea that such discretion should be assigned to local workers was resisted. Reformers often complained

* In most states, welfare is both state supervised and also state administered. In other states, it is state supervised and county administered.

about harsh treatment by local agencies where poor people were treated badly, sometimes simply given “bus money” to leave town. If the kind of behavioral fine-tuning envisioned in the Personal Responsibility Act is to be achieved, however, there is no way to avoid assigning primary responsibility to local administrators and, most of all, to front-line case managers. As stressed earlier, this places a high premium on the development of information systems for case management to connect and track social program benefits and social services, and also for oversight and evaluation purposes.

Adaptability of the Research Process

In the way just cited and in others, field evaluation studies over the years have been adaptable in the sense of enabling findings to reflect institutional learning. As of the time of the writing of this book, many factors lead us to believe that the changes taking place in the late 1990s in welfare and job programs have staying power. The strong work orientation of the new welfare resonates with widely held beliefs by the majority of Americans about what welfare systems ought to do and emphasize. This may be the most lasting effect of the reforms, producing a new basis for political legitimacy that was lacking under AFDC. In effect, what we are seeing in many places is a shift in opinion to a new consensus about welfare systems with a more politically acceptable mission.

The second order devolution of welfare and job programs and the diversity we found in signaling and systems requires a similar devolution by researchers. For us, the critical independent variable institutionally is local “regimes,” not programs in the customary sense. By regimes, we mean combinations of values, signals, agency cultures and connections, and operational capacity. Future Rockefeller Institute implementation research on welfare reform will concentrate on local systems: Are social programs connected for TANF benefits, job services, food stamps, Medicaid, child support, child care, transportation, and related social and health services (such as those for substance abuse treatment, the prevention of family violence, mental health, and family planning)? Local systems in this way are a major independent variable. Research ingenuity then needs to be applied to use Census data (2000

fortuitously is a decennial census year), administrative data, available state studies, and other information about what is happening to poor and working poor families as crucial dependent variables.

Almost all states are now conducting their own studies, using both administrative records and survey data, to ascertain what is happening to people who leave the TANF rolls. A number of states are also studying what is happening to other populations — people on the rolls as long termers, the population diverted from cash-assistance reciprocity, and also what can be called (but is very hard to identify) the “deflected” population of eligible persons who are discouraged from applying for work-conditioned welfare benefits. Other research projects are also producing large data sets. Two of the major studies are sponsored by the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the Urban Institute, in the latter case focused on a representative sample of thirteen states.¹¹

Still, in the final analysis, there is a limit to what social scientists can know about the effects of so complex and diverse a phenomenon as the plethora of current welfare reforms. Albert Einstein once said: “I have little patience with scientists who take a board of wood, look for the thinnest part, and drill a great number of holes where the drilling is easiest.”¹² To evaluate program implementation in American federalism, the object should be to answer hard questions in as scientific a manner as possible; we should drill where the drilling is not easy. The purpose and argument of this book can be re-stated in these terms. Demonstration research can help politicians decide what to do for welfare reform. Then, after major decisions are made about new policies, two kinds of questions come into play: Were the new policies carried out? That is, did the program procedures and institutional systems change the way they were supposed to? And second, what were the effects of these changes on people? Like the sand of the sea, which the Prophet Hosea said, “can neither be measured or numbered,”¹³ there are limits to what we can learn in both respects. But we can learn a lot and in so doing aid the policy process.

Endnotes

- 1 Richard P. Nathan and Thomas L. Gais. *Implementing the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996: A First Look* (Albany, NY: The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, 1999).
- 2 John Burghardt, Anu Rangarajan, Anne Gordon, and Ellen Kisker, *Evaluation of the Minority Female Single Parent Demonstration. Volume I: Summary Report* (Princeton, NJ: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., October 1992), p. xiii.
- 3 Deborah A. Ellwood and Donald J. Boyd, *Changes in State Spending on Social Services Since the implementation of Welfare Reform: A Preliminary Report* (Albany, NY: The Nelson A Rockefeller Institute of Government, February 2000).
- 4 Irene Lurie, "Evaluating Welfare Reform," Department of Health and Human Services Administration for Children and Families, Office of Child Support Enforcement, Arlington, Virginia, May 11-13, 1999.
- 5 This quote and other references to findings for states contained in the Rockefeller Institute's field research sample are taken from Richard P. Nathan and Thomas L. Gais, *Implementing the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996*.
- 6 There is an overall four-year time limit for adults that further restricts them to not more than two years of benefits in any five-year period, with a three-year exception for long-term participants with limited job skills.
- 7 Irene Lurie, "Evaluating Welfare Reform," op cit., p. 27.
- 8 Richard P. Nathan and Thomas L. Gais, *Implementing the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996*, p. 17.
- 9 U.S. General Accounting office. *Welfare Reform: Improving State Automated Systems Requires Coordinated Federal Effort* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, April 2000), Report to Congressional Committee, GAO/HEHS-00-48. See also Terrence Maxwell, *Information Federalism: A History of Welfare Information Systems, Working Paper* (Albany, NY: The Nelson A Rockefeller Institute of Government, 1999).
- 10 Deborah A. Ellwood, and Donald J. Boyd. *Changes in State Spending on Social Services*.
- 11 The Census Bureau study is longitudinal, called the Survey of Program Dynamics. Information about the Urban Institute thirteen-state study can be obtained from its website. For a discussion of the role of these studies, see Peter Rossi, "Research on PRWORA and TANF: What Can Be Learned from Four Projects Currently Underway," paper presented at an AEI conference on "Child Well-Being Under Welfare Reform," Washington, DC, December 8-9, 1999.
- 12 As quoted in *Science News* 115 (March 31, 1979): 213.
- 13 *Old Testament*, Hosea 1:10.

Lessons from Evaluations of Employment and Training Programs

A major idea about public policy research advanced in this book is the need for multidisciplinary approaches. The field of employment and training research offers a good opportunity for examining this idea. Labor economists have played the strongest role in the design and conduct of evaluations of employment and training programs. In this chapter, I consider research both by economists and political scientists. I begin with the study conducted by the field network evaluation group at the Brookings Institution, which I directed, of the public service employment program established under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). This study produced a lively controversy about research methods.

The CETA Public Service Employment Program

The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act was enacted in 1973 in the form of a block grant as part of Nixon's "New Federalism" domestic program. Among other purposes, the aim of the law was to consolidate federal grants-in-aid in order to give greater discretion to state and local governments. Initially, most of the funds provided were for job training. Republicans resisted the idea, which many Democrats in Congress were advocating at the time, to provide funds for job creation.

Such a public service employment program was authorized as a title of the CETA law, but was funded at a very low level. Later, this public service employment program was expanded to combat the deep recession in 1974-75. Again, this was despite resistance from Republicans and from the Ford administration. As the recession deepened, however, spending for public service jobs was increased and Republican resistance subsided. This expansion of the public service jobs program occurred over three years from 1976 to 1978. The public employment program continued in effect until 1981, when it was eliminated under Ronald Reagan, who was vociferous in his criticism of this policy.¹

At its peak in April of 1978, the public service employment program employed over 750,000 people at an annual spending rate of \$7 billion. This made it by far the largest federal program in the employment and training field, and at the time one of the largest federal grant-in-aid programs to states and localities.* The expanded version of the public service employment program was an obvious target for Reagan's budget cutters in 1981; CETA job creation had few friends and lots of enemies when Reagan came into office and ended it.

In the usual way, the CETA job creation program of the late 1970s had multiple purposes which were not precisely stated or weighted. Among its major objectives were to provide jobs for the unemployed in recession periods; aid disadvantaged persons in developing skills and obtaining job experience; and assist state and local governments in providing needed public services. In 1976, when the public service employment program was reauthorized, Senator Henry L. Bellmon (R-OK) added an amendment to study an issue related to the first of these three objectives, job creation. The Bellmon amendment became the source of the interdisciplinary controversy featured in this chapter.

Senator Bellmon's concern was that public service jobs were being used by state and local governments to displace workers who would otherwise have been on state or city payrolls. Opponents of the public

* It was, however, smaller than the Works Progress Administration (WPA) of the Depression years, which at its peak employed three million people.

service jobs program charged that it was simply a hidden subsidy to state and local governments and that it did not really increase employment. Bellmon's amendment directed the National Commission for Employment Policy, a permanent research and advisory group chartered under federal law, to make a study of the "net employment effects" of the public service employment program. This commission, chaired by Eli Ginzberg, contracted with the Brookings Institution to conduct this research through a field evaluation study of the CETA public service jobs program. The study was initiated at Brookings, and was later completed at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.²

The choice by the National Commission for Employment Policy to adopt the field network evaluation approach is interesting. Previously, there had been a number of theoretical studies by labor economists of the displacement issue for public service employment programs. The research was done in the form of statistical modeling studies, using econometric techniques based on program, national economic, fiscal, and demographic data. A 1974 paper written for the U.S. Department of Labor by labor economist George Johnson reached the tentative conclusion that the job-displacement impact of a federally funded public service employment program would be very large — in fact that in the long run the displacement effect of grants-in-aid for public service job creation would absorb all, or nearly all, of the funds appropriated for this purpose.³

Johnson's econometric approach is not the only way to try to answer the hard-to-answer question about the job-displacement effects of public service employment grants to state and local governments. By contracting with the Brookings-based field network to conduct the study mandated under Senator Bellmon's amendment, the National Commission was bringing an alternative methodology to bear. Researchers refer to this as *triangulation*, conducting studies using different methods to see if their findings converge.

It was in this setting that the Brookings-based field network turned its attention in 1976 to evaluating the effects of public service employment. Thirty field researchers (in this case approximately

equally divided between economists and political scientists) conducted four rounds of field observations in forty state and local jurisdictions. The sample included three types of program sponsors: (1) large local units (over 100,000 population) that qualified as "local prime sponsors"; (2) consortia of local units designated as "local prime sponsors"; and (3) state governments responsible for administering CETA programs in "balance of state" areas. Within these jurisdictions, funds for job creation were channeled to thousands of public and nonprofit agencies, thus greatly expanding the screen for field analysis and requiring a sampling procedure for selecting the organizations for detailed analysis. The study jurisdictions at the time accounted for 10 percent of all enrollees in the CETA public service employment program.

The research design included a number of categories of effects. It was not limited to job displacement. It dealt with questions involving the fiscal effects of CETA job funds and also the types of jobs provided, the public services affected, structural matters involving the agencies that administered the program and their implementation processes, the training provided to participants, and the effect of these funds on nonprofit organizations, which sponsored many of the local programs.

As it turned out, the bottom-line finding of the Brookings-Princeton study of the job-displacement issue was very different from that made by George Johnson. His paper indicated a high (eventually total) job-displacement effect of the CETA public service employment program. By contrast, we found what many observers regarded as a surprisingly low level of job displacement.⁴ For the sample as a whole, approximately one-fifth of the positions studied were assigned by the field researchers, in consultation with the study's central staff, to job displacement. These findings were issued in a series of reports published by the National Commission for Employment Policy, and summarized in books, testimony, papers, and articles. These publications described the research methodology and provided illustrations, drawing on statements in the reports submitted by the field researchers regarding the kinds of determinations that were made in assigning the positions studied to the various employment effect categories used in this field research.

A number of reasons appeared to explain why local officials (most of these funds went to local governments) were reluctant to use public service employment funds for displacement. One reason, and it is a reason which I believe other experts in the field did not take seriously enough, is that the law prohibited displacement. A number of provisions in the law were intended to prevent it from occurring. A second reason for the relatively low level of displacement we found was that local officials in many cases shared the national objective of creating jobs to relieve unemployment.

In even more basic terms, however, field researchers reported that many officials in the study sites were reluctant to use these job creation funds for displacement because of the possible long-term consequences of doing so. These local officials had been burned before by federal policy changes. In the case of the CETA public employment program, there was an understandably high level of uncertainty about the future intentions of the federal government. A major concern on the part of local officials was that when this federal largesse was ended, or if the rules for its use were changed (both events in fact occurred), they would be left holding the bag. They would face strong political pressures to lay off local workers or to increase taxes in order to continue to pay employees who were being supported with CETA funds if they had used these funds for job displacement. This was a risk that most local officials simply did not want to take.

There was one important exception to this finding. In jurisdictions facing serious fiscal pressures (mainly economically distressed central cities in our sample), we found displacement to be higher than in other jurisdictions, which we attributed to the need, or at least the perceived need, to use every available dollar to maintain basic services.

Another important finding was that many public service positions were not filled by local governments or other public entities at all; they were instead suballocated to nonprofit organizations. Over time, an increasing percentage of these positions were contracted out to nonprofit (mostly community-based) organizations that provided social services and administered community development programs. In the first round of the field research, one-fourth of the positions accounted for in the

sample were subcontracted to nonprofit organizations; by the second round of the field research, this proportion had risen to nearly one-half.⁵

The reports we issued showing relatively low-level displacement were widely noted in the relevant policy communities because they were contrary to what many people (including some of the researchers in our field network) had expected. Two meetings about this controversy stand out in my memory. The first was with Senator Henry Bellmon. I was told by the staff of the National Commission for Employment Policy that he had read our initial report and that he wanted to talk to me about it. I was apprehensive, since Senator Bellmon had earlier indicated his opinion that CETA public service jobs funds were highly substitutive. At our meeting, and greatly to his credit in my opinion, Senator Bellmon said that, although he had been skeptical about our results when he first heard about them, after reading our report he was convinced by the conclusions and by our explanation about how we arrived at our findings.

The second memorable meeting at which the results of this research were discussed was arranged by the staff of the National Commission for Employment Policy to examine the two approaches used to analyze the net employment effects of the public service employment program. George Johnson and I were the speakers. The audience was relatively large for a meeting on research methods (about sixty people). It included both researchers and experts in the field of employment and training. True to academic style, this meeting featured a hot, intense debate about the competing research approaches. Those of us working on the field network evaluation study came away from this confrontation (not an inaccurate description) with a good feeling about the reaction to our presentation.

The “Complementarity” Approach

A major premise of the field evaluation approach as we have applied it over the years is that the choice among research methods is not an either/or proposition. In two of our studies — the public service jobs study and the earliest field evaluation we conducted, that of the

revenue sharing program discussed in the next chapter — members of the field research group conducted what we refer to as *complementary* statistical studies. In the case of the public service employment program, the results of the complementary statistical study, using a pooled time series approach, were published in the *Journal of Human Resources*, thus subjected to the scrutiny of academic peer reviewers.⁶ The idea of this complementarity approach was to use insights from the field research to build a better mousetrap for a statistical analysis. As it turned out, the high degree of subcontracting to nonprofit organizations under the CETA public service employment program made a substantial difference both in the field and in the statistical research we conducted.

The first step in conducting this complementary statistical analysis was to review the earlier econometric studies to identify lessons from the field research — in this case, especially the importance of subcontracting CETA public service jobs — that could cause distortion in a statistical analysis. In the early econometric studies, it was assumed that all of the CETA job creation funds allocated to a jurisdiction were paid as wages by that government. If, instead, some (maybe the bulk) of these funds were subcontracted to nonprofit organizations (or if they were suballocated to other public entities as was often the case, for example, to local school districts) this could have the effect of creating what appeared to be — but was not — a job-displacement effect in a statistical analysis.⁷

Another important aspect of the field research that was discovered while doing the statistical analysis involved the timing of the receipt and expenditure of CETA funds. Data from the U.S. Census of Governments did not fit well with the receipt-and-spending cycle for CETA job funds. It was found necessary to adjust for these timing differences in our statistical analysis. In the statistical study we conducted, this was done with the help of the Bureau of the Census, using unpublished worksheets from the Bureau that showed the actual receipt-and-spending cycle for CETA funds for the thirty municipal governments in our statistical analysis.⁸ Fortunately for us (or I wouldn't be making so much of the point), the results of the complementary statistical analysis tied to the field research turned out to be similar to those

found earlier in the field evaluation. The interdisciplinary approach used in this case involving economists and political scientists seemed to produce added value.

Studies of Individual Impacts under CETA

So far this chapter has described the fiscal effects of the CETA public service jobs program on jurisdictions.⁹ However, these effects on jurisdictions were not the foremost concern of most researchers and policymakers. The dominant concern was the impact of CETA programs on *individuals*. In this research arena, more than any other, the experience with studies of the impact of large ongoing programs shows that measuring their impact on individual participants is fraught with problems.

Several characteristics of both training and public service employment programs produce high research hurdles. One hurdle is the federalism barrier reef discussed earlier. Employment and training programs of the federal government have been in an almost constant state of flux for a very long time. The CETA law was succeeded in 1982 by the Job Training Partnership Act, which in turn was succeeded by the Workforce Investment Act in 1998. However, the important point is that the CETA block grants and all successor federal programs have been administered on a highly decentralized basis by state and local governments. This involves fifty states, thousands of localities, and literally hundreds of thousands of local agencies and nonprofit organizations. The data problems of such a program would give any self-respecting researcher indigestion, but this is not all.

Another problem of individual-impact research in this field is that these programs are so widespread (indeed, effectively universal) that politics mitigate against the use of research designs based on random assignment whereby some persons are assigned to a program and others to an untreated control group. It would have been extremely hard for even the most supportive CETA managers of public service employment programs at the local level to arrange to have a randomly selected, untreated control group under these conditions. As we have already seen, random assignment is not the only way to get at questions about what works for

individual participants in government programs, although it is the best way to do so. Without it, the results of studies are often unconvincing in part because of controversies about their methodology.

A third and related hurdle of evaluation research on the impact on individuals of federal grant-in-aid programs for job training is what might be called the "marginality problem." This was described earlier as the research hurdle of the null hypothesis. The typical CETA intervention (usually a job training program) was not that long or large. There is reason to question whether job training or job counseling services by themselves could have been expected to have a discernible, lasting impact on the lives of participants, that is, considering the great number of forces and factors (both public and private) that impinge on the way human beings develop and change in a technologically advanced society like ours.

In the 1970s, I served on the advisory committee for a large survey research project designed to evaluate the impact of CETA programs on individuals. It was called the Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey (CLMS), and was funded by the U.S. Department of Labor beginning in 1974. For the CLMS, the Labor Department contracted with the U.S. Bureau of the Census to have the Bureau survey a succession of cohort groups entering various components of CETA programs. Altogether, more than 6,000 people were included in this study. There was a baseline interview and in most cases four follow-up surveys for people in the sample.

But even after interviewing all these CETA participants, one faced the perennial question — *compared to what?* Observations about the experience of participants during and after CETA programs could not reveal the extent to which the programs did or did not assist them. There is value, of course, in knowing what CETA services were provided and what types of people received them. Still, it is reasonable to ask whether a research investment as large as this one should have been undertaken if these were the only research outputs. The advisory committee wrestled with the problems of establishing the counterfactual for this study, as did staffers of the Labor Department and the researchers with whom the Department contracted from the Westat Company of Rockville, Maryland.

The solution decided upon was to rely on data from existing files as the basis for comparison, mainly the Current Population Survey conducted by the Census Bureau, which in March of each year includes an enlarged sample on the employment experience of respondents. These data, however, are time limited. To obtain a longer time horizon, data from the Current Population Survey were linked with the earnings records of people in the CETA sample obtained from the U.S. Social Security Administration on a confidential basis. In this way, a "matched file" was constructed with characteristics similar to those of people in CETA programs.

Labor Department technical reports on this research were candid in discussing the drawbacks of this approach for establishing a comparison group. Contamination was one problem: There was no way of knowing whether the people in the matched file had received employment and training services. Furthermore, there was evidence that the Social Security earnings records (critical to the analysis, because earned income after the CETA program was the key outcome variable) did not include some types of earnings, for example, wage and salary payments to many state and local government employees and also federal government employees.

One of the early reports on the CLMS contains this depressing statement: "One simply cannot say at this time how comparable the comparison groups are to the participant groups in the absence of the CETA program."¹⁰ The Labor Department continued to try to work out the wrinkles, and some progress was made. Nevertheless, a report issued two years later on this study contains a caveat similar to that just quoted: "As in all program evaluations where it is not feasible to randomly assign potential participants to the program or to a control group, there is some uncertainty about the amount of selectivity bias in the estimates of net impact."¹¹ Other experts in the field were not so restrained.

When the Reagan administration won enactment of the successor program to CETA (the Job Training Partnership Act, JTPA) in 1982, an elaborate data collection system like the CLMS was designed as the basis for research on the impact of the JTPA program. But in the end, it

was decided not to use such data for research purposes. Instead, the U.S. Department of Labor decided to conduct studies with random assignment to ascertain the impact on individuals of JTPA services. The Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation was one of the organizations involved in this research. In sixteen areas around the country, MDRC along with Abt Associates studied 20,000 randomly assigned adults and out-of-school youth who applied for JTPA services and were assigned either to a treatment or control group.

Although called a national study, this is somewhat misleading as JTPA participants were not selected nationwide; they were chosen from the sixteen local sites willing to participate in this study, none of which were large cities. (The largest city included in the sample was Oakland, California, population 372,000.) Other barriers were that it was not possible for specific types of treatments to be tested rigorously, and school districts would not participate. Commenting on this effort to use randomization to evaluate an ongoing program, Cornell labor economist Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., said, "The problem is that this is a methodology only an economist could love." He added, "What it should be able to accomplish in principle is at variance with what it can accomplish in fact."¹²

The authors of the report on this study themselves came to the reluctant conclusion that the study design should not be replicated, noting that the first results from the national JTPA study were not available until six years after it was initiated, and also observing that it was "relatively burdensome to program staff in the study sites."¹³ Other problems were political. To the extent measurements could be made, they showed very small impacts, and in some cases differences between the treatment and control groups that were so small as to be insignificant. Youth groups in particular showed no long-term gains. Other groups did show gains, notably adult men and women. However, the overall tone of the discussion of the findings from this study was downbeat from the point of view of advocates of this public program. Government officials tried to explain away disappointing findings or to downplay them. When the dust had settled, it has to be said that this was not a good moment for applied social science.

Endnotes

- 1 The Reagan administration later replaced the training portion of the CETA law with a new block grant, mainly distributed to the states, called the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), and then still later, in 1998, it was replaced with the Workforce Investment Act, which stresses the creation of "one-stop" job centers. This has been an unsettled, changing area of domestic policy for a long time.
- 2 I moved to the Woodrow Wilson School as a faculty member in 1979.
- 3 George E. Johnson, "Evaluation Questions for the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973," Framework for Evaluation Paper No. 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Assistant Secretary for Policy, Evaluation, and Research, July 1974).
- 4 The design and findings of the Brookings study are summarized in Richard P. Nathan, Robert F. Cook, V. Lane Rawlins, et al., *Public Service Employment: A Field Evaluation* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981). For a later and fuller account, see Robert F. Cook, Charles F. Adams, Jr., and V. Lane Rawlins, *Public Service Employment: The Experience of a Decade* (Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1985). Four rounds of field research were conducted for this study: in July 1977, at the beginning of the Carter administration's expansion of the program; in December 1977, at the height of this enrollment buildup; in December 1979; and in December 1980.
- 5 See Nathan, Cook, et al., *Public Service Employment*, chapter 2.
- 6 Charles F. Adams, Jr., Robert Cook, and Arthur J. Maurice, "A Pooled Time Series Analysis of the Job-Creation Impact of Public Service Employment Grants to Large Cities," *Journal of Human Resources* (1983): 283-94.
- 7 Later statistical studies of the intergovernmental effects of the CETA public service employment program corrected for this factor. See Lauri J. Bassi and Alan Fechter, "The Implications for Fiscal Substitution and Occupational Displacement under Expanded CETA Title VI," Technical Analysis Paper No. 65 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Evaluation, and Research, March 1979).
- 8 This research had to be limited to relatively large municipal governments because Census Bureau worksheets were only available for these jurisdictions.
- 9 For examples of the implementation studies, see Grace A. Franklin and Randall B. Ripley, *CETA: Politics and Policy, 1973-1982* (Knoxville, TN:

- University of Tennessee Press, 1984); and William Mirengoff and Lester Rindler, *The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act: Impacts on People, Places, Programs, an Interim Report* (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1976).
- 10 "Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey: The Impact of CETA on Participant Earnings," Working Paper No. 2, Entrants during the First Half of 1975 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, June 1980, prepared by Westat, Inc., Rockville, MD), p. xviii.
 - 11 "Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey," Net Impact Report No. 1, Supplement No. 1, "The Impact of CETA on 1978 Earnings: Participants in Selected Program Activities Who Entered CETA during Fiscal Year 1976" (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, July 1982, prepared by Westat, Inc., Rockville, MD), pp. 1-3.
 - 12 Vernon M. Briggs Jr. review of "Does Training for the Disadvantage Work? Evidence from the National JTPA Study," by Larry Orr, Howard S. Bloom, et al., *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 50, no. 3 (April 1997): 531.
 - 13 Larry Orr, Howard S. Bloom, et al., "Does Training for the Disadvantaged Work? Evidence from the National JTPA Study." An Abt Associates Study (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press, 1996) p. 23. Commenting on the scope of the study, Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., said: "It is hard to understand how any evaluation of this type of public policy initiative can boast of being a 'national' study if it does not include any major city in its scope," in *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, p. 530.

The Beginning of the Field Network Evaluation Methodology

This penultimate chapter, which continues the consideration of the field network methodology, is out of sequence chronologically in order to preserve the flow of the narrative on welfare reform issues and studies. The chapter deals with the first program evaluated using the field evaluation methodology, the general revenue sharing program enacted in 1972. The program is gone now. It is of interest for the book because of the way the early decisions were made about how to conduct this type of study.

Federal revenue sharing was enacted under President Nixon to provide general purpose grants-in-aid (\$5.3 billion per annum initially) to state governments and some 39,000 city, county, and township governments, and Native-American Tribes. I had been involved in the design and enactment of revenue sharing as assistant director of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget during the first term of the Nixon administration. I had previously chaired the transition task force in 1968 that recommended a revenue sharing program to the new administration.

Revenue sharing was the keystone of Nixon's "New Federalism" domestic policy. The program was in existence fourteen years until it was ended in 1986 under the Reagan administration. Altogether, the program paid out nearly \$80 billion over the fourteen years of its

existence. Only Gerald Ford among Nixon's successors fully supported the program. Neither Carter nor Reagan (despite the fact both were former governors, or maybe because of this) shared Nixon's enthusiasm for the revenue sharing idea. Under Carter, state governments were eliminated as aid recipients (up to then they received one-third of the total amount of money distributed), and under Reagan the remaining shared revenue payments to local governments were ended.

When it was enacted in 1972, supporters of the revenue sharing program backed it for a number of reasons. Some saw it, as Nixon did, as an instrument of decentralization. Nixon frequently complained, using conventional Republican rhetoric, about the fragmentation and complexity of the federal grant-in-aid system. Its many hundreds of categorical grant-in-aid programs were seen as undermining the priority-setting processes of state and local governments and weakening their role vis-à-vis what was perceived as the increasingly intrusive role of the federal government in domestic affairs. Many Democrats, too, criticized the rigidities of categorical federal grant programs in this period. Walter W. Heller, a Democrat who supported revenue sharing as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors during the early years of the Johnson administration, urged President Johnson to adopt this idea. Heller, always a great phrasemaker, referred to the federal grant-in-aid system as suffering from "hardening of the categories."

The answer for Nixon to the problem of multiple program categories was to change the form of federal grants, adopting two types of grant-broadening instruments — revenue sharing and block grants. Revenue sharing was essentially unrestricted aid to state and local governments. Block grants, which still exist, are flexible grants in a broad functional area, allocated on a formula basis. Nixon first proposed revenue sharing in 1969 at the relatively meager level, by Washington standards, of \$500 million per year. This was not enough to get Congress's attention, so in January 1971, in a State of the Union message devoted almost exclusively to domestic affairs, Nixon upped the ante. He proposed an \$11 billion combined program of revenue sharing and block grants — \$5 billion per year for revenue sharing and \$6 billion in block grants. (Total federal spending for grants-in-aid to

states and localities at this time was \$34 billion; total federal spending was \$231 billion.)

Nixon's 1971 federal aid initiatives were estimated to increase total aid by 25 percent. "The time has come," he argued, "to reverse the flow of power and responsibilities from the States and communities to Washington, and start power and resources flowing from Washington to States and localities and, more important, to the people, all across America. . . . I reject the patronizing idea that government in Washington, D.C., is inevitably more wise, more honest and more efficient than government at the state and local level."¹ Most of the funds for Nixon's proposed block grants were obtained from consolidating existing categorical grants into broader programs, with some additional funds added called "sweeteners." Nixon's two most important block grants, both of which were enacted, were for employment and training and for community development.

Unlike the earlier and much smaller revenue sharing plan Nixon had put forward, his new and enriched \$5 billion-per-year version of revenue sharing did get people's attention. It activated state and local officials to lobby for this initiative. In 1972, in the midst of Nixon's re-election campaign, revenue sharing was enacted. The President journeyed to Philadelphia to sign the law in the presence of a large group of state and local government officials, and claimed that revenue sharing would "renew" the American federal system.² The first payments were made just before Election Day.

Soon after this legislation was enacted, officers of the Ford Foundation approached the Brookings Institution to propose that Brookings conduct an evaluation of this program. It is interesting to look at the questions faced in taking up this research challenge, which of course you have to do when the Ford Foundation or another big foundation comes calling. The key and underlying question was: What difference did it make to have this new and more flexible fiscal flow from the national government to states and localities? Brookings formed a research team, which I headed, to consider this. From the outset, we decided that an evaluation of the revenue sharing program should focus on two main types of effects: (1) those that emerged as the most prominent effects in

the implementation of revenue sharing; and (2) those effects (whether prominent or not) that were important to politicians because they were strongly reflected in the goals of the new program. The second type of effect is particularly hard to deal with. In textbooks on research methods, readers are told that step one in an evaluation study is to clearly define a program's objectives. Yet in the case of the revenue sharing program, as for a great many other public programs, there was not agreement among policymakers on the goals of the program.

In addition to Nixon's goal of decentralization, supporters of the revenue sharing program stressed its role in achieving other goals. Among those purposes were: (1) providing fiscal relief to local governments; (2) equalizing fiscal capacity among states and localities; (3) providing new funds to deal with important public sector needs; (4) serving as a stimulus to innovation on the part of recipient state and local governments; (5) stabilizing and reducing state and local taxes, particularly the property tax; and (6) altering the nation's overall tax system, putting more emphasis on income taxation (predominantly federal) as opposed to property and sales taxes.

Which of these goals should be featured in an evaluation? How should these goals (seven in all) be defined and weighed? Views of the various players in the policy process differed. In fact, the same players often emphasized different objectives at different times. Moreover, even if we could have assigned weights to all of the goals of revenue sharing on the basis of a close reading of the legislation and the legislative debates, this would not have been enough. Ideas about policy goals change all the time. The ultimate decision about the success or failure of a program depends on the way these goals are regarded by a particular person or group at a particular point in time.

Two other important factors complicated this picture. One was the fact that the program was *universal*. Every state and some 39,000 local governments received a share of the funds according to a distribution formula stipulated in the law. There was no way to use states and cities that did not receive revenue sharing funds as a comparison group for research purposes. Compounding this challenge was the federalism barrier reef. Tremendous variation exist in the structure of the state and

local governments that received shared revenue, and also in the ways these jurisdictions defined and carried out their functions and kept their financial accounts.

The Research Approach

We decided to base our evaluation of revenue sharing on parallel and connected, uniformly structured case studies of a representative sample of state and local governments. The field research was conducted by an interdisciplinary group, ultimately thirty-two on-the-scene academic social scientists (political scientists and economists in roughly equal numbers) serving on a part-time contractual basis as field researchers.

Four broad categories were used to define the program effects to be studied — fiscal, programmatic, institutional, and distributional. The distributional effects of revenue sharing were studied centrally at the Brookings Institution in Washington, based on demographic and financial data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census and program data from the Department of the Treasury, which was responsible for administering the revenue sharing program. The analysis of the three other types of effects (fiscal, programmatic, and institutional) was done by the researchers in the field. Researchers in sixty-five state and local governmental jurisdictions (including one large Native-American Reservation) spent on average of thirty days on this study for each of three rounds of field observations. Before each round, the field evaluators participated in a research conference at Brookings at which the central staff and field researchers discussed the conceptual framework and the research plan for that round of field observation. The aim of these conferences was to have all of the members of the field research group on the same wavelength.

Field researchers submitted *their* analysis for each round of observations. The reports consisted of answers to both closed-ended and open-ended questions according to a standard reporting format. Field researchers drew on state and local records and reports, and interviewed key participants in the decision making processes regarding the state and local use of revenue sharing funds.

It needs to be stressed that the analysis of the effects of revenue sharing was done by the field researchers. It was not based on the answers to closed-ended survey-type questions asked of particular state and local public officials, although other studies of the effects of the revenue sharing program used this survey-research approach. The Brookings central staff for this study reviewed and combined the analyses made by the field researchers into summary research reports. The draft reports were circulated for comments to the field researchers; it was very much a group effort. The sample for the study included eight state governments, twenty-nine municipalities, twenty-one counties, six townships, and one Indian Reservation. It overrepresented larger jurisdictions. Overall, the sample jurisdictions accounted for about 20 percent of the total funding of the revenue sharing program. The research was longitudinal. It began soon after the first revenue sharing checks were received by states and localities and continued for the same jurisdictions over six years.

The decision to start out quickly in the field research turned out to be a wise one. Although there was a temptation to devote more time to research design, we expected that the period in which the initial payments of revenue sharing funds were made would be the time when the decision making processes regarding the use of revenue sharing funds would be easiest to observe.

The Brookings study combined two methods, field research and a complementary statistical analysis.* Although the focus was on institutions (recipient state and local governments) as opposed to the effects of shared revenue on individual citizens, the research challenge was the same. We needed to model the counterfactual in order to determine what would have happened in the absence of revenue sharing so that we could draw conclusions about the effects of this new form of federal aid. This analysis, as noted, was done by the field researchers; the evaluation, like the program itself, was decentralized. In essence, field researchers modeled the counterfactual in that most powerful of all computers, the human brain. This modeling process used many

* This complementary field and statistical approach was also used in field evaluation of the public service employment program described in the previous chapter.

variables in elaborate ways. These were in effect similarly structured case studies integrated by the central staff into a combined analysis. This was not a new methodology for program evaluation research, but its extensive use in this and later studies did constitute a departure for evaluation research on the effects of U.S. domestic programs.

The central staff reviewed each field report. We did not change the assessments made by the field researchers without consulting them about the possible reasons for modifying their findings. In most cases, collegial relationships obtained. The role of the central staff was to elicit the reasoning behind the analytical findings made by the field researchers in order to make certain, to the best of our ability, that the group as a whole (all of the field researchers and the central staff) were using a similar analytical framework and approach across the sample. Other methods were used for checking the field analyses. One check involved changes in the assignments of the field researchers. In some instances, field researchers moved or were unable to continue to work on this study. Two field researchers died during the first round of this study.*

Our use of the field network evaluation approach was based on what I believe is the most sensible way to take into account the basic federalism terrain. One cannot unravel state and local decision making processes about the use of a fiscal subvention without collecting observations from the field. Field reports prepared in this way are much more detailed than the statistics that are available on state and local finances. The U.S. Census Bureau collects state and local financial, program, and employment data; however, they are not sufficiently detailed and comparable with respect to the way grant-in-aid funds are treated or with respect to the techniques and time periods used for accounting for them by different state and local jurisdictions. To study the effects at the margin of a program like revenue sharing, we needed a more sensitive

* Fortunately, this did not happen in any of the other field network evaluations. Transfers of responsibility for the state and local field research for other reasons (e.g., people moving or on sabbatical) did provide a check on the findings and the consistency of the application of the research methodology for some jurisdictions.

data-collection methodology that permitted researchers to probe about fiscal and program effects of this new subvention.

In addition to the field research, later when statistical data became available on state and local finances for the period during which we conducted the revenue sharing field research, a group of the researchers who participated in this study undertook a statistical analysis of the fiscal effects of the program on a complementary basis where the two research methods were closely connected.

Knowledge obtained in the field on the workings of the revenue sharing program enabled the researchers doing the statistical analysis to conduct a statistical study that took into account the nature and limitations of national data on state and local finances. The method used for this complementary statistical analysis was to apply regression equations comparing revenue and expenditure patterns before and after revenue sharing funds were received in order to make inferences about the uses of shared revenue, with observations from the field research guiding this analysis. As it turned out, the complementary statistical study of the fiscal effects of shared revenue was limited to major cities because of data availability considerations, in this case involving data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census. This part of our research, which was conducted as a special study for the U.S. Treasury Department and vetted with public finance experts, yielded findings in line with those from the field research.

A practical point about the advantage of using these two approaches together concerns the timing of program evaluations. Statistical studies of new national programs like revenue sharing, even under the best of circumstances, almost always involve a substantial time lag before the needed national data become available. In this case, this meant that the statistical research results were not completed in time for their consideration in relation to the Congressional schedule for legislative reauthorization.

On an overall basis, timing considerations had a significant bearing on the publication and use of our revenue sharing research. The initial findings from this field evaluation were published in books, articles,

and papers and presented in Congressional testimony early in 1975.³ The original revenue sharing law expired at the end of 1975, so the congressional renewal process was just getting under way as these findings were becoming available. In the House of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Operations, which had jurisdiction over the revenue sharing program, began hearings in June 1974. In the Senate, where jurisdiction for this program was assigned to the Finance Committee, hearings were held in April of the following year. Brookings researchers testified at both hearings. In the House, we previewed our findings. By the time the Senate hearings began, the first Brookings book on this research was available.

A major point that emerged early in the discussion of the effects of revenue shared involved the *fungibility* of shared revenue: All dollars are green. Federal grant-in-aid dollars are very hard to trace. The law required that these funds be assigned to certain spending categories enumerated in the law (for example, public safety, environmental protection, transportation, health, social services). We found, however, that these categories had little effect on recipient behavior — sometimes no effect. These “official” designations of the uses of shared revenue, which were compiled and published by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in the early program years, were highly political, and in our view, and also that of the U.S. General Accounting Office, illusory. We found that because many local officials regarded police protection to be a popular area of governmental activity, they perceived political benefits from officially assigning revenue sharing dollars to public safety. However, in such cases our field researchers often determined that the effect of this infusion of federal aid funds was very different from what was officially reported.

For local officials especially (two-thirds of this money went to localities) grant-in-aid revenue is received from many federal and state sources, including in this period the revenue sharing program. In setting priorities, local officials could allocate broad-gauged revenue sharing dollars to any function they wanted for purposes of reporting to the federal Treasury, as long as they had spent at least that amount on that function. So, if they felt police protection, as stated above, to be a popular function that would appeal to constituents and to the Congress as a use

of shared revenue, they could report that they used their shared revenue for the police. But did they actually use the funds this way? That is, was this extra money actually used for more policing? That was a question we asked our field researchers to answer, using a uniform analytical framework to report in the best way they could and with a detailed justification of their analysis. Over time, we developed increasingly better, and we felt more sensitive, ways for explaining fungibility in relation to the use of revenue sharing funds. In our opinion, the official data from the U.S. Treasury Department on the uses of shared revenue, based on the approved spending categories listed in the law, were misleading. A consensus emerged on this point, and as a result the official reporting categories were dropped in the first renewal of revenue sharing legislation.

Basically, shared revenue could be used for new purposes or to offset tax cuts, that is, substituting this money for what would otherwise have been raised through taxation. If the funds were used for substitution purposes (also called fiscal displacement), another question arose: In what types of jurisdictions was this most likely to occur? And why? Likewise, to the extent shared revenue was used for new-spending purposes, policymakers wanted to know what kinds of new purposes.

Although the aim of this chapter is to describe the rationale of the field network methodology, several points about the findings are useful here. Substitution effects were not found to be widespread in our research. One-time (often capital) expenditures dominated the new-spending effects. We determined that the reason for this was that government officials, especially local officials of smaller jurisdictions, were leery of absorbing this new aid money into their regular finances. They feared, and rightly so, that someday the federal government would turn off the water. They did not want to have to raise taxes or lay off regular employees when this happened, so they tried to keep shared revenue separate from other revenue. A good way to do this was to build something. Since many politicians have an "edifice complex," revenue sharing turned out to be good for them in these terms.

Despite the fact that our sample was stratified and not random, and despite the fact that we based our findings on field analyses that could

not easily be replicated, we were able to present findings in ways that helped policymakers understand the effects of the revenue sharing program in the diverse and fragmented setting of American federalism. In every situation, we tried to be as clear as possible about our research method — its strengths and its limitations.

Other studies of the revenue sharing program were also conducted, several of them under the auspices of the National Science Foundation (which also provided support for the Brookings research) and the U.S. General Accounting Office.⁴ The other approaches used in the evaluation studies of revenue sharing were: (1) surveys of state and local officials; and (2) statistical studies that compared the post-revenue sharing experience with a counterfactual established through econometric modeling.

Researchers using the three different methodologies, as is to be expected, had strong opinions about the weaknesses of approaches other than their own. I am no exception. I particularly have reservations about the use of self-reported survey data in this kind of setting. State and local officials have many options about what they could report as their use of this federal aid. Under such conditions, they are likely to tell researchers what they think the U.S. Congress or their constituents want to hear, whether or not that represents the way federal aid funds actually affected the finances of their government. The behavior, which is not unreasonable, bears out a statement by former New York Yankees catcher Yogi Berra that is a good axiom for studying governmental behavior in a setting as fluid and complex as American federalism. Said Berra: “You can observe a lot just by watching.”⁵

Endnotes

- 1 The President’s State of the Union Address Delivered before a Joint Session of the Congress, January 22, 1971. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 7, no. 4, Monday, January 25, 1971 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), pp. 92, 94.
- 2 The President’s Remarks Upon Signing the Bill Providing State and Local Fiscal Assistance in a Ceremony at Independence Hall in Philadelphia. October 20, 1972. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 8, no. 43, Monday, October 23, 1972 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 1536.

- 3 See Richard P. Nathan, Allen D. Manvel, et al., *Monitoring Revenue Sharing* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1975). See also Richard P. Nathan, Charles F. Adams, Jr., et al., *Revenue Sharing: The Second Round* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1977).
- 4 For a discussion of other studies, see Nathan and Manuel, chapter 12.
- 5 Yogi Berra et al., *The Yogi Book: "I Really Didn't Say Everything I Said"* (New York: Workman Publishing, 1998).

PART IV

CONCLUSIONS

Public Policy and Policy Research: Limits and Possibilities

Demonstration studies to test new policy ideas and evaluation studies to assess the effects of ongoing public programs can focus on the same units of analysis — individuals, groups of individuals, communities, and various different kinds of institutions and organizations. However, demonstration studies are best suited to the first two types of units of analysis — individuals or groups of individuals — although it is necessary (indeed essential) in demonstration research also to know a great deal about program operations, that is, the institutional behavior of a public program being tested. It does not make sense to test for the outcomes on individuals of a particular new public policy or major program departure if researchers do not know a great deal about how it operates.

Evaluation Research — The Frontier of Applied Social Science

My special interest in this book is in evaluation research on the implementation of ongoing programs. Once a new policy or program has been adopted, politicians are likely to be especially interested in its implementation. This is particularly the case in American federalism, as in any decentralized governmental setting. The experience of the field network evaluation studies of program implementation shows the

importance of this point in the welfare field. We found that the Family Support Act of 1988 was not implemented aggressively or effectively, and on the other hand that the institutional effects of the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996 have been pervasive, deep, and fundamental.

This distinction between evaluation and demonstration research has important implications both for policy research and for public policy. Public policies can be of two main types: Governments can attempt to influence the *society* — that is, to influence how people in the society think, feel, and view the world. They can also attempt to cause public agencies and other organizations to take actions that change *individual behavior*. Many public policies have both types of purposes, and the lines between them can be blurred.

Welfare policies send signals. They seek to transmit values in the society and to change the way responsibilities to meet needs are viewed and treated. They also direct public agencies to impinge in particular ways on people's lives. Put in the most basic terms, public policies can touch the human spirit and they can touch a human life. They often seek to do both. They seek to achieve both societal effects and individual outcomes without being explicit about which types of goals are paramount or how they are to be weighted and related.

Many public policy researchers care very much (sometimes totally) about having crisp, clear measures of the effects of public policies on individuals. Policy researchers on the other hand tend to be less interested in the effects of public policies on societal values and institutional behavior. But the catch is that the way a public policy affects institutional behavior, though elusive, has to be understood for the purpose of measuring its effects on individuals treated as research subjects.

Realistic, well-designed evaluation studies can assess, although generally not definitively, the effects of complicated and often imprecise governmental actions where the aim is to assess their effects on societal values and institutional behavior. But they cannot easily assess — sometimes they cannot assess at all — whether such a public policy once adopted has caused a certain effect in the life of a particular individual or family. For example, teaching Johnny or Jane to read and act

responsibly as a citizen by influencing school districts and schools is an important purpose of political actors for many education policies. But not every political action done in the name of such a purpose is translatable into actions by school districts and schools that can be defined precisely, treated as an independent variable, and measured in terms of its effects on an individual child.

Public policies operate in complex, noisy environments in which a great many factors are also operating. Tightly specified causal analyses of policy effects, no matter how desirable, often simply are not possible to undertake. What I am concerned about is that despite this situation, many policy researchers reject inferences about causality that are not based on rigorous, often only randomized, policy research. The perfect should not be the enemy of the good.

As we have seen in the discussion of demonstration research in Part II of this book, even under the best of conditions, the real world environment in which demonstration studies are carried out to test new public policies presents many hurdles to the specification of treatment and control groups in a social experiment. Moreover, because of the complexity of the environment in which they operate, many social experiments show only modest results compared to what the advocates of a tested new policy seek to achieve. In chapter 2, I referred to an article by two policy researchers, Gary Burtless and Robert H. Haveman, who reviewed three social experiments and reflected on the modest results obtained. They concluded dourly, "if you advocate a particular policy reform or innovation, do not press to have it tested."¹

My concern is that the overemphasis of public policy researchers on individual, as opposed to institutional effects, loads the deck against government. It does so because it does not acknowledge that institutional and signaling effects can change values in pervasive ways that touch the human spirit greatly, but touch individual lives much less discretely and discernibly. This point about signals changing attitudes and thus affecting institutional and individual behavior indirectly is a strong theme in social science. Economists emphasize theories about signaling. Indeed, John Maynard Keynes stressed this psychological dimension for understanding how economies fare and function.

Welfare is by no means unique among areas of public policy in which value changes and changes in institutional behavior are intrinsic to what politicians are seeking to accomplish. In the post-World War II period, civil rights legislation has been the most notable area of American legislative reform in the field of domestic policy. Yet, civil rights laws are not instrumental in the micro-sense whereby politicians are trying to change individual behavior in precise and specific ways. Civil rights laws seek to change the way institutions behave — the labor market, governments, private accommodations, schools, and the electoral system.

While there is a large literature on civil rights policy, there was not in the period of the civil rights revolution in America a large amount of social science research on how and how much institutional change occurred in response to civil rights laws and policies. There are historical and advocacy literatures about civil rights in America, but perhaps because the research terrain is so amorphous, the sponsors and leaders of public policy research did not gravitate to this area the way they have to studies of more finely tuned social programs that appear to lend themselves to the application of statistical methods and random assignment to study individual outcomes.

In the case of civil rights, the impetus for change can be said to be liberal in the way that word is commonly used. Returning to the education policy used earlier for illustrative purposes, there has been a similar strong (although historically not as consequential) effort recently to reform schools and school systems. Here, too, the push has been to change values and institutional behavior, although in this case much of the recent hard charging has been done by conservatives. By advocating charter schools and vouchers, reformers seek to change education as an enterprise. Their aim, often explicit, has been to create competitive pressures by dint of their support for alternatives to public education so that the educational industry as a whole is stimulated to raise standards.

The best measure of the success of charter schools and vouchers is not whether a single student does better over a lifetime of earnings than a student educated in a conventional public school. This may be a test we would like to apply, but for the sophisticated school reformer it would not be the most sensible one, or even a sufficient one. The real

test is whether the enterprise of education is infused with a new spirit of competitiveness to raise standards of excellence.

In short, the mindset of randomized experimental studies is useful and good, but its attractiveness to social scientists has caused many participants in governmental policy-making to view many policies too narrowly. Evaluation studies of the institutional effects of ongoing public programs may not be glitzy to social science researchers who like to use their latest statistical bells and whistles. Nevertheless, such studies are of great value to politicians who want to know if and how their new policies got implemented. Hard as it is to change reward systems for large and multifaceted undertakings such as applied social science in government, I think the public would be well served by trying to do this.

Many activities of governments in the United States could be made more effective if we knew more about what happened to public policies after they were adopted: Did they get implemented in the ways they were supposed to in terms of changed signals and changed organizational structures, institutional behavior, and administrative processes? My essential argument is that this type of social science knowledge-building (both quantitative and qualitative and involving multiple social science disciplines) should have more standing for public policy research and public policy researchers. Significant benefits could flow from this in many fields. The signaling, institutional, and administrative effects of efforts to reform public welfare, public schools, hospitals and health systems, and child care and child welfare systems, to name just a few examples, are all cases in which sophisticated, independent public policy research to evaluate the performance of institutions could enhance the nation's governance capacity and enrich our understanding of the operations of America's governments and American federalism.

The Demand for Policy Research

The focus of most of the discussion in this book has been on the supply side of public policy research, describing and comparing certain kinds of applications of social science to social policy. I shift in this final section

to the demand side. Two main types of institutions — governments and foundations — are the main sponsors and funders of public policy research. Both have turf to protect and purposes to advance that are rooted in politics, although different kinds of politics. In this consideration of the demand for public policy research, the discussion again is organized according to three types of applied social science — demonstration studies to test potential new policies, evaluation studies to assess the effects of ongoing public policies, and studies of conditions and trends.

Demonstration Studies. I have already stated a preference for service-type demonstrations as opposed to demonstration studies of the effects of income maintenance programs, or similar universal entitlements. But even in the former case of service-type programs, I believe demonstration research should be selective. Demonstration studies are best suited to situations in which three conditions apply: Politicians and administrators are genuinely interested in a particular goal; there is a lack of consensus on how best to achieve it; and there is a willingness to devote the time and resources necessary for finding out about the effects of preferred policy approaches. Random assignment, which is the favored approach of most demonstration researchers, has the special advantage in such situations of helping (or at least making it easier) to factor out bias in the conduct of demonstration studies.

Generally, it is governments that sponsor and pay for demonstration research. For example, in the case of the supported work demonstration, the first demonstration study conducted by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, it was the Ford Foundation that launched this ship, but it floated on federal money. The negative income tax and other demonstration studies of income maintenance programs conducted in the fields of health, housing, and education were paid for almost entirely by the federal government.

State governments and sometimes local governments and foundations also undertake projects to test new program ideas. Note the use of the word “projects,” as opposed to studies, in the last sentence. By this, I mean to convey the idea that sometimes demonstrations are not so much a test of what works as an effort to prove that something does work. For social scientists, this can produce a dilemma: Should social scientists

help to bring as much expertise as possible to bear in such projects, or should they restrict their activities to well designed, genuine, and independent pilot studies of programs and major new program approaches? My inclination is for social scientists to get involved, but not to conduct research or to sign and issue reports, unless there is a willingness on the part of the sponsors of demonstration projects to be scientific and nonpolitical about the results achieved and the methods used.

Increasingly, public policy experts trained in university graduate schools of public affairs are the people who play the key roles on both sides of this transaction. They serve as government and foundation officials responsible for sponsoring demonstration research and they also serve as public policy researchers. They both do applied social science and sponsor it, in which latter role they have a big hand in determining what kind of public policy research is conducted. People trained primarily in economics have played the main roles in applying social science to social policy, and tend to dominate public policy education. But, as I argue, while economists should be credited for this, there is a need for a broadened disciplinary perspective in order to add other social science disciplines and researchers — sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, and ethnographers — to the teams conducting demonstration research studies. This is done in some demonstration studies, but needs to be done more widely and more actively.

Two important topics also need to be considered here — access to data and the problem of squishy research. I learned from the experience of the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation that months, even years, can be taken up working out study designs and getting them adopted, and even then that problems can occur in getting access to needed data. Sometimes a plan for a demonstration study aborts because the political stars are not aligned; government officials decide, for whatever reason, to prevent access to needed data. The best course of action in dealing with such situations is to be up-front and to avoid the political thicket when it is just too thick. It is in the interest both of the sponsors of applied social science and of policy researchers to avoid situations in which the results of demonstration research will not be credible. This is not to say that agencies and advocates should or could be prevented from using whatever data are available and making claims

that a program works or doesn't work. However, government officials in the field of policy research and social scientists should try — and this is hard to do — to make a distinction between situations in which an independent and scientific test of a new policy or program idea is feasible and those in which politics operate in ways that make it unwise to invest in attempting to do this.

The word “research” cannot be patented. There are lots of reports called “research” written by individuals and groups that are not seeking to answer a question, but rather to advance a particular point of view. This is “advocacy research.” It is a cousin to policy analysis, but I believe it is distinct from good policy analysis. Advocacy studies (both research and policy analysis projects) have a role to play. It concerns me, however, when advocacy studies are cited too easily and authoritatively as “research” in the media where quick answers and easy-to-describe arguments are always needed.

Evaluation Studies. Evaluation research, which is highlighted in this book, is harder to deal with than demonstration research when it comes to the problem of studies called “research” that aren't legitimately such. The tendency to claim success for an ongoing public program, or that the other side's program is a failure, is common in political discourse — very common. Evaluation studies that are legitimate research undertakings require sponsors and researchers who are credible and seen as such. Sophisticated as they may be, government officials who have a stake in their programs may not be able to resist asking researchers: “Really, tell me if my program is working.” Even without intending to do so, they may be saying, “Tell me what is good about my program and how to make it better.”

One solution is to have outside organizations (that is, outside of the agency involved or outside of government altogether) evaluate an ongoing program. This can include oversight agencies such as the U.S. General Accounting Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Congressional Research Service. Although it is often the case that within operating agencies, research offices lack adequate political insulation, officials in such positions (i.e., heading agency research offices) frequently feel compelled to show their independence by sponsoring

evaluations that are unbiased. But this is not easy. It is very hard for organizations that *do* things also to *assess* them.

Even when outside organizations conduct evaluations, the politics of policy research can be hard going. To stay in business, a research organization (public or private) has to generate a steady flow of income. This requires a delicate balance in order to have a critical mass of support for the work one wants to do and at the same time maintain a high level of scientific integrity.

Outside evaluators are of three types — university research centers, independent think tanks, and private companies. The first two (universities and think tanks) receive grants from foundations, governments, and sometimes from corporations, whereas profit-making companies typically do not receive grants, although they do compete under “requests for proposals.” As opposed to government research offices, foundations as the sponsoring agencies of public policy research often and understandably seek to use their (at least in their view) “limited” resources to change things rather than to study them. The special plea I would make to foundation grant officers is that applied social science of the type recommended in this book — *action research* — can help them. To change the world, it is often necessary as a first step to understand it.

The three types of research organizations are pulled in different directions. University-based social scientists interested in conducting applied research often have a hard time coexisting with their academic colleagues whose main interest is in theory building and who often eschew applied work. Think tanks, on the other hand, are not all of one genre. They are varied in their character. Some are advocacy organizations. Others are dedicated to independent inquiry. But even for the latter group of research-oriented think tanks, they often get (and sometimes want to be) co-opted — that is, positioned to reflect a certain point of view and set of values about the areas in which they conduct demonstration or evaluation studies. As for private corporations that conduct governmental research, their stockholders may not care about the purposes of the programs being evaluated, but they may find the often specialized and elaborate requirements of scientific inquiry incompatible with a corporation’s other lines of business.

We need to look at the pluses and minuses of each of these three auspices. On the plus side, universities are likely to attract intellectually strong, creative social science researchers and to have inexpensive support personnel (students). Think tanks can be more specialized, hiring people with just the right subject-area background and research skills for a particular line of research, but they may not be as grounded intellectually in social science as university researchers. Private companies, on the other hand, can be more cost-consciously competitive and may have a somewhat easier time being apolitical, or at least not being as much affected by policy preferences as nonprofit policy researchers.

On the minus side, universities are difficult environments for managing undertakings like a large evaluation study. As already stated, the leading scholars in the pertinent academic departments often and understandably resist being pulled, or having their junior colleagues and students pulled, into applied tasks. The downside for think tanks, again as already suggested, is that they may have difficulty attracting and retaining highly qualified lead social science researchers for studies, not so much as consultants and advisors, but as the crucial experts that give cohesion and character to their enterprise. Another downside factor for think tanks is that in recent years policy experts at some think tanks with ostensible research missions have tended to yield to the temptation to engage too often in op-ed like punditry. Finally, the fact that private companies frequently are not comfortable homes for some types of social science researchers may say more about the kinds of evaluations private contractors are best suited to bid on than about their overall suitability as evaluators.

Studies of Conditions and Trends. The third type of applied social science, as defined in this book, is studies of conditions and trends. Even though this subject is not treated in depth, it needs to be included in discussing the demand for applied social science. Activities under this heading of studies of conditions and trends include "advocacy research" on public problems, which I argue is not an appropriate type of work for academic applied social science. This practice of essay-writing to advance a point of view is best left to advocacy organizations in the political process. There are times when social scientists testify, opine, and, as citizens, back ideas or causes they care about. But it is necessary, and I

believe possible, to distinguish these occasions, as compared to those in which trained social scientists are acting in their professional capacity.

This discussion is not meant to gainsay the value of research and policy analysis done by social scientists to study conditions and trends, particularly those studies that involve creating and using large data sets. References were made in the discussion of policy research on welfare reform to state government studies of people who leave the welfare rolls or are diverted or deflected from applying for cash assistance. Federal agencies and national foundations have also undertaken large data-gathering studies of the conditions of poor and vulnerable populations in efforts to link such studies to changes taking place in welfare and related social programs. The largest such studies recently have been sponsored by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Anne E. Casey Foundation. These studies are examples of applied research on social conditions using large data sets, often multiple data sets (statistical data, administrative records, and survey data), in creative ways. What I am opposed to is not these types of studies, but rather the allocation of substantial amounts of money that could be used for applied social science to essay writing on what the social scientists themselves define as “problems.”

Concluding Comments

The types of applied work that social scientists do in and around government can be distinguished by their degree of scientific seriousness. The most activist is *advocacy* research, which moves into, and I believe should be viewed as, a form of political action. It is not inappropriate for social scientists to function in this role. In truth, it would be unrealistic to consider preventing them from doing so. Although surely not everyone in the field would agree, I believe the amount of attention devoted to this advocacy role by social scientists should be reduced. And in the most scrupulous way possible, it should be kept separate from the professional practice of social science.

A second activist category of applied work that social scientists do is *participatory*, whereby social scientists are engaged in working with, advising, and assisting political actors in the design and execution of public

policies. Again, there are social scientists who serve in this role and see great value in it. Such work can be technical assistance or can involve a stronger advocacy orientation. But again, such a participatory role should be distinguished from the professional practice of social science.

Henry James once advised an aspiring novelist that the theme of a book should come through like an iron rod. I hope the theme of this book that comes through in this way is that credible, applied social science is different from, and should be kept separate from, advocacy. The book argues for more and stronger emphasis on evaluation research — multidisciplinary studies of the effects of new and changed public policies on institutions. In the long run, such studies can enrich both theory building and scholarship in the social sciences.

I think of both demonstration research to test new program ideas and evaluation research to assess the effects of ongoing programs as “action research” to inform and assist the governmental process. Its role, as stated in the opening paragraph of the book, is to educate not advocate. Such a role for social scientists performing in their professional capacity needs to be distinguished from basic social science where the principal aim is theory building. However, in the final analysis the two activities are compatible, in fact very much so. They can reinforce each other. The relationship between applied and basic social science should be a two-way street. The conduct of applied social science research should not only be a matter of what social science can do for the real world. It also should be a matter of what the real world can do for social science.

Endnotes

- 1 Gary Burtless and Robert H. Haveman, “Policy Lessons from Three Labor Market Experiments,” in *Employment and Training: R & D Lessons Learned and Future Directions*.

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**INSTRUCTIONAL PACKET
TO ACCOMPANY**

**NEW YORK STATE
GOVERNMENT**



2nd Edition

ROBERT B. WARD

INSTRUCTIONAL ACTIVITIES

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About This Packet
Notes for Educators

New York State Government by Robert B. Ward (2nd edition, 2006, Rockefeller Institute Press) presents a comprehensive guide to the inner workings of State government. Mr. Ward's writing is very readable and may be accessible in its entirety for many middle and high school students. However, within the classroom educators may prefer to use it as a reference tool to accommodate time constraints and varying student ability levels.

The activities provided in this Instructional Packet utilize various sections of the book, the Table of Contents, and the Index. In addition, a **Chronology of New York State History** is included in this Packet to provide an historic frame of reference in an easy-to-read format. Students are encouraged to use any and all other available resources (classroom texts, Internet, biographical dictionaries, encyclopedias, etc.) to complete the activities. Please refer to the *Notes to Students* for an explanation of the research skills developed throughout the Packet.

The majority of the directions, activities and learning experiences in this Instructional Packet are written directly to the student of New York State government. Information intended for teachers or instructors only is indicated at the top of the page. Educators will find it helpful to read through the entire packet prior to selecting individual activities for student assignment.

Who Can Use This Packet?

- Because the study of New York State is an integral part of the social studies curriculum in grades 7 and 8, the learning experiences are designed for use with middle school students at various ability levels.
- High school students in Participation in Government classes will find many of the activities challenging and relevant to their course of study. Discussion and research topics located in the sections entitled "*Learning and Thinking More About It...*" lend themselves to more in-depth study of government at various levels within New York.
- Teachers of grade 4 (Local Community History) and Grade 11 – United States History and Government may adapt some of the activities to accommodate their students and instructional content.
- English/language arts teachers in middle and high school will find many activities useful to the development of critical reading, writing and thinking skills with their students.

About the Instructional Activities

The activities were created as instructional materials; students will learn the topic and develop research and reading skills as they proceed through the activities. Therefore, class instruction and notes, texts, reference materials and other resources are all important and necessary to complete the activities.

About This Packet
Notes for Educators

Because the study of government is complex and Mr. Ward's book comprehensive, the activities attempt to focus on a variety of topics while highlighting essential concepts, organizing and simplifying information in manageable "chunks" for students.

The entire text provides extensive information, and complements sections specifically identified in Student Activities. Many of the activities require students to utilize the Chronology of New York State History; some use charts, excerpts or portions of the text as "documents" for guided reading exercises, research or constructed response questions.

How To Use Activities in This Packet

- Teachers are encouraged to *determine point allocations* for various activities prior to distributing the assignment to students. This allows teachers to weight some items more heavily than others; employ letter grades for more interpretive items; and assign some items as individual work, group work, class discussion, or challenge activities. Teachers are encouraged to establish their own rubrics or scoring guides, based on their instructional goals and objectives for their students.

- The activities are designed to sequentially develop a student's research skills and acquisition of knowledge. However, *each activity is self-contained* and can be used independently of the others. Teachers can do one or several activities in the packet, dependent upon the ability and skills of their respective classes. Activities such as the *guided readings or constructed response questions* may be assigned as homework, if students have access to appropriate resources outside of the classroom.

- *Thought or discussion questions* may also be used as expository writing assignments and developed in English/language arts classes, providing a natural interdisciplinary activity. Many discussion questions lend themselves easily to topics for: *debate, letter writing (perhaps to legislators or newspapers), editorials, political cartoons, journal prompts or research projects.*

- Students can be encouraged to *review newspapers for current events that illustrate or exemplify the issues or topics under study.*

- Teachers are encouraged to use formats presented in this Packet to develop additional activities for further study of New York State government.

About This Packet
Notes for Educators

**Answers to
*Getting Started - Worksheet: Vocabulary for the Study of NYS Government***

1. simple majority	6. public sector	11. amend	16. advocate	21. minor
2. suffrage	7. reform	12. charter	17. statute	22. balance of power
3. franchise	8. primary	13. legislature	18. budget	23. civil service
4. quorum	9. social welfare	14. separation of powers	19. allocate	24. constitution
5. stalemate	10. constitutional convention	15. apportion	20. reserved powers	25. eminent domain

New York State Government

Curricular Correlation of Text and Student Activities with New York State Social Studies, Grade 7 & 8

Instructional focus of this packet

- To help students find, organize, make connections, and apply information while learning about New York State government.
- To use the text, *New York State Government*, and other reference materials to understand how government affects people in their everyday lives, and how people can and do affect government.

Curricular alignment with New York State Social Studies Resource Guide Grade 7 & 8

UNIT THREE: A Nation is Created	
III: Early attempts to govern the newly independent States Objectives	1. To understand how the colonists attempted to establish new forms of self-government 4. To describe how ordinary and famous historic figures in the local community, State, and the United States have advanced the fundamental democratic values, beliefs, and traditions expressed in the Declaration of Independence, the New York State and United State constitutions, the Bill of Rights, and other important documents
Content Outline	B. The Second Continental Congress represented the first attempt to govern the colonies 2. Request for state constitutions and political systems E. Independence creates problems for New Yorkers 1. Organizing new State government
V: Economic, political, and social changes brought about by the American Revolution Objectives	1. To understand how a revolution can have a profound effect on the economic, political, and social fabric of nation
Content Outline	B. In New York State 2. A republican ideology developed which emphasized shared power and citizenship participation
UNIT FOUR: Experiments in Government	
II: The New York State Constitution of 1777 Objectives	2. To compare and contrast the development and evolution of the United States and New York State constitutions 3. To understand how the United States and New York State constitutions support majority rule but also protect the rights of the minority
Content Outline	D. Effectiveness 4. A model for the United States Constitution of 1787

New York State Government

Curricular Correlation of Text and Student Activities with New York State Social Studies, Grade 7 & 8

UNIT FIVE: Life in the New Nation	
<p>I. New government in operation</p> <p>Objectives</p>	<p>3. To understand how civic values reflected in the United States and New York State constitutions have been implemented through law and practice</p> <p>6. To explain how societies and nations attempt to satisfy basic needs and wants by utilizing scarce capital, natural, and human resources</p>
<p>Content Outline</p>	<p>E: The Era of Good Feelings</p> <p>2. Internal expansion: new roads, canals, and railroads</p>
<p>III. Preindustrial Age: 1790-1860s</p> <p>Objectives</p>	<p>2. To understand the nature and effect of changes on society and individuals as the United States began to move from an agrarian to an industrial economy</p> <p>6. To understand how scarcity requires people and nations to make choices that involve costs and future considerations</p> <p>7. To develop conclusions about economic issues and problems by creating broad statements that summarize findings and solutions</p> <p>8. To describe the relationships between people and environments and the connections between people and places</p> <p>9. To use number of research skills (e.g. computer databses, periodicals, census reports, maps, standard reference works, interviews, surveys) to locate and gather geographical information about issues and problems</p>
<p>Content Outline</p>	<p>C: Technological changes altered the way people dealt with one another</p> <p>1. Improved transportation made travel and communication easier</p> <p>2. Greater ties between communities were possible</p> <p>3. The Erie Canal and its impact</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">a. Reasons for building the Erie Canal</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">d. Results of building the Erie Canal</p> <p>F: Slavery and abolition</p> <p>G: Social changes:</p> <p>3. Mental hospital and prison reform</p> <p>4. Education</p> <p>5. Temperance</p> <p>I: Portrait of the United States, 1860</p> <p>2. The North</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">c. Urban centered – “causes and consequence of urbanization”</p>

New York State Government

Curricular Correlation of Text and Student Activities with New York State Social Studies, Grade 7 & 8

UNIT SEVEN: An Industrial Society	
<p>I. The maturing of an Industrial Society in the Second half of the 19th Century</p> <p>Objectives</p>	<p>2. To explain how societies and nations attempt to satisfy their basic needs and wants by utilizing scarce capital, natural, and human resources.</p>
<p>Content Outline</p>	<p>A: Problems and progress in American politics: Framework for a changing United States</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. New problems created a changing role for government and the political system 2. Scandals, depressions, and limitations of traditional politics resulted in reluctant change, e.g. civil service 3. New York State and New York City in an era of machine politics, e.g. the Tweed Ring and Tammany Hall <p>C: Growth of corporation as a form of business organization: Case studies – oil, railroads, steel</p> <p>D: Laissez-faire versus regulation</p>
<p>II. Changes in the social structure altered the American scene</p> <p>Objectives</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To understand how industrialization altered the traditional social pattern of American society and created a need for reform 2. To investigate key turning points in New York State and United States history and explain why these events or developments are significant
<p>Content Outline</p>	<p>A: The immigration experience</p> <p>D: Responsibilities of citizenship</p> <p>G: Leisure activities reflected the prevailing attitudes and views of the time</p>
<p>III. The Progressive movement, 1900-1920: Efforts to reform the new society</p> <p>Objectives</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To understand how industrialization led to a need for reevaluating and changing the traditional role of government in relation to the economy and social conditions 2. To investigate key turning points in New York State and United States history and explain why these events or developments are significant 3. To gather and organize information about the important achievements and contributions of individuals and groups living in New York State and the United States
<p>Content Outline</p>	<p>A: Social ills</p> <p>B: Efforts to reform government and politics</p> <p>C: Economic reforms</p>

New York State Government

Curricular Correlation of Text and Student Activities with New York State Social Studies, Grade 7 & 8

UNIT NINE: The United States Between the Wars	
<p>I. The Roaring Twenties Reflected the Spirit of the Postwar Period</p> <p>Objectives</p>	<p>1. To understand the economic, social, and political development of America in the period between World War I and World War II</p> <p>4. To classify major developments into categories such as social, political, economic, geographic, technological, scientific, cultural, or religious</p>
<p>Content Outline</p>	<p>A: Prohibition and the 18th Amendment</p> <p>D: A rising standard of living resulted in the growth of a consumer economy and the rise of the middle class</p> <p>E: Changes in the workplace</p> <p>F: Problems developed in the midst of unprecedented prosperity</p> <p>G: Foreign immigration and black migration resulted in a very diverse population and an increase in social tensions – the effects of human migrations on the nature and character of places and regions</p> <p>H: New ideas about the use of leisure time emerged</p> <p>I: The stock market crash marked the beginning of the worst economic time the country has ever known</p>
<p>II. The Great Depression</p> <p>Objectives</p>	<p>2. To understand the economic, political, and social changes that took place in the world during the 1930s</p> <p>4. To understand how scarcity requires people and nations to make choices that involve costs and future considerations</p> <p>6. To develop conclusions about economic issues and problems by creating broad statements that summarize findings and solutions</p>
<p>Content Outline</p>	<p>B: Responses to deepening economic woes</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">2. Local and State actions</p> <p>C: The New Deal</p> <p>D: Effects on work, family, and communities</p>

New York State Government

Curricular Correlation of Text and Student Activities with New York State Social Studies, Grade 7 & 8

UNIT ELEVEN: The Changing Nature of the American People from World War II to the Present	
I. Postwar society characterized by prosperity and optimism Objectives	2. To investigate key turning points in New York State and United States history and explain why these events or developments are significant
Content Outline	A: Changing patterns of production and consumption resulted in economic expansion B: Families and communities underwent significant changes
II. The United States begins a new century Objectives	1. To understand the economic, social, and political trends that shaped the end of the 20 th century and point to the 21 st century 2. To investigate problems and opportunities the United States faces in its immediate future
Content Outline	B. Federal and state governments reevaluate their roles 1. Fiscal and monetary policies: taxation, regulation, deregulation 2. Social programs: health, welfare, education D: Old and new problems must be addressed 1. Violent crime and substance abuse 2. Protection of the environment 3. Growing number of elderly Americans 4. The continuing struggle for economic and social justice for all citizens

New York State Government

Curricular Correlation of Text and Student Activities with New York State Social Studies, Grade 7 & 8

Alignment with NYS Social Studies Standards and Performance Indicators Intermediate Level

NYS Standard 1: Students will use a variety of intellectual skills to demonstrate their understanding of major ideas, eras, themes, developments, and turning points in the history of the United States and NYS.

Key Ideas and Performance Indicators for Intermediate Level

1. *The study of NYS and US history requires an analysis of the development of American culture, its diversity and multicultural context, and the ways people are unified by many values, practices, and traditions.*
 - Students interpret the ideas, values, and beliefs contained in the Declaration of Independence and the NYS Constitution and the U.S. Constitution, Bill of Rights, and other important historical documents.
2. *Important ideas, social and cultural values, beliefs, and traditions from NYS and US history illustrate the connections and interactions of people and events across time and from a variety of perspectives.*
 - Students investigate key turning points in NYS and US history and explain why these events or developments are significant.
3. *Study about the major social, political, economic, cultural, and religious developments in NYS and US history involves learning about the important roles and contributions of individuals and groups.*
 - Students gather and organize information about the important achievements and contributions of individuals and groups living in NYS and the United States.
 - Students classify major developments into categories such as social, political, economic, geographic, technological scientific, cultural, or religious.
4. *The skills of historical analysis include the ability to explain the significance of historical evidence; weigh the importance, reliability, and validity of evidence; understand the concept of multiple causation; understand the importance of changing and competing interpretations of different historical developments.*
 - Students consider the source of historic documents, narratives, or artifacts and evaluate their reliability.
 - Students compare and contrast different interpretations of key events and issues in NYS and United States history and explain reasons for these different accounts.

New York State Government

Curricular Correlation of Text and Student Activities with New York State Social Studies, Grade 7 & 8

Alignment with NYS Social Studies Standards and Performance Indicators Intermediate Level

NYS Standard 5: Students will use a variety of intellectual skills to demonstrate their understanding of the necessity for establishing governments; the governmental system of the U.S. and other nations; the U.S. Constitution; the basic civic values of American constitutional democracy and the roles, rights, and responsibilities of citizenship, including avenues of participation.

Key Ideas and Performance Indicators for Intermediate Level

2. *The state and federal governments established by the Constitution of the United States and the State of New York embody basic civic values (such as justice, honesty, self-discipline, due process, equality, majority rule with respect for minority rights, and respect for self, others, and property), principles, and practices and establish a system of shared and limited government. (Adapted from *The National Standards for Civics and Government*, 1994)*

- Students understand how civic values reflected in United States and New York State Constitutions have been implemented through laws and practices.
- Students understand that the New York State Constitution, along with a number of other documents, served as a model for the development of the United States Constitution.
- Students compare and contrast the development and evolution of the constitutions of the United States and NYS.
- Students understand how the United States and New York State Constitutions support majority rule but also protect the rights of the minority.

3. *Central to civics and citizenship is an understanding of the roles of the citizen within American constitutional democracy and the scope of a citizen's rights and responsibilities.*

- Students explain what citizenship means in a democratic society, how citizenship is defined in the Constitution and other laws of the land, and how the definition of citizenship has changed in the U.S. and NYS over time.
- Students discuss the role of the informed citizen in today's changing world.
- Students explain how Americans are citizens of their states and of the United States.

4. *The study of civics and citizenship requires the ability to probe ideas and assumptions, ask and answer analytical questions, take skeptical attitude toward questionable arguments, evaluate evidence, formulate rational conclusions, and develop and refine participatory skills.*

- Students explain the role that civility plays in promoting effective citizenship in preserving democracy.
- Students participate in negotiation and compromise to resolve classroom, school, and community disagreements and problems.

New York State Government

Curricular Correlation of Text and Student Activities with New York State Social Studies, Grade 7 & 8

Alignment with NYS Social Studies Standards and Performance Indicators Commencement Level

NYS Standard 1: Students will use a variety of intellectual skills to demonstrate their understanding of major ideas, eras, themes, developments, and turning points in the history of the United States and NYS.

Key Ideas and Performance Indicators for Commencement Level

1. *The study of NYS and US history requires an analysis of the development of American culture, its diversity and multicultural context, and the ways people are unified by many values, practices, and traditions.*
 - Students will describe the evolution of American deocratic values and beliefs as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the NYS Constitution and the US Constitution, Bill of Rights, and other important historical documents.
2. *Important ideas, social and cultural values, beliefs, and traditions from NYS and US history illustrate the connections and interactions of people and events across time and from a variety of perspectives.*
 - Students will develop and test hypotheses about important events, eras, or issues in New York State and United States history, setting clear and valid criteria for judging the importance and significance of these events, eras, or issues..
3. *Study about the major social, political, economic, cultural, and religious developments in NYS and US history involves learning about the important roles and contributions of individuals and groups.*
 - Students will understand the interrelationships between world events and developments in New York State and United States.
4. *The skills of historical analysis include the ability to explain the significance of historical evidence; weigh the importance, reliability, and validity of evidence; understand the concept of multiple causation; understand the importance of changing and competing interpretations of different historical developments.*
 - Students will analyze historical narratives about key events in New York State and United States history to identify the facts and evalutate the authors' perspectives.

New York State Government

Curricular Correlation of Text and Student Activities with New York State Social Studies, Grade 7 & 8

Alignment with NYS Social Studies Standards and Performance Indicators Commencement Level

NYS Standard 5: Students will use a variety of intellectual skills to demonstrate their understanding of the necessity for establishing governments; the governmental system of the U.S. and other nations; the U.S. Constitution; the basic civic values of American constitutional democracy and the roles, rights, and responsibilities of citizenship, including avenues of participation.

Key Ideas and Performance Indicators for Commencement Level

*2. The state and federal governments established by the Constitution of the United States and the State of New York embody basic civic values (such as justice, honesty, self-discipline, due process, equality, majority rule with respect for minority rights, and respect for self, others, and property), principles, and practices and establish a system of shared and limited government. (Adapted from *The National Standards for Civics and Government*, 1994)*

- Students compare and contrast the Constitutions of the United States and New York State.
- Students understand the dynamic relationship between federalism and state's rights.

3. Central to civics and citizenship is an understanding of the roles of the citizen within American constitutional democracy and the scope of a citizen's rights and responsibilities.

- Students understand how citizenship includes the exercise of certain personal responsibilities, including voting, considering the rights and interests of others, behaving in a civil manner, and accepting responsibility for the consequences of one's actions.
- Students analyze issues at local, state, and national levels and prescribe responses that promote the public interest or general welfare, such as planning and carrying out a voter registration campaign.
- Students explore how citizens influence public policy in a representative democracy.

4. The study of civics and citizenship requires the ability to probe ideas and assumptions, ask and answer analytical questions, take a skeptical attitude toward questionable arguments, evaluate evidence, formulate rational conclusions, and develop and refine participatory skills.

- Students evaluate, take, and defend positions on what the fundamental values and principles of American political life are and their importance to the maintenance of constitutional democracy.
- Students take, defend, and evaluate positions about attitudes that facilitate thoughtful and effective participation in public affairs.
- Students participate in school/classroom/community activities that focus on an issue or problem.
- Students prepare a plan of action that defines an issue or problem, suggests alternative solutions or courses of action, evaluates the consequences for each alternative solution or course of action, prioritizes the solutions based on established criteria and proposed an action plan to address the issue or to resolve the problem.

About This Packet
Notes to Students

The activities in this Instructional Packet are designed to help you develop some skills in reading, research, thinking, and writing. They will focus on information about New York State government, and two themes:

- ◆ *What role does state government play in the lives of students and their communities?*
- ◆ *How can or do people influence government?*

Each activity will help you develop one or more of the following skills:

<p>Find information – using any resources and tools available to you.</p> <p>This includes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● reading a paragraph or a photograph; ● using a table of contents and/or an index; ● locating information from charts, graphs, chronologies; ● using the Internet or a variety of reference materials such as dictionaries, encyclopedias, textbooks; ● carefully observing events, behavior or watching videos. <p>For these activities, you will find the text <i>New York State Government: What It Does, How It Works</i> (Robert B. Ward, 2002) very useful, since they were developed to accompany the book.</p>	<p>Organize information – collect information in a way that makes it useful for you to use again. It helps to determine your focus or purpose for collecting the information. (How will you be using or applying the information? – see below.)</p> <p>The collection or organization process includes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● taking clear notes; ● writing definitions that you understand; ● completing an outline, worksheet or graphic organizer; ● answering a series of related questions, as in a constructed response or guided reading; ● comparing and contrasting information. <p>The hardest part of this skill is knowing what information to include and what to omit; not everything is equally important to your focus, purpose, theme, thesis or controlling idea.</p>
<p>Make connections between the information you have found and previously acquired information.</p> <p>Acquired information can be from other courses in school or from your experiences in life. You may be asked to determine how an event or law or behavior of a person affects your life today, or how it may have changed people’s lives in another time in history.</p> <p>Some questions to ask yourself:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● What does this information have in common with what I may already know? ● How does this relate to me, my community, my hobbies or interests, my future life and plans? <p>This is known as developing a frame of reference, and is key to remembering information.</p>	<p>Apply information – use it in some way.</p> <p>It might be to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● write a letter, an editorial or a thematic essay; ● design a chart, advertisement or a poster; ● answer a question or a series of questions; ● participate in a discussion; ● complete a worksheet; ● develop a research project; ● create a short story, a poem, a song, a piece of art; ● take a test!

<p><i>Terminology & Concepts for Research Assignments & Student Activities</i></p>

Directions for activities and learning experiences in this Instructional Packet will use terminology and concepts that are also found in New York State assessments in English Language Arts and social studies. It is important to become familiar with them.

Below are some working and simplified definitions important to doing research in the classroom.

<i>Document (n.)</i>	Any map, chart, illustration, graph, photograph, or written material, which may be analyzed and interpreted to obtain information. This should not be confused with a <i>primary source or document</i>
<i>Primary source or document (n.)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ An official document (e.g. license; legislation; report card), ▪ Eye or ear witness account (e.g. letters; journal entries; interviews; oral histories), OR ▪ Physical remains (e.g. photographs; clothing; furniture) that provides information about an event or time period and <i>is from the period</i>. <p>It requires interpretation by the reader or observer, unlike secondary sources (such as textbooks, encyclopedia articles) which bear the interpretation of authors and editors, are written after the fact, and base their information on other sources</p>
<i>Evidence (n.)</i>	Specific information, such as legislation, events, biographical data, organizations, relevant dates; information and details obtained from the document in question
<i>Support (n.)</i>	Specific related evidence that helps prove a position or point of view
<i>Thesis statement (n.)</i>	A statement, proposition or position assumed to be true, and requiring defense with supporting evidence taken from documents and/or outside sources (e.g. texts). In English/Language Arts classes, this is similar to the “critical lens,” a quotation through which students must analyze readings and literature. (This is also similar to, but not the same as, a hypothesis , which is an educated guess that may or may not be true.)
<i>Hypothesis (n.)</i>	An educated guess that may or may not be true; an assumption that needs to be tested and proved/disproved

***Terminology & Concepts for
Research Assignments & Student Activities***

<i>Observation (n.)</i>	Information acquired by actually watching the actions and reactions of materials, chemicals, objects, and people within a determined setting or circumstance
<i>Analyze (v.)</i>	To break a larger idea or document into smaller parts or sections in order to examine it carefully or better understand it
<i>Compare (v.)</i>	To observe and point out similarities between two or more ideas, people, events, organizations, etc.
<i>Contrast (v.)</i>	To observe and point out differences between two or more ideas, people, events, organizations, etc. When directions ask you to COMPARE & CONTRAST, you must point out ways in which the items are the same AND the ways in which they are different
<i>Citation (n.)</i>	Identifying any source from which ideas and information used to support a position are taken
<i>Context (n.)</i>	The events that come before and after an historic event that may influence its outcome or importance; background information that helps to understand the significance of an event or person
<i>Extended response (n.)</i>	A short written paragraph, usually one to four sentences in length, that addresses a specific question or task

**Getting Started:
Vocabulary for the Study of New York State Government**

Each of the thirty-three terms in the boxes below is related to the function of government in some way. Carefully read the definitions provided and, using the terms from the list, write the term that most closely matched the definition in the appropriate response box. (The part of speech is indicated because some words may be used in more than one way.)

Each term is used only once, but not every term has a definition provided. After you match the provided definitions with the best term, define the remaining terms in your own words in the empty spaces on this worksheet. You may use *New York State Government* (Robert B. Ward, 2nd edition, 2006), classroom texts, dictionaries and any other resources. Keep in mind that each definition must relate to the function of government in some way.

Once you have completed the worksheet, keep it in your notebook and refer to it as needed. As you continue your study of NYS government, add other related terms unfamiliar to you to the list.

(to) advocate (v) (to apportion (v) (to) allocate (v) (to) amend (v) “exurban” (adj) balance of power bond (n) budget (n) charter (n) civil service (adj) comptroller	concurrent powers Constitution (n) eminent domain franchise (n) gerrymandering (n) infrastructure (n) legislature (n) moratorium (n) municipality plebiscite (n) primary election	quorum (n) reform (n) reserved powers separation of powers simple majority social service social welfare stalemate statute (n) suffrage (n) user fee
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1.	A decision based on one more than one-half of the people present at a meeting.
2.	Three nouns that refer to the right to vote.
3.	
4.	
5.	The minimum number of people needed to be present at a meeting for any decisions to be made or acted upon (noun).
6.	A situation in which opposing sides cannot come to an agreement (noun).
7.	The system of government funded programs formed to “aid, care and support ...the needy”
8.	A law or program designed to improve social, political or economic conditions (noun)
9.	An election in which enrolled members of a political party determine which candidates will represent that party in a general election.
10.	Programs meant to provide New Yorkers with basic need such as food, shelter and medical care.

**Getting Started:
Vocabulary for the Study of New York State Government**

11.	To officially change a law or legal document (verb).
12.	A document that legally grants a group or organization permission to do something, and creates guidelines by which their actions will be governed (noun).
13.	The branch of NYS government made up of the Senate and Assembly (noun).
14.	Duties, rights and responsibilities shared by national and state governments, such as the power to tax.
15.	To divide a state into regions or districts for the purposes of determining representation in government (verb).
16.	To act or speak out in strong support of an idea, principle, group of people, etc.
17.	Another word meaning the same as “law” or “legislation” (noun).
18.	A financial plan that determines the amount of money each government agency, program, and/or district is given to spend each year (noun).
19.	To set aside or determine an amount of resources (money, land, time, workers, etc.) to be used for a given purpose (verb).
20.	Specific social, political and economic issues for which state governments are solely responsible, according to the U.S. Constitution.
21.	A person under the age determined by law to legally engage in certain behaviors or activities, such as sign contracts, vote, purchase alcoholic beverages (noun).
22.	The idea that no one branch of government has more control or is more important than the other two branches.
23.	The term that describes the types of jobs held by most people who work for government agencies. These jobs have certain legal job protections (<i>refers to non-elected and non-appointed positions</i>).
24.	The document containing the governing structure and highest laws in a state or nation (noun).
25.	The ability of the state to take over privately owned land when it will be used to benefit the general public.
26.	
27.	
28.	

Getting Started:
Vocabulary for the Study of New York State Government

29.	
30.	
31.	
32.	
33.	

Answer Key

1. simple majority
2. plebiscite
3. suffrage
4. franchise
5. quorum
6. stalemate
7. social welfare
8. reform
9. primary election
10. social service
11. amend
12. charter
13. legislature
14. concurrent powers
15. apportion
16. advocate
17. statute
18. budget
19. allocate
20. reserved powers
21. minor
22. balance of power
23. civil service
24. constitution
25. eminent domain

Activity One:
Everyday Influence, Everyday Government

Purpose:

To understand the many ways in which New York State government affects our lives everyday.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)

Chapter One – A Broad Impact, pp. 1-4

Directions:

- Read the selection entitled “A Broad Impact” (pp. 1-4).
- Use the graphic organizer below to outline the various ways in which the author has connected the daily activities of people around New York State with the role of State government. For each entry on the graphic organizer, identify the region of NYS, the activity described, the relationship (role) of government to that activity and the government agency responsible for its management.
- The first one is done for you as a model. Continue the graphic organizer on other paper as needed.

Region of NYS	Activity	Role of NYS govt.	Agency
Long Island (Montauk Pt. State Park)	Recreation: hiking, skiing, swimming, fishing, picnicking	Maintaining parks, cleaning up after visitors; guiding, educating visitors	Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation

<p><i>Activity One:</i> Everyday Influence, Everyday Government</p>

Learning and thinking more about it...

- Use a map of New York State. Locate the regions identified in the graphic organizer you completed in Activity One. Determine where each is located in relation to where you live (e.g. southeast, northwest). If you were traveling by car, what route would you take? Approximately how long would it take? (Good maps to use may be obtained from the NYS Office of Parks and Recreation, American Automobile Association, or found in road atlases, or on the Internet.)
- Based on “A Broad Impact,” make a list of activities that you, your family or friends do every day or every week that State government affects in some way. You may find the section, “A Broad Impact” (pp. 4-5), helpful in completing this task. Use a chart similar to the one on the previous page to categorize your activities. Identify the role played by State government in that activity. Finally, determine which State agency is connected to that role. Use whatever resources necessary to help you complete your chart.
- *Discussion/thought/essay question:*
Is so much government involvement necessary in New York State?
Provide at least three specific pieces of evidence to support your opinion.
Use any resources to help you support your opinion.

Activity Two:

Structure of New York State Government – Executive Branch

Purpose:

To understand the structure, roles and responsibilities of the executive branch of New York State government.

To compare and contrast the structure of State and federal governments.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)

Chapter Seven – The Constitution

Chapter Four – The Governor and Other Statewide Elected Leaders

New York State Constitution

United States Constitution

Background:

New York State’s constitution was originally created in 1777, and served as a model for the U.S. Constitution. While the basis of today’s State constitution was created in the 1800s, it has been changed (amended) more than 200 times. In many ways, New York’s constitution remains similar to that of the nation, it also contains some differences.

Directions:

- Use the above materials and any other resources to help you complete the chart (graphic organizer) on the next page. If your teacher allows, you may work with a partner.
- In the box next to the term, define in your own words “Executive Branch.” Make certain your definition is one that you understand.
- Listed are the four main offices in the executive branch of NYS government. Identify the responsibilities of each of the four positions.
- In the next column, write the name of the individual currently holding each office.
- In the last column, determine if a similar position exists in the federal (U.S.) government. If the answer is YES, write the name of the office in the space. If the position does not exist, write NO. Make certain you support your answer by referring to the appropriate constitution and/or resource.

Activity Two:

Worksheet - Structure of New York State Government – Executive Branch

Executive Branch	Definition:		
Office/Position	Responsibilities of position according to New York State constitution	Individual currently in position & political party	Comparable position in U.S. government?
Governor			
Lieutenant Governor			
Comptroller			
Attorney General			

Activity Two:

Worksheet - Structure of New York State Government – Executive Branch

Learning more about it....

- Refer to the completed Worksheet for Activity Two. If the office or position exists in the U.S. government, determine the responsibilities of that position as stated in the federal Constitution. You may use the chart below to help organize your research results.

Office/Position	Responsibilities of position according to federal Constitution	Individual currently in position & political party

- Compare the positions and responsibilities of the executive branch of State and federal governments. How are they similar? What responsibilities do they have in common?
- Contrast the positions and responsibilities of the executive branch of State and federal governments. How are they different? What might be some reasons for these differences? Support your answer with specific examples or evidence.

Activity Three:

Structure of New York State Government – Legislative Branch

Purpose:

To understand the structure, roles and responsibilities of the legislative branch of New York State government.

To compare and contrast the structure of State and federal governments.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)

Chapter Seven – The Constitution

Chapter Five – The Legislature

New York State Constitution

United States Constitution

Background:

New York State’s constitution was originally created in 1777, and served as a model for the U.S. Constitution. While the basis of today’s State constitution was created in the 1800s, it has been changed (amended) more than 200 times. In many ways, New York’s constitution remains similar to that of the nation, it also contains some differences.

Directions:

- Use the above materials and any other resources to help you complete the chart (graphic organizer) on the next page. If your teacher allows, you may work with a partner.
- In the box next to the term, define in your own words “Legislative Branch.” Make certain your definition is one that you understand.
- Like most states (the exception being Nebraska), New York’s legislature is *bicameral*, meaning “made up of two houses.” Identify the number of people currently in the Senate and Assembly, and the responsibilities of each house.
- Next, identify what limits are placed on each legislative house.
- In the next rows, write the name of the highest position of leadership in each house, the responsibilities of each leader, and the individual currently holding that position. Include the political party and region of NYS represented by each leader.
- Finally, identify the individuals representing you in the New York State Legislature.
- Create a similar chart for the United States Congress. Compare the results. In what ways are the two legislative branches similar? How do they differ?

**Activity Three:
Structure of New York State Government – Legislative Branch**

Worksheets

Legislative Branch	Definition:	
New York State Legislature	Senate	Assembly
Current # of members		
Responsibilities and powers		
Limitations on power		
Highest position of leadership in house & responsibilities		
Individual currently in position, political party & region		
Your Legislative Representatives		

Activity Three:
Structure of New York State Government – Legislative Branch

U.S. Congress	<i>(house)</i>	<i>(house)</i>
Responsibilities and powers		
Limitations on power		
Highest position of leadership in house & responsibilities		
Individual currently in position & political party		
Your Congressional Representatives		

<p><i>Activity Three:</i> Structure of New York State Government – Legislative Branch</p>

Learning and thinking more about it...

- In your notebook or folder, define the following terms:
 - Political ward (n.)
 - Political or election district (n.)
 - Apportionment (n.)

Explain how each is related to the legislative branch of government.

- Identify the number of your local election ward and Assembly district.
(Extra credit: Identify their geographic boundaries.)
How might a reapportionment change the social, economic or political composition of your district(s)?
How might this affect future elections, or decisions made by legislators?

<p><i>Activity Four:</i> Structure of New York State Government – Judicial Branch An Overview</p>
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Purpose:

To understand the structure, roles and responsibilities of the judicial branch of New York State government.

To compare and contrast the structure of State and federal governments.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)

Chapter Seven – The Constitution

Chapter Six – The Judiciary

New York State Constitution

United States Constitution

Background:

New York State’s constitution guarantees the people of New York an independent judiciary that is accountable to the elected representatives of the people – members of the executive and legislative branches.

Directions:

- Use the above materials and any other resources to help you complete the charts (graphic organizers) and activities in this section. If your teacher allows, you may work with a partner.

Chart: An Overview of the NYS Judicial System

- In the box next to the term, define in your own words “Judicial Branch.” Make certain your definition is one that you understand.
- New York’s court system is similar to that of other states and the federal government. Courts fall into two main categories: trial courts, and appellate courts. In the appropriate space, define each term.
- Identify the responsibilities of trial and appellate courts.
- Next, identify what limits are placed on the powers of the Judiciary.
- Finally, identify the highest court in the State system, and its role.
- Use other paper if necessary to complete your chart.

Activity Four:
Structure of New York State Government – Judicial Branch
An Overview

Learning and thinking more about it...

- Create a similar chart for the judicial branch of the United States. Compare the results. In what ways are the two judicial branches similar? How do they differ?
- The State Constitution devotes more than eleven pages to the discussion of the Judiciary, more than the other two branches combined. Why might this have been necessary? Support your answer with specific evidence (Chapter Five will help).

Activity Four:
Structure of New York State Government – Judicial Branch
An Overview

Chart: An Overview of the NYS Judicial System

Judicial Branch	Definition:	
New York State Court System	Trial Courts	Appellate Courts
Definition (What is the role or purpose?)		
Responsibilities and powers		
Limitations on power of the courts		
Highest court in NYS and its role (responsibility) in the court system	Name of Court: Role in the court system:	

Activity Five:
Structure of Judicial Branch – Trial Courts

Purpose:

To understand the structure, roles and responsibilities of the trial court system in the judicial branch of New York State government.
To identify the many ways in which New Yorkers are affected by the court system.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)
Chapter Six – The Judiciary

Directions:

Use the above material, your knowledge of social studies, and any other resources to help you complete the activities in this section. If your teacher allows, you may work with a partner.

Background:

In her State of the Judiciary Address in 1999, New York Chief Judge Judith Kaye referred to the system of trial courts as “absurdly complex...difficult to understand.” Yet this branch of State government affects New Yorkers in a variety of ways everyday.

Activities:

- In the space below, define the following terms as they apply to the court system.

Adversary:
Plaintiff:
Defendant:
Trial:
Counsel/counselor:
Appeal:
Arbitration:
Jury:
Party:
Private party:
Public party:

Activity Five:
Structure of Judicial Branch – Trial Courts

- Trial courts themselves are divided into two categories: civil courts (those that hear cases involving civil cases), and criminal courts (involving criminal cases). Define each type of case in your own words. (Refer to p. 136-137; 142-144).

Civil cases:

Criminal cases:

- Identify possible **adversaries in a civil court case.**

- Why are the people of New York State always one of the **adversaries in a criminal case?** Explain your answer in complete sentences.

Activity Five:

Structure of Judicial Branch – Trial Courts

- **Four types of trial courts** operate in all regions of New York State. Using pages 142-144 as a reference, **identify each type and explain the purpose** of each in your own words. Then, based on your research and prior knowledge, **provide 3 examples of each type of case**. Use additional paper if needed.

Category of Trial Court	Definition of court	Specific examples

- **In what ways does the Supreme Court of NYS differ from the United States Supreme Court?** Explain your answer in complete sentences. (You must have at least two differences in your answer.) Use additional paper if needed.

<p><i>Activity Five:</i> Structure of Judicial Branch – Trial Courts</p>
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Learning and thinking more about it...

Thought questions – persuasive writing:

- Refer to the quote by Chief Judge Judith Kaye regarding the complexity of the State trial court system. In a well-documented essay, defend Justice Kaye’s opinion, providing at least three pieces of supporting evidence. Use the conventions of standard English grammar and punctuation in your defense.
- Identify and explain one or more changes to the State’s trial court system you would recommend as a measure of “court reform.” Include in your recommendation the following:
 - Rationale (reason) for the reform – why it is needed
 - Specific change to the system
 - How your recommendation(s) will improve the court system

Activity Six:
Structure of Judicial Branch – Appellate Courts

Purpose:

To understand the structure, roles and responsibilities of the appellate court system in the judicial branch of New York State government.

To identify the many ways in which New Yorkers are affected by the court system.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)

Chapter Six – The Judiciary

U.S. History text and/or U.S. Constitution

Directions:

Use the above material, your knowledge of social studies, and any other resources to help you complete the activities in this section. If your teacher allows, you may work with a partner.

Activities:

- In the space below, define the following terms as they apply to the court system.

Intermediate court:
Lower court:
Jurisdiction (n.):
Appeal (n.):
Appellate (adj.):
Disbarment (n.):
Chief Judge (n.):
Consultation (n.):
(To) Preside (v.):
Reversal (n.):
(Legal) Brief (n.):

Activity Six:
Structure of Judicial Branch – Appellate Courts

- Explain in your own words why the appellate courts system is less complicated than the trial court system. Support your answer with specific evidence. You may list your reasons. (Refer to p. 146-151).

- Identify the role of the Court of Appeals in the State judicial system. Write your answer in complete sentences.

-

Activity Six:
Structure of Judicial Branch – Appellate Courts

- Why is the Court of Appeals referred to as “the court of last resort?”
- Which court in the United States judicial system serves the same purpose?
 Use specific information and explain your answer in complete sentences.

- What are the duties of the justices on Court of Appeals?
- How does an individual become a member of the Court?
- Using the chart on page 150, identify three characteristics shared by the majority of the members of the Court of Appeals, 2006.

Duties	
Process of becoming a justice on the Court of Appeals	
Characteristics	

-

Activity Six:
Structure of Judicial Branch – Appellate Courts

- Compare and contrast the Court of Appeals of NYS to the United States Supreme Court.
- You may list your answers. Use additional paper if necessary.

	NYS Court of Appeals	U.S. Supreme Court
Similarities		
Differences		

- Based on your research, which court is more powerful?
 Support your answer with specific examples or pieces of evidence.
 Explain your answer in a well-written essay, using complete sentences.
 Use other paper for your essay.

Activity Seven:
Understanding the Role of Local Government

Purpose:

To understand the various levels of local government and their affect on the lives of New York’s residents.

To determine how public services are delivered to residents in New York State.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)

Chapter Eighteen – 3,166 Local Governments: History and Structure

Background:

New York State has 3,166 independent government units at the local level that provide basic public services and levy taxes to support their delivery. These local government units fall under six categories: counties, cities, towns, villages, school districts, and fire districts.

Directions:

- Use the above materials and any other resources to help you complete the charts (graphic organizers) on the next pages. If your teacher allows, you may work with a partner to complete these activities. Use additional paper if needed, or put your information in your course notebook.

Chart I: LEVELS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

- Refer to the chart in the text on page 514. Determine the number of local government units in EACH of the six categories, according to the Office of the State Comptrollers’ *2005 Annual Report on Local Governments*.
- Next, based on the information provided in the chapter and your own experience, determine 3 – 5 *basic public services* provided by EACH level of local government. Indicate your responses in note form (one or two word descriptions) rather than complete sentences. Use additional paper if needed.

Chart 2: BASIC PUBLIC SERVICES

- Consider these questions while you complete this activity: *What does it mean to provide a service? What does it mean to serve the public? Why would a service considered to be “basic” to life in New York State?*
- Chart 2 contains a list of terms and locally provided services. Use the information in Chapter Eighteen and your own experience. Define each term or identify the service provided and explain, in your own words, why EACH is considered a *basic public service*.

Chart 3: LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN MY LIFE

- Write in the names of your local levels of government in the first column in Chart 3.
- Identify/list the various services you personally receive each week from the each level. Highlight or circle any services provided by more than one level of local government. *How many are in the “duplicated services” category?*
- In the last column, list all the services received by members of your family within the last 2 years. *How does a person’s age or health affect the kind of services received from local government levels?*

**Activity Seven:
Understanding the Role of Local Government**

Chart I. LEVELS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Category of Local Govt.	# Units in NYS	Major Roles & Responsibilities (list 3 -5 for each category of local government)
Counties		
Cities		
Towns		
Villages		
School Districts		
Fire Districts		

**Activity Seven:
Understanding the Role of Local Government**

Chart 2: BASIC PUBLIC SERVICES

Term/Service	Definition/services provided	Why is this a <i>basic public service</i> ?
human services		
district attorney		
coroner		
county clerk		
infrastructure maintenance		
public safety		
zoning boards		
municipal courts		
parks & recreation		
water/sewer		
property assessment		
emergency medical services (EMS)		
public school districts		

**Activity Seven:
Understanding the Role of Local Government**

Chart 3: LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN MY LIFE

Level of Local Govt. (Names of each)	Services I receive weekly (be specific)	Services received by family members
County (e.g. Rensselaer)		
City (e.g. Troy)		
Town		
Village		
School district		
Fire district		

Questions to Consider:

- How many services are provided by more than one level of local government? How many are in the “duplicated services” category?
- How does a person’s age or health affect the kind of services received from local government levels?

Activity Eight:
Upstate Problems and Promise

Purpose:

To identify and understand the social, political and economic differences between and challenges facing Upstate and Downstate New York.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)
 Chapter Three – The Upstate Challenge

Background:

For many New Yorkers, Westchester County divides the state into Downstate and Upstate – a regional short-hand meaning “New York City” and the remainder of the state. All too frequently, the division results in negative comparisons between a “progressive” metropolitan area and its more conservative “country cousins.”

Directions:

CONTRASTING REGIONS OF NYS

- Using pages 36 and 37 in the text and other available sources, contrast the Upstate counties with the region known as Downstate. Record your differences according to four categories: geographic; social; economic; and political. Circle or highlight any characteristics you consider to be advantages on the chart, and be ready to explain why. Use additional paper as needed.

	Downstate	Upstate
Geographic area (include names of counties and major cities)		
Social/cultural		
Economics		
Politics		

**Activity Eight:
Upstate Problems and Promise**

IDENTIFYING UPSTATE PROBLEMS

- Read pages 38-45
 Sections entitled:
 - ✓ A Dramatic Reversal of Economic Fortunes
 - ✓ A Rising Tide, then as Ebb, of Manufacturing Jobs
 - ✓ Sharp Decline in Upstate Cities
- Identify FIVE major problems facing Upstate NY at the beginning of the 21st century:

Problem 1	
Problem 2	
Problem 3	
Problem 4	
Problem 5	

- Compare your list of problems with that of another person in your class. Write additional problems in the space below.

Problem	
Problem	
Problem	
Problem	
Problem	

- Think about your own county or region. Put an “X” next to any of the above problems that affect your community.
- With a partner or in a small group (as directed by your teacher), select ONE of the above problems affecting your community and determine a plan of action that has been or could be realistically implemented to help solve the problem. Use Chapter Three of the Ward text, the Internet and your local newspapers to help with your research.
- In a written statement, briefly explain your action plan, identifying the specific problem and how your solution would help. Discuss your action plan with other class members.
- Compare your plan to the ideas proposed in October 2006 by then-candidate Eliot Spitzer (p. 53). How do your suggestions or solutions compare to Spitzer’s proposals?

Activity Eight:
Upstate Problems and Promise

Taking action....

- Using the format from ***Activity Ten: Citizen Action Strategies***, prepare an action plan to address a specific issue facing your community or region of NYS.
- Identify the level(s) of government responsible for this issue, and write a letter outlining your proposed solution. Include information from your research and/or action plan.
- Write a letter to the editor of your local newspaper, addressing the issue, why you feel it's a problem for your community, and what can be done to help the situation. Include information from your research and/or action plan.

Activity Nine:
The Role of Citizens in State Government

Purpose:

To identify the roles and responsibilities individual citizens have in state government.
To recognize ways in which citizens can affect and influence decision-making in the democratic process.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)
Chapter Twenty – The People’s Government

Directions:

Base your answers to the following questions on Chapter Twenty and your knowledge of social studies.

1. What specific qualifications does an individual have to meet in order to vote in New York State?

2. What percentage of registered voters in New York State cast a ballot in the 2002 gubernatorial election?

Bonus: to what public office does the adjective “gubernatorial” refer?

3. Why is it important for citizens in a democratic society to be informed about public issues? Support your answer with specific information.

Activity Nine:
The Role of Citizens in State Government

4. Identify five ways in which New York citizens can influence government decision-making. Use specific information in your answer.

5. In the 2000 election, which age group of citizens had the largest percentage of people exercising their right to vote?

Why do you believe this occurred?

6. In the 2000 election, which age group of citizens had the smallest percentage of people exercising their right to vote?

Why do you believe this occurred?
What strategies would you take to increase their participation in the democratic process?

Activity Ten: **Citizen Action Strategies**

Purpose:

To identify the roles and responsibilities individual citizens have in state government.
To recognize ways in which citizens can affect and influence decision-making in the democratic process.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)
Chapter Twenty – The People’s Government

Directions:

Chapter Twenty identifies six strategies (pp. 579 – 580) individual citizens can take to influence decision-making in state government. They are listed in the chart on the next page.

- In the column next to each strategy (action step), explain in your own words why it’s important or what it means.
- Select an issue about which you and/or your classmates are particularly concerned and want to influence people in authority. Keep in mind that the strongest efforts of citizen action result from issues that have direct or personal meaning to those citizens. Write your issue or concern in the appropriate box.
- Determine who is responsible for making decisions regarding this issue. This is your audience, the ones you hope to influence with your action plan. The audience could be your school board, your principal, parents, community leaders, or local and state legislators
- Determine what you want as the result of your actions, what the expected outcome will be. In other words, what do you want the people in authority to do with your issue? How will you know if your efforts paid off?
- Based on the identified strategies, develop some specific action steps you and/or your friends could take to influence your audience concerning your issue. Write your specific action steps next to the appropriate strategy.
- Review your action plan. Does it make sense? Are all the actions legal? Do they respect the rights of others? Are the action steps related to the issue and/or the intended outcome? Explain why you evaluated your plan the way you did. Write your assessment of your action plan in the appropriate box.
- Finally, determine any changes you may need to make to your action plan, or what you will do if your first plan fails (Plan B). Use additional paper if necessary.
- If your teacher allows, you may work with a partner to complete this activity.

**Activity Ten:
Citizen Action Strategies**

My issue or concern

Intended audience

An expected outcome or result of my actions

Strategy	Explanation/Importance	My action steps (What I/we plan to do)
Learn the issues		
Identify key actors and stakeholders		
Consider a wide range of potential outcomes, including goals that are highly ambitious		
Personalize the issue		
Assess the political landscape		
Find a champion		

Activity Ten:
Citizen Action Strategies

Assessment of my action plan (Is it reasonable? Will it achieve the desired outcome? Why or why not? What is needed to make it better?)

Plan B (What will I do if my first plan is unsuccessful?) Be specific.

**Activity Eleven:
Thinking About Local Control**

Purpose:

To analyze the effectiveness of local control vs. regionalization.
To connect information presented in the text to real-world problems facing New Yorkers.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)
Chapter Eighteen – 3,166 Local Governments: History and Structure
Chapter Nineteen – The State-Local Paradox pp. 557-558

Background:

“New York is home to a complex, costly local-government structure dating from colonial times and early U.S. history.” (Ward, p. 511)

Directions:

Use the above materials and any other resources to help you answer the following questions. If your teacher allows, you may work with a partner to complete these activities. Use additional paper if needed, or put your information in your course notebook.

1. Based on the information in Chapter Eighteen and your knowledge of social studies, identify *three advantages* to the local-government structure in NYS.

<i>Advantages of local governments in NYS</i>	

2. Based on the information in Chapter Eighteen and your knowledge of social studies, identify *three disadvantages* to the local –government structure in NYS.

<i>Disadvantages of local governments in NYS</i>	

3. Read pp. 515-516. In your own words, explain why NYS has 3,166 local governments.

Activity Eleven:
Thinking About Local Control

4. What is meant by “*regionalization*”?

5. According to the text and your knowledge of social studies, identify at least three reasons why New Yorkers are reluctant to regionalize or consolidate levels of local government, school districts and/or fire districts.

<i>Obstacles to regionalization in NYS</i>	

6. Property & School Taxes:

Who pays them? _____

How are they determined? _____

What is the STAR program? _____

How does the STAR program affect residential property owners?

Activity Eleven:
Thinking About Local Control

Thinking more about it and making it personal...

Essay or Discussion Questions:

Question #1:

Many communities in Upstate New York face declining population, increasing financial burdens, a decreasing tax base and costly duplication of services with nearby areas.

In your community, *is there a level of local government that has been recommended for consolidation or regionalization?* (For instance: joining 2 or more school districts in your geographic area; maintaining or creating an independent village/town government)

If so, identify:

- *the problem presented in your community*
- *the proposed change or recommendation*
- *the reasons for the recommendation (why/how this would solve the problem)*
- *the community members or groups that support and oppose the recommendation or proposed change.*

Next, determine:

- *What reasons do members of each side give to support their positions?*
- *Is the community problem on-going, or short-term?*
- *Has a resolution been reached?*
- *What alternatives have been presented to solving the problem?*
- *What's your opinion about this issue in your community?*

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**Question #2:**

In your opinion, *does the large number of local governments benefit New Yorkers?* Are some levels of local government more beneficial than others? How has technology affected this issue? Support your opinion with specific evidence and factual information.



**Activity Twelve:**  
**Upstate Challenge: Stopping “Bright Flight”**

**Purpose:**

To identify the reasons behind changes in population in New York State.

To analyze and discuss how factors affecting personal decisions relate to public issues and policies.

**Materials:**

*New York State Government* (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)

Chapter Three – The Upstate Challenge

Newspaper article: “Flight of Young Adults is Causing Alarm Upstate” –

Sam Roberts, *The New York Times*, June 13, 2006

**Background:**

New York is becoming grayer as young adults leave the state in large numbers, particularly after attending college. In the 1990’s, Upstate lost 10% of its population between the ages of 18 to 44. This exodus of young adults in their most productive professional years is creating a “bright flight” while raising concerns over the future tax base in the state.

**Directions:**

- **Read** pp. 46 – 54 in the text, and the following newspaper article, “Flight of Young Adults Is Causing Alarm Upstate,” originally published in *The New York Times* and referenced in Chapter Three of the text.
- **Create** a T-chart in your notebook like the one below:

| Information gained from readings –<br>What information did I learn?<br>What info surprised me? | Questions raised –<br>What do I need/want to learn more about? |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                                |                                                                |

- As you read, **take notes** using the T-chart. On the left side of the chart, write specific information you gained from the text and the article; on the right side, write questions raised in your mind by the reading. These questions will help you focus on what additional information you may need to learn more about this issue. You should have **at least 10 entries** in each column of the chart.
- Working with a partner or a small group of students (as directed by your teacher), **share the information** you have on your chart. On your chart, write any new information presented by your partner(s).
- With your partner(s), **discuss** whether or not you plan on remaining in New York State following your graduation from high school and/or college. Provide specific reasons for your decision – what criteria you are using to decide? What would make you change your mind? How might your decision affect New York’s future?

**Activity Twelve:**  
**Upstate Challenge: Stopping "Bright Flight"**

## **Flight of Young Adults Is Causing Alarm Upstate**

By SAM ROBERTS.

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The New York Times: June 13, 2006 Tuesday

Upstate New York is staggering from an accelerating exodus of young adults, new census results show. The migration is turning many communities grayer, threatening the long-term viability of ailing cities and raising concerns about the state's future tax base.

From 1990 to 2004, the number of 25-to-34-year-old residents in the 52 counties north of Rockland and Putnam declined by more than 25 percent. In 13 counties that include cities like Buffalo, Syracuse and Binghamton, the population of young adults fell by more than 30 percent. In Tioga County, part of Appalachia in New York's Southern Tier, 42 percent fewer young adults were counted in 2004 than in 1990.

"Make no mistake: this is not business as usual," Robert G. Wilmers, the chairman of M & T Bank in Buffalo, told his shareholders this spring. "The magnitude and duration of population loss among the young is unprecedented in our history. There has never been a previous 10-year period in the history of the upstate region when there has been any decline in this most vital portion of our population."

In New York City and the five suburban counties in New York State, the number of people ages 18 to 44 increased by 1.5 percent in the 1990's. Upstate, it declined by 10 percent.

Over all, the upstate population grew by 1.1 percent in the 1990's — slower than the rate for any state except West Virginia and North Dakota.

Population growth upstate might have lagged even more but for the influx of 21,000 prison inmates, who accounted for 30 percent of new residents. During the first half of the current decade, the pace of depopulation actually increased in many places.

David Shaffer, president of the Public Policy Institute, which is affiliated with the Business Council of New York State, described the hemorrhaging of young adults as "the worst kind of loss."

"You don't just magically make it up with new births," he said. "These are the people who are starting careers, starting families, buying homes."

In almost every place upstate, emigration rates were highest among college graduates, producing a brain drain, according to separate analyses of census results for The New York Times by two demographers, William Frey of the Brookings Institution and Andrew A. Beveridge of Queens College of the City University of New York. Among the nation's large metropolitan areas, Professor Frey said, Buffalo and Rochester had the highest rates of what he called "bright flight."

Irwin L. Davis, president of the Metropolitan Development Association in Syracuse, which promotes economic growth in central New York, said, "We're educating them and they're leaving."

And Gary D. Keith, vice president and regional economist for M & T Bank, said, "Sluggish job growth is the biggest driver of out-migration among young upstate adults."

The decline in the 1990's in the population ages 18 to 44 of the 52-county upstate region was "chilling," he said.

"When the jobs don't grow, the people go," Mr. Keith said.

Matthew O'Brien, a graduate of Siena College in Loudonville, N.Y., was 26 when he left his home in Troy, just northeast of Albany, a decade ago for a better job offer down South.

**Activity Twelve:**  
**Upstate Challenge: Stopping “Bright Flight”**

He first moved to South Carolina, and now lives with his wife, Melissa, a Rochester expatriate, and their two children in Tampa, Fla., where he handles manufacturing operations for the company that makes Bubble Wrap packaging.

"I guess if I look back and think of the people I went to high school with, they all kind of went away to college, and that might have been a steppingstone to building a career," Mr. O'Brien said. "Not a lot did come back."

Some of the decline in the number of young adults may also have reflected children who left in the 1970's or 1980's with their parents.

Mr. O'Brien's parents still live in Troy, which was known in the 19th century for the manufacture of detachable collars and also led the nation at one point in iron and steel production. All but two of his eight siblings moved away, though.

While the chronic economic woes upstate have been of growing concern for a decade or more, the accelerating departure of young people is considered particularly alarming.

It has already been injected into this year's campaign for governor, with both major candidates, Eliot Spitzer and John Faso, highlighting population stagnation there and the need to help spur business activity.

Last month, after graduating with a master's degree in engineering from Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Andrew Allen, 23, returned to his parents' home in Greece, a Rochester suburb. He is weighing job possibilities and may pursue a doctoral degree.

But staying in Rochester, where his father works at Kodak, the city's second-largest employer, is probably not one of his options.

"Rochester is on the list, but do I think I'll work here? Probably not," he said. "When you think Rochester, you think Kodak. But you also think layoffs."

Of eight close friends of Mr. Allen's from high school, one is finishing graduate school in Rochester and one has decided to start a career there, he said. The others have left.

As more young people depart, the population is aging. In Broome County, which includes Binghamton in the Southern Tier, the median age rose to 38.2 in 2004 from 33.3 in 1990.

"The number of upstate residents 45 or older increased by 15.3 percent, even as the number of young people, on whom they rely to hold jobs and pay taxes, went down sharply," Mr. Wilmers of M & T Bank said.

The number of young adults was expected to decline naturally as baby boomers, some of whom were younger than 35 in 1990, grew older. Only two counties in the state -- Manhattan and Queens -- actually gained young adults from 1990 to 2000.

From 1990 to 2004, all but one of the state's 62 counties recorded a decline in 25-to-34-year-olds, ranging from 1 percent in Manhattan to 42 percent in Tioga.

The sole gainer was neighboring Tompkins County in the Finger Lakes, where Cornell University, Ithaca College and tourism have boosted the job market.

The numerical decline during that period in Erie County, around Buffalo, was second only to the decline in Nassau County, where high home prices have also driven away many young adults. In Syracuse, total population losses may have been stanching since 2000 as children have returned to take

**Activity Twelve:**  
**Upstate Challenge: Stopping “Bright Flight”**

care of aging parents, jobs have become available in more diverse fields and housing prices have become more affordable. "It's given us some hope that we're going to arrest the continuing decline of young people," said Mr. Davis, of the Metropolitan Development Association there.

In the Rochester area, Andrew Allen's older sister, Laura Jeanne Hammond, 26, returned to her hometown after graduating in 2001 from the University of Missouri with a journalism degree. She was hired as managing editor of Next Step Magazine, which is distributed in school guidance offices, and also founded a social group, Rochester-Area 20-Somethings. "My friends escaped to New York City for a life of poverty and I bought a house and started a family," she said.

Since people in a specific age group in 1990 are not the same people counted in 2004, it would be imprecise to say that the population declines in the 25-to-34 age group represented people who necessarily moved out.

In 1999, upstate residents were asked in a poll for M & T Bank if they intended to move to another state in the next five years. Fully 40 percent of 18-to-30-year-olds replied yes. Most people said they would head to the South or the West. But among young adults, a high percentage said they were uncertain where they would wind up.

Among all people who left Erie County, according to an analysis by M & T Bank of data from 2003 tax returns, about half moved elsewhere in the state. About as many moved to Los Angeles County as moved to either Manhattan or Brooklyn.

Rolf Pendall, a Cornell University professor who studied population losses for the Brookings Institution, said: "Upstate New York and the great bulk of the territory of Pennsylvania are unusual in the United States in that this is an urbanized region, with 15 million residents in a couple dozen census-defined metropolitan areas. The Upper Great Plains, Lower Mississippi Delta and Appalachia are also regions that have lost population -- and have in fact bled people for decades -- but they are rural. They share, of course, issues of serious and long-term economic transition and transformation."

Catherine Richter, 23, a public relations executive, was raised in the Hudson Valley, attended the State University of New York at Geneseo and went to work in Rochester, but after becoming a victim of several minor crimes, she asked for a transfer to Albany. There, she joined a group similar to the one Laura Hammond founded in Rochester.

"The other option for a lot of people my age is to move down South, but I don't think that's for me," Ms. Richter said. "One of the main missions of the group is to stop the brain drain. And we're trying to do that by increasing the arts scene and lots of networking."

**Activity Thirteen:**  
**Reform: What? Why? How?**

**Purpose:**

To identify systemic problems within New York State government most frequently targeted for reform.

To determine feasible alternatives to “business as usual”, that might create greater responsiveness, efficiency and transparency in NYS governance.

To develop articulate, supported individual position statements based on these issues.

**Materials:**

*New York State Government* (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)

Chapter Two – Reform: Is This the Time?

**Background:**

Since the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, major proposals have been made to change four processes in NYS: the way in which the budget is developed; how laws are made and passed; the influence of money in political campaigns and lobbying; and how legislative districts are drawn. Voters and politicians alike question: What actually gets accomplished? What doesn't, and why? Who are the decision-makers? How does the process affect the voters? What obstacles stand in the way of efficiency and effectiveness, and do we need to change the foundation of our state government – New York's Constitution?

**Directions:**

Chapter Two examines four major categories of process-related change: the budget process; the legislative process; political influence of money; and legislative redistricting.

**IDENTIFYING THE ISSUE/CHANGING THE SYSTEM**

- Using information from Chapter Two and your knowledge of social studies, complete the chart: CHANGING THE SYSTEM. Use extra paper if needed. If your teacher allows, you may work with a partner to complete this chart.
  
- For each category of process-related change, provide answers to the following questions:
  - What is the current process – how are things currently done?
  - What problems does the current process have? Why do people believe change is needed?
  - What specific change(s) are proposed?
  - Will this change require a change to the state Constitution?
  
- In the box at the bottom of the chart, explain in your own words what is meant by a *transparent process*.
  
- *Questions to consider* – Based on the chart, information in Chapter Two, and your knowledge of social studies:
  - How does money affect or influence each of the four processes?
  - Why might New York voters be ready to see change in the way their government operates?
  - How “transparent” are any of the four processes outlined in the chart?
  - In your opinion, are the voters benefiting from the current processes?

**Activity Thirteen:**  
**Reform: What? Why? How?**

**Chart: CHANGING THE SYSTEM**

|                                                          | The Current Process | Problems – need for change | Proposed changes | NY Const. change? |
|----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Budget process                                           |                     |                            |                  |                   |
| Legislative process                                      |                     |                            |                  |                   |
| Campaign finance & lobbying reform                       |                     |                            |                  |                   |
| Legislative redistricting                                |                     |                            |                  |                   |
| Define “transparent process” as it applies to government |                     |                            |                  |                   |

**Activity Thirteen:**  
**Reform: What? Why? How?**

**TAKING A STAND**

In a *position statement* you choose a side of an issue and defend it with supporting evidence.

- Using the information in Chapter Two and the chart: CHANGING THE SYSTEM, select ONE process recommended for reform. Determine how you feel about the current process selected and any proposed changes, and explain why you agree or disagree with the need for change in a supported position statement.
- Use the graphic organizer that follows to help you organize your information. Include the following information (use the chart for assistance):
  - the specific process needing change;
  - the problem with the current process;
  - your position on the issue – Does the process need to be changed or not? Do you support the change, or oppose it? What are your reasons for doing so? What other groups of people or organizations agree with you?
  - an alternate solution or change, if you don't agree with the one(s) recommended
- Word process the completed draft of your position statement.

**GRAPHIC ORGANIZER**

**Identify the process, the problem and the proposed change:**

| The Process<br>needing reform | The Problem(s)<br>w/ the current process | The Proposed Change(s)<br>to solve the problem(s) |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
|                               |                                          |                                                   |

**Identify my position:**

|                                                  |
|--------------------------------------------------|
| <p><b>My position</b> (am I for or against?)</p> |
| <p><b>Explanation</b> (because?)</p>             |

**Activity Thirteen:**  
**Reform: What? Why? How?**

**Support your ideas:**

**Evidence/Reason**

**Evidence/Reason**

**Evidence/Reason**

**Alternative Solution:**

**My Solution to the problem:**

**Why I think it would work:**

**Conclusion.** Sum up your opinion and examples about the issue to make your point a final time.

**Combine your notes into a well-written position statement (essay).**

Word-process your drafts to make revisions and editing easier.

Use correct spelling, grammar, and punctuation.

Remember to support your statements with evidence.



**Activity Fourteen:**

**Constructed Response Question – Department of Motor Vehicles**

**Purpose:**

To understand how technological advancements increase the responsibilities and change the operation of state government.

**Materials:**

*New York State Government* (Robert B. Ward, 2nd edition, 2006)

Chapter Fourteen – Transportation and Economic Development

p. 379 – “Department of Motor Vehicles”

**Directions:**

Base your answers to the following questions on the above selection and your knowledge of social studies.

1. Before it became a separate department of New York State government in 1959, the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) was a bureau within another department. Identify it.

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2. What popular consumer product required the creation of the DMV in the late 1950s?

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3. What are the major governmental responsibilities of the Department of Motor Vehicles?

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4. Identify three specific changes made to improve “customer relations” between licensed drivers in New York State and the Department of Motor Vehicles during Governor Cuomo’s administration, and the problems these changes hoped to resolve.

| <b>DMV Improvements</b> | <b>Problem(s) Resolved by the Change</b> |
|-------------------------|------------------------------------------|
|                         |                                          |
|                         |                                          |
|                         |                                          |

**Activity Fourteen:**

**Constructed Response Question – Department of Motor Vehicles**

5. During Governor Pataki’s administration in the 1990s, new technology led to further changes in the way in which the DMV carried out its responsibilities. Identify three specific technological changes and the way in which each change affected New York’s drivers.

| <b>Technological advancement (invention)</b> | <b>Affect on NY drivers</b> |
|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                                              |                             |
|                                              |                             |
|                                              |                             |

6. In the 1990s, travel by automobile increased while the numbers of fatal accident decreased. What might be one reason for this occurrence? Use specific evidence in developing your answer.

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***Activity Fourteen:***

**Constructed Response Question – Department of Motor Vehicles**

***Learning & Thinking more about it...***

*Research Activity:*

Use the Chronology of New York State History, Chapter Fourteen and your classroom text.

- Make a timeline of changes in transportation in the state in the last 200 years.
- On your timeline, highlight three changes that required the creation of new legislation, agencies, or other changes in New York government.
- In complete sentences, identify and explain the change in government resulting from each change in transportation.
- How has each change made a difference in your life? How has each change affected the residents of New York?

*Essay Question:*

In your opinion, what political, economic or social event has had the greatest impact on the public authorities governing transportation in New York?

In your answer, be certain you:

- Identify the specific event and date in which it occurred.
- Explain why you believe it to be significant.
- Identify the effects or results of the event on public transportation authorities at the time it occurred and now.
- Use specific examples or pieces of evidence to support your position.
- Use the conventions of standard English
- Use other paper for your response

## **Activity Fifteen:**

### **Compare & Contrast – Organizing research results**

#### **Purpose:**

- To understand the impact of technological advancements on the economy of New York State.
- To compare and contrast an engineering feat of the 19th century with one of the 20th century.
- To recognize the affect of transportation on communication and social reform.
- To use research questions as a focus for data collection.
- To organize data collected through research in a useful format.

#### **Materials:**

*New York State Government* (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)

Chapter Fourteen – Transportation and Economic Development

Pp. 375-383: “Early Transportation and the Great Canal;” “Growth and Decline of the Canal System;” “Changes in Administrative Structure;” “Modern Department of Transportation;” “The Thruway.”

#### **Background:**

In the 19th century, the opening of the Erie Canal was considered an engineering marvel. It united the waters of the Atlantic Ocean with the Great Lakes, and changed the economic and social development of New York. The creation of the Thomas E. Dewey Thruway in the mid-20th century was a similar construction feat that greatly affected the residents of New York and the nation.

#### **Directions:**

- Read the identified pages of Chapter Fourteen.
- Using information from the text, compare and contrast in a chart the economic and social impact of the Erie Canal, completed in 1825, with the Thomas E. Dewey Thruway, completed in 1955.
- Use the questions on the next page to focus your research. You may add other questions to the list as you re-read the identified selections or conduct your research.
- As you read each question, highlight or circle the key words of each question, or write one word next to the question that sums up the main idea or topic of that question. These words will become the categories for your chart. (The first one is done for you.)
- Set up you chart with three columns: Categories/Topic; Erie Canal; Thruway.
- The number of topics you highlighted will determine the number of rows in your chart. List them in the first column. Your collected data (information) will go in the appropriate boxes. Make certain you leave enough room for your answers.

## ***Activity Fifteen:***

### **Compare & Contrast – Organizing research results**

#### **Research Focus Questions**

- What was the **main purpose** or reason it was built?
- Why was it considered necessary?
- What method(s) of transportation did it replace or affect?
- Which governor is given credit for its construction?
- When was construction begun?
- When was it completed?
- What made its construction difficult? (Why is it considered a feat of engineering?)
- How much did it cost? How was the construction financed (paid for)?
- How long is it?
- Which groups of people benefited from its construction?
- Which groups of people were negatively affected?
- Who was/is responsible for governing and operating it?
- How was/is its operation financially supported?
- How did it change since its original completion?
- How did its use change the way people lived in New York State?
- How did it affect population patterns (where people live)?
- How did it make a difference to the economy of the state?
- How is it used today?

## ***Activity Fifteen:***

### **Compare & Contrast – Organizing research results**

#### ***Learning & Thinking more about it...***

##### *Research Activity:*

Use the Chronology of New York State History, Chapter Fourteen and your classroom text.

- Make a timeline of changes in transportation in the state in the last 200 years.
- On your timeline, highlight three changes that required the creation of new legislation, agencies, or other changes in New York government.
- In complete sentences, identify and explain the change in government resulting from each change in transportation.
- How has each change made a difference in your life? How has each change affected the residents of New York?

##### *Essay Question:*

In your opinion, what political, economic or social event has had the greatest impact on the public authorities governing transportation in New York?

In your answer, be certain you:

- Identify the specific event and date in which it occurred.
- Explain why you believe it to be significant.
- Identify the effects or results of the event on public transportation authorities at the time it occurred and now.
- Use specific examples or pieces of evidence to support your position.
- Use the conventions of standard English
- Use other paper for your response

**Activity Sixteen:  
Public Authorities**

**Purpose:**

To understand how public authorities benefit the state and its residents while contributing to state debt.

**Materials:**

*New York State Government* (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)  
Chapter Eleven – State Debt and Public Authorities

**Directions:**

Use the above materials and any other resources to help you answer the following questions. If your teacher allows, you may work with a partner to complete these activities. Use additional paper if needed, or put your information in your course notebook.

1. List the four conditions under which New York may borrow money, according to the state Constitution (p. 281):

a. \_\_\_\_\_

b. \_\_\_\_\_

c. \_\_\_\_\_

d. \_\_\_\_\_

2. What is a *public authority*? Explain how it is different from a state agency.

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

3. Identify two reasons why public authorities are so important to New York State government (p. 283).

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**Activity Sixteen:  
Public Authorities**

4. From what sources do public authorities receive money to operate (p. 286)?

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5. Name five public authorities in existence today and describe how each benefits the state (pp. 287-290).

| Public Authority | Function – what it does |
|------------------|-------------------------|
|                  |                         |
|                  |                         |
|                  |                         |
|                  |                         |
|                  |                         |

6. How are public authorities involved in rebuilding lower Manhattan following the attack on the World Trade Center?

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7. How do public authorities affect state debt (money the state owes)? \_\_\_\_\_

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**Activity Sixteen:  
Public Authorities**

***Thinking more about it and making it personal...***

Discussion Question #1:

Look at the chart of Major New York State Public Authorities, and those listed in Chapter Eleven.

- *What public authorities influence your community and/or life?* (For instance, do you live near or drive on the Thruway?)
- Is the influence positive, negative or mixed?
- Be specific and support your answer with evidence.

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Discussion Question #2:

Based on information in Chapter Eleven and your knowledge of social studies,

- *Do you think public authorities and the state's borrowing practices are assets or liabilities to New York taxpayers?*
- Support your opinion with specific evidence and factual information.
- If you consider them to be liabilities, *what changes would you make to the current system?*

Activity Seventeen:
Reading & Research – Health & Mental Hygiene

Purpose:

To comprehend the main concepts and ideas of an informative text.
To recognize the role of State government in dealing with public health issues.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)
Chapter Twelve – Health and Mental Hygiene

Directions:

Base your answers to the following questions on Chapter Twelve and your knowledge of social studies.

1. Why is the protection of public health an important concern for federal, state and local governments? Support your answer with specific evidence.

2. How do various levels of government use the media in their efforts to keep New Yorkers healthy? Provide specific examples in your answer.

Activity Seventeen:
Reading & Research – Health & Mental Hygiene

3. Why is the mental health of its residents an important issue for local and state governments? Use specific information in your answer.

4. Identify four ways in which poor mental health or mental illness affects the “quality of life” for all residents in a region and state. Use specific information in your answer.

5. Why are alcoholism and substance abuse considered a public health issue? Support your answer with specific evidence.

6. Why is the cost of health care so high in New York when compared to other states? Use specific evidence in your response.

<p><i>Activity Seventeen:</i> Reading & Research – Health & Mental Hygiene</p>
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Learning & thinking more about it...

Analyzing Trend Data:

- Review census data and other demographic information for your region and New York State for the past 20-30 years.
- What are some patterns or trends you can identify by studying this information?
- Based on this information from the recent past, what predictions could you make for your region and state, assuming similar patterns and trends will continue?
- How might these affect public health issues and costs in the next decade?
- How will these affect you in your lifetime?
- Remember to use specific examples or evidence in your responses.

Activity Eighteen
Reading & Research – Medicaid

Purpose:

To comprehend the main concepts and ideas of an informative text.
To recognize the role of State government in dealing with public health issues.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)
Chapter Twelve – Health and Mental Hygiene

Directions:

Base your answers to the following questions on Chapter Twelve and your knowledge of social studies.

1. What is Medicaid? Use your own words to define the program.

2. Medicaid was designed to help two specific groups of New Yorkers. Explain who they are and how the program expected to provide assistance.

3. What specific types of services are funded under Medicaid?

Activity Eighteen

Reading & Research – Medicaid

4. What levels of government pay for programs and services provided under Medicaid? Why are these levels responsible for financing Medicaid?

5. Identify two ways in which **Medicare** differs from **Medicaid**.

6. Why is the cost of Medicaid so high in New York when compared to similar programs in other states? Use specific evidence in your response.

Activity Nineteen:
Guided Reading & Research – Using a primary source

Purpose:

- To comprehend the main idea and supporting details of a primary source document.
- To utilize reference materials and guide questions to develop better comprehension while reading text.
- To view an historic event and period through the eyes of an individual from that period.

Materials:

- New York State Government* (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)
Chapter Five – The Legislature, p. 103: “New York City is Pie for the Hayseeds”
- Various reference materials: Dictionary, biographical dictionary, Internet
- Classroom U.S. history texts

Directions:

Read the selection from *New York State Government*
Page 103: “New York City is Pie for the Hayseeds”

- Use the reading selection and any other resources to help you answer the following questions.
- Unless specifically directed to “list” your responses, put all answers in complete sentences. Spelling counts. If needed, use additional paper for your answers.

1. Define “legislative apportionment”

2. This selection is an excerpt from an interview with George Washington Plunkitt. Who was he and why was he important in New York City and New York State government?

Activity Nineteen:
Guided Reading & Research – Using a primary source

3. A reference is made to “Tammany Hall.” It is both a location and a political symbol. Identify both meanings in the space below.

Location:

Political symbol:

What is a political machine?

Who was considered the “Boss” of Tammany Hall in the mid 1800s?

4. What is Plunkitt’s attitude towards lawmakers from districts outside of New York City?

5. According to Plunkitt, who has more “real freedom and home rule” than New York City residents?

Activity Nineteen:
Guided Reading & Research – Using a primary source

6. Who does Plunkitt believe controls New York City?
Support your answer with TWO specific examples from the reading.

7. Define “hayseed”

8. Why does Plunkitt believe NYC should have a stronger voice in NYS government?

9. This excerpt is a “primary source document.” Explain why.

Activity Twenty: Legislative Influence

Purpose:

To understand the extent of legislative influence and responsibility within New York State.
To identify, analyze and categorize historic events according to areas of legislative influence.
To identify specific examples of general concepts.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)
Chapter Five – The Legislature
Chronology of New York State History

Directions:

- In the chart on the next page, identify 12 major areas of influence in which New York State legislators regularly develop laws (statutes). Use Chapter Five of *New York State Government*, pp. 106-108, to help you with this research.
- Then, using the Chronology of New York State History – 19th, 20th and 21st centuries, find an event that is an example of each area of influence. Write the complete event, including year, in the box next to the appropriate area of influence.
- Use additional paper if necessary to complete your chart.

Learning and thinking more about it....

- *Thought questions:*
 - How have changes in technology affected the areas in which legislation has been created?
 - Select five major areas of influence from your list.
Is legislation or government intervention necessary in these areas? Why or why not?
If action is needed, should it be taken by the government, or by the private sector?
Support your opinion with specific evidence.

Activity Twenty-one:
Guided Reading – Public Education in New York

Purpose:

To understand the roles and responsibilities of New York State government in public education.
To identify the significant contributions New York has made to the development of public education around the nation.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)
Chapter Thirteen – Education: pp. 336-345

Background:

From the earliest beginnings of its government, New York State has recognized the importance of educating its residents. Many of the regulations, programs, policies and reforms initiated in New York were adopted by other states around the nation.

Directions:

Read the above selection from Chapter Thirteen. Use information from the selection, your knowledge of social studies, and any other resources to help you answer the following questions. If your teacher allows, you may work with a partner.

Short Answer Questions

1. Under the New York State constitution, what is the official name of the Board of Regents?

2. The root words of the noun “jurisdiction” are “juris,” meaning “right or law,” and “dictio,” meaning “speaking, to say, to point out in words.” Using a dictionary, how the word is used in the passage, and the root meanings, define “jurisdiction” in your own words.

3. Using the information in the passage, list the educational programs governed by the Board of Regents. In the second column, name a specific example of each program in your region of New York (for instance: elementary schools – P.S. 25).

EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS	SPECIFIC EXAMPLES

Activity Twenty-one:
Guided Reading – Public Education in New York

4. According to the passage, how does an individual become a member of the Board of Regents?

5. In your own words, identify the educational responsibilities of school superintendents in the 1790s.

6. According to the passage, in what ways did the school systems of the Dutch and the English differ?

7. The educational system of New York State is based on three key ideas. Identify these key ideas in your own words.

8. Name the New York governor who created the State Education Department in 1901.

Activity Twenty-one:

Guided Reading – Public Education in New York

9. Name the two agencies that were combined to form the State Education Department in 1901.

_____ & _____

10. List three non-instructional responsibilities of the State Education Department.

11. As student populations grew, the number of school districts decreased. In your own words, explain why this occurred.

Base your answers to the next four questions (#12 – #15) on the passage, “Toward Universal Schooling” (p. 250).

12. What is meant by “free and universal education?”

13. List three reasons why both urban and rural workers support “free and universal” public education.

14. Who pays for public education in New York State? _____

Activity Twenty-one:

Guided Reading – Public Education in New York

15. In the chart below, identify 5 specific changes (reforms) made to the education system in New York State. Next to each change, provide a reason why this change may have occurred.

EDUCATIONAL REFORM	REASON FOR REFORM

<p><i>Activity Twenty-one:</i> Guided Reading – Public Education in New York</p>
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Learning & Thinking more about it...

Research Activity:

Use the Chronology of New York State History.

- Make a timeline of changes to public education in the state in the last 200 years.
- Highlight those changes still in effect today.
- Identify the changes that you feel have most positively affected you. Explain why you selected each. How has each change made a difference in your life? How does each change affect your ability as a productive member of your community?

Thought Question:

What political, economic or social event has had the greatest impact on public education? In your answer, be certain you:

- Identify the specific event and date in which it occurred.
- Explain why you believe it to be significant.
- Identify the effects or results of the event on public education, then and now.
- Use specific examples or pieces of evidence to support your position.
- Use the conventions of standard English
- Use other paper for your response

Activity Twenty-two:
Constructed Response Question – Interpreting a Chart (Education)

Purpose:

To analyze and interpret information presented in an informational chart.
To recognize the influence of international events, history and public opinion on what students are expected to study in school.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)
Chapter Thirteen – Education
Page 349: “Selected New York State Curriculum Mandates”

Directions:

Base your answers to the following questions on the chart and your knowledge of social studies. Unless otherwise directed, write your answers in complete sentences. If needed, use other paper to complete your work.

1. In 1947, what four subjects were added to the topics all teachers were required to teach in New York State?

2. Two subjects mandated in 1947 have a common theme. Identify the two subjects and explain what they have in common.

Activity Twenty-two:

Constructed Response Question – Interpreting a Chart (Education)

3. What national or international events occurring in the years prior to 1947 may have contributed to these subjects being added to New York’s educational curriculum?

4. What subject was added to NYS curriculum in 1977?

5. What national events, patterns or trends in the 1960’s and 1970’s probably contributed to the addition of this subject?

Activity Twenty-three:
Research, Thinking & Writing about Education

Purpose:

To use information from a variety of resources as supporting evidence in developing thematic essays.

To understand the roles and responsibilities of public education in a democratic society.

To understand how education influences and is influenced by changes in society, economics, technology and political events.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)

Chapter Thirteen – Education

Chronology of New York State History

Directions:

Use information from Chapter Thirteen, the Chronology of New York State History, your knowledge of social studies, and any other resources to help you complete the activities in this section. These tasks are designed to be developed as essays, but may also be used for discussion, debate, or further projects, as determined by your teacher.

Thought Question # 1:

Background:

New Yorkers experienced much social, political, and technological change during the 19th and 20th centuries. As a result, New York State government developed new programs, policies and regulations for educating its residents. Some of these changes were in response to national events, but others were the result of events directly affecting life in New York.

Task:

In a well-documented essay, explain how public education in New York changed during the 19th and 20th centuries in response to social, political and technological events.

In your response:

- Identify at least one social, political *and* technological event that affected New Yorkers in the 19th and/or 20th centuries (minimum of three events).
- Explain how public education in New York changed as a result of these events.
- Use the conventions of standard English grammar and punctuation.

Activity Twenty-three:
Research, Thinking & Writing about Education

Thought Question #2:

While issues concerning public education are important to all New Yorkers, students in the many schools across the State are usually those most directly affected.

- Read pages 345-350, and review the events of the 19th and 20th centuries from the Chronology of New York State History.
- Select three changes made to public education in New York State that have had the most effect on you as a student.
- In a well-written essay, identify the specific changes you selected and explain how each has affected your life as a student in New York.
- Use the conventions of standard English grammar and punctuation.
- Use other paper for your answer.

Research and Thought Question # 3:

Background:

Charter schools, private schools, and home schooling are several alternatives to public education. Each alternative has its defenders and detractors. Questions and concerns frequently center on financial responsibility (who should pay for these programs?); content and materials (what's being taught, and what's being used to teach it?); and assessment (what do students know, and how is it measured?).

Tasks:

- Define in your own words the terms: *charter school*; *private school*; *home schooling*.
- Compare and contrast: Explain how each alternative is similar to and different from public schools. Include in your comparison: location/building; teacher(s); materials; number of students in program/class; length of day; any other areas you feel are important to your answer.
- Identify the ways in which public school districts are mandated (directed by law) to support each alternative education program.
- Create a chart or develop a list that identifies ways in which each of these alternative programs must follow New York State requirements. In your answer, include: curriculum; materials; testing; reporting and record keeping.

Thinking more about alternative education programs....

In a well-written answer, write your responses to the following questions.

- When the State financially supports alternative education programs, what is the source of the money? Who pays for these programs? Who pays for public schools?
- Should the State government support and fund programs that are alternatives to public education? Explain your answer and support your opinion with at least three specific pieces of evidence. Use other paper for your answer.

Activity Twenty-three:
Research, Thinking & Writing about Education

Research and Thought Question # 4:

- Why did the writers of the U.S. Constitution reserve power over education for state governments? You may list your reasons.
- Do these reasons make sense in the 21st century? Why or why not? Support your reasons with specific evidence.
- What evidence is there that the federal government is interested in taking a greater role in public education? In your response, cite specific examples.

Activity Twenty-four:

Constructed Response Question – Using a Primary Source

Purpose:

To comprehend the main idea and supporting details of a primary source document.
To view an historic event and period through the eyes of an individual from that period.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)
Chapter Twelve – Health and Mental Hygiene, p. 327: “Report by Dorothea Dix”

Directions:

Read the selection from *New York State Government*

Page 327: “Report by Dorothea Dix”

- Base your answers to the following questions on the reading passage and your knowledge of social studies.

1. What social reforms did Dorothea Dix want to occur?

2. Whose support was Dorothea Dix hoping to gain?

3. A reference is made to an “alms-house.” What is meant by this term? Who would be its residents?

Activity Twenty-four:

Constructed Response Question – Using a Primary Source

4. What specific living conditions did Dorothea Dix identify as unsafe or unsanitary?

5. Identify three specific ways in which the residents of the alms-house were treated harshly.

6. What are two methods Dorothea Dix used to achieve her goals?

7. This excerpt is a “primary source document.” Explain why.

Activity Twenty-five:
Constructed Response Question – West Nile Virus

Purpose:

To comprehend the main idea and supporting details of a reading passage.
To recognize the role of State government in dealing with public health issues.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)
Chapter Twelve – Health and Mental Hygiene
P. 308: “Public Health: What Was Old is New Again”

Directions:

Base your answers to the following questions on the reading passage, “Public Health: What Was Old is New Again,” and your knowledge of social studies.

1. In your own words, explain the danger West Nile virus presents to the human body.

2. What local, state and federal government agencies are responsible for reacting to a public health threat?

Local:

State:

Federal:

3. By what means is the West Nile virus spread?

Activity Twenty-five:
Constructed Response Question – West Nile Virus

4. What attempts have been made to protect the public against infection by the West Nile virus?

5. Identify ways in which all residents can help prevent the spread of West Nile virus.

6. What are some other ways in which public health may be threatened that would require similar wide-scale responses by government agencies at various levels? Use specific examples in your response.

7. What did the writer of this reading selection want to accomplish?

Activity Twenty-six:

Drawing Conclusions – Government Response to Health Concerns

Purpose:

To identify major public health issues of concern to State and federal governments in the past and present.

To recognize the role and reactions of New York State government in dealing with public health issues.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)

Chapter Twelve – Health and Mental Hygiene

Chronology of New York State History

Background:

Government interest in public health began early in the history of New York and continues to this day.

Directions:

Using information from Chapter Twelve, the Chronology of New York State History, and other available resources:

- Identify some of the major public health issues facing New York State throughout history.
- Identify what measures or actions local, state and/or federal government took in response to these issues.
- Use the chart on the next page to organize your research.
- In the spaces below, write three conclusions you made based on your research.

Conclusion #1

Conclusion #2

Conclusion #3

Activity Twenty-six:**Drawing Conclusions – Government Response to Health Concerns**

Time period	Public health issues & concerns	Government response
1790s		
1800s - 1850s		
1860s - 1900		
1901 – 1940s		
1950s – 1990s		
1990s - present		

Activity Twenty-seven:

Research & Writing – The News Media and State Legislators

Purpose:

To identify the role of the news media in the democratic process.

To recognize ways in which the news media can affect an informed citizenry.

To determine the accuracy of public statements through personal research.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)

Chapter Twenty – The People’s Government

Background:

In his book, *Running with the Machine: A Journalist’s Eye-Opening Plunge into Politics* (Albany, 2001), Dan Lynch makes the following comment:

“Its almost total lack of attentiveness has made the press virtually irrelevant in informing the voters who the candidates are and what they really stand for.” (Ward, p. 585)

Task #1:

In a well-constructed essay, agree or disagree with the above quote, using information from Chapter Fifteen and your knowledge of social studies. Use other paper for your response.

In your response:

- Identify your position.
- Identify the forms of media available for informing citizens about local and state politics.
- Explain how each has or has not fulfilled its role regarding the issue.
- Support your position with specific evidence.
- Use the conventions of standard English grammar and punctuation.

Task #2:

Working with a partner, *collect information* from an example of each of the various news media: local/regional newspaper, television newscast, radio station AND a newspaper published in one of New York’s large urban areas. (Many large newspapers publish daily editions on-line.) *Clip articles or take notes* regarding news items focusing on state lawmakers and local legislators. *Identify the topics or issues* of these news reports.

- What issues received the greatest attention? By which media?
- What individuals received the greatest coverage? By which media?
- What conclusions can you draw based on your research results?
- Does your research support the above quote by Dan Lynch? Cite specific evidence to support your position.

Activity Twenty-eight:

Thematic Essay – Federalism v. States’ Rights

Purpose:

To identify the continuing conflict between federalism and states’ rights in United States government.

To recognize issues currently facing our state and nation that affect the balance of power between federal and state government.

To determine the role of state government in relation to federal governance.

Materials:

New York State Government (Robert B. Ward, 2nd ed., 2006)

Appendix A – Federalism: What is the Role of State Government?

Background:

The Civil War, also referred to as the War Between the States, began as a conflict between federalism and states’ rights. More than one hundred years later the conflict remains.

Task:

In a well-constructed essay, explain how this conflict has continued to affect political decision-making into the 21st century. Use information from Chapter Sixteen and your knowledge of social studies to help you form your response. Use other paper for your response.

In your response:

- Identify the concepts of federalism and states’ rights, and why they may conflict.
- Identify four issues that continue to fuel this conflict in the 21st century.
- Explain the role of state and federal governments in relation to each of the identified issues.
- Determine if or how a balance of power can or should be struck between national and state power, responsibility and control regarding each issue.
- Consider the possible results of the opposite positions in the issues identified in your response.
- Support your position with specific evidence and/or examples.
- Use the conventions of standard English grammar and punctuation.

Chronology of New York State History

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>
1400s	
1400s	The Algonquians and the Iroquois were the two main groups living in New York.
1600s	
1609	Henry Hudson explored the Hudson River and claimed all that he could see as the Dutch colony of New Netherland.
1610s	
1614	The Dutch traveled up the Hudson River to establish a trading post.
1620s	
1623	Adriaen Jorisszen Tienpoint became the first director-general of New Netherland.
1624	Cornelis Jacobsen Mey became the director-general of New Netherland.
1624	The Dutch West India Company established a settlement at Fort Orange near present-day Albany.
1625	Willem Verhulst became director-general of New Netherland.
1626	Since Willem Verhulst had gained a bad reputation as a harsh ruler and manager, Peter Minuit assumed leadership as director-general. He later bought Manhattan Island from the Algonquians with trade items such as kettles, blankets, pots, etc., altogether worth \$24.
1626	The first West African slaves arrived in New Amsterdam.
1629	A group of directors asked for land grants to start their own colonies. The Charter of Freedoms and Exemptions was issued by the Dutch West India Company directors and a 16-mile tract of land was provided to any director who guaranteed to bring 50 settlers to the colony. In addition, the charter declared that settlers could buy land from Native Americans for farming.

1630s

1632 Bastiaen Jansz Krol became acting director-general.

1633 Wouter Van Twiller became director-general.

1638 William Kieft became director-general.

1640s

1640 Fearing the English would take over their colonies, The Dutch West India Company passed a new charter that removed all limits on land ownership and allowed all their residents to participate in the fur trade. This is how they attracted more settlers to their colonies.

1640 Lady Deborah Moody became the first European women to establish her own town in Northern America. She established Gravesend on the western tip of Long Island.

1641 Governor William Kieft called a 12-member council to gain support for a tax on the Algonkian natives. This is believed to be the first attempt at representative government in New York. The council was disbanded when they made additional demands that displeased the governor.

1644 Eleven African slaves requested freedom and the Dutch West India Company granted them such for their many years of service. However, their children were still to remain in slavery.

1647 Peter Stuyvesant was appointed director-general of New Netherland.

1640s The Dutch and the English fought over property rights.

1645 The Native Americans and the Dutch signed a peace agreement to put an end to their fighting, which had caused the death of 1,000 people.

1650s

1650 Since both Dutch New Netherland and English Connecticut claimed ownership of overlapping sections of Long Island, a deal was made to divide the island along Oyster Bay.

1653 The Dutch West India Company ordered Director-General Peter Stuyvesant to establish a city government, which later became the first city to receive a municipal charter for self-rule.

1655 The Dutch and Native Americans resumed their fighting after ten years of peace.

1658 A group of Dutch farmers founded New Haarlem, named after a city in the Netherlands. New Haarlem later became known as Harlem.

1660s

1660-1763	The Trade and Navigation Acts were gradually enacted.
1661	The Dutch and French settled in Staten Island.
1664	The Dutch surrendered New Netherland to the British. King Charles II gave control of the colony to his brother, James, the duke of York. Now a British colony, it is renamed New York.
1664	Richard Nicolls became director-general of the English colony.
1665	The Duke's Laws were passed when the Governor of New York, Richard Nicoll, gathered the representatives from Westchester, western Long Island, and Staten Island and asked them to accept the plan of restrictive government.
1668	Francis Lovelace became governor.

1670s

August 12, 1673	Cornelis Evertsen, Jr. became governor for one month.
1673	Anthony Colve became governor.
1674	Edmund Andros became English colonial governor.

1680s

1681	Captain Anthony Brockholl became acting governor.
1682-1730	A slave code was gradually enacted, which placed African slaves outside colonial society by creating laws that applied to them alone.
October 17, 1683	The first Assembly to appear in the colonies met for the first time at Fort James, near present-day Battery in Manhattan.
1683	New York Town became New York City.
1683	Thomas Dongan became governor on the duke of York's request. He was instructed to let the colonists elect an assembly.
1685	Huguenots, a group of French Protestant refugees escaping religious prosecution in Europe, settled in New Paltz.
1685	New York became a royal colony when James, the duke of York, became James II, the king of England.
1686	Sir Edmund Andros became governor of the newly organized Dominion of New England, which brought together New Jersey, New York and New England.
1687	Governor Sir Edmund Andros appointed Francis Nicholson as his lieutenant governor in New York.

1688	The King of England, James II, was overthrown after three years on the throne. He was a Roman Catholic serving in a country where the majority of people were Protestants.
1688	The news of King James II's fall led to an uprising where Governor Sir Edmund Andros and Lieutenant Governor Francis Nicholson were overthrown. New Yorkers then established a Committee of Safety and named Jacob Leisler as its head.
1689-1691	With the help of a militia, Jacob Leisler took control and served as leader until a new royal governor arrived from England.
1689-1763	The French and English began to fight a number of wars over control of land and trade. American historians later referred to these wars as the French and Indian Wars. When the English became more occupied with fighting the French then controlling their colonies, greater freedom and self-government was gained by the colonists, which eventually led to the revolution.
1689-1697	King William's War was fought during this period as the first in a series of French and Indian wars. In New York the war led to the destruction of Schenectady.

1690s

1691	Henry Sloughter became the new royal governor for the following 4 months.
1691	Richard Ingoldsby became acting governor.
1692	Benjamin Fletcher became governor.
1698	Richard Coote, the earl of Bellmont, served as the governor of New York.
1698	Governor Richard Coote restricted the cutting of white pine, the most popular lumber at the time.
1690s	Political and religious freedom was denied to all Catholics.

1700s

1700	A law was passed that prohibited the practice of Mass for Catholics and banned all priests from entering the colony.
1701	John Nanfan became acting governor.
1702	Lord Edward Hyde Cornbury became governor.
1702-1713	Queen Anne's War, the second of the French and Indian wars, was fought mainly in New England.
1708	Lord John Lovelace became governor.
1709	Richard Ingoldsby became acting governor.

1710s

1710	Escaping from religious oppression and war, a group of 2000 Germans arrived in New York.
1710	Gerardus Beckman became acting governor.
1710	Robert Hunter became governor.
1712	A slave rebellion occurred.
1719	Peter Schuyler became acting governor.

1720s

1720	William Burnet became governor.
1725	William Bradford established The New York <i>Gazette</i> as the colony's first newspaper. For the next tens years, the <i>Gazette</i> published anti-slavery advertisements.
1728	John Montgomerle became governor.

1730s

1730	The first artificial waterway (canal) in colonial New York opened near Utica.
1730	The first Jewish synagogue was created in New York City.
1731	Rip Van Dam became acting governor.
1732	William Cosby became acting governor.
1734	The first permanent almshouse was opened in New York City, combining the dual mission of dealing with poverty and criminality.
1735	John Peter Zenger published a series of articles in his newspaper, <i>The New-York Weekly Journal</i> , criticizing William Cosby, the royal governor. Governor Cosby accused him of libel and thus took the case to court. When Zenger won the case, this became a milestone in the battle for free press and the right to openly criticize government officials.
1736	George Clark became governor.

1740s

1741	A violent slave rebellion occurred where a number of people were hanged, including some Europeans who had helped in the rebellion.
1743	George Clinton became governor.
1744-1748	King George's War, another in the series of French and Indian wars, was fought. In New York, it destroyed Fort Saratoga.

1750s

1751	A tenant rebellion broke out on Livingston Manor and spread all throughout the Hudson Valley. Tenant farmers insisted that they should be able to purchase the land that they farmed.
1753	Danvers Osborne became governor for a brief period.
1753	James De Lancey became acting governor.
1754	King's College (later known as Columbia College) was created as a result of a charter from King George II, but discontinued during the Revolutionary War.
1754-1763	The French and Indian War, the last in the series of wars, was fought and quickly spread across North America. In the Treaty of Paris, the French surrendered and thus the British gained the dominant position in Northern America.
1755	Charles Hardy became governor.
1755	New York's assembly established "committees of correspondence" to maintain contacts with other English colonies concerning the Stamp Act, the Sugar Act, and other "intolerable acts" pressed upon them by England.
1757	James De Lancey became acting governor once again.

1760s

1760	Cadwallader Colden became acting governor.
1761	Robert Monckton became governor.
1762	The Common Council of New York City created a permanent paid workforce of night watchmen to replace the former method where each able-bodied man served one night each month.
1763	Cadwallader Colden became acting governor once again.
1764-1775	The British began to pass new laws in the colonies to raise money and pay off their debts after many years of fighting with the French. In addition, the British wanted to punish the colonists for resisting some of their previous policies.
1764	The British enacted the Sugar Act. This law placed a tax on sugar and lowered the tax on molasses, which was being smuggled in from the French West Indies.
1765	Henry Moore became governor.
1765	The British passed the Quartering Act, which required the colonists to house and feed the large standing British army.

1765	The Stamp Act was passed by the British which placed taxes on newspapers, pamphlets, deeds, official documents, licenses and playing cards. Each of these products had to have a stamp on them indicating a tax had been paid.
1765	As a result of the Stamp Act, nine of the colonies sent their delegates to New York City for a Stamp Act Congress, the first inter-colonial assembly in North America organized by the colonists. The Congress asked the British Parliament to repeal the Stamp Act.
1766	The British parliament repealed the Stamp Act and passed the Declaratory Act stating that Parliament had the right to make laws that colonists had to obey.
1766	Governor Sir Henry Moore suspended the Assembly and would not allow it to do business until New York furnished barracks and supplies for British troops.
1766	A tenant revolt led by William Prendergast began on Philipse Manor and spread through Westchester and New York City.
1767	The British Parliament passed the Townsend Acts, which placed a tax on products such as paper, glass, lead, painting supplies and tea. The money raised by the taxes would pay for the salaries of royal colonial governors and officials. The Townsend Acts also legalized general search warrants.
1767	After a meeting in Purchase, New York, the Quakers became the first organized group to denounce slavery and to form a committee visiting slaveholders and urging them to free their slaves. They also began to boycott any goods that were made using the labor of slaves.
1769	Cadwallader Colden became acting governor for the third time.
1760s	Jupiter Hammond became the first person of African decent to publish in North America. He was an African slave from New York writing essays and poems based on religious ideas.
1770s	
1770	Lord John Murray Dunmore became governor.
1770	The Sons of Liberty and their leader, Sam Adams, presented the official resistance to the Townsend Acts. The group drafted a letter which was circulated around the Massachusetts legislature as well as all the other colonial legislatures calling for the boycott of British policy and goods. The British Parliament responded by repealing all but one provision of the Townsend Acts. The British Parliament continued to tax tea.

March 5, 1770	A crowd of colonist gathered in Boston and began to throw snowballs at the British troops. The soldiers opened fire and killed five colonists and wounded several others. This event became known as the Boston Massacre.
May 1770	Lord John Murray Dunmore became governor.
1771	William Tryon became governor.
1772	Sam Adams and the Sons of Liberty began to spread anti-British sentiment through their Committee of Correspondence in Massachusetts. This lead to the formation of similar committees in other colonies, which became a network uniting all the colonists.
1773	The Tea Act was passed by the British Parliament allowing the British East India Company to sell tea at a much lower prices than the colonial importers. This outraged the colonists who refused to allow ships carrying tea to unload in New York City and Philadelphia.
December 16, 1773	In Boston, 150 members of the Sons of Liberty disguised themselves as Mohawks and boarded 3 British ships were they dumped all the tea into the Boston Harbor. This event is known as the Boston Tea Party.
March 1774	The British Parliament closed down the Boston Harbor to all trade until the colonists repaid the British East India Company for all the dumped tea. The Parliament also began to pass a number of strict laws that were known as the Intolerable Acts.
June 1774	A crowd of protestors took to the streets in New York. They burned effigies of the British prime minister and the appointed governor of Massachusetts.
September 1774	The first Continental Congress was held in Philadelphia. Delegates from all the colonies, except Georgia, were represented. The delegates decided they would boycott all British imports. In addition, they agreed that if the British Parliament did not repeal the Intolerable Acts, they would extend the boycott to colonial exports to Britain.
April 1775	Since the New York assembly was largely controlled by British Loyalists who refused to support any anti-British sentiments, the Sons of Liberty helped set up a committee in New York to help enforce the British boycott. The committee held the First New York Provincial Congress in New York City where they elected new representatives to attend the Second Continental Congress.
1775 - 1783	The colonists fought and won a war for their independence from Britain. One in three battles of this war, known as the Revolutionary War, was fought in New York.
July 4, 1776	The Declaration of Independence was adopted by the delegates at the Continental Congress in Philadelphia and the United States of America came into existence.

July 9, 1776	The Fourth Provincial Congress declared New York independent from English rule.
September 1776 - 1783	The British controlled most of New York City and the surrounding areas, which was also the center for the British Loyalists.
April 12, 1777	The first Constitution of New York State was adopted and remained in existence for 45 years.
1777	George Clinton became the first elected governor of New York. He is known as the father of New York and served for 21 years.
1778	The colonists received assistance from abroad when the French-American alliance was formed.
1779	Spain went to war with Britain, creating further worries for the British.
1780s	
1781	The Netherlands went to war with Britain, making the British navy truly occupied at several fronts.
1781	After serving the Patriot army, the New York legislature promised to free the slaves for their service.
October 1781	An outnumbered group of Patriots fought and defeated a group Loyalists, “Red-Coats”, and Iroquois. Most of the Iroquois league of nations were allied with the British because they wanted to maintain the Proclamation of 1763, which promised to protect the Native American lands.
1782	New York State passed a law banning the use of wheat as payment for taxes.
September 3, 1783	The Revolutionary War came to an official end when the Paris Peace Treaty was signed, but it was not ratified for several months until the delegates of the nine states could meet.
November 25, 1783	The last British ship left New York Harbor and the United States became an independent nation.
1784	Alexander Hamilton established the Bank of New York.
1784	The Legislature established the Board of Regents. Today, it remains the oldest continuous state education entity in America.
1785	John Jay and Alexander Hamilton, both New Yorkers, formed the Manumission Society whose mission was to bring an end to slavery and defend the rights of African-Americans.
1785	The Manumission Society established the first school for African-Americans in New York, known as the Africa-Free School of New York City.

1785	The first bill to end slavery was passed in the New York legislature, but was vetoed by the governor because the bill included the right to vote by African-Americans. However, a ban was placed instead on the importing of slaves for sale.
1786	The New York Legislature allowed a controlled supply of paper money to be printed.
1786	A board of land commissioners was established by the New York Legislature whose responsibility was to transfer available land to private ownership.
1786	Dominick Lynch, an Irish immigrant, founded Rome, New York.
1787	A statute gave Columbia College (today's Columbia University) independent status under the board of trustees.
May 14, 1787	The first meeting of the Constitutional Convention was held in Philadelphia.
September 1787	New York State's Alexander Hamilton persuaded James Madison and John Jay to join him in writing newspaper articles in support of a strong federalist government. These articles were later published as the <i>Federalist Papers</i> .
September 17, 1787	The Constitutional Convention completed its meetings and sent the newly drafted Constitution to the Congress of the Confederation where they asked the states to ratify it.
1788	Economic conditions improved and New York became the center of trade when they signed trade contracts with China, the Netherlands, France and other European countries.
June-July 1788	A state convention was held in Poughkeepsie to vote on the proposed Constitution for the federal government. New York voted 30-27, becoming the 11th state to ratify the Constitution. New York accompanied its ratification sent to Congress with an added statement asking for a bill of rights.
1789	John Jay, a New Yorker, was appointed as the first U.S. chief justice.
1789	Tammany Society was founded in New York City as a political club. It was not long before Tammany Hall grew into one of the centers of the Democratic Party in New York.
1789	The new Constitution went into effect with a Bill of Rights.
1790s	
1791	New York City's longstanding status as a center of world-class hospitals began when the second hospital in the United States, New York Hospital, opened (the first was in Philadelphia, 40 years earlier).

1792	George Clinton was reelected governor.
1795	John Jay was elected governor of New York.
1795	Union College was founded in Schenectady.
1796	Under new law, only murder and treason were to be punished by death. All other crimes were to be punished by life imprisonment.
1797	The Legislature establishes its base in Albany.
1799	Slaves were gradually freed when a new law was passed in the New York Legislature. The law stated that women were to be freed at the age of 28 and the men at 25. However, the children of slave mothers were to remain indentured servants.
1790s	A few years after the creation of the Board of Regents, state law provided for elected town commissioners or superintendents of schools to license teachers, distribute state aid to schools, and compile statistical reports.
1790s	New York's Society for the Promotion of Agriculture, Arts, and Manufactures was established by wealthy landowners.
1800s	
1801	George Clinton was once again reelected governor.
1801	DeWitt Clinton and John Swartwout duelled over the political wrangling of the appointment of public positions. Swartwout suffered 2 leg wounds and Clinton a bullet hole in his coat.
March 1804	A New York City health inspector was appointed soon after the outbreak of the yellow fever epidemic.
April 1804	Morgan Lewis became governor.
1805-1812	Former governor George Clinton of New York served as vice-president of the United States under President Thomas Jefferson and President James Madison.
April 1807	Daniel D. Tompkins served as governor for ten years until he resigned to assume the office of the vice-president of the United States.
1807	A British warship attacked the US warship Chesapeake killing a number of Americans off the coast of Virginia. This practice of the British had become commonplace during this period because the United States had refused to take sides in the war against Napoleon. The British would stop American ships and capture American sailors as traitors and force them to join the British crew.
1808	Dr. Billy Clark started the first Temperance Society in the United States in Moreau, New York.

1810s

1812	A district school law was passed in New York State which encouraged towns to create their own elementary school systems.
1812	Hamilton College in Clinton, New York, opened as a school training Presbyterian missionaries.
June 1812	A declaration of war against Great Britain was signed by the United States Congress, thus starting the War of 1812.
1812-1814	During the War of 1812, Samuel Wilson of Troy, New York, provided the US Army with barrels of meat with initials U.S. stamped on them. Samuel Wilson became known as Uncle Sam by the soldiers.
April 1814	When the war against Napoleon's forces had come to a defeating halt in Europe, the British forces turned their attention to the United States. They planned their attacks at Lake Champlain, Chesapeake Bay, and New Orleans.
December 24, 1814	The Treaty of Ghent was signed which brought the war with Britain to an end.
1817	Construction of the Erie Canal began.
1817	Although he never took the oath of office, John Tayler served as governor from February 24 to July 1 when Governor Daniel D. Tompkins resigned.
1817	De Witt Clinton became governor.
1817	Otsego County hosted the first county agricultural society in New York.
1819	Colgate was established as a Baptist college.
1819	<i>The Plough Boy</i> became the first New York State newspaper published especially for farmers.

1820s

1821	The Troy Female Seminary was opened by Emma Willard.
1821	The Bloomingdale Asylum for mentally disabled poor people opened in Manhattan.
1821	A state constitutional convention was held in response to calls for greater suffrage and other reforms, which resulted in our current state constitutional Bill of Rights.
1822	New York voters approve a revised state constitution, which includes much of the current Bill of Rights
1823	Joseph C. Yates served as governor for one year.

1823	The Auburn system, a prison located in the Finger Lakes region, attracted criminal law experts from around the nation and overseas.
1824	Thomas Eddy established the House of Refuge in New York City for juvenile delinquents.
1825	De Witt Clinton was reelected into the office of governor.
1825	Another general hospital and the first specialty institution — an eye and ear infirmary — opened in New York City.
1825	The Erie Canal opened, providing a shortcut from New York City to Buffalo.
1827	Slavery in New York State came to an official end.
January 1828	Nathaniel Pitcher served acting governor.
1828	All of New York State’s slaves had been freed.
1828	Sojourner Truth gained freedom from slavery because she was born in New York. She is known as reformer for abolition and women’s suffrage.
January 1829	Martin Van Buren from Kinderhook, New York, was elected the ninth governor. He was known as the Old Kinderhook and his campaign utilized the slogan, and lasting catchphrase, A.O.K. He was in office for a few months until he resigned.
March 1829	When Governor Martin Van Buren resigned Lieutenant Governor Enos T. Throop took the position of governor.
1829	The law that created the Bank Fund, later renamed the Safety Fund, was enacted to guarantee the payment of debts of insolvent banks.
1829	Organized labor achieved its first electoral victory when the Working Men’s Party in New York City elected Ebenezer Ford, president of the Carpenters Union, to a seat in the Assembly.
1830s	
1830	Joseph Smith founded the Church of the Latter-Day Saints, whose members are known as Mormons, in Fayette, New York.
1830	Governor Enos T. Throop was elected as governor of New York.
1830	Peter Cooper founded the first U.S. steam locomotive in New York.
1831	A Washington County Baptist minister named William Miller predicted that the Second Advent, or coming, of Christ would take place in 1843 and thus lead to the end of the world. When his prediction had failed, his followers left him to form new Adventist movements. The largest known being the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, which maintained the second coming but did not set a date for it.

August 9, 1831	The first New York State commercial railroad opened up.
1831	New York University was founded as the University of the City of New York.
1832	Reports to educate farmers were issued by the New York State Agricultural Society.
1833	The New York <i>Sun</i> , a daily newspaper, was established by Benjamin H. Day.
1833	Arthur and Lewis Tappan established an abolition society in New York State.
1833	The New York and Boston abolition society's came together to form the American Anti-Slavery Society with its main offices located in New York City.
1833	William L. Marcy became governor.
1835	The <i>New York Morning Herald</i> was a daily newspaper started by James Gordon Bennett.
1835	Female Academy was founded in Albany, New York.
1836	The State Geological and Natural History Survey was founded, which later became the New York State Museum.
1836	The State Lunatic Asylum was founded in Utica, New York.
1838	New York adopts a Free Banking Act, which allowed anyone meeting certain standards and requirements to secure a bank charter.
1838	The Treaty of Buffalo Creek allowed the Ogden Land Company to assume possession of the any remaining land belonging to the Seneca nation.
1839	William H. Seward became governor of New York State.
1840s	
1840	Local asylums for the mentally ill were created.
1841	The New York <i>Tribune</i> was established by Horace Greeley.
1841	A rail connection was established between Albany and Boston.
1842	The anti-rent wars (held at various times between the 1750s and mid-1800s) was a factor in the demand for constitutional change.
1842	The New York Philharmonic Society was founded.
1842-1857	With help of Quaker groups, the Seneca nation was able to regain possession of a number of their reservations in western New York.
1843	William C. Bouck served as governor.

1843	The first state-funded mental health institution, the State Asylum for Lunatics, opened in Utica.
1844	State aid to schools under the direction of any religious denomination was outlawed.
1844	The Legislature created a tuition-free “normal school” at Albany.
1844	The University at Albany was established as a 2-year institution whose mission was to train new teachers and improve teaching in existing public schools.
1845	A bill was passed by the New York State Legislature which allowed towns to stop the local sale of liquor.
1845	Silas Wright from Canton, New York served as governor.
1846	Isaac Mayer Wise of Albany, New York, founded Reform Judaism based on the belief that Judaism would best survive in the United States by adapting to the nation’s customs. Reform Judaism is currently one of three branches of Judaism practiced in the United States.
1846	The state constitution was rewritten again and restrictions were placed on the state government’s powers to incur debt, impose taxes, and aid private enterprise.
1846	The new constitution changed the term of senators to two years.
1846	The New York Court of Appeals is established with the new state constitution. Thus, abolishing the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of Errors.
1846	The University at Buffalo was created as a private institution. It remained a private school until 1962.
1846	Fordham became New York City’s first Roman Catholic college.
1847	The New York State law allowing towns the right to ban the sale of liquor was repealed.
1847	Frederick Douglass, having escaped from slavery, started an abolitionist newspaper, <i>The North Star</i> , in Rochester, New York.
1847	John Young became New York State governor.
1847	The Free Academy was founded. The City University of New York (CUNY) dates back to the creation of this academy, which later became the City College of New York.
1848	William M. Tweed, otherwise known as Boss Tweed, founded the Americus Engine Company Number Six, a volunteer fire company with 75 men. The “Big Six” became Boss Tweed’s first political power base as he guided each of the men’s votes for each election.

1848	Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott organized the Women's Right Convention in Seneca Falls, New York, where 300 women and 40 men attended.
1848	Ernestine Rose helped pass New York State's Married Women's Property Act, which allowed women some legal protection over property that they inherited.
1849	Elizabeth Blackwell became the first female medical doctor in the United States when she graduated from the Geneva Medical College in New York.
1849	New York City's Hamilton Fish became governor.
1849	New York State followed Thomas Eddy's efforts and created a state shelter for juvenile delinquents in Rochester.
1840s	The tenant farming system ended.
1850s	
1850	The nation's first publicly owned historic site was established in Newburgh at George Washington's Revolutionary War headquarters in 1782 - 1783.
1850	Governor Hamilton Fish and the Legislature began to require every city and incorporated village to appoint a board of health and a health officer.
1850	<i>Harper's New Monthly Magazine</i> , later known as <i>Harper's Magazine</i> , was established as a literary journal.
1851	Henry J. Raymond established the <i>Daily Times</i> .
1851	Washington Hunt served as governor for one year.
1851	The Banking Department was established.
1852	William M. "Boss" Tweed served as alderman for New York City's Seventh Ward. He used his position to help himself and his friends by appointing people and issuing licenses in return for illegal payoffs.
1853	The New York Central Railroad was established when Erastus Corning combined the eight lines between Buffalo and Albany.
1853	Horatio Seymour became governor.
1853	New York became the first state in the nation to legislate a 10-hour work day for noncontract workers.
1853	Reverend Charles Loring Brace helped establish the Children's Aid Society, which became the first such organization to help needy children.
1855	Myron H. Clark served as governor.

1855	Elmira Female College, later known as Elmira College for Women, was founded.
1856	Elisha Otis invented the first elevator and founded the Otis Elevator Company of Yonkers, New York. The skyscrapers of New York would not have been possible without the invention of elevators.
1857	Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell founded the New York Infirmary for Women and Children.
1857	John A. King became governor of New York.
1857	Rochester, New York, provided free public high school education.
1857	Samuel Hammond, an Albany attorney, was the first person to speak out for preservation of the northern forests.
1857	The Metropolitan Police Force was created to replace the local force.
1859	Edwin D. Morgan became governor.
1860s	
1860	The Insurance Department is established as the first independent regulatory agency in the country.
1860	A New York State law was passed which allowed married women control over money which they inherited or earned. It also stated that men and women would be joint guardians of their children.
1861	Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell helped establish the Central Relief Committee, which trained nurses on the battlefield.
1861	Vassar College for Women was founded.
1861	Abraham Lincoln became the 16th president of the United States.
April 12, 1861	The Civil War began.
1862	Julia Ward Howe, a New Yorker, wrote the “Battle Hymn of the Republic,” which became an inspirational marching song.
1862	A. T. Stewart built the largest retail store in the world in New York City.
1862	The Confederacy set up a draft system, which would force men to join the army if called upon.
March 1863	The Union set up its own draft system.
July 1863	The New York City Draft Riots broke out when the first names were announced. The rioters took their anger out on the abolitionists and African-Americans. The burning of the Colored Orphan Asylum, where 250 children under the age of 12 were housed, was the worst of the riot attacks.

1863	Horatio Seymour was reelected governor.
1863	William M. “Boss” Tweed was elected leader of Tammany Hall. Tammany Hall became a powerful political machine and the symbol of public corruption. Its members used bribery to attain control of state and local democratic politics.
1864	Citizens Association, an activist organization with a number of New York City’s prominent doctors, conducted a sanitary survey of the city and aroused widespread public interest.
1864	George Pullman of Chautauqua County invented the sleeping car, which enabled trains to offer sleeping, dining, and parlor cars.
April 9, 1865	The Civil War came to an end when the Union declared victory.
April 14, 1865	President Abraham Lincoln was assassinated by John Wilkes Booth, a supporter of the South.
1865	New York State passed a bill requiring public high school education to be free.
1865	Reuben E. Fenton served as governor.
1865	The first Regents exams were held.
1865	Reformer Dorothea Dix exposed ill treatment of mentally ill individuals, which led to a legislative investigation. The result was the establishment of a state hospital for chronic mentally ill patients, the Willard Psychiatric Center, named after Dr. Sylvester D. Willard, who led the investigation.
1866	The Metropolitan Board of Health was created as a result of the sanitary survey. The statute was the first in the nation to create strong government authority for monitoring and enforcing sanitary conditions; even England and France, which had pioneered public-health efforts in the Western world, were not far ahead.
1866	A state constitutional convention was held where the current structure of the Court of Appeals was created.
1867	The Legislature enacted a law providing for free schools for all children, along with a statewide property tax to pay for it.
1867	Governor Reuben E. Fenton established the state Board of Charities to help manage relief for the poor on a consistent basis.
1868	The Legislature created a Fisheries Commission to study the impact of logging on fish and water supplies.
1868	George Westinghouse of Central Bridge, New York, created the air brake used to stop a train’s wheels.
1869	John T. Hoffman became governor.

1869	Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony organized the National Woman's Suffrage Association.
1870s	
1870	The Normal School (later known as Hunter College) was created in New York City as the first free college for women.
1870	John D. Rockefeller, a native New Yorker, founded the Standard Oil Company, which later owned 90 percent of the nation's oil refineries.
1870	<i>The New York Times</i> exposed William M. "Boss" Tweed and other members of Tammany Hall, otherwise referred to as the "Tweed Ring," for stealing millions of dollars from New Yorkers. In addition, <i>Harper's Weekly</i> posted political cartoons by Thomas Nast denouncing Boss Tweed.
1872	Governor John T. Hoffman and the Legislature created a constitutional commission to propose amendments that could be acted upon by the Legislature, without the need for a constitutional convention.
1872	The State Communities Aid Association, an advocacy group for low-income New Yorkers, was established.
1872	Susan B. Anthony, a New York schoolteacher, registered to vote and voted illegally. When she was caught and fined she refused to pay the court.
September 1873	The New York Stock Exchange crashed and led to an economic depression referred to as the Panic of 1873.
1873	John A. Dix became governor.
1873	Harlem became part of New York City.
1874	A law required children ages 8 through 14 to attend at least 70 days of school each year.
1874	Christopher Latham Sholes' typewriters were produced by E. Remington and Sons in Ilion, New York.
1875	Samuel J. Tilden served as governor for a year before he became the democratic candidate for the United States presidency.
1875	Elbridge Thomas Gerry, with the help of Henry Bergh, founded The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children.
1875	Governor Samuel J. Tilden destroys the Canal Ring and prosecutes all the profiteers who stole from the fund necessary to repair and extend the New York State canal system.
1875	Boss Tweed escaped from prison and fled to Spain. However, he was soon captured when someone recognized him from a Thomas Nast political cartoon.

1876	Governor Samuel J. Tilden loses the presidential election to Rutherford B. Hayes. This was a controversial election because Governor Samuel Tilden had won the popular votes, but lost the electoral college votes.
December 5, 1876	The Brooklyn Theater fire led to the death of 400 people.
1877	Lucius Robinson became New York State governor.
1877	A new law authorized the Regents to give academic exams as a standard for high-school graduation and college admission.
1878	The increasing number of canals led to the creation of the state Department of Public Works, with the primary duty of overseeing operation and maintenance of the man-made waterways.
1878	Boss Tweed testifies against a group of 30 state assemblymen who worked together and sold their legislative votes in a block. This group of assemblymen were referred to as the “Black Horse Cavalry”.
1878	Boss Tweed dies in Ludlow Street Jail in New York.
1879	Frank W. Woolworth convinces his employer to start a 5 cent counter in his Watertown, New York, store. Woolworth later establishes a chain of “5 and dime” stores.
1880s	
1880	Alonzo B. Cornell is elected into the office of governor.
1880	Granville Woods, an African-American inventor, created a telegraphing system used between moving trains. The New York resident also developed a “third rail”, which was used to deliver power to electric trains such as those of the New York City subway system.
1880	A railroad board was created to monitor and investigate complaints against the railroad industry. This was a result of a committee investigation led by Assemblyman A. Barton Hepburn of Colton, New York, which uncovered numerous illegal practices.
1881	The Code of Criminal Procedure was established.
1881	New York State senators Roscoe Conkling and Thomas Platt resigned their seats in protest over President Garfield’s appointment of a new collector to the New York Custom House. Much to everyone’s surprise, the two senators were not reelected to the Senate.
1881	The Knights of Labor and New York City’s Central Labor Union come together to pressure management for labor reforms.
1882	Charity Organization Society was created to help the needy in New York.

September 1882	The first Labor Day parade was held around Union Square in Manhattan.
1883	Grover Cleveland served as governor until his resignation to become the President of the United States.
1883	The Civil Service Commission was created, making New York the first state to reform its civil service system.
1883	Governor Grover Cleveland signed legislation to create a board of commissioners to acquire certain lands that would help preserve Niagara Falls.
May 24, 1883	The Brooklyn Bridge, designed by John Augustus Roebling, opened providing a link between Brooklyn and Manhattan.
1885	The Statue of Liberty opened. The people responsible for creating the Statue are Frederic-Auguste Bartholdi (sculptor), Gustave Eiffel (structural engineer), and Richard Morris Hunt (pedestal designer).
1885	Lieutenant Governor David B. Hill became governor when Governor Grover Cleveland resigned. The same year, he was officially elected into office for a full-term.
1885	The Legislature enacted the State Forest Preserve helping to protect forests in the Adirondacks and Catskills.
1885	The Health Department began to oversee the quality of public drinking water supplies.
1885	The first public-health nursing associations, forerunners of visiting nurse associations, were organized in Buffalo.
1886	Voters overwhelmingly voted for a constitutional convention.
1886	George Westinghouse formed the Westinghouse Electric Company in Buffalo, New York, which became the first alternating current power plant in the nation. Alternating current soon became the industry standard, which replaced direct current.
1886	The first settlement house, called the Neighborhood Guild (later renamed University Settlement), was opened in the United States in the Lower East Side of Manhattan by Dr. Stanton Coit, which provided social services for the poor.
1886	Samuel Gompers and Adolph Strasser, both leaders of New York's cigarmakers union, unite numerous craft unions into a coalition called the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Within a matter of two decades the AFL membership grew from 600,000 to 4 million.
1886	New York State became the first state to establish a child labor law requiring a minimum age of 13 for factory employment.

1887	Labor Day was declared an official holiday by the New York Legislature. Four years later, the US Legislature declared Labor Day as a national holiday.
March 12, 1888	A blizzard hits New York City and kills 400 people.
1888	George Eastman invented the Kodak camera in Rochester, New York.
1888	Melvil Dewey, creator of the Dewey Decimal System, is appointed head of the New York State Library.
1888	Governor David B. Hill served another term in office.
1889	<i>New York World</i> journalist Elizabeth Cochrane (also known as Nellie Bly) creates a world record for going around the world in 72 days, 11 minutes and 14 seconds.
1880s	The Regents published curricula and teacher guides.
1880s	Large numbers of European immigrants entered the United States through New York City. This led to the emergence of foreign-language newspapers throughout New York.
1890s	
1890	The World Building, a 26-floor structure, became New York City's first skyscraper.
1890	Governor David B. Hill signs the Corrupt Practices Act requiring all candidates to make their campaign expenses public record. He also signs the Saxton Bill, which legislates voting by secret ballot.
1890	The state government passed legislation that abolished county asylums and stipulated staffing levels, treatment regimens, and safety rules for state facilities. Often considered the first such statute in the country, the law established a statewide system that remained in use until the 1950s. It also replaced the word "asylum" for "hospital."
1891	The Regents were given the responsibility for licensing physicians — a logical step given the importance of medical education.
1891	Steel baron Andrew Carnegie's Carnegie Hall opens with Russian composer Peter Illyich Tchaikovsky as its first concert presentation.
1891	Seneca Ray Stoddard's photographs and lectures helped convince the New York State Legislature to create laws protecting the Adirondack Park.
1892	Thomas Edison merged his company with Thomas Houston Company to form General Electric, which soon became the largest employer in Schenectady, New York.

1892	Castle Garden is replaced by Ellis Island as the official entry point for European immigrants. Over the next 6 decades, there are nearly 16 million immigrants who enter the United States through the gates of Ellis Island.
1892	Roswell P. Flower became governor of New York State.
1894	Reverend Charles Parkhurst's campaigns against municipal corruption, particularly Tammany Boss Richard Crocker, encouraged the New York State Legislature to create the Lexow Committee to investigate matters. The Committee found the New York City Police Department rampant with corruption. This led to the reorganization of the Police Department, with various dismissals and Theodore Roosevelt as the new police commissioner.
1894	The state constitution was revised. Most of today's judicial structure, provisions on education and conservation, the merit system of civil appointments, and election rules were approved. The amended constitution also stated that civil service positions could only be obtained by merit and fitness.
1894	As a result of growing concern over child labor, children aged 8-12 were required to be in school at least 130 days and 80 days for slightly older children who were employed.
1894	The first labor-related addition to the state constitution was made.
1894	The Constitution guaranteed free school for children as part of the state's fundamental law.
1895	Levi P. Morton served as governor.
1895	George Selden, a New York lawyer, received the first patent on gasoline-powered vehicles.
1895	Dr. Edward L. Trudeau opened the first tuberculosis sanatorium at Saranac Lake in the Adirondack Mountains. The Doctor believed the location would provide fresh air, which is essential treatment for the disease.
1896	Electricity generated from Niagara Falls provided Buffalo with cheap energy.
1896	The Kinetoscope, created by Thomas Edison, is introduced to the New York City theater. Viewers paid a nickel to peep through the magnifying lens at the first moving picture. This creation led to the development of nickelodeon theaters across the nation.
1896	<i>The New York Times</i> is rescued from the brink of failure by Adolph S. Ochs. By insisting on thorough and objective reporting and the latest technological advances, he helps turn <i>The Times</i> into a highly respected newspaper.
1897	Frank S. Black became New York State governor.

1897	Pulitzer's <i>New York World</i> and Hearst's <i>New York Journal</i> used sensational and biased reporting methods, referred to as yellow journalism, to report the Spanish atrocities in Cuba.
1898	The United States gets involved in the Spanish American War when the U.S.S. Maine is sunk in Havana Harbor.
1898	The United States annexed Puerto Rico, which led to mass migration from the Island primarily to New York State.
1898	The first "state highway," called State Road Number 1, was built with the combination of town, county, and state dollars. The two-mile road was the start of what is known today as Route 7, from Schenectady to Troy.
1898	The city of Brooklyn and the county of Kings, the county of Richmond (Staten Island), and part of the county of Queens became part of New York City.
1899	The Long Island Railroad Bridge opened connecting Long Island to New York City.
1899	Theodore Roosevelt served as governor of New York State.
1899	William Lewis Bulkley became the first African-American to serve as a public school principal in New York City.
1890s	The elevated trains in New York City switched from dirty steam engines to clean electric engines. In addition, New York State replaced horse drawn carriages with electric trolleys.
1900s	
1900	The New York State Rehabilitation Hospital was created in West Haverstraw. Today the hospital is known as the Helen Hayes Hospital.
1900	The International Ladies Garment Workers Union (I.L.G.W.U.) is formed in New York City. Union members want a reduction in the 70-hour work week and 30 cents a day increase in wages for sewing at home.
1901	New York was the first state to develop a state health department.
1901	New York was among the first states to establish a Department of Labor, which was years before the creation of the US Department of Labor.
1901	Under Governor Theodore Roosevelt, a commission recommended merging the Department of Public Instruction with the administrative offices of the regents to create the Education Department.
1901	Benjamin B. Odell became governor.

1901	President William McKinley is shot by Leon Czolgosz in Buffalo, New York. Former Governor Theodore Roosevelt became president of the United States.
1902	Daniel Burnham's amazing architectural design, the Flatiron Building, opened.
1902	New York Central System's train, The Twentieth Century Limited, helped shorten rail travel time from New York to Chicago to 20 hours.
1903	Child Labor Law banned child labor in factories, farms, sweatshops and street trades. This new policy affected 400,000 children in New York.
1903	New York State voted in favor of spending \$101 million for the creation of a new canal system, known as the New York State Barge Canal. The Barge canal consists of the Erie Canal and three chief branches, including the Oswego, the Champlain, and the Cayuga and Seneca canals.
1903	The airplane was created by the Wright brothers in North Carolina.
1904	The Education Department was created.
1904	With the help of Professor Liberty Hyde Bailey, Cornell's College of Agriculture is declared a state college by the state legislature.
October 1904	The first New York City subway opened.
1905	The Niagara Movement was born when W. E. B. Du Bois held a national meeting in Niagara Falls, New York. The goal was to end voting restrictions and demand full equality for all African-Americans.
1905	Frank W. Higgins served as governor.
1905	Complaints about the prices of gas and electricity prompted the Legislature to appoint a committee headed by Charles Evans Hughes to investigate. This resulted in new laws regulating gas and electricity prices in addition to the Freedom of Information Law was enacted by the Legislature to help guarantee public access to governmental records.
1907	Charles Evans Hughes became governor.
1907	New York Assemblyman Sherman Moreland helped create a law giving the governor power to appoint special investigatory bodies known as the Moreland Act Commission. This is how the governor could maintain control over the state bureaucracy.
1907	Governor Charles Evans Hughes and the Legislature established an ongoing Public Service Commission (today's Department of Public Service).
1907	Voluntary admissions to state mental hospitals began.

1907	The Public Service Commission was created to oversee utilities and railroads in New York State.
1907	The Agnew Hart Bill was signed by Governor Charles E. Hughes, which banned bookmaking from race tracks.
1907	The failure of the Knickerbocker Trust Company caused investors and depositors to withdraw large sums of money from the New York stock market and banks, which led to a financial crisis referred to as the Panic of 1907.
1907	The political conservative Frank E. Gannett started buying newspapers in New York State. Within the next 3 decades, the Gannett Company became the largest newspaper chain in New York State and the third largest in the United States.
1907	Henry Ford began selling his Model T automobile for \$850.50, claiming it was stronger than a horse and much easier to maintain.
1909	The National Negro Conference organized by Mary White Ovington and Oswald Garrison Villard in New York City led to the creation of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).
1909	Governor Charles Evans Hughes created the Department of Highways in recognition of the coming of age of the automobile.
1909	The International Ladies Garment Workers Union won major victories, such as a 50-hour work week, a closed union shop, and a ban on home work.
Early 1900s	Aftercare services, occupational therapy, and out-patient clinics were developed.
1910s	
1910	Lieutenant Governor Horace White became governor when Governor Charles Evans Hughes resigned to become associate justice of the United States Supreme Court.
1910	W. E. B. Du Bois founded and edited <i>The Crisis</i> , the NAACP's magazine.
1910	William Lewis Bulkley founded the Urban League in New York City. The goal of the organization was to provide equal economic opportunities for all African-Americans.
1910	New York became the first state in the nation to enact modern compensation law.

1910	Long Island became a center of the airline industry with the first airport (Mineola), the first airmail flight (Belmont Park) and the first aircraft factory (Garden City).
1911	John A. Dix became governor.
1911	With the help of Governor John A. Dix and the Legislature, New York became the first state to develop a conservation department.
1911	Joseph Pulitzer bequeaths \$2 million to create a School of Journalism at Columbia University. He also requires \$500,00 be placed aside to fund prizes for excellence in American journalism and literature.
March 25, 1911	More than 140 workers — mostly young women — died in a fire at the Triangle Waist Company, a shirt manufacturer near Washington Square in Manhattan. The deaths were attributed to the unsafe and unhealthy working conditions in factories. The Triangle fire convinced the Legislature to establish a Factory Investigating Commission to conduct public hearings, thus leading to the creation of new labor laws.
1911-1914	Dozens of labor-related laws were enacted as a result of the Triangle fire. In 1913 alone, 40 new laws were created.
1913	Cass Gilbert's 60-floor Woolworth Building opened. It remained the world's tallest building for the next 2 decades.
1913	William Sulzer became governor. During the same year he was also impeached and Martin H. Glynn served as governor. He is the only New York governor to ever be impeached.
1913	The school year was extended to the current 180 days.
1913	New York State established scholarships for students pursuing higher education. \$100 a year was provided to 750 undergraduate students in New York.
1913	John D. Rockefeller established the Rockefeller Foundation to promote the international well-being of humankind.
1914	The University at Albany was upgraded to a 4-year institution known as the New York State College for Teachers.
1914	New York's Workers Compensation Law was enacted.
1914	The State Insurance Fund was created to provide a government source of workers' compensation coverage to provide workers with some income after being injured on the job.
1914	World War I broke out in Europe. The United States remained its neutrality for the next three years.
1914	The New York City and New York State health departments created special bureaus for the purpose of educating the public on how to stay healthy.

1915	Charles S. Whitman served as governor.
1915	A state constitutional convention was held, which produced proposals, enacted through legislative action over the following decade or so, to reorganize the executive branch and create an executive budget.
1915	The Constitutional Convention recommended an executive budget as one of several major steps to strengthen the role of the governor and, by extension, make state government more accountable. However, the voters rejected the proposal.
1915	The Widowed Mothers Pension Bill was enacted.
1916	The age for mandatory school attendance rose to 15.
1917	The United States declared war on Germany and joined the Allies in World War I, known as the Great War.
1917	With the help of Carrie Chapman Catt, as the leader of New York's women's movement, New York State became the 12th state to grant women suffrage.
1917	The State Police was created to provide protection for rural areas after a 1913 murder occurred in Westchester County, which had no local police department.
1917	The New York State Department of Health, along with Massachusetts Health Department, was the first to employ nutritionists.
1918	World War I ended with the Allies defeating the Germans when the Europeans signed the Treaty of Versailles. However, the United States and Germany signed a separate treaty in 1921.
1918	United States army pilots began flying the first airmail service from New York to Philadelphia.
1918	The New York State Barge Canal opened.
1919	Alfred E. Smith became New York State governor.
1920s	
1920	Women won the right to vote nationwide under the nineteenth amendment.
1920	The first coast-to-coast airmail service began from New York to San Francisco.
1920	People in New York and elsewhere called for a broad program of publicly funded health care.
1920	An Extraordinary Session was held by the New York State Legislature to enact relief for tenants who were unable to pay the soaring costs of rent. The new relief measures helped stabilize rents, which helped stop mass evictions.

1920	Health Commissioner Hermann Biggs proposed a network of local health centers that included hospitals, clinics for tuberculosis and other specific diseases, laboratories, and public-health nursing.
1920	Governor Alfred E. Smith appointed a Reconstruction Commission to push for reform in state government, which included an executive budget.
1920	The New York State Legislature barred five elected officials because they belonged to the Socialist party.
1921	The Legislature authorized county governments to form health districts and create matching grants for building hospitals and providing nursing and other health services.
1921	Governor Alfred E. Smith lost his reelection bid to Nathan L. Miller.
1921	Since the Conservation Department did little to limit pollution, the Bureau of Stream Pollution Prevention was created.
1921	The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey was created as a bi-state public entity to oversee the planning and development of terminal, transportation, and other facilities in a 1,500 square mile district centering New York Harbor.
1922	New York's Health Department was the first agency in the country to broadcast regular health programs. The name of the program was "Keeping Well" aired by WGY, a radio station, in Schenectady.
1922	The first drama radio program in the nation was aired by WGY, General Electric's station in Schenectady, New York.
1922	WEAF, a New York City radio station aired the first radio advertisement in the nation.
1923	Governor Alfred E. Smith was reelected. He was still determined to make changes in state government by creating an executive budget. This time he put together a commission chaired by former Governor Charles E. Hughes.
1923	Governor Alfred E. Smith reorganized the state administration and created a unified Department of Public Works, responsible for highways, canals, and public buildings.
1924	Governor Alfred E. Smith and Robert Moses engineered a \$15 million bond for New York parks.
1925	A statute required transportation be provided for children in most public school districts.

1926	As part of their broad restructuring of state government, Governor Alfred E. Smith and the Legislature established the Department of Mental Hygiene to consolidate responsibility for individuals with mental illness, mental retardation, and suffering from epilepsy.
1926	The Julliard School of Music was founded in New York City and soon gained world-renowned notoriety.
1926	Gertrude Ederle from New York City became an instant hero when she became the first woman to swim across the English Channel.
1927	Playing for the New York Yankees, George Herman “Babe” Ruth set a record for 60 home runs in one baseball season becoming a national hero.
1929	Franklin Delano Roosevelt became governor after Governor Alfred E. Smith resigned to run for the United States presidency as the first Roman Catholic candidate.
1929	The New York stock market crashed and thus led to the Great Depression.
1929	Albany imposed its first gasoline tax, which was 2 cents a gallon.
1929	The Glenn H. Curtiss Airport was opened as a private flying field in New York.
1929	Governor Alfred E. Smith was able to convince both the voters and Legislature to enact a revised Article VII of the Constitution, State Finances, which was not effective until Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller took office. Throughout the years the executive budget has remained fundamentally the same.
1929	The Legislature required local welfare districts to provide medical care to those receiving relief and to otherwise self-supporting persons who could not afford needed care.
1929-1930	Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt extended relief and provided a general pension system for individuals over the age of 70 who met certain restrictions.
1930s	
1930-1931	The local government of Rochester began a public works projects to put the unemployed to work.
1931	The Empire State building, the tallest building, opened. John Jakob Raskob of General Motors and former Governor Alfred E. Smith had formed a corporation to finance the construction the 102-floor building.
1932	Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York was elected President of the United States. Once in office, he began to pass his New Deal laws to help revive the nation from the Great Depression.

1933	State minimum-wage legislation was approved.
1933	George Balanchine and Lincoln Kirstein founded the School of American Ballet.
1933	Herbert H. Lehman served as governor.
1936	The age for mandatory school attendance rose to 16.
1937	A state amendment was enacted giving the governor and other state-wide officials four-year terms.
1938	Voters approved the Constitutional Convention proposals regarding the rights of labor and provision for housing, social welfare, and health programs.
1938	The new constitution changed term limits in the Assembly from one-year to two-years.
1939-1945	World War II was fought in Europe. The United States remained neutral for first couple of years.
1939	Professor Albert Einstein of New York's Columbia University wrote a letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt explaining the military uses of atomic power. The President soon started the top-secret Manhattan Project where a number of universities conducted research on different methods of making fuel for the bomb.
1930s	Brooklyn and Queens colleges were created.
1940s	
1940	New York City purchased the Interborough Rapid Transit (IRT) and Brooklyn-Manhattan Transit (BMT) systems, after labor and other problems made it difficult for private ownership to continue, and combined them with a city-owned system.
1941	The United States entered World War II and began fighting the Axis powers. During the war, 900,000 New Yorkers served in the military.
1942	Governor Herbert H. Lehman initiated construction of the Thruway, as the state's population continued to grow, use of motor vehicles became more common and mobility more desirable.
1942	When Governor Herbert H. Lehman resigned to become Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, Lieutenant Governor Charles Poletti served as governor for the next month.
1943-1954	Thomas E. Dewey became governor.
1944	The Department of Commerce was created to promote business and act as a clearinghouse for contacts between business owners and the state.

1945	After the United States dropped two atomic bombs in Japan, the Japanese surrendered and World War II came to an end.
1945	The Cold War began between the United States and the Soviet Union.
1945	The Ives-Quinn Act was passed by the New York State Legislature, which declared everyone had a civil right to be able to obtain a job without being discriminated.
1946	Triple Cities College opened its doors as a branch of Syracuse University.
1947	The Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York began operating in 1947 as one of the nation's prepaid group plans offering comprehensive health services — the forerunner of today's health maintenance organizations and other managed-care plans.
1947	When the Glenn H. Curtis Airport was taken over by New York City, its name was changed to honor former Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia.
1947	The New York State Legislature passed a rent-control law, which latest into the 1990s.
1948	New York International Airport opened.
1948	Governor Thomas E. Dewey and the Legislature appointed a commission to assess the creation of a state university system. The commission initiated legislation creating the State University of New York, including today's network of locally sponsored community colleges. However, the goal was brought to reality under the leadership of Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller.
1950s	
1950	Triple Cities College was incorporated into the state university and renamed Harpur College (later known as State University of New York at Binghamton) in honor of a colonial teacher and pioneer who helped settle the Binghamton area.
1950	The United Nations building was built in Manhattan.
1951	Governor Thomas E. Dewey helped establish the state Civil Defense Commission to deal with the threat of nuclear attack and the creation of bomb shelters.
1953	Dr. Jonas Salk, a New Yorker, discovered the polio vaccine.
1954	Legislation enacted under Governor Thomas E. Dewey established local mental-health boards in each county and in New York City, formally creating a state-local partnership for delivery of mental-health services.
1955	W. Averell Harriman served as governor.

1955	The 1929 mandate for the localities to provide medical care for those on welfare was expanded to require comprehensive health care, from physical exams to vision care and lab services.
1956	The State University of New York at Stony Brook was founded to educate teachers of science and math.
1956	The Department of Motor Vehicles was given the power to oversee required annual inspection of vehicles more than four years old.
1956	The superintendent of insurance was authorized to oversee union welfare funds.
1957	The Air Pollution Control Act was enacted.
1958	<i>Magraw v. Donovan</i> established the principle of judicial involvement in questions of state legislative apportionment.
1958	The Research and Development Bureau was created, later becoming part of the Department of Transportation (DOT). This new bureau focused on research in structures, materials, and pavement along with active technology-transfer programs to help local highway departments.
1959	Formerly a bureau within the Department of Taxation and Finance, the Department of Motor Vehicles was established.
1959-1973	Nelson A. Rockefeller served as governor during this time. He resigned his office to serve as chairman of the National Commission on Water Quality and National Commission on Critical Choices for America.
1950s	Staten Island Community College (now the College of Staten Island) and the Bronx and Queensborough community colleges were created.
1960s	
1960	The creation of a State Council on the Arts allowed drama companies to travel to smaller cities for their productions.
1961	Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller and the Legislature created the City University of New York (CUNY).
November 1961	Much of the current Judiciary Article of New York's Constitution was adopted by statewide referendum.
1962	U.S. Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction in an apportionment case for the first time (<i>Baker v. Carr</i>).
1962	The Civil Practice Law and Rules was enacted to give citizens the power to "challenge action (or inaction) by agencies and officers of state and local government."
1962	Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller established the Family Court System.

December 1963	New York International Airport was renamed in honor of the late president as the John F. Kennedy International Airport.
1963	New York became the last state to eliminate the mandatory death sentence for premeditated, first degree murder.
1964	The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in <i>Reynolds v. Simms</i> that both houses of the state legislature must be apportioned as strictly as possible according to population.
1964	The Senate and the Assembly enacted a reapportionment law increasing the Senate's membership to 65.
1964	The New York Court of Appeals ruled that a full Assembly seat could no longer be guaranteed to each county, and that because some districts would cross county lines, local legislatures would no longer have the power to draw Assembly districts.
1964	Race riots broke out in Harlem, Rochester and elsewhere in the nation in the 1960s.
1965	Malcolm X was shot and killed in New York City while giving a speech.
1965	The New York State Penal Law was enacted.
1965	New York City welfare workers walked off the job for 28 days, seeking higher wages, lighter caseloads, and better working conditions.
1965	Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller provided \$1 billion to develop the Pure Water Bond Act.
1965	Harpur College was formally designated the State University of New York at Binghamton.
August 1965	The <i>Staten Island Advance</i> reported on deteriorating conditions in Willowbrook State School for the Mentally Retarded, the largest institution of its kind in the nation.
1966	Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller and the Legislature created a Narcotic Addiction Control Commission within the Department of Mental Hygiene.
1966	A court-devised plan established a Senate of 57 members who were elected for a two-year term.
1966	Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller and the Legislature enacted a new law providing aid for low-income children to attend preschool.
1966	Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller helped create state-funded financial grants for certain crime victims, such as medical and funeral costs, etc.
1966	Within months of the federal government's creation of Medicaid, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller and the Legislature created New York's version of the program.

January 1, 1966	30,000 employees of the New York City Transit Authority went on strike for 12 days.
1967	A state constitutional convention was held but voters rejected the proposals presented.
1967	The Taylor Law (a.k.a. the Public Employees Fair Employment Act), a labor-relations statute, was enacted. It was the first comprehensive labor relations law for public employees in the state, and among the first in the United States.
June 1967	The New York State Lottery began as a means, its supporters said, of increasing revenue for education while reducing illegal gambling. New York became the second state in the nation to have state-operated gambling (New Hampshire's started in 1964).
1967	Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller and the Legislature created the Department of Transportation.
1968	The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) assumed control of city transit operations.
1968	Martin Luther King, Jr. was shot and killed.
1969	New York adopts legislation allowing localities to create industrial development agencies (IDA).
1960s	Both the United States Congress and the New York State Legislature passed laws against many forms of discrimination.
1970s	
1970	Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller signed legislation creating the Department of Environmental Conservation on Earth Day, which absorbed the former Conservation Department.
1970	The Environmental Facilities Corporation was created to provide low-interest funds for projects involving water treatment, solid waste management, sewage treatment, and remediation of hazardous wastes.
1970	Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller established the Attorney General's Statewide Organized Crime Task Force (OCTF).
1970	Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller established the Department of Correctional Services, which consolidated the Department of Correction, the Commission of Correction, and Division of Parole.
1971	The <i>Staten Island Advance</i> reported a series of articles describing the horrific conditions of the Willowbrook State School for the Mentally Retarded. The stories led to television coverage, which — along with the many lawsuits filed — finally brought corrective attention from state leaders.

1971	Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller created the Adirondack Park Agency (APA) to help regulate private land use.
September 1971	Inmates took over the Attica Correctional Facility for 4 days. After negotiations failed, the state police marched into the prison. This led to the death of 32 inmates and 11 officers, in addition to 80 wounded, thus making the event the most important in New York's modern history of the prison system.
1971	The current Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) was established.
1972	As a result of Attica, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller and the Legislature responded by enacting 8 prison bills.
1972	New York State Unified Teachers (NYSUT), a statewide teachers' union, was created.
1972	The Environmental Quality Bond Act provided \$1.1 billion for the treatment of wastewater, solid-waste, air pollution, and support for land acquisition in the Adirondacks and Catskills.
1973-1988	Warren M. Anderson served as Republican Majority Leader of the New York State Senate.
1973	<i>In Dole v. Dow</i> , the New York Court of Appeals ruled that an injured worker can sue a third party and that the third party could then sue the employer.
1973	The World Trade Center (WTC) was built.
December 1973	Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller resigned and Lieutenant Governor Malcolm Wilson became governor.
1973	The Commission of Correction was established as an independent agency within the Executive Department.
1974	Harold Stevens, the only African American member of the Court of Appeals at that time, was defeated in a primary.
1974	Mary Ann Krupsak was elected Lieutenant Governor of New York.
1975	Governor Hugh L. Carey gave his State of the State speech on the need to cut spending and made the famous phrase "the days of wine and roses are over."
June 3, 1975	Governor Hugh L. Carey and the Legislature enacted the State Administrative Procedure Act (SAPA), setting clear and consistent rules for agencies to follow in regulatory activities.
1975-1982	Hugh L. Carey served as governor.
1975	The State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) was enacted, which required both state and local agencies to conduct comprehensive studies of the potential environmental impact of their activities.

1976	As a result of Love Canal, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) was created to establish a “cradle-to-grave” regulatory program requiring rules for handling, storing, transporting, and disposing hazardous waste.
1976	The Public Authorities Control Board was created.
1977	Governor Hugh L. Carey and the Legislature created the Temporary State Commission on Regulation of Lobbying requiring lobbyists to register with them instead of the Secretary of State’s office where they had no regulatory authority.
1977	The Legislature enacted the Open Meetings Law requiring governmental bodies to deliberate and make decisions during sessions that are open to the public.
1977	Legislation was adopted that required state taxpayers fund all operational costs for New York’s court system (not including town and village courts).
1977	Governor Hugh L. Carey established the Council on Children and Families.
1977	The Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled was created.
1978	Governor Hugh L. Carey and the Legislature reorganized the Department of Mental Hygiene in an effort to improve the management of programs for those with mental illness, mental retardation, and drug/alcohol abuse. The former department remains in place, largely as a legal construct, while three autonomous agencies provide services for individuals with differing needs — the Office of Mental Health, Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, and the Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse (later renamed the Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Services).
1978	A group of Long Island school districts with relatively low property wealth — joined by New York City and other large city school districts — sued the state education commissioner in an attempt to force a new financing system for public education.
1978	The Administrative Regulations Review Commission (ARRC) was created through legislation to monitor agencies’ compliance with the State Administrative Procedures Act (SAPA).
1978	Governor Hugh L. Carey began to buy out homeowners who lived near contaminated Love Canal even though the government played no part in creating the problem.
1978	The Disaster Preparedness Commission was established.

1978	Construction of the Empire State Plaza in Albany, which housed state government offices, was completed. The official name of the plaza was changed to the Nelson A. Rockefeller Empire State Plaza.
1979	New York adopted the nation's first Superfund law for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites.
1979	The office of Business Permits was created, a one-stop shopping office for companies seeking a variety of state permits.
1980s	
1981	Legislation initiated by the Assembly majority required that state funds be reported according to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
1982	In the case of the 1978 school district lawsuit against the education commissioner, the Court of Appeals found substantial inequities in funding exist from district to district. However, the court did not rule in favor of the school districts on the grounds that the state constitution does not require equal funding for education. Instead, the court found the constitution entitles students to a "sound basic education" although it did not specify what that means.
1982	The Taylor Law underwent significant changes when Governor Hugh L. Carey and the Legislature enacted additional provisions known as the Triborough amendment.
1982	The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, the public policy research arm of the State University's institutions, was created to bring the resources of higher education to bear on the governmental process.
1983	The Health Department was assigned to decide how much hospitals in each region of the state could charge private insurers as well as Medicaid and Blue Cross for each of several hundred types of services, from various types of surgery to laboratory tests. The rate-setting was known as the New York Prospective Hospital Reimbursement Method (NYPHRM).
1983-1992	Cable television systems in the Capitol Region began to broadcast legislative and other proceedings on the New York State Community Affairs Network.
1983-1994	Mario M. Cuomo served as governor.
1984	The Regents required high-school graduates to prove basic competence in English, math, science, global studies and U.S. history and government; students had the choice of passing local exams or generally more challenging Regents exams.
1984	The Acid Deposition Control Act was enacted, which imposed limits on air contaminants that caused acid rain. This action anticipated the federal Clean Air Act amendments of 1990.

1984	New York became the first state in the nation to require motorists to wear seatbelts.
1985	The Office of Business Permit's mission was expanded legislatively and it became the Office of Business Permits and Regulatory Assistance, conducting studies on regulatory problems and offering assistance in some cases.
1986	The Environmental Quality Bond Act provided \$100 million to close landfills that did not meet modern standards.
1987	Governor Mario M. Cuomo appointed a Moreland Act commission to examine ethics and accountability in state and local government. This led to the creation of ethics legislation to prevent former officials from dealing with their former agencies on issues they addressed while in state employment.
1988	The Education Department adopted regulations requiring home-schooled students receive at least the "substantial equivalent" of the time and types of instruction provided in public schools.
1989	David Dinkins became the first African-American mayor of New York City.
1989-1992	New York State's economy foundered, thus leading Governor Mario M. Cuomo and the Legislature to enact several tax increases.
1989-1994	Ralph J. Marino served as Republican Majority Leader of the New York State Senate.
1990s	
1990-1992	New York experienced severe economic difficulties, 500,000 jobs are lost in this time period. Governor Mario M. Cuomo is forced to reduce the state payroll due to the sagging economy that had weakened state-tax revenue.
1990	As a result of New York's serious economic and fiscal problems, Governor Mario M. Cuomo and the Legislature created the Local Government Assistance Corporation to issue long-term bonds, which in turn would be used to reduce the accumulated deficit and eliminate spring borrowing.
1991	Governor Mario M. Cuomo and the Legislature initiated a constitutional amendment, approved by the voters, that allowed long-term leasing of canal system lands to encourage business development.
1991	Governor Mario M. Cuomo and the Legislature enacted what became an infamous "sale" of Attica Correctional Facility to the Urban Development Corporation to obtain badly needed revenue for the state's regular operations.

1992	Responsibility for operating and maintaining the canal system was transferred from the Department of Transportation (DOT) to the New York State Canal Corporation, a new subsidiary of the Thruway Authority.
1992	An Appellate Division panel held that the Education Department's delay of four years in starting disciplinary proceedings against a physician caused "actual prejudice" because the witness had difficulty recalling events.
1992	Judge George Bundy Smith was appointed Court of Appeals judge by Governor Mario M. Cuomo.
1992	Governor Mario M. Cuomo provided the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) power to regulate solid waste in addition to mandating that all municipalities begin to recycle household and commercial waste.
1993	A group of New York City community school boards and other plaintiffs formed a coalition called the Campaign for Fiscal Equity and filed a lawsuit against the state. The coalition argued that the state was failing in its simple obligation to provide the "sound basic education" that the Court of Appeals ruled in 1982 as a required by the Constitution.
1993	Governor Mario M. Cuomo appointed Judge Judith S. Kaye, Judge Carmen Beauchamp Ciparick, and Judge Howard A. Levine to the Court of Appeals.
1993	Governor Mario M. Cuomo appointed a Moreland Act commission to examine school districts' management and spending.
1993	Governor Mario M. Cuomo appointed a Temporary Commission on Constitutional Revision to study the processes for holding a convention and to recommend issues it might address in anticipation to the 1997 vote.
Oct. 1993-Sept. 1998	The Comptroller's Office conducted more than 600 audits of state agencies and public authorities to identify financial and operational weaknesses and to encourage improvement.
1994	Republican members of the Senate ousted Majority Leader Ralph J. Marino, who was considered antagonistic to the governor-elect, George E. Pataki.
1994	Sheldon Silver became speaker of the New York State Assembly.
1995	At the initiative of Governor George E. Pataki, the Legislature reduced rates and enacted other changes to the personal income tax to return an estimated \$4 billion a year to taxpayers.
1995-Present	George E. Pataki serves as governor.

1995-1999	The Comptroller's Office audited 40 of the state's 57 counties and 679 of 932 towns in New York to identify any problems that might exist.
1995	Governor George E. Pataki proposed restructuring the Medicaid system.
1995	In response to motorists' criticism, legislation was enacted requiring construction projects in metropolitan New York and Long Island be done at night whenever feasible. Many road jobs elsewhere in the state are also performed after the hours of heaviest use.
1995	Governor George E. Pataki enacted a capital punishment statute.
January 1995	Joseph L. Bruno became New York State Senate majority leader.
January 5, 1995	Governor George E. Pataki announced a moratorium on regulations that affect the economy.
November 1995	Governor George E. Pataki formerly created the Governor's Office of Regulatory Reform.
June 1995	The Court of Appeals concluded the Campaign for Fiscal Equity had grounds for a legal claim.
1996	The Legislature made substantial changes to the Workers Compensation Law and thus outlawed most cases as was seen in 1973 (<i>Dole v. Dow</i>).
1996	Governor George E. Pataki and the Legislature repealed the New York Prospective Hospital Reimbursement Methodology (NYPHRM) and allowed most non-Medicaid payers of hospital bills to negotiate rates with hospitals.
1996	The Regents adopted new standards defining what students should know at all grade levels, including significantly more rigorous requirements for high-school graduation.
January 1, 1996	The Legislature eliminated automatic exemptions from jury duty. For example, some of those previously exempt were lawyers, pharmacists, embalmers, podiatrists and prosthetists.
February 1996	Governor George E. Pataki establishes the Task Force on State Work Force Management and Employee Development "to coordinate State agency staff reduction efforts...."
1996	Governor George E. Pataki helped provide \$1.75 billion for the Clean Water/Clean Air Bond Act.
1996	Governor George E. Pataki and the Legislature created a "Bill of Rights" requiring certain information be made available to patients guaranteeing insurers would not limit the ability of providers to discuss treatment options with patients.

1996	With the help of Senator Joseph L. Bruno, the Jobs Now fund was established, which set aside \$40 million each year to be used as incentives for major new projects or business expansions.
1997	Judge Richard C. Wesley was appointed Court of Appeals judge by Governor George E. Pataki.
1997	New York's Child Health Plus became a model for the national State Children's Health Insurance program enacted by President William J. Clinton and the Congress.
1997	The federal government approved the state's request for permission to enroll 2.2 million recipients into managed care over several years.
1997	A New York National Guard unit participated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.
November 1997	New Yorkers voted against calling a constitutional convention.
December 1997	Governor George E. Pataki and the Legislature enacted legislation authorizing 100 charter schools statewide.
1998	The Legislature adopted a joint conference committee process to organize its deliberations and reach agreement on a budget.
1998	Judge Albert M. Rosenblatt was appointed Court of Appeals judge by Governor George E. Pataki.
1998	New York City Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani criticized the Comptroller's Office's audits of city government as politically motivated and refused the comptroller access to certain records.
1998	Governor George E. Pataki appointed a Moreland Commission to investigate how efficiently New York City schools use taxpayer dollars.
1998	19 states including New York filed an antitrust suit against Microsoft.
1998	A new amendment to the Criminal Procedure law requires prosecutors to inform the victims of violent crime when the perpetrator of the crime escapes or is released from prison.
1998	School report cards were established by the Board of Regents to create accountability for school districts by showing publicly how well students in each school perform on standardized tests.
1998	Charter schools were created in New York.
1998	The former Department of Social Services (DSS) administered Medicaid for more than two decades. However, Governor George E. Pataki initiated consolidation of the entire program in the Health Department as part of a broad restructuring that eliminated the DSS.
January 1998	Governor George E. Pataki sent the National Guard to help locate stranded residents after a severe ice storm in the state's northern counties.

November 1998	A nationwide settlement is made with the tobacco companies, bringing a new source of revenue to New York State.
1999	<i>Newsday</i> runs a series of articles analyzing the involvement of many judges in Nassau and Suffolk counties in Republican politics.
1999	Anyone who commits a violent crime will be subject to mandatory DNA collection.
1999	The New York State Office of Science and Technology (NYSTAR) was created to bring together a variety of technology-development efforts and provide increased funding for such programs.
1999	The outbreak of West Nile, a mosquito transferred disease, occurred in New York City.
1999	Governor George E. Pataki appointed Antonia Novello, former US surgeon general, as the commissioner of the Health Department.
1999	The national tobacco settlement reached by attorneys general from around the country created a new, significant role in the finances of state government. Attorneys General Dennis Vacco and Eliot Spitzer, as New York's representatives in negotiations with the tobacco companies, helped determine the amount of money that the state and its localities would receive (and the amount that would be collected from smokers and tobacco-company stockholders nationwide, including those in New York).
1999	The Democratic majority in the Assembly initiated the expansion of Medicaid. Family Health Plus was enacted to provide a broad range of health services, including doctor visits, prescription drugs, and dental care for lower-income, working adults aged 19 through 64.
April 1999	The Court of Appeals affirmed the comptroller's authority to audit New York City.
June 1999	The New York Stock Exchange named the comptroller as the only public official to sit on its board.
December 1999	Legislation was passed to significantly increase state funding for hospitals.
1990s	At Governor Mario M. Cuomo's initiative, the Legislature enacted the Child Health Plus program to provide health insurance for children whose families were not poor enough to qualify for Medicaid.
Late 1990s	The Department of Transportation created an Environmental Analysis Bureau, as part of the Office of Engineering, to provide expertise on environmental matters and a liaison to environmental agencies and groups.
2000s	
2000	Assembly Majority Leader Michael J. Bragman attempted to oust Speaker Sheldon Silver, but failed.

2000	A statute was created to recognize a new type of crime, “hate crime”, and provide harsh punishments for perpetrators.
2000	Judge Victoria A. Graffeo was appointed Court of Appeals judge by Governor George E. Pataki.
2000	At the initiative of Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, the state expanded an existing form of incentives into a dramatic new program called Empire Zones — areas within 40 designated communities around the state where new or growing businesses could operate virtually tax-free.
2000	A major new exemption on clothing sales was enacted at the initiative of Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver. The exemption was first applied for one-week periods in 1998 and 1999. It became permanent, on sales valued at less than \$110, in 2000.
2000	Governor George E. Pataki and the Legislature raised the cigarette tax from 56 cents to \$1.11 per package as one of several new revenue sources to pay for expanding the state’s Medicaid program.
February 1, 2000	New York’s estate tax was reduced to the amount that can be taken as a credit against federal estate taxes.
April 2000	United States District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson found Microsoft liable under state anti-trust laws.
March 2000	Judge Jonathan L. Lippman directed state judges to supervise more closely the court-appointed receivers who oversee bankrupt or mismanaged businesses and property.
2001	During the legislative session, 30 news organizations assigned 52 journalists to regular coverage of the state Capitol.
2001	As of 2001, women accounted for approximately 22 percent of the members of the Legislature. And, 20 percent of New York lawmakers were black or Hispanic.
September 11, 2001	Terrorists attack the World Trade Center (WTC). After the attack, 2,000 National Guard members were assigned to provide security in the WTC area, around nuclear power plants, and other sites.
2001	After the New York City terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush created the Office of Homeland Security. Soon thereafter, Governor George E. Pataki created the Commission on Terrorism to assess the state’s ability to respond and prevent future attacks.
October 2001	Part of the decision against Microsoft is overturned on appeal. The U.S. Justice Department and Microsoft reach a settlement.
October 2001	Governor George E. Pataki established the Office of Public Security.
2003	The state will be required to make public extensive new information about its financial health, including estimates of the value of capital assets.

March 20, 2003	The United States invaded Iraq. Governor George Pataki supported President George W. Bush on the war.
January 2004	The first college of nanotechnology in the nation was created at SUNY-University at Albany to complement the Albany Center of Excellence in Nanoelectronics.
2004	The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, published a report declaring New York State Legislature “the most dysfunctional” in the country. The report spurred a wave of governmental reforms.
December 2004	The New York State Legislature overrode a gubernatorial veto and enacted the Empire State Wage Act of 2004, which substantially increased the State minimum wage over a period of twenty-five months, beginning January 1, 2005.
March 31, 2005	The New York State Legislature passed the state budget before the constitutionally mandatory April 1 deadline, for the first time in two decades.
2005	A constitutional amendment, shifting the budget-making power from the governor to the Legislature, was brought to the voters. The amendment, called Proposal One, was overwhelmingly defeated.
2006	Eliot Spitzer was elected governor of New York State.
November 28, 2006	The New York State Commission on Health Care Facilities for the XXI Century (also known as the Berger Commission), established by Governor Pataki, issued its final report recommending possible consolidation, closure, conversion or restructuring of hospitals and nursing homes and reallocation of local and state-wide resources.
December 22, 2006	New York State comptroller Alan Hevesi resigned his post after he pleaded guilty to defrauding the state for using state employees as chauffeurs and aides to his ailing wife.
January 1, 2007	Eliot Spitzer was inaugurated as New York’s 54th Governor. In his inaugural address, Governor Spitzer, keeping faith to his campaign promises, said: “Every policy, every action and every decision we make in this administration will further two overarching objectives: We must transform our government so that it is as ethical and wise as all of New York, and we must rebuild our economy so that it is ready to compete on the global stage in the next century.”

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