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The Interplay Between Retirement Plan Funding Policies, Contribution Volatility, and Funding Risk

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Introduction

- **Poor funded status of defined-benefit public pension plans**
 - Public pension assets: **\$3.7 trillion** (FRB)
 - Underfunded by approx. **\$1.95 trillion** (FRB/BEA) despite contribution increases.
- **Investment return volatility and funding risks**
 - Governments make contributions, in combination with investment income, to secure future benefit payments
 - Governments face great **uncertainty** in contributions, a big source of which is investment return volatility
 - Extra contributions are need to shore up the fund when returns fall short
- **Funding policies: Rules to determine contributions made by sponsoring governments**
 - Rules for how shortfalls are recognized and reflected in contributions
 - Statutory rules that override actuarially determined contributions


Introduction

- **Trade-off in the choice of funding policies**
 - Repaying shortfalls quickly:
 - Better benefit security for beneficiaries; less burden on future taxpayers
 - Large immediate increase in contributions → sharp temp. cut in budgets or tax increases
 - Repaying shortfalls over a long time:
 - Low near-term cost; cost stability
 - Greater risk of deep underfunding and burden for future taxpayers
- **This paper**
 - **Goal:** Evaluate and quantify risk of severe underfunding and of large increases in employer contributions (ERC) under different funding policies.
 - **Method:** stochastic simulation model
 - **Findings:**
 - Commonly used funding methods can exacerbate the risks of severe underfunding and of large increases in contributions by government employers.
 - No easy way out: de-risking almost certainly requires higher contributions.

Elements of funding policy


- **Discount rate:** Lower discount rate → higher estimate of liability and annual costs (example in paper: NC at 6% DR is ~ 2x NC at 8% DR)
 - **Amortization methods and periods:** How fast the unfunded liability is paid off
 - Closed or open
 - Level dollar or percent of payroll
 - Length of amortization period
 - **Asset smoothing:** How fast the investment gains/losses are recognized.
 - **Adjustments and overrides through caps, corridors, and statutory contribution rates**
 - Actuarially determined contributions are overridden by statutory rules in **50 percent** of the 110 large state-administered plans analyzed by a recent study over the 2001-2010 period.
-
- 57% of UAAL under “open” method (PPD, 2013)
- 72% of UAAL under “level pct” method (PPD, 2013)
- 2/3 of UAAL in plans with amort. period of 30 years or more;
Often paired with “open method” (PPD, 2013)

Open amortization pays down liabilities slowly. Open level percent: never fully paid.



Stochastic simulation method

Model structure and goals: Mimic the behavior of real-world plans and simulate alternative funding policies and return scenarios.



A prototypical fund that resembles real-world pension plans in important ways:

- Demographics, benefit structure, stable workforce
- Actuarially determined contributions are made (including 5% employee contribution; alternatively, can override ADC)
- 75% initial funded ratio

Stochastic simulation method

Assumptions on investment returns

- returns are independent year to year and follow normal distribution
- mean long-run compound return of 7.5% and standard deviation of 12%

Funding policies examined

| Amotization | Asset smoothing | Discount rate |
|---|-----------------|---------------|
| 15-year closed/open; level dollar/level percent | No | 7.5% |
| 30-year closed/open; level dollar/level percent | No | 7.5% |
| 30-year closed/open; level percent | 5-year | 7.5% |
| <i>SOA Blue Ribbon Panel's Standardized Contribution Benchmark:</i> | | |
| 15-year open; level percent | 5-year | 5.9%* |

* Long-run expected compound return is 7.5% as in other scenarios, even though the actuarial assumption is 5.9%.

Stochastic simulation method

How we evaluate risks

| Types of funding risk | Measures of risks: Probability that, anytime in 30 years, |
|--|---|
| Extremely low funded ratio | funded ratio will fall below 40% |
| Extremely high contributions | employer contribution will rise above 30% of payroll |
| Large increases in contributions in short periods of time | employer contribution will rise by more than 10% of payroll in a 5-year period |

There usually are trade-offs between these risks.


Results: Illustrative simulations

Employer contributions and funded ratio can be highly variable even if earnings assumption is met on average.


Three individual simulations, all with 7.5% compound annual returns

- **Deterministic run: constant returns**
- **Stochastic run : high returns in early years**
- **Stochastic run : low returns in early years**

Employer contribution rate




Funded ratio



Funding policy: 30-year level pct open with 5-year asset smoothing

Employer contribution: Median employer contribution rate

- Employer contributions in runs with **highly stretched-out** funding policies are **lower** in early years but **higher** in later years.




Employer contribution: Probability of high ERC / sharp increase in ERC


The **very stretched-out** policy of 30-year level percent amortization is attractive to employer:

- **Near-zero** chance of employer contribution rising above 30% of payroll
- **Very low** probability that contribution will rise above 10% in a 5-year period

Probability that employer contributions will rise above 30% of payroll during the first 30 years




Probability that employer contributions will rise by more than 10% of payroll in a 5-year period



Impact on funded ratio: Median funded ratio


- Plans with **more stretched-out** policy progress toward full funding **more slowly** than plans with less stretched-out policy
- Under the **very stretched-out** common policy, median funded ratio only rises to **87%** from 75% after 30 years.



Impact on Funded ratio: Probability of severe underfunding


The **very stretched-out** common policy of 30-year level pct open amortization with 5-year asset smoothing has a **far greater risk** of severe underfunding than other policies.

Probability that the funded ratio will fall below 40% during the first 30 years



What happens to the funded ratio if contributions are less than actuarially determined contributions?


- Model the consequences of a shortfall in paying the actuarially determined contribution by imposing a **cap on the employer contribution** as 20% of payroll.
- The effect of the contribution cap is **more prominent** when the plan faces **bad return** scenarios (25th percentile) and the contribution cap is therefore triggered more frequently.



The trade-off between contribution volatility and the risk of underfunding

- Contribution volatility: max increase in any 5-year period of employer contribution rate
- Risk of underfunding: Probability of funded ratio falling below 40% during first 30 years

Risk of severe underfunding and contribution volatility under selected funding policies




Key conclusions

- Common smoothing methods → great risk of underfunding. Ex: 75% funded plan using 30-year level-percent amortization & 5-year asset smoothing, & **employer makes full contributions**. After 30 years:
 - reaches only 85% funding even if it earns 7.5% **every** year
 - if expected return is correct but returns vary (12% SD), substantial risk of crisis -- 1:6 chance of falling below 40% funding in 30 year period
- Plans face **significant contribution volatility** despite smoothing policies, as a result of volatile investment earnings from risky assets.
- **Dampening contribution volatility** through smoothing methods comes at the expense of **greater risk** of severe underfunding and politically untenable contribution increases
- No easy way out. Plans can de-risk to reduce volatility. But that almost certainly will require lowering earnings assumptions, in turn requiring higher contributions, albeit more stable ones.

Appendix

Risk-free interest rate and earnings assumptions of public and private sector pension funds

Assumed investment returns of public and private retirement systems and risk-free returns



Sources:

State-local assumed return from Public Plans Database


Private assumed returns provided by Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers

10-Year Treasury yield from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED)

Summary results: How uncertainty changes over time

- The likely range around the funded ratio increases over time (under the assumption of serially independent returns)

Funded ratio quartiles with common funding policy
30-year level-percent open, 5-year asset smoothing
(Initial funded ratio of 75%)




Summary results:

Likelihood of achieving full funding

Likelihood of achieving full funding (95% or better) over 1000 simulations:


- High chances for SOA benchmark and 15-year level-dollar closed amortization
- Relatively low chances for 30-year level-pct amortization methods, especially open amortization.

Probability of 95% or better funding as of a given year
Under alternative funding policies
(Initial funded ratio of 75%)



Summary results: Alternative thresholds of low funding

Probability that the funded ratio will fall below a given threshold during the first 30 years under 30-year open level-percent funding, with 5-year asset smoothing



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